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1984

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### Recommended Citation

Rett R. Ludwikowski, *The Roots of Polish Catholicism*, CENTER J., Spring 1984, at 9.

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This may be a disappointment to the USCC, but surely a slow and careful treatment of the pastoral is far superior to the rushed and politically controlled approach many feared.

KERRY J. KOLLER  
EDITOR

## The Roots of Polish Catholicism

Rett R. Ludwikowski

One Sunday in the early 1960s I was showing a group of American scholars and congressmen around Krakow. The guests seemed to be especially puzzled by the many churches packed to overflowing during the numerous Masses. Later that afternoon, during the official party in a local government building, one of the guests drew me aside and asked incredulously whether this was the true position of the Catholic Church in Poland, whether what he had seen indicated the real scope of Poland's religious freedom.

"Is it possible," he asked, "that in this Communist country you can go to confession, receive communion, baptize children, and participate in Masses without persecution?"

My positive response did not seem to dispel his doubts. As I thought about how to convince him, I recalled that this was the feast of Corpus Christi, when there was an annual procession from one of Krakow's churches to another. A few minutes later I escorted him to the window and showed him the enormous crowd of people following a group of priests, with a bishop at the head,

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walking under the baldachin and carrying the Holy Sacrament. The American congressman only shook his head. As the party ended he drew me aside again and said, "I appreciate a lot of the things you've done in your country. You've restored your cities after the war; you've worked to create an impressive industry; you've had many cultural achievements, but the thing I appreciate most is your organizational skill. Americans could never have arranged that kind of a procession in just 15 minutes!"

This congressman was assuming that, as usually happens in Communist states, everything was specially organized to deceive foreign visitors. I encountered this same disbelief on my visits to the United States. My questions obviously found it odd that in the middle of the Communist Bloc exists the most fervently religious society of Europe—far more so than Spain or Italy. How can an atheistic Communist government tolerate the fact that Poland has now almost twice as many priests as there were before World War II? Does this mean there has been a successful reconciliation of Catholicism and Marxism, some kind of paradoxical "altar Communism"? Was the attachment of Poles to Catholicism so strong that the Communists were compelled to give way? It is impossible to answer these questions and to explain these amazing anomalies without an examination of the roots of Polish Catholicism. The special bonds of religion and of the Polish culture can be understood only by studying some of the unique aspects of Polish history.

In the late 1970s the Polish government supported an in-depth study which examined the historical background of Poland's current political culture. The study showed that Polish culture, while very fluid, still possesses some components which are relatively stable and which can typify and describe the Poles as a whole. The report proved that Poles are characterized as a particularly religious peo-

ple and that their special attachment to Catholicism is regarded by them as an attribute of the Polish national character. The exceptionally powerful position of the church does not stem simply from the spiritual loyalty of over 32 million Catholics in a population of almost 36 million. It stems primarily from the conviction of the Poles that Catholicism and the Polish nation are bound with "special chains." Some Poles, more inclined to rational analysis of this special relationship, emphasize the traditional impact of religion on the Polish national culture or the role of the church in the history of the Polish state. Still others try to support the romantic view that these bonds have a charismatic, supernatural character. Defending the stereotype of "a Pole: a Catholic," they argue that Catholicism is a necessary feature of the Polish character—that each true Pole must be a Catholic. This special relationship devolves from the unique role which Poland is meant to fill in the history of the Christian world.

This conviction of a special relationship between Catholicism and the Polish national character, which has had a considerable impact on the recent position of the church in Poland, is not a mere curiosity of the contemporary scene. It accompanied the progressive formation of a strong Polish national consciousness in the 19th century, and its signs were already perceptible in the Polish political literature of the Counter-Reformation. The contemporary conviction is part of a cultural inheritance and development.

Almost since the beginning of its existence Poland was within the Christian cultural sphere. The Christianization of Poland (966) not only converted the country to Christianity but also established a church administration, and brought Poland into the Roman family of civilization. In his attempts to strengthen the independence of the Polish church from German metropolitans, the prince Mieszko placed all Poland under the protection of Rome. Mieszko's

donation of Poland to the Apostolic See is often regarded as the first evidence of the special relationship connecting Poles and the Catholic Church.<sup>1</sup>

Over the next four centuries Poland experienced periods of retreat from its Western policies and even diminution of the influence of Rome, but Catholicism survived as the predominant religion of Polish society and had an overwhelming impact on the customs of the nation. Christianity introduced into Poland the world of Western court manners and ceremonies. Pagan beliefs, superstitions and ancient customs officially gave way to the church's rituals, and survived only in the folk practices.

Humanistic trends in Poland in the 16th century revived an interest in classical learning and speculative inquiry and strengthened the position of laymen by depriving the clergy of their monopoly on learning. The Reformation, which undermined the universal supremacy of the pope in Europe, had a certain degree of influence in Poland, as Polish Protestants strove for religious toleration and equality of all beliefs. The Counter-Reformation weakened these trends and restored predominance to the Catholic Church, but it must be admitted that persecution of Protestants in Poland was never as strong as in Spain or Italy, where Protestantism was thoroughly suppressed. Poland preserved its traditions of religious tolerance and did not experience either mass executions or religious wars. It remained a predominantly Catholic country, primarily because of the strong attachment to Catholicism of the peasants and the nobility, the two largest segments of the population.

In the 16th century Poles established the unique political system of democracy among nobility. This system, which also granted privileges and various freedoms to the gentry, is usually pointed to as the main cause of the later degeneration of political power in Poland. The position enjoyed by the gentry, who were often manipulated by

powerful magnates, was a challenge to any attempt at political reform. In the 17th century this political system received further support from the doctrine attributing the popular motivation for the existing political situation to the Sarmatian roots of the Polish nation. According to Ptolemy, the genealogy of the Polish gentry was derived from the ancient Slavs who inhabited so-called Sarmatia, a land located between the Wisla and Dniepr rivers. Seventeenth-century Sarmatianism established the characteristic stereotype of the "old-Poland gentleman," which had such a strong impact on later generations of Poles. A Sarmatian was defined as a true defender of the democracy of the gentry, of political equality, of limited royal and parliamentary powers, of principles of elected not hereditary monarchy, and of the right of opposition. He was usually presented as a brave warrior, equipped with all chivalric virtues, preferring an austere style of life, and always ready to sacrifice his life for the Fatherland. He was a man of rigid morality, strongly attached to Catholicism and its religious principles.

The more Sarmatianism emphasized the unique character of the Polish political system, the more Polish noblemen were convinced that a peculiar Sarmatian legacy imposed on them, in addition to their special responsibility for the preservation of the democracy of the gentry and its chivalric virtues, a primary responsibility for the preservation of Catholicism and strong support for the position of the Roman Church.

A Pole—a Sarmatian—was a true *defensor fidei*, and Poland the bulwark of Western Europe, defending Catholicism from the Turks, Tartars, Protestant Scandinavians and schