Moral Communities or a Market State: The Supreme Court's Vision of the Police Power in the Age of Globalization

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What has been called the "Central Tradition"\(^1\) of political philosophy has long taught that the "State" is a moral community—indeed, that this is the State's central and defining attribute. The Central Tradition has its roots in Greek political thought:\(^2\) As Aristotle wrote in *The Politics*,

[A] city must concern itself with goodness if it is to be truly... called a city.

... [A] community, where they only helped each other against wrongdoers as in a defensive alliance, and each man treated his own household like a city, would not even if they came together seem a city to accurate observers, if the manner of the association remained the same. ... [T]he city is not the sharing of a place, and does not exist to prevent wrong and promote exchange. These are necessary conditions of there being a city. But a city is not just the presence of all of them. It is the community of households and the clans in the good life, for the sake of perfect and self-sufficient life.\(^3\)

In contrast to the teaching that the State is directed to the perfection of life stands the powerful tradition of Liberalism—very roughly, the idea that the proper sphere of State action is limited by private right, and consists for the most part (to use Aristotle's words) in "prevent[ing] wrong and promot[ing] exchange."

Although the Liberal Tradition is dominant in American

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1. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, *MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY* 19–20 (1995) (remarking that the Central Tradition inspires politics to do more than make people "safe, comfortable, and prosperous, but also to help make them virtuous").

2. *Id.* at 21 ("No one deserves more credit (or blame) than Aristotle for shaping the central tradition's ideas about justice and political morality."). We do not, of course, deny that other central influences on Western political thought, such as Christianity, have seen the State as serving moral purposes. It must be remembered, however, that early pre-Constantinian Christianity taught that "the State, and the social order in general... constitute... a sinful, lost world... against a Church which alone can offer redemption," and that it instilled in Christian believers a "dualistic tendency" towards "on the one hand, acquiescence in the existing order; on the other, the sternest opposition to the State, which reveals its demonic origin in the worship of the Emperor, in the refusal to allow Christians to form their own associations, and in its cruel condemnation of the Christians." 1 ERNST TROELTSCH, *THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES* 145–46, 148 (Olive Wyon trans., 1949).


constitutionalism, the Central Tradition also holds an important place in it. American federalism, while severely limiting the power of the central government to create a moral community on a national scale, has also traditionally permitted States to regulate morality by the prevailing standards of the local community. Federalism, in other words, preserves a secure place for the Central Tradition even within an overarching constitutional framework dominated by Liberalism. The Constitution addresses, almost exclusively, either the powers that must be vested in the national government in order to enable it to pursue certain limited ends (national defense, the promotion of trans-border trade, and the like), or else the procedures for choosing the leadership of the national government or the bounds within which that leadership must act. The Constitution does not assign to the national government the responsibility for pursuing any substantive conception of the good; indeed, by implication, it denies the national government any significant responsibility for such projects. In the eighteenth-century context, the explicit constitutional prohibition in the First Amendment of a national establishment of religion—coupled with the implied, and intended, protection for state religious establishments—would have been emblematic of precisely this division of authority between the two different levels of government.

This understanding of federalism plainly reflects the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers. Thus, in demarcating State and federal spheres, Madison stated in The Federalist No. 45 that “[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to

5. For a classic study of the subject, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (1955).

6. See William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 66–67 (1964) (explaining how the States have traditionally regulated moral issues such as marriage and sexual behavior).

7. Another way to express this point is in terms of Michael Oakeshott’s illuminating distinction between the polity viewed as a “civil association,” or alternatively, as an “enterprise association.” Viewed as a civil association, a polity seeks primarily to maintain civil order, and does not attempt to impose or encourage any preferred pattern of ends. See Michael Oakeshott, Morality and Politics in Modern Europe: The Harvard Lectures 62 (Shirley Robin Letwin ed., 1993). Viewed as an enterprise association, the polity attempts to use law for substantive purposes, including the legislation of morality. See id. at 101–03. American federalism can be seen as a system creating a (primarily) civil association at the national level, but providing for and preserving enterprise associations at the subnational level.

8. See Riker, supra note 6, at 20–25.

all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."¹⁰ Indeed,
Madison's celebrated account in The Federalist No. 10 of the
risks of capture of State legislatures by tyrannical factions and of
the consequent need for an effective national government to
dissipate and localize these risks presupposes that the States
may and will legislate particularistic, and therefore polarizing,
conceptions of the good.¹¹ American federalism thus incorporates
and endorses the possibility of the enactment and enforcement of
morally normative legislation on the State (as contrasted with
the national) level.¹²

The judicial doctrine of the States' "police powers" has long
encapsulated this understanding of federalism.¹³ As explained in a
1900 U.S. Supreme Court case upholding a local ordinance banning
prostitutes from certain parts of a city, "[i]t has been often said that
the police power was not by the Federal Constitution transferred to
the nation, but was reserved to the States, and that upon them
rests the duty of so exercising it as to protect the public health and
morals."¹⁴ The breadth of the States' original police powers was also
underscored by the fact that the Court long construed the Bill of
Rights not to apply to the States,¹⁵ and by the patterns of
nineteenth- and early- to mid-twentieth-century state legislation
and case law.¹⁶ Even recent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed
the power of local governments to regulate with a view to their
citizens' good habits and moral well-being.¹⁷ Thus, reviewing the

¹⁰. The Federalist No. 45, at 260–61 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
(explaining the advantage promised by the Union to break and control the violence of
factions).
¹². Id. at 51 (noting the advantages of having the federal government deal with
a national aggregation of interests while preserving local decisions to the States).
¹³. L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 588–90, 596, 600 (1900).
¹⁴. Id. at 596.
(promulgating the understanding that the Constitution was established "by the People of
the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government
of the individual states"); see also Amar, supra note 9, at 144–45 (reiterating that the Bill
of Rights favored by the Anti-Federalists sought limits on the federal government to
protect States' rights).
¹⁶. See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in
America, 45 Hastings L.J. 1061, 1084–85 (1994) (surveying early legal practices and
relating the concept of the States' obligation to provide an institutional framework that
would foster the productive energies of society through the use of their police powers).
(1986) (upholding a territorial law that sought to reduce casino gambling among
residents); cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489–90, 513 (1996)
Although the liberal tradition has always denied that private morality is of any concern to government, the fact is that governments have invariably regulated such matters as marriage, sexual behavior, the use of stimulants, sacrilege, etc. In our tradition the states fully control these things, although the Supreme Court sometimes has become peripherally involved via the full faith and credit clause (Article IV, Section 1). In exceptional circumstances the United States has indirectly controlled (e.g., by refusing to admit Utah as a state until it prohibited polygamy and by prohibiting the interstate transport of women for prostitution).

The traditional role of the States as moral communities has, however, been called into question as a result of the perceived demands of globalization. The concept of globalization has acquired several different meanings, and has been used to refer to a complex and imperfectly understood phenomenon that works on several planes. Regardless of whatever else "globalization" may signify, however, it includes a constitutional dimension. That constitutional dimension has recently been explored in innovative and illuminating ways by Philip Bobbitt. Contrary to analysts who perceive a global trend towards the sheer disappearance of the "Nation State," Bobbitt sees a transition from the constitutional order of the Nation State to that of an emerging "Market State." For Bobbitt, "[t]he market-state is,
above all, a mechanism for enhancing opportunity, for creating something—possibilities—commensurate with our imaginations.\textsuperscript{23} The emergence of the Market State entails sweeping consequences for the relationships between governments—whether national or subnational—and their citizens, as well as for the relationships between rival Market States themselves.\textsuperscript{24} In the context of American constitutionalism, the emergence of the Market State has been taken to necessitate fundamental changes in conceptions of federalism and, relatedly, of individual liberties.\textsuperscript{25}

We agree with Bobbitt that a global transition from Nation States to Market States is now well underway. The chief thesis of this Article is that the Supreme Court has embarked on a program of reshaping constitutional doctrine so as to encourage and facilitate the emergence of a fully developed Market State in this polity, with a view to positioning the United States to be successful in meeting the competitive challenges of a new, post-Cold War international order. In taking this course, the Court has increasingly aligned itself with the prescriptive views of American business and political élites, for whom globalization is understood "not merely [as] a diagnostic tool but also [as] an action program."\textsuperscript{26} From this perspective, globalization "represents a great virtue: the transcendence of the traditional restrictions on worldwide economic activity . . . inherent" in the era of Nation States.\textsuperscript{27} Proponents of this vision of a globalized economy characterize the United States as "a giant corporation locked in a fierce competitive struggle with other nations for economic survival," so that "the central task of the federal government" is "to increase the international competitiveness of the American economy."\textsuperscript{28}

Whether or not the Court's membership is fully conscious of its role in underwriting this program does not ultimately matter.\textsuperscript{29} It is sufficient if our explanation works merely as a
heuristic device—a reconstruction of how the Court would reason if it were perfectly lucid and candid about the results it sought to achieve. However self-aware the Court or its individual members may be about the nature of this enterprise, the effect of the Court's jurisprudence is to uproot historic premises of American constitutional law. The Court's program might even be considered revolutionary, insofar as it represents a tectonic shift from one kind of constitutional order—the Nation State—to another—the Market State.

The effects of the Court's activities are most visible in the areas of federalism and the protection of individual liberties. In both doctrinal areas, the Court no longer starts from premises that once were axiomatic understandings of the scope and limits of State power. In order to meet the perceived needs of the emerging Market State, the Court has called into question the historic authority of States, under the police power, to advance self-consciously moral, avowedly nonutilitarian, goals. To put the matter in somewhat Darwinian terms, the Court has registered changes in the international environment that would reward certain adaptations in constitutional doctrine, including new kinds of relationships between the individual and the polity at large. In response to this changed environment, the Court has attempted to work these new relationships into the fabric of constitutional law. In particular, to serve what it understands to be the needs of the emerging Market State, the Court has set out to eviscerate the traditional role of the States as moral communities.

OVERVIEW

In essence, this Article attempts to explain the underlying logic of two intersecting lines of recent Supreme Court decisions. The first line of cases concerns the allocation of constitutional power between the Nation and the States (i.e., cases about


30. There is nothing particularly novel in this method of legal analysis. Scholars have often sought to derive the Supreme Court's decisions from higher-order premises unarticulated by the Court. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 488–89 (2002) (attempting to ground the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence in a Tocquevillian theory of governance). Indeed, what we are attempting here is nothing more than an application of the hypothetico-deductive method common in both the natural and social sciences: positing a hypothesis to explain the data, deriving consequences from the hypothesis, and checking the data to see if it matches the predicted consequences. See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 617–18 (1988) (explaining the hypothetico-deductive method).
"federalism"); the other line concerns claims of individual rights against exercises of purported State power (i.e., cases about "individual rights"). The federalism cases deal, respectively, with the powers of the States against Congress in the regulation of domestic matters and as against the Executive (and, less often, Congress) in influencing foreign affairs. The individual rights cases deal with equal access to State-provided benefits that take account of race and with State regulation of private decisionmaking under the auspices of police power. Both lines of cases can be understood as efforts by the Supreme Court to adapt the American constitutional order to what it perceives as the necessities of globalization, and specifically to the successful transition from the constitutional order of the Nation State to that of the Market State.

The concepts of Nation State and Market State require a brief elucidation. The Nation State is a form of constitutional order that took hold in the nineteenth century and dominated


33. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted interest in diversity).

most of the twentieth century. The idea of the Nation State assumed that the population of a State would consist primarily, if not solely, of a particular "people"—understood in terms of common historical consciousness and remembered (or imagined) collective past, ethnicity, language, and possibly even religion.

In Bobbitt's view, the Nation State's chief functions were to ensure internal and external security, to expand material wealth, to uphold civil and political rights of popular sovereignty, to provide its people with economic security and a variety of public goods, and to protect the State's cultural integrity. To simplify Bobbitt's complex and subtle thesis, the Nation State can no longer perform these functions successfully, and a new constitutional order—which Bobbitt styles as the Market State—must supplant it.

Unlike the Nation State, the Market State is primarily a facilitator of opportunities rather than a guarantor of outcomes. The Market State does not aim to promote the "welfare" of the citizen body or national people, but rather to enlarge the array of opportunities open to them. Accordingly, many of the Nation

35. Movsesian, supra note 21, at 1084–86.
36. Benedict Anderson has famously (and sympathetically) described Nation States as "imagined communities." See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 5–7 (rev. ed. 1991) (defining the nation as "an imagined political community").
37. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 215–16.
38. For a summary of Bobbitt's argument, see infra text accompanying note 118.
39. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 228.
40. Id. at 229–30.
41. Id. In the Market State the distinction between citizen and noncitizen, which is fundamental to the Nation State, becomes blurred. The contrast between the traditional and more recent conception of the meaning of national citizenship is evident in the various opinions in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), a case discussing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to an alien apprehended in a foreign country and then transported to the United States for arrest. Compare id. at 265–66 ("[T]he purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States territory."), with id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[A]liens who are lawfully present in the United States are among those 'people' who are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights"). and id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them."). A similar tendency to devalue U.S. citizenship, as opposed to alienage, can be seen at work in the plurality opinion of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), despite the opinion's assertion that it does not mean to "give short shrift . . . to the privilege that is American citizenship." Id. at 2648. The Hamdi plurality incongruously models a citizen's right to seek liberty from captivity as an enemy combatant on a claimant's right to seek Social Security benefits—a model that could arguably be applied to aliens. Id. at 2646 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as providing the relevant test). Justices Scalia and Stevens, dissenting, would have placed the rights of citizen and alien detainees on wholly different footings, and argued
State’s functions relating to the provision of welfare are delegated or privatized by the Market State. For example, deficiencies in the provision of social services, such as health care or prison planning, are addressed through incentives directed towards privatization or piecemeal private sector supplements, rather than through redistributive programs. The Market State is generally reluctant or even unable to manage economic matters through democratically elected political bodies. It tends to cede control over monetary policy to central banks and control over exchange rates to the vagaries of currency markets. Culturally, the Market State shies away from the idea of a dominant or favored ethnicity, common substantive values and traditions, or a shared way of life. "[T]he market-state is largely indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that matter to any particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an impediment to economic competition. . . . The sense of a single polity, held together by adherence to fundamental values, is not a sense that is cultivated by the market-state." The Market State does not even require its citizens to respect the most central integrating symbols of the Nation State, such as the Nation’s flag.

How is the transition from the Nation State paradigm to that of the Market State reflected in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence? Assuming—again, if only as a heuristic device—that the Supreme Court wishes to facilitate that transition, what considerations would guide the Court’s thinking in federalism cases? In individual rights cases? In outline, we think the answers are the following.

In the area of federalism, the emergence of the Market State, with its strong decentralizing tendencies, would seem at first to favor a robust form of federalism. After all, strong pro-federalism policies enable and encourage individual States to

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42. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 240–42.
43. Id. at 238–40 (explaining the Market State’s influence and even attraction in precisely tying a candidate’s ability to support campaigns through fundraising with the interests judged to be important to them).
44. Id. at 229.
45. Id. at 230.
46. Id.
47. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315–19 (1990) (concluding that the First Amendment protects flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989) (noting that while the U.S. flag serves “as a symbol of nationhood and national unity,” a conviction for “desecrating a flag” is not “consistent with the First Amendment”).
48. See BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 234.
exploit their competitive advantages to the presumed good of the greater whole. Pro-federalism policies will stimulate States to find the mix of regulatory policy, taxation levels, crime control, environmental protection, educational services, and welfare benefits that will attract investment capital and draw entrepreneurial elements of the population into the jurisdiction. Indeed, one might even expect to find that the jurisprudence of the Market State invited States to take an untraditionally assertive role in foreign affairs by becoming active members of an international civil society that included other subnational or transnational actors—such as nongovernmental organizations.

In other words, one might have expected to find in the Court’s cases a new federalism, not only in domestic affairs, but also in foreign affairs.

Both kinds of new federalism, however, have encountered sharp reversals in the Supreme Court’s decisions. In particular, the Court has, at least for now, firmly nipped any budding federalism in foreign affairs. Yet these reversals are consistent with the hypothesis that the Court is undertaking a program of midwifing the birth of the Market State. Under the Court’s developing rationale, if the States were permitted to play a significant role in foreign affairs, they would be too prone to introduce (what are deprecatingly called) “moralisms” that would tend to thwart the emergence of a Market State, i.e., the States


50. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 236.

51. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority includes power to prohibit local cultivation and use of controlled substance in compliance with State “medical marijuana” law).

52. For a time, it had seemed to several legal writers that the post-Cold War decline of national sovereignty might favor a more robust role for subnational units, such as the States, in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water’s Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 57–59 (2001); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1223–27 (1999) (observing that while “courts have slapped down state activity that poses even the potential to complicate the nation’s foreign relations,” post-Cold War international society has changed to include both Nation States and subnational governments, which accordingly challenges the need for such “federal exclusivity”).
would adopt policies that inhibit the cross-border flow of trade and alter the free workings of capital markets by subjecting them to moral norms and judgments. In the Court's view, the "appropriate" role for the States in a globalized economy precludes any such moral role.

The doctrinal trend described above is evident in *American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi*, in which the Court relied on a sweeping view of the President's preemptive powers to invalidate an effort by California to advance the moral interest of uncovering evidence of foreign corporate involvement in the Holocaust. In *Garamendi*, the Court's majority tilted in favor of federal policy, not only because the federal interest in an international process for addressing the issue of Holocaust insurance claims was implicated, but also because it found that no significant State interest was involved. The case is not fully explicable, therefore, as a restatement of the common view that the federal government has the exclusive role, or at least the lead role, in managing the Nation's foreign affairs; it also required the Court to discount the State's traditional role as a regulator of insurance when the State's exercise of that authority impaired relations with foreign insurers and reflected a judgment on the morality of their conduct. The Court's decision to bar the State from regulating in this manner was based on the doctrinally

53. See Delahunty, *supra* note 52, at 58 (suggesting that emergent conceptions of national sovereignty may authorize States to step forward to vindicate human rights).

54. Thus, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, opined that although California's attempt to ensure corporate truthfulness in describing the conditions of workers at foreign facilities was a "legitimate, traditional, and important public objective[" for a State, nonetheless "a private 'false advertising' action brought on behalf of the State, by one who has suffered no injury, threatens to impose a serious burden upon speech." *Nike*, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer subsequently reiterated and defended his Nike views at a speech at Harvard University. See Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Speech at the Harvard University Tanner Lectures on Human Values 2004-2005: Our Democratic Constitution 14 (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_11-17-04.html (preliminary draft).


56. *See id.* at 2379; Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, *American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs*, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 924 (2004) (calling the Court's opinion an endorsement of "the entirely novel concept that presidential policy, unaided by explicit or implicit congressional authorization, possesses the quality of a legislative act, at least to the extent of displacing state law").


questionable and unexamined assumption that mere executive agreements based on the President's asserted Article II powers can trump state law, even in the absence of action by Congress.\(^6\)

Given that Congress functions—and was designed to function—as a forum for articulating and defending the concerns of the States,\(^6\) _Garamendi_ struck a double blow against strong readings of federalism: first by denying the weight and legitimacy of the State's interest in subjecting foreign corporations operating locally to the moral views of its citizens,\(^6\) and again by depriving the State of the procedural protections it would enjoy at the national level if unilateral executive action were held insufficient to supersede State law.\(^6\)

The Court's position on federalism in domestic affairs is more complicated, although even here the most recent cases represent a marked retreat from the Court's earlier protectiveness towards the States.\(^6\) Cases such as _United States v. Lopez\(^5\)_ and _United States v. Morrison\(^6\)_ can be understood from our perspective as efforts to preserve an area of noneconomic activity for (primarily) State rather than federal regulation. Noneconomic action, as _Lopez_ and _Morrison_ understand it, appears to comprehend a large and important category of activity, including, specifically, the regulation of most violent

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60. _Id._ at 2386–88, 2394. Even before _Garamendi_, the Court's assumptions and, more generally, its views of the relation between executive foreign-affairs power and the States had been subjected to withering criticisms by legal scholars. _See, e.g._, Jack L. Goldsmith, _Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism_, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622–24 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, _The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism_, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 403–29 (1999). _But see_ Carlos Manuel Vázquez, _W(h)ither Zschernig?_, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1304–23 (2001) (arguing that the concerns raised by critics "do not justify the doctrine's abandonment"). The _Garamendi_ Court displayed little or no awareness of these criticisms.

61. _See_ Garcia _v._ San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–52 (1985) ("[T]he Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power. The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent even today in the course of federal legislation.").

62. _Garamendi_, 123 S. Ct. at 2379, 2383 (overturning the California law extending the statute of limitations "to allow state residents to sue in State court on insurance claims based on acts perpetrated" during the Holocaust).

63. _Id._ at 2390 (reaffirming the "Executive's responsibility for foreign affairs" because of the potentially sensitive nature of dealing with foreign governments).

64. _See, e.g._, Gonzales _v._ Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to ban the growth and use of marijuana even when such activities are legal according to State "medical marijuana" laws).


crimes and the provision of most education for the young. These, of course, are core areas in which any public morality operates. Beyond those immediate objectives, the Lopez and Morrison decisions also aimed to limit the power of the federal government to reach "marriage, divorce, and child custody." At stake in these cases was the power of the States to function as genuine moral communities that reflected local choices and values in such sensitive areas. Preserving the Central Tradition's conception of the States as moral communities happened to dovetail, in these cases, with the quite distinct Market State conception of the States, insofar as the latter envisages that the States will have considerable discretion to devise local mixes of criminal law and educational policy. But the Central Tradition's conception of the States as moral communities is ultimately antagonistic to the Market State's jurisprudence of federalism—as, perhaps, the razor-thin majorities in Lopez and Morrison indicated. The latent divergence between the two conceptions of the States has become ever more apparent in the Court's individual rights and equal protection cases.

67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564–67 (refusing to "pile inference upon inference in a manner that would . . . convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States"); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (protecting "areas of traditional state regulation" by rejecting "the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic . . . conduct based solely on the conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce").

68. See Raich, 125 S. Ct at 2195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The States' core police powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.").

69. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615–16.

70. As Justice Souter argued in his Morrison dissent, the majority had a "new animating theory" that "serv[ed] a conception of federalism. It is the instrument by which assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of preserving a supposedly discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual States see fit." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644–45 (Souter, J., dissenting).

71. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550 (5-4 decision); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600 (5-4 decision); BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 228–42; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 20 (defending the perfectionism of the Central Tradition's goal of promoting "morally upright and valuable lives").

72. Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (rejecting analogizing U.S. federalism to European subsidiarity), with id. at 976–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that U.S. federalism should learn from European subsidiarity principles, which focus on the effective, efficient cooperation of the European Union and its member States and, accordingly, do not find objectionable executive and legislative commandeering).

73. For a different view of the relationships between the Court's equal protection jurisprudence and its federalism cases, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When
An early warning signal of the divergence came in the 1996 *Romer v. Evans* case, which invalidated, on equal protection grounds, an amendment to a State constitution that prohibited the State and its localities from adopting antidiscrimination laws in favor of homosexuals.\(^{74}\) *Romer*’s author, Justice Kennedy, had been part of the *Lopez-Morrison* majorities, as was Justice O’Connor, who joined the *Romer* opinion.\(^{75}\) The *Romer* dissenters—Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist—had also been members of the *Lopez-Morrison* majorities, and sturdily defended in *Romer* the right of “the majority of [a State’s] citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality statewide.”\(^{76}\) More subtly, the Court’s decisions in *Boy Scouts of America v. Dale*\(^{77}\) and *Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston*\(^{78}\) signaled that the Court—including Justices in the *Lopez-Morrison* majorities—was implicitly repudiating the concept that the States could condemn certain conduct on moral grounds in the name of the polity as a whole.\(^{79}\) Strikingly in those two cases, the matter at issue was the validity of antidiscrimination measures designed to protect homosexuals, and on both occasions the Court invalidated the

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\(^{74}\) *It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption*, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s preemption decisions reflect the Court’s deregulatory bias in favor of business interests as well as its hostility to civil rights laws). On the contrary, this Article finds an underlying pro-Market State bias at work in both types of preemption cases that Chemerinsky contrasts.

\(^{75}\) *Id.* at 620, 635–36 (1996).

\(^{76}\) *Id.* at 621; *Lopez*, 514 U.S. at 550; *Morrison*, 529 U.S. at 600.

\(^{77}\) *Romer*, 517 U.S. at 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Provocatively, Justice Scalia wrote the following:

> The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The [State] constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a “bare... desire to harm” homosexuals... but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.

\(^{78}\) *Id.* at 636. In speaking of a Kulturkampf, Justice Scalia is alluding to German Chancellor Bismarck’s “ultimately counter-productive effort to prevent the emergence of an independent political force committed to social justice by subjecting Prussia’s Catholic Church to state control.” JAMES JOLL, EUROPE SINCE 1870: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 7 (1973).

\(^{79}\) *See Dale*, 530 U.S. at 660 (“Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained greater social acceptance. But this is scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these views.” (internal citation omitted)); *Hurley*, 515 U.S. at 660 (“While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightening either purpose may strike the government.”).
antidiscrimination rules on the basis of their infringement on First Amendment associational freedoms. Although the resemblance to Romer may not be immediately apparent, the underlying affinities of all three cases are deep and substantial: The Court refused to permit the States to enforce a collective moral judgment regarding homosexuality, whether to allow or to disallow discrimination against it. In effect, the Court was enjoining on the States a wholly neutral, nonmoral role. Even rules prohibiting private discrimination—which might be taken for canonical expressions of collective moral judgments—were impermissible in this area. As will become apparent when we consider Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court's hostility towards morally-based State action has become so intense that it prefers to regard even antidiscrimination norms as instrumental rules rather than as moral judgments.

The conceptual underpinning of the Romer, Dale and Hurley cases—that the States are severely limited in their ability to enforce the collective moral judgments of the political community—is also central to the Court's other recent case law on the subject of individual rights, including Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas. What is often overlooked, however, is the remarkable inner coherence of the position of some Justices that, on the one hand, rejects strong federalism in favor of claims for national and executive power and, on the other hand, upholds claims of the individual to be free from moral regulation in the private sphere.

81. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 ("Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."); Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 (holding that the Boy Scouts could exclude homosexuals and reasoning that "public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept members"); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 578 (allowing organizers of a private parade to exclude a homosexual group despite protective legislation meant to "prevent any denial of access to (or discriminatory treatment in) public accommodations on proscribed grounds, including sexual orientation").
87. Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644 (2000) (Souter, J., with whom Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, dissenting) (rejecting the Court's reliance on the "theory of traditional state concern" as a limiting principle for the plenary
This Article attempts to explore, with special reference to Philip Bobbitt's work, the relationship between international politics and constitutional law. Part I sets out a view of the relationship between these two domains, demonstrating how developments in international society and the international political system can influence the reasoning of the Supreme Court. Part I begins by discussing the international environment created by globalization—an environment to which the traditional functions and constitutional premises of the Nation State appear badly adapted. These premises are described and then contrasted with those found suitable to the emerging Market State. Part I then examines the role of the Supreme Court in smoothing the transition from the constitutional order of the Nation State to that of the Market State, and considers the jurisprudence of legal pragmatism, which enables the Court to play the role that it desires here. Part I concludes by examining earlier phases of the Court's history in which it has engineered fundamental constitutional change with a view to the international environment and the United States' competitive position within it.

Part II explains the Supreme Court's traditional doctrine concerning the sources and limits of the States' police powers, as well as the relation of those powers to the elements of American constitutional law that protect basic liberties. Part II begins by demonstrating that established—and, indeed, recent—Supreme Court precedent has treated the legislative codification of community morality as a part of the police powers, and follows with a survey of the Court's cases on the States' police powers—including Commerce Clause, Privileges or Immunities Clause, and substantive due process decisions. The historical survey demonstrates that the Court's recent holdings, which strip the States of their power to create and sustain moral communities, are clearly contrary to the Court's own consistent teachings.

Part III explains how the premises of the traditional doctrine have been uprooted though developments culminating in recent decisions. Part III locates the ruling premise of several major recent substantive due process decisions in the Court's belief in a doctrine of radical autonomy: that the meaning of life is for the individual alone to determine, in light of his or her attitudes towards the suffering and joys incident to life. This ruling

national commerce power), with Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (Kennedy, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined) (holding that the petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government").
premise is understood to entail that the States may not attempt to regulate and direct the individual's pursuit of pleasure or avoidance of pain, at least in sexual activity, unless that conduct causes direct and tangible harm to another "person" (in a specifically constitutional sense of personhood). Rooted in cases such as the joint opinion of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter in *Casey*, this doctrine serves as the master premise of the Court's later decision in *Lawrence*. *Casey* and *Lawrence*, taken together, represent decisive moves in restructuring American federalism by contracting the authority of the States to express and enforce traditional, commonly held moral judgments. Because they represent such a radical breach with the Court's own precedents, the legal justification of these decisions is problematic. This Article views the Court as, in pragmatic fashion, appealing to and relying on elite opinion to support its constitutional innovations.

Part IV argues that the *Garamendi* opinion further illustrates the developments described in Part III and evidences their extension to foreign-relations federalism. It is argued that there is a direct link between (on the one hand) the Court's view in its substantive due process and equal protection cases that the States have no legitimate interest in enacting communitarian moral judgments and (on the other hand) the Court's holding in *Garamendi* that the State had little or no interest in securing restitutionary justice for Holocaust survivors and their descendants from foreign corporations. Part IV contends that *Garamendi* posited an unprecedented and dubious view of the President's power to preempt State law, and thus reached a conclusion hostile both to "human rights internationalism" and to the recognition of any role for the States in promoting moral causes in foreign affairs. Moreover, we argue that *Garamendi* should not be seen as a "sport": Its view that State regulatory power should be directed primarily to economic ends rather than to moral ones is also reflected in a dissenting opinion signed by two key "centrist" Justices—Justice O'Connor and Justice Breyer—in the *Nike* case. Deferring to elite foreign opinion, the *Garamendi* Court thus eviscerates still further the conception of the States as moral communities. Both in domestic and foreign affairs, therefore, the States are—in the Court's current view—

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89. *Nike*, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that "legal and practical checks... tend to keep the energies of public enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic harm").
largely destitute of power to legislate moral opinion. Confining the States to largely instrumentalist, efficiency-promoting tasks, however, also deepens and entrenches the constitutionalization of the Market State.

Part V closes with some reflections on the likelihood that the Court's project, as envisaged, will be successful. Fittingly enough, the final judgment on a pragmatic judiciary is whether its constitutional responses to the Nation's strategic environment will, in the end, be pragmatically justified.

I. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Globalization and Constitutional Law

Globalization has been variously characterized either as the ruling ideology of American hegemony in international politics or as a necessary response to technological change. Neither of these stark views seems correct: Globalization forces the United States' polity, economy, and culture into accommodations with those of other nations, rather than merely exporting American models elsewhere; and technological change interacts with, and may be modified or arrested by, ideational causes in producing political, economic, or cultural outcomes. Philip Bobbitt comes closer to the truth by arguing that American constitutional law is shaped, not only by the technological requirements for success in the international environment, but also by the perceived principles of legitimacy in the international system.

In his panoramic vision of the history of States, Bobbitt argues that the current international system of Nation States is yielding to a new international order, centered on what he terms the Market State. Bobbitt contends that the rise of the Market State is based on the demise of the Nation State. Epochal struggles for supremacy took place throughout most of the


91. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 2004) (arguing that ideational factors as well as material changes entered into the emergence of early modern capitalism).

92. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 228.

93. Id.

94. Id.
twentieth century among the fascist, communist, and liberal-capitalist versions of the Nation State. In this competition, the liberal-capitalist models, represented by the United States and post-war Europe and Japan, emerged triumphant primarily because they did a better job than their fascist and communist rivals of harnessing the technological revolutions in nuclear weapons, information, and communications. The very triumph of the liberal-capitalist version of the Nation State has, however, through what Hegel would have called the "cunning of Reason," begun to undermine the premises of the traditional Nation State. This evolutionary process is ushering in a new domestic constitutional order that requires a new basis for legitimacy and, correlative, a new international legal and political order. These developments have, in turn, given rise to a period of renewed international struggle, in which three competing versions of the Market State—a highly entrepreneurial model represented by the United States, a strongly managerial model represented by Europe, and a decidedly mercantilist model exemplified in Japan—will contend for supremacy in ways that will resemble the Market State's emergence from the epochal wars of the Nation State and that will force and reward major technological and strategic innovations.

As the technological creativity of the liberal-capitalist Nation State provided for its triumph in the wars against fascism and communism by liberating individuals to pursue excellence and invention, so too will the next set of epochal wars produce the distinctive strategic, economic, and cultural attributes that will characterize the successful States of the future.

95. See id. 34-64 (describing the European political struggles of the early twentieth century).
96. Id. at 215-28.
97. See Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, Hegel's Philosophy of History 138-40 (1974) (noting that "the cunning of Reason acknowledges the importance of the unintended consequences of intentional human action" and that usually "these consequences can be viewed teleologically as furthering man's freedom").
98. Bobbitt, supra note 22, at 213.
99. See id. at 258-64 (discussing America's nationalist and internationalist models and the balance of international power in the "New Realism").
100. See id. at 667-76 (outlining how "[t]he new orthodoxy of the market-state will ... play out in several competing formulations"). It seems a likely defect in Bobbitt's scenario that he does not consider the emergence of China and India as competitors potentially on the level of the United States, Europe, or Japan. For a corrective vision, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 218-19 (1996) (commenting on the effect of Asia's economic development and growing self-confidence on international politics).
Bobbitt outlines the domestic constitutional arrangements that he believes will be instituted as the logic of the Market State progressively displaces that of the Nation State. In brief, Bobbitt sees the central move in the transition from the Nation State to the Market State as the abandonment of the State's responsibility for securing the welfare of the community as the basis for State legitimacy. Responsibility for welfare promotion will be replaced by the responsibility for promoting the opportunities of the State's individual citizens. Accordingly, this Part will first describe the traditional constitutional characteristics of the Nation State; second, identify the contrasting features of the Market State; and third, summarize the innovations which apparently best adapt the American Constitution to the requirements of the emergent Market State.

B. The Constitutional Premises of the Nation State

According to Bobbitt, the Nation State "defines itself by its axiomatic linkage to a people and its portrayal as their benefactor." Bobbitt locates the emergence of the Nation State's constitutional order in the transformation of the American Civil War. Building on the example of French revolutionary armies, Bobbitt contends that Lincoln's great strategic achievement was inventing "total war." Waging total war required mass mobilization that could be sustained only by a constitutional order purporting to represent a Nation of citizens—a single

102. See id. at 214–34 (explaining that the State's shifting focus from the population's welfare as a whole to maximizing individual choice requires governmental restraint).
103. Id. at 228–30.
104. Id. at 208.
105. Id. at 215–16 (stating that the Nation State's characteristic of waging "total war" can be seen in the American Civil War).
106. Id. at 203.
107. Id. at 216 (noting that the strategy of total war involves mobilizing all the "resources of the society in pursuit of its political goals"). Although a proposal for conscription into the federal army had been mooted in the War of 1812, see The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 384–85 (1918) (noting that "[p]lease came before the bill was enacted"), the first federal statute imposing conscription was the Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731. See The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 386–87 (stating that the Act applied to "all the citizens of the United States" and made "every male citizen of the United States between the ages of twenty and forty-five... subject... to be called by compulsory draft to service in a national army"). As the Court noted, the compulsory mobilization of the citizenry for military service was followed soon after by the Fourteenth Amendment's transformation of the character of American citizenship from State-based to predominantly national. Id. at 377; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
108. The post-Civil War period explored the possibility of constitutionalizing the concept of national citizenship—an innovation that was ripe with possibilities to work basic changes between the individual and the local States—until that possibility was
people composed by a multi-ethnic American republic. Justice Holmes, himself a Civil War veteran, explained that “it has taken a century and has cost the] successors [of the Founding generation] much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.” In Germany, Bismarck’s key strategic innovation, the introduction of compulsory social insurance, was equally significant for the emergence of the Nation State’s constitutional order. The military and economic innovations made possible by the Nation State caused it to become the dominant form of State into the next century.

The Nation State, so viewed, represents a bargain between the State and its people: On the one side, there is the people’s commitment to upholding the State by the willing sacrifice of wealth, liberty, and even life; on the other, there is a reciprocal pledge by the State to provide for the people’s welfare. In America, the Nation State’s commitment to the welfare of the community prescribed a set of principles that ultimately shaped post-New Deal constitutional change. Chief among these principles was the recognition of the Nation State’s authority, not only to provide public goods and to correct market failures, but also to pursue certain collective moral goals—such as wealth redistribution, a social safety net, and eventually racial equality—through significant regulation of private

largely extinguished by the Supreme Court. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 35–45 (1975) (discussing how the Supreme Court limited the concept of national citizenship by its narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)).

109. In its multi-ethnic character, the American Nation State has been and remains strikingly different from the racially-based European and Japanese versions of the Nation State; indeed, this feature of the American Nation State may arguably give it a persisting competitive advantage over those nations. But see PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000, at 523–25 (1987) (arguing that the multitude of interests competing within the American polity creates certain liabilities not shared by its competitors).


111. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 203–04.

112. The Court in The Selective Draft Law Cases assumed such a bargain when it argued that “the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to compel it.” 245 U.S. at 378. That bargain seems to have dissolved on both sides. As Sir Michael Howard has noted, while “an individual commitment, however notional, to dying for one’s country” was characteristic of the Nation State’s heyday, “by the end of the twentieth century death was no longer seen as being part of the social contract.” MICHAEL HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 99–100 (2000).

113. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 214–18.

114. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1964) (affirming Congress’s power to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations and citing earlier precedent concerning congressional regulation of morally objectionable
contracting[116] and regulation of the use of private property.[116] In subordinating private liberty to the needs of the community, the New Deal Supreme Court proclaimed that "regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process."[117]

Bobbitt argues persuasively that the constitutional order of the Nation State is no longer tenable. Bobbitt explains that, viewed from the angle of the Nation State's post-Cold War defaults,

[N]o nation-state can assure its citizens safety from weapons of mass destruction; no nation-state can, by obeying its own national laws (including its international treaties) be assured that its leaders will not be arraigned as criminals or its behavior be used as a legal justification for international coercion; no nation-state can effectively control its own economic life or its own currency; no nation-state can protect its culture and way of life from the depiction and presentation of images and ideas, however foreign or offensive; no nation-state can protect its society from transnational perils, such as ozone depletion, global warming, and infectious epidemics. And yet guaranteeing national security, civil peace through law, economic development and stability, international tranquility and equality, were the principal tasks of the nation-state.[118]

Further, the financial burdens of a commitment to the "ever-improving welfare of its citizens"—aggravated in the West by demographic considerations and, perhaps, by growing difficulties in extracting taxes—is one of the reasons why the contemporary Nation State appears to be defaulting on its side of the bargain.[119]
Bobbitt wrote, before September 11, 2001, that the very nature of the Nation State now debars it from performing its vital function of providing "internal security against crime and terrorism." This critical failure is, he believes, "a consequence of the national character of nation-states, which isolates and alienates substantial minorities of their citizens even to the point of defining some criminal behavior in essential ethnic ways." Bobbitt adds that

[t]he ethnic focus of the nation-state, its pervasive analogy to the family, creates a role for antisocial elements, "misfits," that is connected to violence because violence is the currency of the state. In every society there are such people, and such groups; in the nation-state they become the enemy of the State (and vice versa), because the State itself is fused to a national conception of the culture.

needs and consequently the citizens turn away from it and search for alternative[s]).

120. BOBBIrIT, supra note 22, at 219.

121. Id.

122. Id. Other writers have pointed out the difficulties that European societies in particular have experienced in assimilating and integrating their large Islamic populations. These commentators have noted that even apparently fully assimilated second- and third-generation Muslims often feel little identification with the surrounding polity. See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 100, at 264–65 (offering reasons why Muslim minorities may be harder to assimilate—both in Europe and non-Western cultures—than other religious minorities or ethnic groups); GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE WEST 241–87 (Pascale Ghazaleh trans., 2004) (commenting on terrorism in Europe and the battle over Islam); OLIVIER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 143–46, 315–17 (2004) (describing the "general pattern of radicalisation [sic] in Europe" and its relationship to the Muslim youth culture). Indeed, young European-born Muslims are proving to be willing recruits to jihad with alarming frequency. The bombing of commuter trains in Madrid in March, 2004—an incident that left 191 dead and more than 1800 wounded—was allegedly caused by men "raised and schooled in Spain." David Crawford & Keith Johnson, EU's New Threat: Radicals With Passports: Local Islamic Youth Join Jihad, Posing Big Challenge for Security Officials There, ASIAN WALL ST. J. (Hong Kong), Dec. 29, 2004, at A8; see also KEPEL, supra, at 241–48; Renwick McLean, Bombings in Spain Are Seen as a Sign of Basque Group's Decline, Not Strength, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A16 (reporting the number wounded). Spanish police "arrested more than 70 suspected Islamic terrorists [in 2004]—most of whom [had been] legally registered as long-term residents." Crawford & Johnson, supra. In November 2004, a prominent Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, was assassinated, allegedly by Mohammed Bouyeri, a twenty-six year old Dutch Muslim. Bouyeri, the child of Moroccan immigrants to Holland, grew up in a suburb of Amsterdam, had written pieces celebrating mutual tolerance and respect, and was a former community organizer who "worked passionately to channel the frustrations of young Muslims like himself into positive programs" not long before his conversion to radical Islam. Glenn Frankel, From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist: Suspect in Killing of Dutch Director Was Radicalized, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2004, at A1. The mayor of Amsterdam, Job Cohen, said of Bouyeri that "[a] couple of years ago he was a well-educated guy with good prospects." Andrew Higgins, A Brutal Killing Opens Dutch Eyes to Threat of Terror: Crackdown on Radical Islam Follows Filmmaker's Death; Immigrants Get Scrutiny: Shifting View of Welfare State, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A1. In light of such cases, European terrorist experts say that their continent "is also proving to be a
Moreover, Bobbitt writes,

[T]wo opposing but interacting phenomena—the oppression of minority groups by the nation (that is, by the dominant ethnic group with whom the State is identified) and the resistance to an assimilation that might overcome oppression—are damaging to the legitimacy of those nation-states that are based on the promise of assuring equality among all national members. As a result, it is increasingly difficult in multicultural, multiethnic states to get consensus on public-order problems and the maintenance of rule-based legal action, which are core tasks of the State.\textsuperscript{123}

To summarize Bobbitt's argument, it is the confluence of increasing costs of governance—exacerbated by the availability of weapons of mass destruction to nonstate actors and the new information technology—and a legitimacy crisis in its redistributivist and communitarian goals that, taken together, doom the constitutional order of the Nation State.

C. The Constitutional Premises of the Market State

By contrast, according to Bobbitt, the Market State's legitimizing principle is a commitment to individual opportunity—not to collective welfare.\textsuperscript{124} Different models of the Market State—the "Entrepreneurial," "Managerial," and "Mercantile" models (i.e., the American, European, and Japanese models)—offer varied interpretations of what it means to maximize opportunity.\textsuperscript{125} The Entrepreneurial, or American, model is of chief interest here.

\textsuperscript{123} Id. at 672–74 (describing the essential features of each Market State model); see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
"The basic ethos of the Entrepreneurial Model is libertarian..." The libertarian ethic of the Entrepreneurial Model embodies the conviction that it is the role of society to set individuals free to make their own decisions. This ethos counsels minimal state intervention in the economy as well as in the private lives of its citizens. Privatized health care, housing, pensions, and education as well as low taxes and low welfare benefits all characterize such states. Regulation on behalf of special interests is discouraged. Indeed, responsibility for regulation of any kind is largely abdicated in favor of policing by the market, which responds with extensive information to the consumer, who is expected to look out for himself.\(^{127}\)

Fully enacting the libertarian agenda of the Entrepreneurial version of the Market State would imply radical changes in American constitutional law. In particular, on libertarian premises, any claim by the government to regulate private conduct for the sake of promoting commonly recognized forms of moral virtue would presumptively be illegitimate, or "unconstitutional."\(^{128}\) From the libertarian angle, it makes excellent constitutional sense to ask: "[W]hy in the West is marijuana criminalized but martinis are not? Why is polygamy criminalized but not divorce?"\(^{129}\) Bobbitt argues that "[t]he sense of a single polity, held together by adherence to fundamental values, is not a sense that is cultivated by the market-state. This cultural indifference does, however, make the market-state an ideal environment for multiculturalism."\(^{130}\)

The constitutionalizing of Market-State libertarianism has clear implications for the structure, as well as for the ends, of government. The radical authority of the individual to set the bounds for his or her own opportunities, with the Market State as \textit{primus inter pares} facilitator, might at first suggest an increased demand for more devolution of authority to States and localities.\(^{131}\) Neither the market, nor the national government,  

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(^{126}\) \textsc{Bobbitt, supra} note 22, at 671.
  \item \(^{127}\) \textit{Id}.
  \item \(^{128}\) See, e.g., \textsc{Lawrence v. Texas}, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (declaring that "[t]he State cannot... mak[e] [a homosexual's] private sexual conduct a crime").
  \item \(^{129}\) \textsc{Bobbitt, supra} note 22, at 219.
  \item \(^{130}\) \textit{Id} at 230.
  \item \(^{131}\) It might also suggest increased privatization of traditional State functions, such as the responsibility for education. Although steps in this direction—such as school voucher programs—have been challenged under the Religion Clauses, the Court has (guardedly, and by a slim majority) supported them. See \textsc{Zelman v. Simmons-Harris}, 536
need be the best provider of all kinds of services (e.g., protection against local crime); in some instances, States and local governments, or private nonprofit organizations, may be better equipped to carry out the necessary responsibilities. Insofar as the States’ comparative advantage in performing such functions stems from their greater ability to respond to purely local values and needs, however, the Market State’s intrinsic libertarianism will often collide with any attempt to augment State power beyond strict limits. In such conflicts, the constitution of the Market State would treat libertarianism as primary, and federalism as subordinate and instrumental. Thus, local States attempting to regulate genetic research, abortion, or sexual orientation would swiftly find themselves charged with “unconstitutional” encroachments on individual welfare maximization and autonomy. In such conflicts it seems overwhelmingly likely that the claims of federalism would be subordinated to libertarianism by judges managing a constitutional transformation to the Market State.

D. Constitutional Law Transformation and the Jurisprudence of Legal Pragmatism

Bobbitt’s theory requires the belief that the American constitutional order is under severe strain insofar as it rests specifically on Nation State premises, and therefore must change “to reflect a new constitutional archetype” that meets the “demands for new bases for legitimacy, demands . . . aris[ing] in part as a consequence of the strategic innovations that won the Long War.” How is this shift to a new “constitutional archetype” to be accomplished?

Basic changes in constitutional structure—such as the transformation to the Nation State—have often been birthed by violence, as represented by the Civil War in the United States and by Bismarck’s successful wars culminating in the formation of the German Empire. It seems most unlikely, however, that the United States’ transition to the Market State, already far

U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002) (holding that Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program is constitutional). The Zelman Court noted,

Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.

Id. at 652.

132. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 213.

133. Id. at 24–26, 177.
along the way, will be marked by violence. Although the possibility of a financial or currency crisis as a catalyst for change can by no means be ruled out, the ordinary mechanisms of American politics may prove adequate to manage aspects of the transition, especially those relating to national security and public finance. But a significant role in engineering the change will undoubtedly be—indeed, this Article will attempt to show that it has already been—assumed by the Supreme Court.

Yet ascribing the role of constitutional architect to a body that professes to be merely a constitutional interpreter is paradoxical. How can the Supreme Court, while purporting to work within the ambit of its own constitutional doctrines, so refashion those materials as to create not merely novel, but fundamentally incompatible, doctrines? Consistent with his earlier work, Bobbitt appears to believe that the constitution of the American Nation State can be judicially remade to facilitate the American Market State, without departing from existing modes of constitutional argument. He emphasizes that such a transformation does not mean that the present U.S. constitution will be replaced. It has already weathered one such transformation in the constitutional order, that from state-nation to nation-state, and its underlying theory of popular sovereignty, personal liberty, and individual equality is perfectly compatible with the multicultural market-state. On some issues, though, such as federalism and the regulatory powers of Congress, it may be interpreted in the new archetypal context in ways that are more restrictive of government; while in others, notably national security, the power of the executive may gain. But none of these developments require a departure from the available constitutional arguments that currently make up American constitutional law, even if the outcomes of

134. See Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire 279–80 (2004) (pointing out that "the United States is the world's biggest borrower.... In 2002 the deficit was 4.8 percent of GDP; in 2003 it was even higher."); Robert Z. Aliber, The Dollar's Day of Reckoning, Wilson Q., Winter 2005, at 14, 23–24 (commenting that it is unlikely the inevitable transition to a sustainable situation will occur without "significant effects on employment and inflation or major disruptions in the foreign-exchange market"); Peter G. Peterson, Riding For a Fall, Foreign Aff., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 111, 117–21 (discussing the borrowing practices of the U.S. government and reporting that "[v]irtually none of the policy leaders, financial traders, and economists... believes the U.S. current account deficit is sustainable at current levels for much longer than five more years. Many see a real risk of a crisis").

constitutional decision making were to undergo some considerable change.\textsuperscript{136}

Bobbitt's claim that the Court may accomplish a change in "constitutional archetypes" while operating only within the range of "available constitutional arguments that currently make up American constitutional law,"\textsuperscript{137} is questionable. The Court's fidelity to constitutional text and structure, to the historical understandings of the framers and ratifiers, to the Court's own doctrines and precedents, and to the longstanding practices of American government sets boundaries—even if broad ones—to the Court's authority to introduce radical innovations in constitutional law.\textsuperscript{138} To be sure, the Court has not always felt handcuffed by such constraints.\textsuperscript{139} But the fact that it has favored modes of argument leading to such conclusions, or even met with acquiescence when it has ventured that far, does not establish that such "outcomes of constitutional decision making" are legitimate. The Court may be the (illegitimate) agent of change from one "constitutional archetype"\textsuperscript{140} to another, even while seeking to maintain the outward façade of constitutional continuity and purporting to play a merely interpretive role.

Nonetheless, the Court seems prepared to undertake the task of spearheading the constitutional transition from a Nation State to a Market State by demanding a certain style of jurisprudence—one that tolerates a very relaxed approach to doctrinal reasoning that can be characterized as a kind of "legal pragmatism."\textsuperscript{141} Legal pragmatism seems to us to be very evident in the Court's decisions that are of most concern to this Article.\textsuperscript{142} Not altogether easy to define, legal pragmatism, in Professor Daniel Farber's words, "tries to analyze problems based on both social policy and traditional legal doctrines, seeking a satisfactory adjustment of the two.... [The] blend of principle and policy, of tradition and innovation, is the essence of legal

\begin{enumerate}
\item[136.] BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 213 n.†.
\item[137.] Id. at 213 & n.†.
\item[139.] Id. at 251 (noting that in one particular case, "the Court's pragmatic concern with results overpowered all such specifically legal considerations").
\item[140.] BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 213.
\item[141.] See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1377 (1988) ("The alternative is a less structured mode of decision making called legal pragmatism.").
\item[142.] See Lund, supra note 138, at 249–51 (finding a legal pragmatism characteristic in the Rehnquist Court's antidiscrimination decisions).
\end{enumerate}
Another scholar, Judge Richard Posner, characterizes legal pragmatism as

a functional, policy-saturated, nonlegalistic, naturalistic, and skeptical, but decidedly not cynical, conception of the legal process....

Legal rules are to be viewed in instrumental terms, implying contestability, revisability, mutability.

Law is forward-looking. This is implicit in an instrumental concept of law—which is the pragmatic concept of law, law as the servant of human needs.

...The judge is not merely an interpreter of legal materials. He is not only a finder but also a maker of law.

Legal pragmatism is influenced by American philosophical pragmatism, which classically drew on evolutionary and related statistical reasoning to develop a conception of truth as a mere device for manipulating effects to produce wanted outcomes. Truth was what worked, not what corresponded to reality. Like statistical thinking, philosophical pragmatism saw reality as consisting in individual cases, with generalizations

143. Farber, supra note 141, at 1377.
146. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 27 (1999). Philosophical pragmatism maintains its long link to evolutionary theory’s account of selection, because pragmatic “truth” is what confers competitive advantage in seeking survival.

Pragmatists—both classical and ‘neo’—do not believe that there is a way things really are. So they want to replace the appearance-reality distinction by that between descriptions of the world and of ourselves which are less useful and those which are more useful. When the question ‘useful for what?’ is pressed, they have nothing to say except ‘useful to create a better future.’ When they are asked, ‘Better by what criterion?’, they have no detailed answer, any more than the first mammals could specify in what respects they were better than the dying dinosaurs.

Id.

147. See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 201–32, 435–45 (2001) (drawing the connection between evolutionary and statistical reasoning and the philosophy of pragmatism, conceived by Charles Pierce but reformulated and popularized by William James, and ultimately extended to judicial reasoning by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.). It is a great historical irony that it was the pragmatic conception of law, an approach that found its roots in evolutionary thinking, that inspired Holmes to condemn a parallel influence of evolutionary thinking on the political process when he wrote, dissenting in Lochner v. New York, that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
amounting to no more than useful devices to identify a truth revealed only indirectly by probable variations in error.  

The adoption of legal pragmatism as a preferred style of judicial decisionmaking is closely connected to the Court’s implicit recognition that it must reshape constitutional law in order to secure comparative advantages for the United States in a competitive international environment. Three characteristics of legal pragmatism make it particularly suitable as a jurisprudential style for a Court attempting to respond to international circumstances that present what Bobbitt characterizes as strategic threats.

First, a pragmatic Court will discount traditional legal doctrine and precedent and be open to even drastic or abrupt revisions of seemingly settled law. A pragmatic Court should espouse a very relaxed (not to say, cavalier) doctrine of constitutional stare decisis—which is part of the current Court’s approach. The great exceptions, of course, are those cases in which an outward profession of belief in a strong stare decisis doctrine is felt to be pragmatically necessary to sustain the Court’s prestige and to legitimize its decisions. Second, a pragmatic Court will rely heavily on nonlegal materials, including the policy recommendations of amici, in its reasoning. Third, a pragmatic Court will demonstrate a willingness to step into the breaches created, as the Justices see it, by the defaults of political actors. Such a Court will attempt to solve social or

148. See MENAND, supra note 147, at 177–200 (discussing the place of the law of errors in the development of philosophical thought).
149. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 811–14.
150. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 860–65 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the substantive due process methodology employed to decide the case had been specifically rejected the previous Term).
151. See, e.g., id.
152. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–66 (1992). Informed by pragmatic considerations, the Court purports to “explain why overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power.” Id. at 865; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1029–39 (2003) (criticizing Casey as demonstrating the Court’s concern with retaining political clout and asserting that “a significant part of Casey’s justification for... stare decisis... is that it enhances public perceptions of the Court’s (and its members’) integrity, and thus safeguards the Court’s power”).
153. Indeed, as the philosopher Richard Rorty points out, the courts may spic their pragmatism with “visions,” as he believes was true in “such debatable decisions as Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, ... and some [then] future Supreme Court decision that will strike down antisodomy laws.” RORTY, supra note 146, at 97–98 (footnotes omitted). Pragmatic judges, as Rorty notes, hardly need be tentative or complacent; their decisions may be “breakthroughs into romance.” Id. at 99.
154. See Justice Scalia’s view of the plurality decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.
political problems that are constitutionally committed to other governmental bodies if those actors prove unable or unwilling to address them.\textsuperscript{155} Indeed, a pragmatic Court will characteristically see its very isolation from the political process as an institutional advantage that justifies its resolution of political or cultural issues that electorally responsive bodies may be reluctant to decide.\textsuperscript{156}

All three of these features of legal pragmatism, discussed more in depth below, were exhibited in \textit{Brown v. Board of Education},\textsuperscript{157} an important and illuminating precedent for Court-led constitutional change in response to a strategic threat posed by the international environment.\textsuperscript{158}

\textbf{E. Precedent for Constitutional Change in Response to “Strategic Threats”}

It has not been uncommon for the Supreme Court to introduce fundamental legal and constitutional innovations on the basis of its perception of the surrounding international

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\textsuperscript{155} See BOBBITT, \textit{supra} note 135, at 4 (noting the possibility “that insulation from political reaction . . . [may] actually fit the Court to be the conservator of constitutional principles”). Thus, Richard Rorty becomes starry-eyed about pragmatic judges—those “wise elders” who “do[ ] their best to keep America intact” and who “are, and deserved to be, revered”—precisely \textit{because} they stand above the banalities and compromises of the political process. RORTY, \textit{supra} note 146, at 112. “As our presidents, political parties and legislators become ever more corrupt and frivolous, we turn to the judiciary as the only political institution for which we can still feel something like awe.” Id. It does not seem to have occurred to Rorty, however, that the political process may have become debased largely because the courts have siphoned off so much responsibility from elected politicians.

\textsuperscript{156} 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

\textsuperscript{157} BOBBITT, \textit{supra} note 22, at 777–80.
environment. The most famous example may well be the historic decisions to end racial segregation in American public schools in Brown v. Board of Education, and Brown's companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe. At least one current member of the Court understands Brown, as we do, as directly responsive to the international environment in which the decision was handed down. Brown itself was the culmination of

159. The doctrine of "territorial incorporation," which grew out of the Court's Insular Cases, provides a clear example of constitutional decisionmaking of this kind. GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 197 (2004) ("The doctrine of 'territorial incorporation' that emerged from The Insular Cases is transparently an invention designed to facilitate the felt needs of a particular moment in American history. Felt needs generally make bad law, and The Insular Cases are no exception.").

For other cases in this vein, see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409–10 (1990) (refusing to extend the Act of State doctrine to cover a case in which foreign governmental officials were alleged to have accepted bribes for military contracts in violation of U.S. antitrust and antiracketeering law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government... in the absence of a treaty... even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law."); and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1900) (examining the pedigree of the international maritime custom of exempting fishing ships and their cargo from seizure as prizes of war and holding that this exemption is part of American law).

The Court's uncertainty persists as to whether, and how far, to incorporate international law as a rule of decision for domestic courts. This is shown by the Court's equivocal interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). Echoing Sabbatino, the Sosa Court expressed wariness about "consider[ing] suits under [international] rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and... hold[ing] that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits... [M]any attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign policy consequences." Id. at 2763; see also id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring) (limiting the application of the statute by invoking "those notions of comity that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its laws and their enforcement"). The Court's caution is well-taken; indeed, the Court should arguably have been far more cautious than it was. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 450–51 (1999) (arguing that "[i]nternational legal theory is in disarray" and that customary international law lacks both legitimacy and effectiveness); Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of International Law, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1243, 1245–51 (2004) (questioning "whether U.S. courts are institutionally equipped for the project" of applying international law, and discussing the difficulties of conducting empirical investigations of modern international law).

160. 347 U.S. at 495 (declaring that "separate but equal" in public education violates equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment).

161. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that "racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution").

a series of landmark civil rights cases in which the Court took account of that environment.

Six years before Brown, in Oyama v. California,163 four Justices took note of international influences in their opinions on the question whether to protect people of Japanese descent from discriminatory State land laws that regulated certain categories of land ownership on the basis of nationality.164 The year of this decision, 1948, is significant in that it places the case at the very outset of the Cold War.165 Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, noted the relevance of the United Nations Charter's nondiscrimination provisions to the case.166 Justice Murphy, joined by Justice Rutledge, argued further that the California statute "from its inception has proved an embarrassment to the United States Government," and like Justice Black pointed out that the statute "stands as a barrier" to the United States' fulfillment of its United Nations Charter obligations.167

In several of the pre-Brown cases in this line, the Court was responding to prodding from the executive branch, which itself was highly sensitive to growing international condemnation of American racial segregation. The Truman Administration repeatedly filed briefs urging the Supreme Court to mitigate, and finally to strike down, State-supported racial segregation.168 The first such brief appeared in Shelley v. Kraemer,169 a restrictive

doubt that the climate of the era explains, in significant part, why apartheid in America began to unravel after World War II").


164. See id. at 647–50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring); Paul Gordon Lauren, First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter, in RACE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE PRESENT 25, 48 (Michael L. Krenn ed., 1998). Six Justices comprised the majority, with four Justices concurring in two opinions written by Justices Black and Murphy. Three Justices dissented in two separate dissenting opinions. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635 (majority opinion); id. at 647 (Black, J. concurring); id. at 650 (Murphy, J. concurring); id. at 674 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 684 (Jackson, J., dissenting).


167. Id. at 672–73 (Murphy, J., concurring).

168. BORSTELMANN, supra note 165, at 57 ("No judges were immune from the Cold War atmosphere that heightened international attention to American race relations, and the Truman administration made good use of these judicial breakthroughs in its diplomacy abroad.... Truman's Justice Department consistently intervened in civil rights cases in an effort to convince the country's highest court of the negative impact of officially sanctioned racial discrimination on American foreign relations.").

covenant case in which whites sold residential property to blacks in violation of a landowner's covenant. The question presented was whether State court enforcement of such covenants was "state action" in violation of the rights of the black purchasers. Solicitor General Philip Perlman explained the Justice Department's interest in Shelley by noting that "racially restrictive covenants hampered the federal government 'in doing its duty in the fields of public health, housing, home finance, and in the conduct of foreign affairs.'" The Justice Department's amicus curiae brief followed the State Department's view that "the United States has been embarrassed in the conduct of foreign relations by acts of discrimination taking place in this country."

Two years later, the Justice Department again emphasized the international implications of U.S. race relations in the amicus curiae brief it submitted in Henderson v. United States. This case challenged segregation in railroad dining cars. The Justice Department's brief informed the Court of Soviet and other foreign criticisms of American race discrimination and included quotes of statements by foreign governmental representatives (i.e., the Soviet Union and Poland) at "a United Nations subcommittee meeting that 'typify the manner in which racial discrimination in this country is turned against us in the international field.'" The Justice Department's brief opposed the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which had ruled that separate seating in dining cars for black passengers did not violate the statutory equal treatment requirement of the Interstate Commerce Act. The Justice Department disagreed with the ICC's reading of that statute and argued that if such segregation was authorized, it was an equal protection violation. The Justice Department's argument is significant

170. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4–5 (framing the case as "questions relating to the validity of court enforcement of . . . restrictive covenants, which have as their purpose the exclusion of persons of designated race or color from the ownership or occupancy of real property").

171. Id. at 13–14 (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment only bars State, not private, action); Dudziak, supra note 169, at 91.

172. Dudziak, supra note 169, at 91 (emphasis added).

173. Id. at 91–92.

174. 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Dudziak, supra note 169, at 92.

175. Henderson, 339 U.S. at 818; Dudziak, supra note 169, at 92.

176. Dudziak, supra note 169, at 92–93 (quoting Brief for the United States at 60–61, Henderson, 339 U.S. 816 (No. 25)).

177. Id. at 92.

178. Id.
because the decision in Henderson might have resulted (although in fact it did not)\textsuperscript{179} in the overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson.\textsuperscript{180}

The Justice Department was forthright in advising the Court of the foreign policy consequences of its constitutional decisionmaking in Sweatt v. Painter\textsuperscript{181} and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,\textsuperscript{182} both of which were challenges to the segregation of black postgraduate students at public universities.\textsuperscript{183} The Justice Department's brief in the cases again stressed that the practice of racial segregation in the United States posed a danger to the United States' national security and its reputation in other countries:

"It is in the context of a world in which freedom and equality must become living realities, if the democratic way of life is to survive, that the issues in these cases should be viewed. In these times, when even the foundations of our free institutions are not altogether secure, it is especially important that it again be unequivocally affirmed that the Constitution . . . places no limitation, express or implied, on the principle of the equality of all men before the law."\textsuperscript{184}

The Justice Department's amicus brief in the consolidated school desegregation cases, which included Bolling and Brown, was even more emphatic on the foreign policy consequences of the Court's constitutional ruling in the case.\textsuperscript{185} The Justice Department told the Court that racial segregation frustrated the Government's pursuit of its Cold War aims because "[r]acial discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith."\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{179} Id. at 94 (noting that because the "Court ruled that railroad dining car segregation violated the Interstate Commerce Act because it was unequal treatment," it "did not need to decide whether . . . Plessy v. Ferguson should be overturned").

\textsuperscript{180} 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

\textsuperscript{181} 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

\textsuperscript{182} 339 U.S. 637 (1950).

\textsuperscript{183} Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631; McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638; DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 94–95.

\textsuperscript{184} DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 95–96 (quoting Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11–13, McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637 (No. 34) and Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629 (No. 44)).

\textsuperscript{185} Id. at 99 (explaining how the Justice Department's "brief emphasized the embarrassment of race discrimination in the nation's capital").

\textsuperscript{186} Id. at 100 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10)).
The Government's brief spent nearly two pages substantiating this claim by a lengthy quote from a letter written by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who explained,

"[D]uring the past six years, the damage to our foreign relations attributable to [race discrimination] has become progressively greater. The United States is under constant attack in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and in such international bodies as the United Nations because of various practices of discrimination against minority groups in this country. As might be expected, Soviet spokesmen regularly exploit this situation in propaganda against the United States . . . .

The hostile reaction among normally friendly peoples, many of whom are particularly sensitive in regard to the status of non-European races, is growing in alarming proportions . . . .

. . . [R]acial discrimination in the United States remains a source of constant embarrassment to this Government in the day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral leadership of the free and democratic nations of the world."187

The Government's briefs in Brown and the civil rights cases leading up to it were "a call to arms to enlist the Court in . . . safeguarding national security in the Cold War."188 Although the Brown decision itself did not refer to foreign relations, the public diplomacy requirements of the Cold War undoubtedly played a role in the Court's judgment that a half-century of jurisprudence expressed in the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy was no longer constitutionally tenable.189 And "[w]ithin an hour of the Chief Justice's announcement of the Court's unanimous conclusion . . . the Voice of America broadcast the news, in 34 languages, around the globe. The U.S.
Information Agency promptly placed articles on Brown in almost every African journal. Brown underscores two relevant lessons. First, Brown freed the Court to transform American constitutional law, enhancing its self-confidence as a policymaking organ. The prestige that accrued to the Court from Brown bolstered the Court's willingness to mediate later change from one constitutional order to another. As in Brown, the Court in later cases has been prepared to make dramatic constitutional innovations that it considers necessary to enable the United States to address strategic international needs.

Second, Brown helped generate the self-consciously "pragmatic" jurisprudence that has encouraged and enabled the Court to undertake constitutional transformations dictated by perceived strategic needs. Brown was not altogether well received by legal scholars at the time; indeed, a substantial body of criticism developed, suggesting that the Court had imposed its own values on the political community. But the critique of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown and later cases did not have the intended effect; rather, it gave rise to a school of jurisprudence explicitly defending the right and duty of the Supreme Court to make pragmatic judgments concerning preferred social outcomes in constitutional law. And there things stand.

II. THE CENTRAL TRADITION AND THE POLICE POWER IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Our argument requires us to show that the Court is indeed reordering constitutional law, i.e., that its increased willingness to deny that the States may enact and enforce locally prevalent moral norms and values is contrary to its traditional jurisprudence on the subject of the States' police powers. Here we try to substantiate that claim.

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190. Ginsburg, supra note 162.
191. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring the Court's interpretation of the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land).
193. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 192, at 1371 (positing that "the Court's survival and flourishing are indeed more likely to depend on the political acceptability of its results than on its adherence to an esoteric philosophy of interpretation").
Traditionally, the Court's jurisprudence has supported the view that the States may legislate to promote the community's distinctively moral objectives—that is, that the States may legislate within the Central Tradition of political theory. Part II begins with a survey of that earlier jurisprudence. This review encompasses the description and analysis not only of the Court's traditional view of the States' police powers (often defined in opposition to the powers of Congress), but more generally of the States' power to regulate conduct deemed vicious or immoral (often defined by reference to the scope of constitutionally protected individual liberties). Thereafter, Part II shows how the Court's recent decisions represent a striking departure from its earlier (and better established) jurisprudence—a departure that this Article believes is designed to be adaptive to the assumed requirements of globalization and, specifically, to the emergence of a Market State constitution.

OVERVIEW: THE STATES' POWERS OF MORAL APPRECIATION

The States' authority to pursue specifically moral objectives is deeply rooted in the American constitutional tradition. Indeed, it is one of the fundamental features of our federalism. Typically, the legal analysis of this form of State authority is part of the doctrine of the States' "police power," which itself falls under the more general doctrine of the States' "reserved powers." Consequently, our review starts with the Court's delineation of the scope of the States' reserved powers.

The relevant decisions fall into three main categories. First, the police powers are sometimes defined by inference from the Court's jurisprudence regarding the enumerated powers of the federal government, such as Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Second, they have been defined by reference to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Third, they may be defined in relation to the conceptions of substantive due process.

194. For a detailed historical account, see generally Novak, supra note 16, providing a detailed historical account of the evolution of the balance of private rights with public values.

195. See, e.g., L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 596 (1900) (stating that "the police power was not by the Federal Constitution transferred to the nation, but was reserved to the States").

196. This Article will also briefly discuss certain aspects of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence closely related to the relevant substantive due process conceptions.
A. The Reserved Powers of the States—The Contours of the Police Power

In the Court's earliest formulation, the reserved powers of the States were described in sweeping terms. Discussing State inspections in *Gibbons v. Ogden*, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves." Although Marshall's language does not identify the purposes for which the reserved powers may be exercised, the later course of Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence makes clear that the objects of State legislative power included the moral objectives of the community.

In *Champion v. Ames*, in the course of upholding a federal ban on interstate commerce of lottery tickets, the Court, through the first Justice Harlan, stated,

[T]he suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among the most important duties of Government . . . .

If a State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries within its own limits, may properly take into view the evils that inhere in the raising of money, in that mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another?

. . . .

. . . . As a State may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its own people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guarding the people of the United States against the "widespread pestilence of lotteries" and to protect the commerce which concerns all the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another.

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197. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
198. Id. at 203.
199. See, e.g., *Phalen v. Virginia*, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (justifying a State law prohibiting lotteries—even though recognizing that this law interfered with some individuals' rights to contract—because the State's duty to suppress moral nuisances was paramount).
200. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
201. Id. at 356–57.
In dissent, Justice Fuller agreed with the premise of Justice Harlan's argument, that the States themselves retained the power to abolish lotteries for essentially moral reasons. Indeed, he went further, arguing that the States' power to permit or prohibit lotteries was exclusive: "[T]hat power belongs to the States and not to Congress. To hold that Congress has general police power would be to hold that it may accomplish objects not entrusted to the General Government, and to defeat the operation of the Tenth Amendment."

A decade later, in sustaining the Mann Act's attack on so-called "white slavery," or prostitution, the Court reaffirmed the power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, even if its purpose in so doing was explicitly moral. Justice McKenna, writing for a unanimous Court, stated,

"If the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls."

In *Hammer v. Dagenhart*, the Court, while rejecting the extension of this line of cases to a congressional act banning the products of child labor from interstate commerce, reasoned that production employing child labor was itself a "purely local matter," beyond the competence of Congress—*not* that such a matter was beyond the competence of government at *any* level. Further, Justice Holmes, in a dissent that a generation later would form the basis for the overruling of *Dagenhart*, insisted that established precedent had made it clear that political branches were free to legislate on the basis of either the moral values or the prudential judgments of the community. Holmes explained that the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist in some cases was for the consideration of Congress alone and

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202. *Id.* at 364–65 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
203. *Id.* at 365.
205. *Id.* at 322.
206. *Id.*
208. *Id.* at 276.
209. *See Darby*, 312 U.S. at 115–16 (describing Holmes's dissent in *Dagenhart* as "powerful and now classic").
that this Court always had disavowed the right to intrude its judgment upon questions of policy or morals. It is not for this Court to pronounce when prohibition is necessary to regulation if it ever may be necessary—to say that it is permissible as against strong drink but not as against the product of ruined lives. 210

Holmes’s analysis presupposes that even the federal government (and undoubtedly also the States) could legitimately act for moral purposes—purposes that could not be reduced merely to questions of policy but that must rely, instead, on community moral values. 211

Holmes’s view of the scope of the police power became common currency. Within a generation, the Court could treat it as unproblematic that even the national legislature “is free to exclude from [interstate] commerce articles whose use in the states...it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare.” 212 There was thus, by the early 1940s, an agreed understanding as to the existence of both a national and a local police power that embraced the moral judgments of the relevant political community. Relying on that understanding, the Court, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 213 could subsequently determine that Congress was entitled to give effect to the national community’s sense of justice in enacting civil rights legislation: “That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing...[the Civil Rights] Act Congress was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem.” 214

The States’ power of appreciating and relying on the moral values of the community has also played a role in the Court’s reformulated understanding of the limits of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, 215 the Court refused to rely on the so-called “cumulative effects” principle, which by aggregating the effects of local economic activity purports to justify a challenged exercise of Congress’s power to regulate “interstate commerce.” 216 The Court

211. See id. at 277–78 (framing the issue of the case completely without regard to the moral purposes of the statute and focusing only on the control of production methods and excluding the purpose of a statute from judicial consideration of Congress’s power to enact it).
212. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114.
214. Id. at 257.
216. Id. at 556–59 (concluding that the appropriate test is “whether the regulated
characterized the regulation of hand gun possession in school zones as a *noneconomic* question and, therefore, not within the federal regulatory power under the *Commerce Clause*. And in *United States v. Morrison*, the Court invalidated a portion of the Violence Against Women Act, which created a civil cause of action against gender-motivated crime. In finding that the *Commerce Clause* did not provide Congress the power to criminalize the behaviors in question, the Court did not consider violence an *economic activity* and was unwilling to permit regulation of a *noneconomic activity* based on an "aggregate effect on interstate commerce." The *Morrison* Court reasoned that gender-motivated violence fell within certain core areas that had been traditionally subject to State rather than federal regulation. Activities in these quintessentially moral categories—"marriage, divorce, and childrearing"—might well have cumulative economic impacts on interstate commerce, but to regulate them at the federal level would eviscerate the distinction between "what is truly national and what is truly local." The regulation of the activities falling into these categories was thus, in the Court’s view, inherently a State power. In light of these cases, the States’ police powers may undoubtedly be exercised on policy or moral grounds, subject to the limits imposed by constitutional protections of individual rights.

**B. The Police Powers and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause**

The States’ traditional police powers, including the regulation of morality, have also been delineated and upheld in the Court’s Privileges or Immunities Clause jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. Under this rubric, we shall discuss *Mugler v. Kansas*, a case in which the Court upheld a State’s power to enact criminal restrictions on the manufacture and sale of alcohol.  

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217. *Id.* at 560–61.
219. *Id.* at 601–02, 605.
220. *Id.* at 613.
221. *Id.* at 617.
222. *Id.* at 615–16, 618.
223. *Id.* at 615–18.
224. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
225. *Id.* at 657, 662–63.
In reaching its result, the Court rejected the defendant's libertarian argument (which is paraphrased in the synopsis to the reprint of the case in West's Supreme Court Reporter) that the State had "no power to prohibit any citizen to manufacture for his own use, or for export, or storage, any article of food or drink not endangering or affecting the rights of others.... [U]nder our form of government, the state does not attempt to control the citizen except as to his conduct to others."227

Speaking through Justice Harlan, the Court found that "the decisions of this court, rendered before and since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment," had made clear that the States' police power extended to statutory regulations designed to protect or promote morality.228

To make that demonstration, Justice Harlan quoted extensively from the opinions of the Justices in the License Cases.229 Thus, he quoted Justice McLean, who had written there that "[a] State regulates its domestic commerce, contracts, the transmission of estates, real and personal, and acts upon all internal matters which relate to its moral and political welfare,"230 and Justice Grier, who had stated that "[w]ithout attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of this [police] power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for the restraint and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals must come within this category."231 Harlan also quoted statements in Beer Co. v. Massachusetts,222 "[A]s a measure of police regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the Constitution of the United States."233 He cited Foster v. Kansas234 for the proposition that States constitutionally

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226. It is interesting to note that the brief for appellant includes a citation to John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty," perhaps the greatest and most influential defense of libertarianism ever written. Id. at 632.

227. Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 288 (1887) (writing in concise form the arguments of appellant, which appear in their entirety in volume 123 of the U.S. Reports at 628 to 637 under the heading "Mr. Vest's Argument for Mugler").

228. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657.

229. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).

230. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 658 (quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 588 (McLean, J.)).

231. Id. (quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 631 (Grier, J., concurring)).

232. 97 U.S. 25 (1877).

233. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 659 (quoting Beer, 97 U.S. at 33).

234. 112 U.S. 201 (1884).
have the power to regulate liquor. Harlan concluded that "[t]hese cases rest upon the acknowledged right of the States . . . to protect the health, morals, and safety of their people." Fortified by these precedents, Justice Harlan then turned to the appellant's Millian argument and robustly rejected it:

Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere; else society will be at the mercy of the few, who, regarding only their own appetites or passions, may be willing to imperil the peace and security of the many, provided only they are permitted to do as they please. Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that department to exert what are known as the police powers of the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public safety.

C. Moral Regulation and Substantive Due Process Doctrine

Just as the States' right to assert moral grounds as a basis for legislation under its reserved powers is revealed by negative inference from the Court's jurisprudence concerning the scope of enumerated federal powers, so too is that right revealed inferentially by the Court's substantive due process case law. The cases are of interest here in two ways. First, in holding that certain "liberties" are protected against State regulation aimed at a moral objective, the Court has indicated that other, perhaps

235. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 659.

236. Id.

237. Id. at 660–61. Other courts of about this period were more sympathetic to the claim that the Constitution effectively embodied and protected a Millian conception of liberty. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386–87 (Ky. 1909), the court, in voiding a municipal ordinance that forbade the bringing of liquor into a county, interweaving a long discussion of Mill with the racism characteristic of its time, concluded:

Under our institutions there is no room for that inquisitorial and protective spirit which seeks to regulate the conduct of men in matters in themselves indifferent, and to make them conform to a standard, not of their own choosing, but the choosing of the lawgiver; that inquisitorial and protective spirit which seeks to prescribe what a man shall eat and wear, or drink or think, thus crushing out individuality and insuring Chinese inertia by the enforcement of the use of the Chinese shoe in the matter of the private conduct of mankind.

Id.; see also Howard Mumford Jones, The Pursuit of Happiness 48–49 (1953) (describing the moral justifications for exercises of the police power as part of society's pursuit of happiness and discussing Mr. Campbell's challenge of the State's alcohol prohibition as his personal pursuit of happiness, which the Court indulged).
related, areas of individual conduct are subject to State regulation on that basis. Second and more subtly, in identifying and characterizing the kinds of conduct that are constitutionally protected “liberties” not subject to State moral regulation, the Court has impliedly assumed certain conceptions of “morality.”

The Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence has undergone at least two distinct phases—an earlier phase in which its understanding of morality is rooted in the experience and values of the community, and a second phase in which the Court abandoned a communitarian conception of moral reasoning and replaced it with libertarian or individualistic ideals. The first phase did nothing to impair the notion of the States’ police powers that we have examined above; indeed, the cases in this group directly or by implication affirm the States’ police power to adopt and enforce traditional community moral standards. The second phase, however, marks the steady contraction of the States’ police power to uphold moral traditions, and, relatedly, the displacement in the Court’s thinking of one conception of “morality” by another.

The earlier phase of the Court’s substantive due process precedents recognized a special place for historically accepted associations and relationships, including marriage and the family, as the basis for identifying liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause. In Meyer v. Nebraska, for instance, the Court reversed the conviction of a teacher for teaching German in violation of a State law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to young children. Justice McReynolds’s opinion held that, although the State might have been able to defend its policy of “foster[ing] a homogeneous people with American ideals” in the immediate wake of World

238. See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (justifying a State law prohibiting lotteries—even while recognizing that this law interfered with an individual’s right to contract—because the State’s duty to suppress moral nuisances was paramount).

239. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a criminal law preventing married couples from obtaining birth-control devices on the ground that the law invaded a marital “zone of privacy” protected by the Constitution, but suggesting that less invasive laws to achieve the same purpose would be upheld).

240. Although the Court’s substantive due process decisions have often been criticized for being extra-textual, scholars have noted that “[t]hrough one device or another, the Court has always managed to read into the Constitution limits on legislative power that can hardly be gathered from within that document’s four corners.” Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742 (1989).

241. See supra Part II.A–B.

242. See infra Part III.

243. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

244. Id. at 396–97, 399, 403.
War I, the statute conflicted "with the power of parents to control the education of their own." The Court specifically affirmed that "the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally, and morally... but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected." Further, the area of liberty protected against State regulation, though not "define[d] with exactness," was at least roughly coextensive with "those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." In short, the legal and cultural tradition embodied in the common law—which marked out, in the marital union and the family, social spaces largely immune from governmental intrusion—set limits to State power.

Shortly thereafter, Pierce v. Society of Sisters struck down a State statute requiring children to attend public (rather than parochial) schools. Justice McReynolds again located parental rights in a broader communitarian context, for "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

Strikingly, even the Court's later contraception jurisprudence made clear that the Court identified the substantive personal "liberties" protected by the Due Process Clause through reference to the dominant, traditional moral practices and views of the American people. Thus, when the second Justice Harlan's influential concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut invoked the methodology of "ordered liberty" to analyze the State's criminalization of the provision of contraceptive services to married couples, it emphasized the social context in which the case arose. Relying on his earlier dissent in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan articulated a vision of the Court's role in assessing the moral judgments of the State. In this view, the Court seeks to balance the legislative power of

245. Id. at 402.
246. Id. at 401.
247. Id. (emphasis added).
248. Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
249. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
250. Id. at 530, 534–36.
251. Id. at 535.
253. Id. at 500–01.
255. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
the State against the protected liberty of the individual, using the community's judgment on morality.\textsuperscript{256} Harlan's remarks in Poe deserve to be quoted at length:

It is argued by appellant that the judgment, implicit in this statute—that the use of contraceptives by married couples is immoral—is an irrational one, that in effect it subjects them in a very important matter to the arbitrary whim of the legislature, and that it does so for no good purpose.

Yet the very inclusion of the category of morality among state concerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line between public behavior and that which is purely consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from community concern a range of subjects with which every society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal. The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.

It is in this area of sexual morality, which contains many proscriptions of consensual behavior having little or no direct impact on others, that the State of Connecticut has expressed its moral judgment that all use of contraceptives is improper.\ldots Certainly, Connecticut's judgment is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect than are the varieties of judgment, expressed in law, on marriage and divorce, on adult consensual homosexuality, abortion, and sterilization, or euthanasia and suicide. If we had a case before us which required us to decide simply, and in abstraction, whether the moral judgment implicit in the application of the present statute to married couples was a sound one, the very controversial nature of these questions would, I think, require us to hesitate long before concluding

\textsuperscript{256} Id. at 501; Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.").
that the Constitution precluded Connecticut from choosing as it has among these various views.

But... we are not presented simply with this moral judgment to be passed on as an abstract proposition.257

Harlan did not find the statute unconstitutional because of its ends—because it was designed to regulate consensual private conduct in furtherance of the State's moral ideals.258 Rather, he objected to the means that the State had chosen—the machinery of the criminal law, brought to bear on the marital union.259 This he considered an excessive intrusion on marital intimacy within the privacy of the home. The State had entered into what "by common understanding throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty,' the privacy of the home in its most basic sense."260

A close reading of the other opinions in Griswold reveals that other Justices shared Harlan's emphasis on the need to locate the balance between State interests and individual rights in the context of the historic practices of the community.261 Justice Goldberg's concurrence, though nominally grounded in the Ninth Amendment, shared Harlan's view on the need to locate fundamental rights in the historic practices recognized by the people as a core part of its ethos.262 Similarly, while Justice Douglas's majority opinion identified the right to "privacy" as an independent source for constitutional analysis, he too emphasized the "sacred" character of the historic institution of marriage as the context for the exercise of the privacy right he found in the Fourteenth Amendment.263
While setting limits to the States’ powers to legislate for moral reasons, these substantive due process cases nonetheless affirmed the relevance and legitimacy of moral traditions in determining the scope of individual “liberties” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The limits to the States’ regulatory powers were derived from traditional morality; only when a State’s regulation threatened to encroach on and injure an established institution or practice like marriage or the family was it found to have improperly negated “liberty.” Moreover, claims to protected “liberties” were evaluated against the background of traditional norms and understandings; “liberty” was not the freedom to engage in radical, innovative, and counter-cultural experiments in living. Traditional associations like marriage or the family created zones of privacy that were to be free of criminal regulation and surveillance by the States, because State action there was deemed to threaten the flourishing of a commonly held morality, not to sustain and uphold it. By necessary consequence, if the States did act to the end of promoting virtue without trespassing into the zones marked off from regulation, their regulatory activity—as Justice Harlan clearly implied in Griswold—would presumptively survive constitutional review.

This historically rooted approach to identifying protected liberty interests, rather than positing a generalized right to privacy, was followed as recently as seven years ago in Washington v. Glucksberg. In Glucksberg, the Court rejected a substantive due process challenge to State legislation generally prohibiting physician-assisted suicide. The Court began as it does “in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.” It found that State assisted-

worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

264. See supra text accompanying notes 243–248 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and noting that the State has great liberty to improve the morals of its citizens).

265. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (predicting that the Connecticut contraceptive law would have “maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship” (emphasis added)).

266. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the standard for substantive due process cases should be whether a statute “violates basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” thereby leaving the States free to regulate, substantially as they pleased, any areas not covered by this pronouncement).


268. Id. at 735.

269. Id. at 710.
suicide bans, far from being “innovations,” were “longstanding expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life.”270 Indeed, the Court observed, “for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”271 Even though “the States’ assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined,” they have been “generally, reaffirmed.”272 In summary, the Court found that although “[a]ltitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton, . . . our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide.”273 Turning then from the States’ legal traditions and practices to the “liberties” of the individual, the Court affirmed, over objection from Justice Souter, the “restrained methodology” of its usual substantive due process jurisprudence.274 On that approach, “the outlines of the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [must be] carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition.”275 Only if the “challenged state action implicated a fundamental right,” would its defense require a showing of more than a “reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest.”276 The asserted right to die—including the “‘right’ to assistance in committing suicide”—was not, however, constitutionally “fundamental.”277 Far from being rooted in the Nation’s history and practices, it stood against “a consistent and almost universal tradition” of lawmaking.278

Moreover, the Court rejected the challengers’ appeal to a purported “general tradition of ‘self-sovereignty’” found embodied in “the broad, individualistic principles” of the Court’s recent “liberty jurisprudence.”279 Rather than accepting the invitation to place its liberty jurisprudence on a radically individualistic and libertarian foundation, the Court sought to rein in the broad implications of its reasoning in Casey, insisting (more than a little disingenuously) that Casey’s affirmation of the right to abortion announced in Roe merely concerned one of “those

270. Id.
271. Id. at 711.
272. Id. at 716.
273. Id. at 719.
274. Id. at 721–22.
275. Id. at 722.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 728.
278. Id. at 723.
279. Id. at 724, 728.
personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as... deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or [as] fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty." 280

"That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected ... ." 281

The controlling standard of review in *Glucksberg*, therefore, was merely whether the challenged statute had a rational relationship to legitimate State interests. 282 In identifying those interests, the Court clearly accepted that the State could legitimately act to advance a "symbolic and aspirational as well as practical" interest in the preservation of human life. 283 In particular, the State could legitimately "decline to make judgments about the "quality" of life." 284 For example, the State could use the criminal law for the moral and educative purpose of affirming the value of all human life, including that of the terminally ill.

Even if *Glucksberg* now seems plainly out of alignment with the Court's latter-day substantive due process case law, 285 it stands as a recent affirmation of the States' power to legislate, protect, and uphold a moral tradition, even in the face of the claim that that tradition restricts the radical autonomy of individuals to decide the fates of their own bodies. In the broader historical perspective, it is the cases discussed below in Part III, rather than *Glucksberg*, that seem to be aberrational. *Glucksberg* preserves the Central Tradition's view of the States as moral

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280. *Id.* at 726–27.

281. *Id.* at 727. In the equal protection companion case to *Glucksberg*, the Court also relied on common law and custom to distinguish between a decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment and an assisted suicide. See *Vacco v. Quill*, 521 U.S. 793, 807–08 (1997) (noting the "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching" that form the basis of the right to refuse treatment). Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in *Glucksberg* that the majority left open "the possibility that some applications of the New York statute may impose an intolerable intrusion on the patient's freedom." *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 751–52 (Stevens, J., concurring). Agreeing with Justice Stevens's assertion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in *Vacco*, held open the possibility of as-applied challenges, but on a severely limited basis. See *Vacco*, 521 U.S. at 809 n.13.


283. *Id.* at 728–29.

284. *Id.* at 729–30 (quoting *Cruzan v. Dir.*, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)).

285. It did not seem so to some legal scholars at the time. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, *The Right To Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition*, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 669–72 (finding the reasoning of the Court to be in line with earlier cases).
III. THE NEW LIBERTARIAN COURT

With the notable exception of Glucksberg, the Court's individual rights jurisprudence has moved away in recent years from recognizing the beliefs and practices of the community as sources of normativity and value and as a legitimate basis for legislation. Instead the Court, retracing the arguments of the nineteenth century, seems inclined now to take the path that it had earlier rejected, and to constitutionalize much of John Stuart Mill's libertarianism.

This Part will identify two crucial shifts in the Court's understanding of the nature of individual rights, leading its jurisprudence to a radical rejection of history and experience as a source of moral value. The first involves a reduction in the power of the State to base its decisions on the moral values of the community, as evidenced in its traditions. The second involves an increased deference by the Court, not to the political branches, but rather to elite institutions and decisionmakers. The first limb of the argument involves an examination of the Court's decision in the sodomy case, Lawrence v. Texas; the second limb involves not only Lawrence but also the Court's affirmative action decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger.

A. Silencing the States on Questions of Morality

The Court's reasoning in Lawrence, rejecting the community or traditional view of morality as a basis for legislation, follows directly from libertarian principles articulated in its other recent precedents. It is no less revolutionary for that. The master premise in all these libertarian decisions is the view that how one finds meaning in the universe is, in considerable part, bound up with the role of joy and suffering, pain and pleasure in one's own life. The individual is to determine his or her conception of

289. 123 S. Ct. at 2383–84.
290. This assumption may derive from the existential philosophy that informed the thinking of the generation that followed the exposure of the Nazi concentration camps. See, e.g., Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy 178, 183 (Wash. Square Press ed., 1968) (1959) (arguing that the key to emotional and spiritual well-being is one's interior attitude towards suffering, even in the face of concentration camp torture). More generally, the Court's master premise in these
meaning, and it is therefore for him or her alone to decide what attitude to adopt towards, and what meaning to confer on, the pain, deprivation and suffering that are necessarily incident to that individual's life. The State, as a moral community, therefore cannot impose on individuals a collective or social conception of the significance of pain, or require unwilling individuals to undergo a deprivation that they would consider meaningless and without value. 291

Thus, the joint opinion in *Casey*, arguing in support of the conclusion that a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy is a protected liberty, focuses on the place of unwanted pain in the woman's conception of a meaningful life:

Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. 292

And again,

[Re]asonable people will have differences of opinion about [abortion]. One view is based on such reverence for the wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term no matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-being. Another is that the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to

individual liberty cases tracks changes in the general culture that have been at work since the 1950s. "[T]he 'pursuit of (individual) happiness' took on a new meaning in the postwar period," so that it was no longer "inscribed within certain taken-for-granted boundaries" set originally by "the citizen ethic, centered on the good of self-rule," as well as by "certain basic demands of sexual morality... [and] the values of hard work and productivity, which gave a framework to the pursuit of individual good." CHARLES TAYLOR, VARIETIES OF RELIGION TODAY: WILLIAM JAMES REVISITED 90-91 (2002); see also CHARLES GUIGNON, ON BEING AUTHENTIC 46 (2004) (noting the long-term secular "transformations that [have] occur[red] in the concept of happiness... from the eighteenth-century ideal of serene contentment in the bosom of one's family to the twentieth-century notion of happiness as a pleasurable feeling... no matter what the cause of that feeling might be"). However one evaluates these cultural transformations, it is not clear why they should serve to provide the ruling principle in constitutional analysis.

291. For a probing critique of the view that the States may not interfere with the activity of personal self-definition and an explanation of the conceptual linkage between that view and Millian libertarianism, see Rubenfeld, *supra* note 240, at 754-61 (analyzing the "personhood" or "self-definition" basis for the constitutional right to privacy and arguing that the privacy right cannot be based on the Millian notion of restricting personal liberty only when one's actions infringe on the liberty of others because controversial personal actions always have some effect on society at large).

the parent. These are intimate views with infinite variations....

It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe sought to protect....\(^{293}\)

The liberty \textit{Casey} protects is thus the freedom to reject the "anxieties," "physical constraints," and "pain" incident to pregnancy, and to a lesser extent the "cruelty to the child" and "anguish to the parent" that could result from being forced to bear a child.\(^{294}\) The logic of the \textit{Casey} joint opinion leads inexorably to Justice O'Connor's \textit{Glucksberg} concurrence, in which she reserved the question of whether there might be a constitutional right to avoid pain at the time of death through physician assisted suicide.\(^{295}\) Seen in this light, \textit{Casey}, like \textit{Roe}, appears to embody "a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection."\(^{296}\)

\textit{Lawrence} flows readily from \textit{Casey}. If the freedom of the individual to frame a conception of meaning shields from State regulation his or her decisions to avoid "meaningless" pain, anguish, or deprivation, it should equally protect the individual's pursuit of those pleasures that he or she finds to be the constituent elements of a meaningful life. In other words, if the right to decide whether or not to accept meaningless pain is a liberty interest worthy of constitutional protection, surely the right to receive or give pleasure is equally a part of protected individual liberty. Certainly, sexual activity—whether narrowly understood as a mere physical act, or more broadly taken as an intimate association with another human being—is the most intense form of pleasure within the common experience of most persons. As such, sexual activity will form a central element in most individuals' conceptions of meaning and value. Surely, then, "the right to define one's own concept... of meaning," as enunciated in the joint opinion in \textit{Casey}, must include the right to decide to engage in activities that produce sexual pleasure.\(^{297}\)

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{293. \textit{Id.} at 853.}
\footnote{294. \textit{Id.} at 852–53.}
\footnote{296. \textit{Casey}, 505 U.S. at 857.}
\footnote{297. \textit{Id.} at 851. For a critique of the idea that "homosexual identity" is essential to the self-identity of those who practice homosexual acts, see Rubenfeld, \textit{supra} note 240, at 779–80. Standing views like Justice Kennedy's on their head, Rubenfeld argues that [I]n the very concept of a homosexual identity there is something potentially...}
Lawrence makes clear that "the right to define one's own concept . . . of meaning" is so central an individual right that it is now outside the ken of social construction and, therefore, of State regulatory power.\(^{298}\) Justice Kennedy, writing for the Lawrence Court, stated baldly that, for purposes of substantive due process analysis, "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual."\(^{299}\) Driving the point home, Justice Kennedy also cited Justice Stevens's sweeping view, in his dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."\(^{300}\) Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, asserted that, for purposes of an equal protection analysis of the distinction the State drew between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy, "[m]oral disapproval of this [homosexual] group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause."\(^{301}\) Drawing on the (implicit) reasoning underlying Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Romer v. Evans,\(^{302}\) Justice O'Connor went on to say that "we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons."\(^{303}\) Thus, both Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court on substantive due process grounds and Justice O'Connor's concurrence on equal protection grounds share the premise that enforcement of the moral values of the community cannot extend...
to regulating the individual’s pursuit of certain forms of pleasure or the avoidance of certain forms of pain. These activities are now matters that constitutional law has reassigned from the political community’s authority to unfettered individual self-determination. Defining meaning is now, constitutionally, a solitary act, not a project to be undertaken through public reflection and collective choice.

The Court’s decision in Lawrence, as indeed in Casey, is not (or not only) a shift in the locus of decisionmaking authority from the community to the individual. It is more revealing to say that it bleeds power out of the political order so as to serve the economic. In the categories we have been using, it represents a decisive move in restructuring the Constitution to fit the demands of an emerging Market State.

First, Lawrence furthers the deconstruction of the States as moral communities, capable of legislating in ways that might inhibit the functioning of markets for the sake of higher-order collective values. More specifically, Lawrence diminishes the States’ ability to use criminal law to serve expressive and educative purposes, tending therefore to restrict criminal law to purely instrumental uses. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in particular goes so far as to imply that a communally deliberated judgment on moral worth, as codified in the criminal law, cannot be distinguished from “a bare desire to harm” the group whose activities the law condemns. The possibility of achieving and enforcing a collective moral judgment through the criminal law is thus collapsed into the expression of crude majoritarian repugnance or distaste. As Justice Scalia provocatively put it in his Romer dissent, “[t]he Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”

Second, Lawrence promotes the “mainstreaming” of homosexuals, a group that in the past has suffered from private discrimination in the marketplace, but that may now be perceived to bring certain competitive advantages to it. Homosexual employees may, for example, be able or willing to work longer hours than married heterosexuals with families; may be more open to relocating as corporate needs require; may not be as likely to sacrifice career goals to child-bearing or child-

304. 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra note 76.
305. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (reasoning that the criminalization of homosexual conduct “is an invitation...to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres”); see also id. at 2485–86 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (contending that the effect of the sodomy law is to “brand[] all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for [them] to be treated in the same manner as everyone else”).
rearing; may require a lower level of health care benefits (because of fewer partners or dependents); may be drawn to employment opportunities in more dynamic or "creative" parts of the economy, such as technology or entertainment; or may find more welcoming employers in those cutting edge sectors.\textsuperscript{306} Casey hinted at similar market-linked arguments for the permissive-abortion régime instituted by \textit{Roe}:

[F]or two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.\textsuperscript{307}

While characterizing its jurisprudence in the rhetoric of freedom and equality, the Court in fact casts a cold eye on the consequences of its decisions for the market economy.

Third, \textit{Lawrence} helps to constitute the legal framework for a system in which individuals do not seek and find meaning, value, and satisfaction in collective political action or in the public affirmation of common identities and purposes, but find their rewards instead in purely private, nonpolitical pleasures and gratifications. \textit{Lawrence} thus marks a further step in the direction of the overall depoliticization of society, and the consequent devaluation of the citizenship—fundamental characteristics of the Nation State.\textsuperscript{308}

\textsuperscript{306} All of these possibilities are conjectural. Nonetheless, there is a common, perhaps prevalent, perception that homosexuals constitute a particularly affluent, well-educated, and technologically-friendly demographic. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, \textit{Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom}, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1994) (gathering empirical data to support findings of homosexual affluence); Vilma Barr, \textit{Coming Out to Shop: Gay and Lesbian Consumers Are a New Driving Force in the Marketplace}, DISPLAY & DESIGN IDEAS, Nov. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 16779297 (reporting that 27\% of same-sex households have an annual income of $100,000 or more; that 37\% of homosexuals are college graduates and that 19\% have postgraduate degrees; that the average same-sex household annual income of $61,000 is 8\% higher than the average heterosexual annual household income of $56,000; that over 50\% of homosexuals own their own homes; and that 31\% have Internet broadband connections at home). Same-sex households are also disproportionately found in economically dynamic urban settings throughout the country, including San Francisco, Seattle, Berkeley, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. Barr, \textit{supra}; see also Richard Florida, \textit{The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life} 255-58 (2002) (finding high concentrations of homosexuals in high-tech areas).


\textsuperscript{308} On the causes and effects of depoliticization, see Carl Boggs, \textit{The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere} 25, 30 (2000).
The future trajectory of the *Lawrence* opinion is of course unforeseeable, but we think that there is no defensible basis to limit its holding to criminal laws condemning homosexual sodomy. Although *Lawrence* speaks (on occasion) of the special constitutional place of the home, an individual may well have a constitutionally protected legitimate expectation of sexual privacy in many other locations. Moreover, although the *Lawrence* Court refers to intimate personal relationships, there is no intelligible basis for limiting the holding to acts that occur within durable and longstanding homosexual relationships, as opposed to casual or anonymous acts of sodomy. Indeed, the rationale of *Lawrence* arguably extends to all modes of sexual pleasure, including those involving relations with animals or any genetically-created beings the *Blade Runner* world of biotechnology may yet fashion for human use and gratification. The capacity to decide questions of meaning and value on the basis of one's personal pain or pleasure knows no principled bounds, for a constitutional libertarian, until another (constitutional) person is "harmed."

The values of such an extreme libertarianism are, of course, unrooted in the history and traditions of the Nation, and are furthermore at odds with the Court's own traditional understanding of American federalism. They are, therefore, highly problematic to justify in terms of original understanding, constitutional text or structure, or judicial precedent. In trying to sustain its innovations, the Court reasons in a characteristically

(declaring that paltry public participation in government, as evidenced by low voter turnout, points to a more general depoliticization and devaluation of the individual citizen in the eyes of the governing elite).

309. Thus, at one place, Justice Kennedy states that the laws at issue in *Lawrence* and in *Bowers* "have more far-reaching consequences [than prohibiting a particular act], touching upon the most private of human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home." *Lawrence*, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. Earlier in the opinion, however, he had recognized that "there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence." Id. at 2475. Logically, nothing in the opinion restricts it either to sodomy practiced in the home or to sodomy practiced as part of an intimate personal relationship. After all, the Court has elsewhere found that there can be a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of [Fourth Amendment] privacy" in a public phone booth. *See* Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

310. Justice Kennedy remarked, platitudinously, that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring." *Lawrence*, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. But of course the "bond" may also be no more substantial than a fleeting encounter.

311. *BLADE RUNNER* (Blade Runner Partnership and The Ladd Company 1982) (a Ridley Scott film in which genetically engineered human "replicants" are used to colonize other worlds and perform labor that is either too dangerous or too demanding for humans).
"pragmatic" fashion: It functions as a self-conscious, policymaking organ of the government, relying for legitimacy on the fact that its choices serve the (purportedly) emergent needs of the Nation in international competition and accord with the outcomes demanded by élite domestic and international opinion.

B. The Court's Deference to Élite Groups and Institutions

A common theme in recent decisions of the Court is the clear appeal to the views of élite groups and institutions. In Lawrence and, when identifying legitimate State interests for purposes of equal protection analysis, in Grutter, the Court's deference to the concerns of economic, political, and cultural élites suggests that a pattern is at work in which community morality is subordinated to the wishes of the "winners" in the emerging Market State.312

Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Lawrence is striking for the use it makes of élite opinion in deciding a question that was properly never before the Court. Ordinarily, substantive due process jurisprudence relies on American history and tradition to substantiate the claim that a fundamental right is at stake, thus triggering a requirement for special justification of the State's need to limit the exercise of that right.313 Justice Kennedy's use of history in Lawrence neither established, nor claimed to establish, the conclusion that homosexual sodomy was recognized at any point in time by American society as within the sphere of protected individual liberty.314 Rather, attempting to refute the interpretation of history reflected in Bowers v. Hardwick,315 Justice Kennedy argued that the historical record did not demonstrate that the coercive power of the State had been directed at homosexual activity.316 In other words, he shifted the burden of persuasion so as to require the State defendant to demonstrate historically that its interest in the regulation of particular sexual conduct had been traditionally asserted and


313. See supra text accompanying notes 261–276.

314. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478–80 (concluding that prior to the 1970s criminal sodomy statutes sought to prohibit “nonprocreative sexual activity more generally” (as opposed to homosexual conduct) but never asserting a general acceptance of homosexual practice).

315. 478 U.S. 186, 192–94 (1986) (finding no historical evidence of a liberty right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy); id. at 196–97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (underscoring his “view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy... [and that] proscriptions against sodomy have very 'ancient roots'”).

316. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478–80.
accepted. The key materials for the conclusion that the States had never relied on the community’s conception of morality to justify the prohibition of homosexual activity was the nearly unanimous verdict, in Justice Kennedy’s view, of the professional historical community.  

Justice Kennedy in Lawrence also relied on another segment of élite opinion—the international legal community’s understanding of homosexual rights. While some early Supreme Court precedent had alluded to the possibility that identifying a violation of a constitutionally protected “liberty” might require the Court to explore conceptions of justice prevailing outside the United States, recent efforts to rely on foreign precedent to inform American conceptions of substantive due process have been met with failure. In Lawrence, however, Justice Kennedy relied expressly on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights to determine that several European nations held views “at odds with the premise in Bowers that the [liberty] claim put forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.”

Even more telling than its use of élite opinion in Lawrence was the Court’s unembarrassed reliance on élite views to determine the scope of a highly contested constitutional antidiscrimination norm in Grutter. Relying extensively on amicus briefs submitted by élite corporate, military, and educational authorities, Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, asserted the following:

[Major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people,

317. See id. (relying on submissions by the libertarian Cato Institute and the “Professors of History, et al.”); see also Rick Perlstein, Op-Ed, What Gay Studies Taught the Court, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B3 (noting the Court’s reliance on an amicus brief submitted by a coalition of history professors, some of whose work had until recently been derided as reflecting marginal scholarship representing the politically correct values of academic elites).


319. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531–32 (1884) (stating that “[t]here is nothing in Magna Charta . . . [that] ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age”).

320. See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2494–95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting in his dissenting opinion that foreign views are “meaningless dicta”).

cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, "[b]ased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security." The primary sources for the Nation’s officer corps are the service academies and the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the latter comprising students already admitted to participating colleges and universities. At present, "the military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and admissions policies."

Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders. Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives.

In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training.\(^\text{322}\)

In short, the Court based its constitutional reasoning on the contention of a group of the Nation's key corporate, political, and military leaders that the Nation's prospects of success in the face of international strategic threats, as well as the continued stability and perceived legitimacy of its domestic political institutions, required racial preferences in élite formation through our major educational institutions.

Fascinating as it is for what it says, the Grutter opinion is perhaps still more fascinating for what it does not say. Faced with the highly charged question of the constitutionality of racial preferences in public higher education—which it had not addressed since the split Bakke\(^\text{323}\) decision of 1978—the Court could have rested its approval of such preferences on the


squarely moral grounds that the State had a compelling interest in overcoming and remediating the effects of past discriminatory practices. In other words, the Court might have seen the State's action as permitted, or even required, by the demands of corrective justice. Instead, the Court chose to rest on purely amoral, instrumentalist grounds—thus evidencing its aversion to the public invocation of a presumptively common or shared morality, not only by the Nation’s legislatures, but also by its courts.

But was a corrective justice rationale available to the Court, even given the longstanding exclusion of minority groups from American leadership cadres? The Court's own affirmative action precedents admittedly tended to block reliance on any such rationale, insofar as they held that governmental racial preferences could be justified as remediation only if they were carefully crafted to redress particularized wrongs committed by the State against specified groups. Accordingly, the State tactically eschewed reliance on a remediation theory, arguing instead that it had sought merely to promote educational diversity. But another body of precedents—the Court's desegregation cases—had recognized that measures to eliminate racial discrimination and its lingering effects had a fundamentally moral basis. At any rate, no remedial rationale ever surfaced in Grutter; the keynote of the opinion was diversity, not corrective justice.

324. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340–41 (justifying the Court's finding of a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body on the ground that diversity is necessary “to cultivate a set of leaders” who can compete in the global marketplace and be seen as “legitima[te] in the eyes of the citizenry”).

325. On the other hand, the Court was not so openly cynical as to declare the State's policy constitutionally valid because, by providing cosmetic relief from the Nation's still-festering racial wounds, it could serve to palliate the grievances of minorities and so bind them to an elite leadership that, for the foreseeable future, would remain disproportionately drawn from other races.

326. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (“In sum, none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race.”).

327. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (describing the law school's diversity policy as “aspir[ing] to ‘achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education’”).

328. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting BICKEL, supra note 108, at 133: “discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society”).

329. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338–40 (accepting the law school's goal of enrolling a diverse class of students as a “compelling interest”).
Diversity, unlike corrective justice, supposes that the legitimate interests of a State in this area are grounded in purely pragmatic, nonmoral goals. The demographic diversity of the leadership class, unlike whether the composition of that class reflects a just society, is an issue that can be considered without appeal to values and norms that, even if widely shared, could prove to be divisive and contentious. As one sympathetic commentator put it, *Grutter* "places us in the Here and Now," rather than "look[ing] back to . . . slavery and Jim Crow." But as a more critical view of "diversity" notes,

Diversity is particularly appealing because of what it is not. It is not based on theories of racial responsibility. It is not based on a vision of group rights, or on a theory that proportional racial representation is an end in itself. It is not based on controversial views of compensation for past discrimination. . . . It does not even require a social consensus about the magnitude of present discrimination.

The reasoning in *Grutter*, therefore, brackets the question of the morality of race-conscious admissions programs—with the apparent but incongruous consequence that acting upon the *morality* of such measures is not within the domain of legitimate State interests.

At the same time, the *Grutter* Court did not disclose what conceivably was, from a more purely instrumentalist perspective, the full measure of its thought. It can be argued with considerable plausibility that the workings of majoritarian democracy—unless effectively constrained by constitutional protections for propertied minorities—will tend to reverse the outcomes produced by markets, in that the markets will normally tend to favor identifiable ethnic minorities. This apparently inescapable tension between democracy and markets can exist, moreover, not only in developing nations, but also in the United States. Left to its own devices and without some form of governmental intervention, American capitalism seems likely to

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331. Eugene Volokh, *Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy*, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059, 2059 (1996) (criticizing the diversity approach to affirmative action as contrary to the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act, which require that a person's race not be considered as a potentially deciding factor in hiring or admissions decisions).

continue to favor and reward certain identifiable ethnic and racial groups disproportionately and to disfavor other identifiable groups. Particularly given the sources of much of this inequality in the nation's history of slavery and discrimination, the persistence (and possible aggravation) of such differences would tend to create sharp and destabilizing conflicts within the American polity. American economic, political, and military élites have a clear interest in abating or suppressing such conflicts. Indeed, they must do so if the American Market State is to remain competitive in the international arena.

The Grutter decision can thus be seen as the Court's ratification (in the guise of constitutional adjudication) of the opinion of the dominant élites on how best to address this troubling prospect. The solution preferred by élites surely cannot be to redress the full costs of slavery and discrimination by large-scale compensatory measures. As well as being (arguably) unaffordable, the political efforts required to enact and execute such a program could be even more divisive and destabilizing (at least in the short term) than the inequalities it was designed to eliminate.

More attractive is the kind of cosmetic solution pursued by the State in Grutter and upheld, at the behest of élite decisionmakers, by the Court. Selection for élites through modest governmental interventions in the admissions process for public, professional schools would be virtually cost-free to existing élites (if much more so to non-élite whites and Asians). At the same time, it would ensure over time such a visible (if perhaps also small) presence of minorities within élite ranks that the great majority of the minority population would be led to accept the continuing legitimacy of the élite's national leadership. Michigan's program was constitutionally valid because it would "cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the [minority] citizenry." From an élite perspective, the optics—not the reality—of racial equality is what mattered. Social peace could be bought at a low price and without fundamentally disturbing the existing structures of hierarchy.

Grutter reflects the Court's deference to élite concerns in yet another way: not so much in forming a national élite that possesses "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry" as in meeting

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333. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
334. As Bobbitt argues, affirmative action, though purporting to promote the equality of "the group that is thought to be in need of assistance," in fact entrenches the hitherto-dominant group's power to "set[] the terms of assimilation," which "implicitly den[i]es equal status" to the assisted group. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 225.
the business needs created by competition in "today's increasingly global marketplace." The Court seems to have accepted the elite judgment that in order to remain vigorously competitive in the international arena, American business must select its leadership cadres from the entire range of racial and ethnic backgrounds found within the Nation's population, so that the increased diversity within those cadres would at least roughly match the diverse population of the "global marketplace" at large. Elite formation would still be conducted in terms of "merit"-based selection principles, but "merit" would now be defined in terms of a competitive advantage in an expanded, more thoroughly globalized, market. Thus, affirmation action, understood and applied in this manner, has fundamentally different goals from the Court's Cold War-era project of desegregation. Desegregation served the needs of a Nation State that was attempting to be "the provider and guarantor of [individual] equality." In large part, desegregation was an effort to assimilate minorities into the dominant national group, thus forging a national people that could meet the external Communist enemy with a united front, and so denying that enemy any opportunity to exploit potentially dangerous rifts within the Nation. Affirmative action, as upheld in Grutter, is also thought to serve the Nation's strategic needs, but in an international environment that is markedly different from the Cold War. No longer does the Court feel a need to foster a national unity that transcends racial consciousness or to further the assimilation of racial minorities. Such strategic needs have

335. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340–41.
336. See id. at 2340 (citing amicus briefs from 3M and General Motors to emphasize that the skills needed to compete in the "global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints").
337. At the same time, the Court was unwilling to depart too far from more traditional criteria of "merit." As Justice Thomas trenchantly pointed out, the Court refused to require the State's law school to consider race-neutral selection schemes that would have produced the same amount of "diversity" as before, while also relaxing the school's demanding academic requirements for admission. See Lund, supra note 138, at 281–82 (citing Justice Thomas's dissent, which argued that the Grutter majority's refusal to require Michigan Law School to consider race-neutral methods was in direct contrast to the Court's opinion in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
338. BOBBI'TT, supra note 22, at 225.
339. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (recognizing the opinions of military leaders that a "'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security'").
340. In a line of cases beginning in 1976, the Court has disapproved lower court decisions to prevent resegregation and has sought to facilitate the transition of public school districts to "unitary" status. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992) (holding that federal courts may relinquish supervision and control of school districts in incremental phases); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (stating that the
passed, together with the passing of the Cold War's chief external threat. Thus the *Grutter* Court could view the prospect of multiculturalism with equanimity despite the fact that, as Bobbitt correctly perceives, multiculturalism makes it "increasingly difficult" for a Nation State "to get consensus on public-order problems and the maintenance of rule-based legal action." Rather than regarding the rise of multiculturalism as a liability that had the potential to weaken or even fracture the Nation, the Court saw it as an *asset* to be exploited for all the advantages it could bring American businesses in their international transactions. And again, race-conscious governmental action is viewed through the prism of its usefulness, not its morality.

In what follows, we build on this analysis of the Court's decisions, including both its rejection of the legitimacy of the States' enforcement of traditional morality and its "pragmatic" deference to elite opinion. Both of these aspects of the Court's jurisprudence follow from its commitment to reorder the Constitution to adapt to the needs of the Market State. Part IV applies the same kind of analysis to the Court's federalism jurisprudence. In particular, the Court's reasoning in *American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi* follows directly from the individual rights doctrines discussed here in Part III.

**IV. THE NEW FEDERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CASES**

Before situating *Garamendi* in the context of the Court's recent individual rights jurisprudence, three other trends of thought, which have long been at work influencing the development of the Court's theory of federalism, must be discussed.

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341. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 225.

342. See *Grutter*, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (commenting that "student body diversity... better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals" who will be ready to enter the "global marketplace").

First, the Court's federalism jurisprudence arguably carries forward a constitutional revolution initiated by *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*. In *Erie*, the Court rejected the twin assumptions that federal courts may apply law that does not derive from either a State or federal sovereign, and that the common law is discovered rather than made—thus constitutionalizing legal positivism. *Erie* feeds into the Court's later federalism in at least two ways: It (1) supports an understanding that the States are in some respects fully sovereign with reserved spheres of authority that even the federal sovereign must respect, and, more importantly here, (2) encourages the view that law is itself primarily a matter of power relationships, not of objective norms discoverable by reason and reflection.

Second, many courts have followed Professor Brainerd Currie's revolutionary work in conflicts of law analysis, which, in drawing on the legal realist movement, supposed that only a State's interests in its own domiciliaries, or in conduct on or affecting its territory, could form the basis of its legislative jurisdiction. Currie's theory rested on the view that lawmaking

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344. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
345. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2762 (2004) (noting that pre-*Erie*, the "accepted conception was of the common law as 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute'" (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); id. at 2764 ("[W]e now tend to understand common law not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of human choice."); id. at 2773 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The Court recognizes that *Erie* was a 'watershed' decision heralding an avulsive change, wrought by 'conceptual development in understanding common law...[and accompanied by an] equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it.'" (alteration in original)); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts—Before and After *Erie*, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 807, 818 (1998) ("[T]he Court in *Erie* rejected... the idea that federal courts can apply law not derived from a sovereign source, and the idea that courts merely discover the common law rather than make it.").
347. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) (explaining the instrumentalist nature of lawmaking and the territoriality of Conflict of Law practice). For judicial acknowledgements of Currie's influence, see *Booking v. General Star Management Co.*, 254 F.3d 414, 422 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing Professor Currie as the most influential critic of the traditional "vested rights" theory of Conflict of Laws), and *Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.*, 630 F.2d 149, 166 n.63 (3d Cir. 1980) (referring to Currie as the "father of modern governmental interest analysis").
348. CURRIE, supra note 347, at 292 (determining that a statute's benefits should "be applied... to effectuate [a] community's policy... whenever those who are the objects of [the statute's] protection are members of the community—i.e., residents or domiciliaries of the state").
is to be conceived as a merely instrumental activity.\textsuperscript{349} It intimated a conception of State authority that discounted any role for pursuing the common good or promoting the virtue of the individual.\textsuperscript{350}

Third, the Court’s recent federalism case law has often focused on reinforcing the process of political competition between the States and the federal government. Accordingly, the Court has tended to view federalism as a device for perfecting political markets, and has sought to ensure that transparency and accountability facilitate informed choices by political consumers.\textsuperscript{351} In effect, the Court has treated the State political process as though it were chiefly a device for preference satisfaction and welfare maximizing, rather than a means for achieving individual virtue and the common good.

All three of these trends complement the Court’s individual rights and equal protection jurisprudence surveyed above. The various strands of thought are knitted together in the Court’s “foreign relations federalism” opinion in \textit{Garamendi}.\textsuperscript{352}

In \textit{Garamendi}, the Court surprised many observers by holding that California’s Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA) had been preempted by executive branch policy reflected in an executive agreement with a foreign government.\textsuperscript{353} The HVIRA had “require[d] any insurer doing business in [California] to disclose information about all policies sold in

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351. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–26 (1997) (extending the reasoning of the legislative anticommandeering principle to a refusal to permit the federal government to commandeer State executive officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182–83 (1992) (invalidating federal directive to a State ordering the enactment of particular legislation on the theory that political accountability is a necessary postulate of federalism, because competition between federal and State policymakers requires that individual voters be able to assign responsibility for a policy choice to the author of the policy rather than merely to its agent); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Were the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.”).

352. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003) (stating that there is “no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy”).

353. \textit{Id.} at 2379 (declaring the preemption).
\end{quote}
Europe between 1920 and 1945. This regulatory requirement, the Court said, "threatens to frustrate the operation of the particular mechanism the President has chosen to vindicate the interests of the United States in the resolution of Holocaust survivors' claims. The President's preferred mechanism was a voluntary body, the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), established to negotiate and settle unpaid policies. The ICHEIC compensation fund for Holocaust victims was created by the 2000 German Foundation Agreement between the United States and Germany. In working out these and related agreements, the United States executive branch did not stipulate, in terms, that inconsistent State law or policy was to be superseded; rather, the United States agreed only to "use its best efforts, in a manner it considers appropriate," to persuade the States to treat the German Foundation process as the exclusive method of claim resolution.

Federal preemption, therefore, could hardly be found in the German Agreement itself. Indeed, the language of the Agreement seemed to imply that the States need not regard the Agreement as preemptive. As the United States' brief in the court of appeals stated, it was a mistake "to suggest that the Agreement by its terms preempts the California statute." Further, the Court did not find any other related agreements or congressional statutes ex proprio vigore to preempt the HVIRA. Federal law and federal treaties, as such, accordingly had nothing directly to do with the Court's result, and indeed nothing in the text of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause could be said to specify the kind of "law" here that trumped a legitimate exercise of State
legislative jurisdiction. Moreover, both judicial precedent and scholarly commentary were distinctly unfavorable to the idea that mere executive branch policy could have a preemptive effect on State law: Indeed, "the idea that a presidential policy could, in itself, displace a state law seemed barely to have been contemplated."

The Court's conclusion that the executive branch policy, embodied in the German Foundation Agreement, preempted the HVIRA depended on resuscitating and refashioning an isolated, dubious, and over thirty year-old precedent, Zschernig v. Miller. Zschernig itself suffered from numerous analytical deficits but, in any event, was misused in Garamendi. In brief, Garamendi read the German Foundation Agreement in conjunction with Zschernig's doctrine of "dormant [federal] foreign affairs preemption," a rule of constitutional exclusion that declares States to be incompetent to affect foreign affairs in particular ways, such that the Federal Executive's foreign policy has a preemptive effect on State law.

**A. The Pre-Garamendi Allocation of Power Between the States and the Federal Government in Foreign Relations**

Zschernig itself, like Garamendi, had come as something of a surprise because it invalidated a State statute similar to one that had previously survived a facial attack in Clark v. Allen. Both Zschernig and Clark had concerned the validity of a State probate law that restricted the ability of legatees living in Communist-bloc countries to receive property willed to them. Commentators and courts have attempted to distinguish the two cases in terms of the judicial administration of the probate law, which afforded State judges an occasion for casting aspersions on

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363. See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").

364. Denning & Ramsey, supra note 56, at 863-64.

365. 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (mentioning the danger of a State's establishing its own foreign policy).

366. See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 56, at 855-57 (arguing that Zschernig is a questionable precedent because, under it, "in the absence of a treaty provision, a law, or even an executive branch policy, a state law may still be" preempted).

367. See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2387-91 (majority opinion) (holding that the Government demonstrated a sufficient enough interest to require a finding of preemption of the State law).

368. 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).

369. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31 & n.1; Clark, 331 U.S. at 505-06 & n.1.
the political systems of Communist-bloc countries, thereby potentially complicating the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. 370 If so, Zschernig might arguably have been best understood as a federalism-grounded, State-law corollary of Banco Nañonal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 371 in which the Court, on the basis of general separation-of-powers principles, refused to enforce a State-law claim grounded on the invalidity of an expropriation of assets in Cuba by the Cuban revolutionary government. 372 The Sabbatino Court reasoned that a judicial ruling as to whether the Cuban government's confiscation of property on its own territory violated international law would undermine the Executive's conduct of foreign policy in this area, thus transgressing (prudential) separation of powers limits on judicial authority. 373 One might then read Zschernig and Sabbatino together as a double-barreled effort by the Supreme Court to enable the political branches of the federal government, without interference from either the State courts or the federal judiciary, to manage the Cold War and, perhaps, to seek détente in the face of domestic resistance to any compromises with communism.

The Garamendi Court's reliance on Zschernig was surprising, not only because the geopolitical circumstances that may have given rise to Zschernig's dormant foreign affairs

370. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 436–37 nn.64–65 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing both cases and reasoning that the "Oregon [probate] statute introduces the concept of 'confiscation,'" which would be in conflict with the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment). Similarly, courts believed the principles underlying the Court's holding in Zschernig to be limited to its particular fact-pattern, which involved judicial statements critical of a foreign legal system. See, e.g., Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398, 398–99 (1969) (indicating that Zschernig makes clear that "a state probate judge is not authorized to make or apply a probate rule contrary to ... federal policy"); Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (stating that Zschernig relates only to judicial application of the statute that can complicate foreign affairs).


372. Id. at 401 (explaining that under the Act of State doctrine, courts may not challenge the validity of acts of other governments committed within their own borders).

373. The Court asserted,

There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens.

It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively the practical and ideological goals of the various members of the community of nations.

The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of whether the State Department has, as it did in this case, asserted that the relevant act violated international law.

Id. at 428–32.
doctrine had long vanished, nor because Zschernig's doctrine had been searchingly criticized by legal scholars, but also because nothing in recent jurisprudence of the Court suggested that Zschernig might be revived. Moreover, the Court's post-Zschernig cases have not otherwise suggested that bare executive branch policy could have a preemptive effect on an otherwise valid State law.

For example, the Court in *Dames & Moore v. Regan* relied on (1) the Algiers Accord, a sole Presidential agreement settling U.S. claims against the Government of Iran in return for the repatriation of American hostages and (2) congressional acquiescence in the longstanding practice of sole executive-claims-settlement agreements, to trump State-law claims sounding in contract. Unlike the executive policy pronouncements that Garamendi held to preempt State law, the pronouncements at issue in *Dames & Moore* were Presidential (rather than being authored by lower level Executive officials). Further, unlike Garamendi, the State law at issue in *Dames & Moore* was inconsistent with the express terms of the relevant executive agreement.

374. See, e.g., Bradley, *supra* note 88, at 285–88 (arguing that neither the dormant foreign-affairs-preemption doctrine nor the federal common law of foreign-relations doctrine is a necessary "reading of the Constitution, federal statutory law, or Supreme Court precedent"); Ramsey, *supra* note 60, at 356–57 (opining that the Court's decision in *Zschernig* was based on assumptions and intuitions rather than constitutional text or structure or original intent regarding the powers of States relating to foreign affairs).

375. See, e.g., Bradley, *supra* note 88, at 286 (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has not applied this doctrine in the thirty-three years since Zschernig"). Further, as Justice Ginsburg noted in her *Garamendi* dissent, the Court had never based another decision on *Zschernig*’s dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2400 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also argued that *Zschernig* was readily distinguishable in that it only involved State policies or intruded deeply into foreign affairs—neither of which was true of the HVIRA. *Id.*

376. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 385 (2000) (finding both executive opinion and reactions of foreign powers irrelevant to "congressional intent because Congress had taken specific actions rejecting the positions both of foreign governments and the Executive" (internal citations omitted)).


378. *Id.* at 675–83.

379. *Id.* at 660.

380. *Id.* at 666–67 (discussing Executive Order No. 12294 and its suspension of all "claims which may be presented to the... Tribunal" and mandating that any such claims "shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United States"). As noted, the documents associated with the German Foundation Agreement had consciously withheld any declaration of preemptive effect. *See Garamendi,* 123 S. Ct. at 2387–88 ("[I]f the agreements here had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the issue would be straightforward.").
Franchise Tax Board,\textsuperscript{381} the Court declined to find that executive branch policy pronouncements, relevant to the interpretation of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, gave rise to a foreign-affairs preemption barring California from using the so-called "worldwide combined reporting" methodology to determine a U.K. firm’s corporate franchise tax.\textsuperscript{382} Finally, the Court’s last pre-Garamendi encounter with foreign-relations federalism, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,\textsuperscript{383} did not rely in the least on Zschernig’s doctrine of dormant foreign-affairs preemption.\textsuperscript{384} Rather, in Crosby, the Court found that a Massachusetts ban on certain State contracts with entities doing business in Burma was preempted by a federal statute authorizing the President to impose—or withhold—sanctions against a narrower class of businesses and investors dealing with Burma.\textsuperscript{385} The Crosby Court reasoned that preemption arose because Congress had manifested its intention to limit sanctions aimed against the Burmese régime to those which the President deemed necessary after seeking to coordinate policy with Japan and the European Union.\textsuperscript{386} The federal statute was construed to have given the President the authority to decide \textit{for the Nation as a whole} what types and what level of sanctions (within the limits prescribed by Congress) were appropriate to achieve the goal of improving human rights conditions in Burma.\textsuperscript{387} The Crosby Court seemed willing to adopt a strained construction of the federal statute in order to preempt State law, rather than to make use of Zschernig’s doctrine of dormant federal-foreign-affairs power to achieve that result.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[381] 512 U.S. 298 (1994). Justice Ginsburg’s Garamendi dissent relied, as had her opinion for the Court in Barclays Bank, on the lack of precedent for finding foreign affairs preemption based on mere sub-cabinet level, executive branch policy statements. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2400–01.
\item[382] Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324–31 (noting that this question is best left to Congress and not to the courts).
\item[384] See id. at 385–86 (finding that “repeated representations by the Executive branch supported by formal diplomatic protests and concrete disputes” provided evidence for congressional intent to preempt).
\item[385] Id. at 366, 376–78 (finding that the State law is in clear conflict with congressional intent).
\item[386] That is to say, the Court read the federal statute as enabling the President to protect the ability of American corporations to do business in Burma, even at a cost to human rights, if their competitors refused to boycott the Burmese régime. Id. at 380–82. Thus, as a result of Crosby, control over the U.S. sanctions policy towards Burma effectively lay with Japanese and European multinationals. See id. at 383 & n.19 (revealing that the European Union intended to begin new World Trade Organization proceedings if the injunction on the State law was lifted).
\item[387] Id. at 374–77.
\end{footnotes}
Thus, recent pre-Garamendi precedent had suggested that foreign-affairs preemption requires either (1) an Act of Congress that could (more or less plausibly) be read to oust conflicting State policy, or else (2) some overt act of constitutional authority by the President—in the form of an executive agreement, ideally coupled with congressional sanction or ratification (or a pattern of acquiescence)—whose express terms were clearly at odds with the State’s statute.\textsuperscript{388} In other words, some reasonably explicit action, transparent to the electorate, would have been required from one or both of the federal political branches, operating at the appropriate constitutional level, before the courts could be invoked to overturn a State law on bare constitutional foreign-affairs grounds.\textsuperscript{389} At a minimum, the Court, following Barclays Bank, could have been expected to hold that mere policy statements emanating from sub-presidential executive branch officials could not trump State statutory law.\textsuperscript{390}

Therefore, the Court’s choice of a different and ill-precedented course is a fact requiring an explanation. This Part argues that the explanation lies in the Court’s changing understanding of federalism, read together with its new-found individual rights libertarianism. Section B explains the linkage

\footnotesize{388. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2394 (2003) (“Indeed, it is worth noting that Congress has done nothing to express disapproval of the President’s policy. Legislation along the lines of HVIRA has been introduced in Congress repeatedly, but none of the bills has come close to making it into law.”).}  
\footnotesize{389. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, Leading Cases, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 231 (2003) (“Garamendi failed to resolve the tension between, on the one hand, the Court’s recent retreat from dormant foreign commerce preemption, and on the other, the expansive foreign affairs preemption adopted in Zschernig . . . .”).}  
\footnotesize{390. However, the Garamendi majority did seek to distinguish the Court’s refusal in Barclays Bank to give effect to executive branch policy pronouncements on two grounds: First, in Barclays Bank the executive branch pronouncements were in the area of the Foreign Commerce Clause, a matter expressly granted to congressional jurisdiction; and second, in Garamendi, there was no suggestion that the sub-Cabinet level policy pronouncements did not reflect the views of the President himself, so that there was no need to apply a requirement for express presidential policy pronouncements in this case. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2391 nn.12–13.}

Neither of these distinctions seems persuasive. They depend on the characterization of issues as falling either under the “Foreign Commerce Clause” or within the “field of foreign policy” when these areas in fact frequently overlap. Furthermore, whether the President approves a particular statement of an executive branch official is simply a matter of fact that cannot be determined by the judiciary in the absence of discovery—as the Court appears to have done, one way in Barclays Bank and the other way in Garamendi, to suit its preferred outcome. Compare Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329–30 (1994) (stating that “Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting”), with Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2381–82 (finding preemption of State law based on the formation of a voluntary international organization that was never officially mandated by the President).
between the Court's foreign-relations-federalism jurisprudence and the conceptual underpinnings of the Court's new individual rights jurisprudence.

B. The "New Federalism" in Foreign Relations

_Garamendi_ has two limbs. Section A considered the first limb—the existence and effect of federal (especially executive branch) power in foreign affairs. Section B considers the second—the Court's finding that California had no significant interest in legislating the HVIRA.

Foreign relations federalism, like domestic-federalism cases, can be reconceptualized in ways that link it closely to the Court's individual liberties cases. If foreign relations matters now include questions that historically were within the province of the States, then the inability of States to articulate a legitimate interest in such matters would, under individual rights limitations, also disable the States from legislating on them. Under this approach, it would be unnecessary to resort to any supposed structural limitations in order to hold a State incompetent to legislate on matters that were exclusively within the ambit of federal regulatory authority. Accordingly, as this subsection explains, the underlying premises of _Lawrence_ and _Grutter_ are useful, perhaps indispensable, in explaining the outcome in _Garamendi_.

1. Legitimate State Interests in Foreign Affairs. The Court's analysis of California's interest in the HVIRA can be understood as an alternative holding, complementing its conclusion that the nature of the federal interest alone was sufficient to trump any State interest. But even if the analysis of the State's (lack of) interest were considered dictum, the Court seems to have gone out of its way to address that subject. Seemingly, the Court wanted to emphasize that the State's authority to legislate, with respect to moral questions, was meager, exactly as the State's authority had been determined to be in _Lawrence_ and other substantive due process cases.

392. _Id._ at 2393.
393. See _id._ at 2392 ("The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.").
394. See _id._ (addressing the State's interest even though the Court declared that the "clear conflict" between the State law and federal policy was enough to find preemption).
395. See _id._ at 2393 (stating that "the humanity underlying the state statute could not give the State the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy").
The Court reached the question of the strength of the State's interest in an oblique and roundabout way—by eliding (while also purporting to respect) the distinction between "conflict" and "field" preemption of State law. It is useful to disentangle that part of the Court's reasoning before addressing its overall evaluation of the State's claimed interest.

Writing for the Garamendi majority, Justice Souter characteristically purported to rely on Justice Harlan—particularly Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig. In that opinion, Justice Harlan had refused to join the Zschernig majority's claim that the federal government's supremacy in foreign affairs operated to preempt State law in the entire "field" of foreign relations, even when the federal government had disclaimed any interest in barring the State's action. Instead, Harlan opined that the Court should determine whether there was an actual conflict between State and federal policy. Justice Souter merged Harlan's conflict-based analysis into what he considered to be applicable dormant Commerce Clause precedent, stating that "it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state law preempted." By that move, conflict preemption was collapsed (by way of the kind of interest-based analysis appropriate to a conflicts-of-law case) into field preemption.

The precise basis for Harlan's concurrence in the Zschernig result was his conclusion that—contrary to the Court's earlier holding in Clark—the Oregon probate statute at issue in both cases was indeed "preempted by a 1923 [U.S.] treaty with Germany." The Zschernig case then fell, in his view, under the "actual conflict preemption" rubric. Justice Harlan, therefore, was far from endorsing the Garamendi Court's view "that state laws not in conflict with any law, treaty, or executive agreement...
were nevertheless preempted on the strength of executive branch [policy] statements.\(^{403}\)

By contrast, Garamendi's dormant foreign affairs preemption approach treated the question of whether the (more expansive) field or the (more restrictive) conflict preemption should be employed as simply a variable dependent on the weight of the underlying State interest—with field preemption operative "[i]f a state were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility," and with conflict preemption analysis applicable when a State acted within an area of its "traditional competence."\(^{404}\) Thus, where Justice Harlan would have looked to the intentions of federal treaty-makers to decide whether a State law was preempted, the Garamendi Court characterized the State's interest, evaluated it, and, after finding it insufficient, allowed a (latent) Presidential foreign affairs authority to preempt it.\(^{405}\) That was emphatically not following Harlan's lead.\(^{406}\)

In any event, the Court scrutinized carefully the strength and legitimacy of the interest asserted by California. The Court questioned whether California's putative interest—"knowing which insurers have failed to pay insurance claims"—was its actual motive because "quite unlike a generally applicable 'blue sky' law, HVIRA effectively singles out only policies issued by European companies, in Europe, to European residents, at least

\(^{403}\) Denning & Ramsey, supra note 56, at 878.

\(^{404}\) Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2389 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).

\(^{405}\) See id. at 2392-93 (finding that federal policy preempted State law because the State's interest was not sufficient).

\(^{406}\) Another (albeit lesser) analytical flaw mars Justice Souter's opinion. He failed to explain why the determination of whether a State was acting in an area of its "traditional competence" for purposes of assessing the potential implications for State law of the Intrastate and Foreign Commerce Clauses should be translated automatically into dormant foreign-affairs-power preemption. It is at least arguable that "tradition," with respect to one of these allocations of authority, is not dispositive with respect to the other: The States might conceivably have more authority to act in foreign affairs (despite the acknowledged supremacy of the federal government in that area) than they do in regulating foreign or interstate commerce. Justice Souter's answer to that suggestion might be that the formation of an American Nation after the Revolutionary War in and of itself nationalized all responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs; thus, there was no power left to be reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, . . . to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality."). Notwithstanding the apparent category error, the Court sought to characterize the nature of the State and federal interests in Garamendi for the purposes of implementing a dormant foreign affairs constitutional preemption analysis. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2393.
The Court concluded that "limiting the public disclosure requirement to these policies raises great doubt that the purpose of the California law is an evaluation of corporate reliability in contemporary insuring in the State. Such reliance on a finding of such substantial under-inclusiveness would be of significance in an equal protection or substantive due process context only under an intermediate or strict scrutiny standard of review. Thus, the Court's rejection of the State's articulated interest—a justification that would appear to be sufficient under any rational-basis test for legislation affecting only economic interests, as well as even the Court's putatively analogous Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence—indicates that the Court was scrutinizing the State's claim under a more demanding standard of review—but without acknowledging that it was doing so.

After excluding the possibility of a State interest focused on the protection of consumers generally, the Court went on to exclude the possibility of a State interest in benefiting a specific group of State domiciliaries. It asserted that "there is no serious doubt that the state interest actually underlying HVIRA is concern for the several thousand Holocaust survivors said to be living in the State." That the State had such an interest, however, "does not displace general standards for evaluating a State's claim to apply its forum law to a particular controversy or transaction, under which the State's claim is not a strong one." In other words, the Court applied a conflict-of-laws-based "interest" standard, in which post-occurrence change of domicile did not, of itself, give the State an interest in applying its law to nondomiciliaries with respect to facts and circumstances outside its jurisdiction. The logic of the reasoning appears to prohibit

407. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2392.
408. Id.
409. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (plurality opinion) (accepting Iowa's claimed interest in health and safety as legitimate, notwithstanding the under-inclusiveness of the means it chose to advance that interest, and balancing that interest against the federal interest of trucking-regulation uniformity in interstate commerce).
410. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (denying that the State had a sufficient interest in protecting Holocaust survivors domiciled in the State).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. (requiring that traditional standards be applied to determine the forum law despite the fact that thousands of Holocaust survivors reside in the desired forum State); see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 311 (1981) (indicating that post-occurrence change of domicile to the forum State in itself is an insufficient basis to justify applying the forum law).
States from legislating on the basis of universal jurisdiction to vindicate the rights or interests of humanity.\textsuperscript{414}

More sweepingly, the Court appeared to find the morally-based interests of States to be constitutionally insufficient to enable them to legislate in the broad field of foreign-relations matters. It concluded that, "against the responsibility of the United States of America, the humanity underlying the state statute could not give the State the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy."\textsuperscript{415} Thus, the State's moral interest—what Justice Souter called the "humanity underlying the state statute"—weighed little in the Court's calculus.\textsuperscript{416} The State's interest was insufficient to let the law stand, even though neither the federal executive nor the federal legislature had spoken in a way that clearly invoked the Supremacy Clause's requirement that only the federal Constitution, federal treaties, or federal statutory law trumped State law.\textsuperscript{417}

The Court's approach in \textit{Garamendi} cannot be dismissed as an isolated example. In fact, \textit{Garamendi} reveals a new understanding on the Court's part of the limits of State competence with respect to moral issues in foreign relations. For example, in \textit{Nike v. Kasky},\textsuperscript{418} two "centrists," Justice Breyer joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the Court's dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, on grounds that revealed a similar depreciation of State competence to pursue moral interests.\textsuperscript{419} \textit{Nike} involved an attempt by a California resident to rely on California Unfair Competition Law to seek civil damages against Nike for unfair and deceptive trade practices through allegedly making false statements and omissions of fact concerning Nike's practices with respect to foreign labor in the manufacture of its products overseas.\textsuperscript{420} As the case came to the Court, the question was whether Nike's advertising involved "commercial speech," subject to an

\textsuperscript{414.} See \textit{Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States} §§ 402 cmt. k, 404 n.2 (1987) (raising the question whether States may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction at least with respect to a limited class of offenses and arguing that, under the Supremacy Clause, universal jurisdiction is a question of federal law).

\textsuperscript{415.} \textit{Garamendi}, 123 S. Ct. at 2393.

\textsuperscript{416.} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{417.} See \textit{id.} (refusing to find a sufficient State interest and allowing State law to be preempted based on conflicting national policy).

\textsuperscript{418.} 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2559 (2003) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{419.} See \textit{id.} at 2560 (arguing that the Court should have granted certiorari because the State law, which discouraged certain kinds of speech, would cause "injury in fact").

\textsuperscript{420.} \textit{Id.} at 2554–55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
intermediate standard of review, or speech that was fully protected by the First Amendment.\footnote{Id. at 2555.} In dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer was ready to reach the merits and sustain Nike's claim that it was entitled to First Amendment protection.\footnote{Id. at 2564 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that, if Nike could prove that its statements were not "unfair" under California law, it would prevail on nonfederal grounds).} Together with other opinions of the Court,\footnote{Justice Stevens, explaining the denial of the writ as improvidently granted, not only focused on jurisdictional issues as a ground for denial, \textit{id.} at 2555–57 (Stevens, J., concurring), but also explained that the novelty of the First Amendment issues raised warranted restraint in adjudication before a full factual record through a trial on the merits was developed by the California courts. \textit{id.} at 2558. Justices Souter and Ginsburg concurred with Justice Stevens, but felt compelled to suggest that some kind of First Amendment protection for corporate speech, relating to matters of public concern, might ultimately be warranted, observing that "[k]nowledgeable persons should be free to participate in" the debate about important public issues that was concerned not only with Nike's labor practices, but with similar practices used by other multinational corporations "without fear of unfair reprisal." \textit{id.} at 2559.} Justice Breyer's dissent suggested that, had the Court reached the merits, a majority could have been found to vindicate Nike.\footnote{Id. at 2568 (Breyer, J., dissenting).}

The rationale that Justices Breyer and O'Connor offered says more about foreign-affairs federalism than it does about the First Amendment. Justice Breyer simply argued that California's Unfair Trade Practices law could not be applied to create a private right of action because no "economic interest" was implicated in the matter; rather, "ideological" plaintiffs, such as the one in this case, should pursue their "political battles" in "other forums."\footnote{Id. at 2567. Justice Breyer also addressed the "pragmatic" dangers that might hamper the efficiency of government by turning public functions to private persons:

The delegation of state authority to private individuals authorizes a purely ideological plaintiff, convinced that his opponent is not telling the truth, to bring into the courtroom the kind of political battle better waged in other forums. Where that political battle is hard fought, such plaintiffs potentially constitute a large and hostile crowd freely able to bring prosecutions designed to vindicate their beliefs, and to do so unencumbered by the legal and practical checks that tend to keep the energies of public enforcement agencies focused upon more purely economic harm.\textit{Id.}} In short, he found that California's legitimate interest was merely "to maintain an honest commercial marketplace. It thereby helps that marketplace better allocate private goods and services."\footnote{Id.} This interpretation of the State's law—identifying economic efficiency and consumer welfare maximization as the only legitimate State interests implicated in
Nike\textsuperscript{427}—suggests a highly restrictive view of the legitimate goals of the State with respect to the exposure of (conceivably) unjust and exploitative foreign-trade practices. The conclusion that facilitating the production of information relating to such unjust enrichment is \textit{not} a legitimate State interest seems predicated—like the Court's holdings in \textit{Garamendi}\textsuperscript{428}—on a conception of the role of the State as limited to pursuing economic efficiency without regard to the community's moral commitments.

In sum, the \textit{Garamendi} Court conceived of the States' interests in terms that would generally disable States from pursuing the moral values of their communities in relation to many practices characteristic of multinational corporations. \textit{Garamendi}, read together with Justices Breyer's and O'Connor's reasoning in \textit{Nike}, suggests that, just as under \textit{Lawrence}, States may not enforce moral values to limit individual liberty, so States' moral values may not be codified in ways conflicting with executive branch policies favoring economic globalization.\textsuperscript{429}

2. \textit{The Role of Élite Opinion in Garamendi}. \textit{Garamendi} also displays an undue deference to international decisionmaking when the latter does not have the effect of controlling law.\textsuperscript{430} This deference is made clear by the Court's discussion of the federal interest in the case, which the Court held to be sufficient to trump the State law.\textsuperscript{431}

Relying on the fact that seeking "restitution for Nazi crimes has in fact been addressed in executive Branch diplomacy and formalized in treaties and executive agreements over the last half century," the Court minimized the novelty of the international agreement before it, arguing that "[v]indicating victims injured by acts and omissions of enemy corporations in wartime is thus within the traditional subject matter of foreign policy in which national, not state, interests are overriding."\textsuperscript{432} In fact, these claims are far from being traditional subject matter of international law, which in general has neither treated

\textsuperscript{427} Id. at 2566–67 (opining that unethical and immoral trade practices do not serve as an appropriate basis for a private right of action by an uninjured plaintiff).

\textsuperscript{428} See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2392–93 (2003) (contending that morality is not a sufficient State interest to preclude preemption).

\textsuperscript{429} See id. at 2393 (allowing federal preemption of State law regardless of the State's interest in morality).

\textsuperscript{430} Id. at 2392 n.14 (allowing preemption even though the President "is acting without express congressional authority, and thus does not have the 'plentitude of Executive Authority' that control[s] . . . preemption").

\textsuperscript{431} See id. at 2392 ("The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.").

\textsuperscript{432} Id. at 2390.
multinational corporations as the bearers of legal personality and nor held them accountable for violations of international law. Moreover, as made clear by even the Court's own description of the international process, based on executive agreements and executive branch policy statements, the ICHEIC was an entirely "voluntary organization formed in 1998 by several European insurance companies, the State of Israel, Jewish and Holocaust survivor associations, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the organization of American state insurance commissioners." This public-private partnership was neither a creature of, nor subject to, international law under any conventional criteria. Its creation reflected a political process generated by élite interest groups, who worked in coordination with interested governments to resolve a legal and political problem that, given the existence of Holocaust litigation in the United States, would otherwise have been resolved in unforeseeable ways by U.S. courts. Indeed, Garamendi subordinated the characteristically American policy of favoring disclosure to the values of an institutional élite, primarily a European élite, that favored individual and corporate privacy. Thus, élite bargaining, supported by governments on both sides of the Atlantic, removed the moral issue of restitution for Holocaust victims from State governance and prevented disclosure of the possible culpability of corporations either through American-style judicial discovery or through the transparency and public accountability mandated by State regulatory law.

433. Multinational corporations "are not international legal persons in the technical sense" and "are not generally subject to obligations and generally do not enjoy rights under international law." LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 421 (4th ed. 2001). But cf. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 35-36 (Feb. 5) (establishing that the State of incorporation, rather than the corporation in its own right, may assert the right of diplomatic protection with respect to the expropriation of corporate property by a host State).


435. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2382.


437. See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2392 (stating that "California's indiscriminate disclosure provisions place a handicap on the ICHEIC's effectiveness (and raise a further irritant to the European allies) by undercutting European privacy protections").

438. See id. at 2393 (rejecting State interest in morality as sufficient to avoid
3. Summary. The logic that undergirds the Court's substantive due process and equal protection cases—denying the States any legitimate interest in enacting communitarian moral judgments with respect to private conduct—is congruent with the Court's holding in *Garamendi* that the State could not deploy its traditional regulatory powers over domestically operating insurance companies to help secure restitution and justice for Holocaust survivors. The "humanity underlying the state statute" proved to be an insufficient State interest to withstand the Court's heightened scrutiny. Although neither Congress nor the President had demonstrated a clear intent to preempt the State's law (indeed, the contrary was true), the Court determined that its unilateral constitutional intervention was necessary to protect the political branches from a State's putative encroachment on their generalized "foreign affairs" powers. The Court offered no argument that its intervention was needed to rectify some structural defect in the political process, such as an inherent vulnerability in the federal political branches that the State was exploiting in order to usurp an authority that the Constitution had located elsewhere. Rather than allowing the normal political process to decide the fate of the State's law, the Court deferred to the wishes of corporate and governmental leaders in Europe in order to remove what it perceived as a likely source of friction in dealings between them and our own national leadership. Moreover, the Court's deference to the consensus views of international élites may have been misplaced: It was not clear how far the object of that consensus was to secure a long-overdue measure of corrective justice, as opposed to avoiding embarrassing publicity and shutting down public conversation on the nature of corporate responsibility for human rights violations. Therefore, in foreign affairs as well as domestic ones, the Court's "new federalism" leaves the States largely denuded of the power to legislate and enforce moral opinion. By limiting the States to the instrumental role of promoting economic efficiency,

preemption by national policy).

439. *See id.* at 2392–93 (characterizing the State's interest in securing justice for Holocaust survivors as insufficient).

440. *See id.* at 2391–92 (explaining that allowance of the State law would compromise the President's capacity to "speak for the nation with one voice" when dealing with other countries) (quoting *Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)).

441. *Id.* at 2386 (basing its decision on the premise that uniformity in dealing with foreign nations requires that at some point State law "must yield to the National Government's policy").

442. *Id.* at 2390 (finding in favor of the Executive's policy because allowance of the State law could generate "sources of friction").
Garamendi further entrenches the constitutionalization of the Market State.

V. WHITHER?

Our review of the Court's decisions should have made it clear that fundamental premises of constitutional law are undergoing a tectonic shift. These judicial developments can be attributed to the perceived need to reorient the Nation's constitutional structures in the aftermath of the Cold War and the emergence of a radically different international strategic environment. What is happening in the case law reflects, on the judicial plane, the processes by which the Nation State is steadily yielding its place to a new order, differing from the older both in the ways the State relates to those it governs and in the ways it relates to other international actors. The Court is more or less self-consciously engaged in the project of adapting and restructuring the Constitution so that it can be made to fit the perceived requirements of the multicultural, value-free, libertarian Market State whose emergence Professor Bobbitt envisages and describes. The Court's individual rights, equal protection jurisprudence, and federalism jurisprudence converge to serve the same transformative end.

The Court seems to believe that the liquidation of the States as moral communities—a role that American federalism, with its roots in the Central Tradition, has traditionally assigned to them, and that they have consistently exercised throughout American history—is essential to the emerging constitutional order of the Market State. The Court increasingly perceives the States as serving only instrumental purposes within a globalized market. The States' differing regulatory, tax, and labor policies offer packages that can attract and provide incentives to different demographic groups, stimulate external investment, and lead to the discovery of useful social innovations. Thus far, the States may find an acceptable place within the overarching Market

443. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1015-16 (2004) (contending that the end of the Cold War marked an irreversible change in the way the Court interpreted the Constitution regarding separation of power and individual rights).

444. See John O. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 903-04 (1996) (opining that "[b]ecause of regional and global trade and open financial markets, nation states no longer exercise as substantial control over their internal economic affairs as they once did").

445. See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (illustrating the Court's refusal to recognize morality as a legitimate State interest sufficient to avoid preemption).
State Constitution. But should the States attempt to enact laws for noninstrumental, normative purposes—most especially, for the sake of upholding traditional moral judgments—they would risk subordinating economic imperatives to noneconomic ones, and must thus be deemed to have no "legitimate" interest in the legislation. In particular, the Supreme Court has emphatically (if unthinkingly) barred the States from playing active, influential and humane roles in an emerging "global civil society" and from taking any significant part in the process of "globalization-from-below." 446

Will the Court's constitutional innovations succeed—where "success" is primarily measured in obtaining elite and popular acceptance within the United States? And will the Court also be successful in securing for the United States competitive advantages against its strategic rivals? The answers cannot yet be known. In attempting to assess the likely outcomes, however, we think that it is useful to press the question whether the Court's project is not likely to encounter at least three major difficulties.

First, the Court's conception of federalism seems to require that society's most searing and divisive social problems be decided by the federal judiciary and at the national level. The Court's reasoning appears to be that such an approach is most likely to lead to a stable, peaceable, national consensus. Yet the Court's own intervention in the national debate on abortion—despite the Court's expressed wish that it be otherwise—has only exacerbated, embittered, and prolonged that controversy. 447 Similarly, the rash and ill-considered intervention of the Massachusetts judiciary into the question of same-sex marriage, 448 in an opinion that repeatedly cited and relied on the Supreme Court's Lawrence decision, inflamed rather than quieted public opinion. 449 A federalism that does not acknowledge


447. The Court's attempt in Casey to quiet the national controversy over abortion has been no more successful than its earlier effort in Dred Scott to take the issue of slavery in the territories "out of politics." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1856) (deciding whether a descendant of a slave could become a member of the political community); see Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict 193 (1992) (arguing that the Dred Scott decision "only provoked heightened disobedience and ignited more violence").


449. See id. (recognizing that many people hold strong convictions regarding same-
the need for settlements of refractory social issues both democratically and at the State level—even at the expense of securing nation-wide uniformity—will be notably less "pragmatic" than a more traditional kind of federalism.

Second, the very libertarianism that the Court seems intent on weaving into constitutional law may well prove to damage the United States' position in international rivalry rather than to enhance it. Since President Bush first raised the question in the immediate aftermath of September 11,450 Americans have asked, "Why do they hate us?"451 The answer must be, in part, that aspects of our moral practice and culture have become increasingly unattractive to hundreds of millions of people worldwide—many of whom happen to live in areas that are likely to generate grave strategic threats to the United States.452 Although it is true that Osama bin Laden rarely indicts popular American morality, he has on occasion done so;453 and it seems safe to say that the contempt and loathing he expresses resonate with millions of others.454 Apologists for the moral order and practice of the emerging American Market State—what they usually characterize as "liberal values"—appear to acknowledge that our course of conduct may well involve us in a civilizational "war with Islam."455 But such a war, if it comes, would be devastating even to the victor; and its final issue would be uncertain.

sex marriage).

450. See Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001).

451. Id. at 1141.

452. For a penetrating study of these perceptions, see MEIC PEARSE, WHY THE REST HATES THE WEST: UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS OF GLOBAL RAGE 11-13 (2004) (discussing other cultures’ perceptions of today's American society and the potential threats that those perceptions pose).

453. In his letter to America dated November 24, 2002, Osama bin Laden said, "We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling's, [sic] and trading with interest. . . . It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization witnessed by the history of mankind." Letter from Osama bin Laden to America (Nov. 24, 2002), available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4552895-110490,00.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). Bin Laden's aversion was anticipated by Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian thinker who was one of the intellectual fathers of radical Islam. See PAUL BERMAN, TERROR AND LIBERALISM 99-100 (2003) (stating that Qutb's vanguard would foreshadow a Muslim rebellion "against the liberal values of the West").


455. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON 109-10 (2004) (claiming that we are or may be at war with Islam).
Finally, the Court's adventures in constitution-making may not recommend themselves to the American people at large (however much they may gratify the élites who form the Court's most sympathetic audience). Perhaps the entrepreneurial Market State does indeed best serve the interests of the American people at this juncture in history; perhaps no other form of constitutional order—including other variants of the Market State, like Europe's or Japan's—is realistically available to us now. History throws up new possibilities, but it also limits them. Conceivably, therefore, the Court might be rendering the American people an unavowed service by practicing "the subtle politics of men like [the Roman emperors] Augustus and Tiberius who likewise allowed the forms of the preceding constitution (a republic in that instance) to subsist while the thing itself existed no longer and could not possibly be brought back."\(^5\) Even so, the American people might not welcome the favor. As Hegel also pointed out, even though the constitution that Napoléon imposed on "the Spaniards was more rational than what they had before, . . . they recoiled from it as from something alien."\(^7\)

The choice of our constitutional fate should rest with the American people, not with our courts.

\[^{456}\text{G.W.F. Hegel, Proceedings on the Estates Assembly in Würtemberg, in Hegel's Political Writings 246, 250 (T.M. Knox trans., 1964).}\]

\[^{457}\text{G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right 287 (T.M. Knox trans., 1962).}\]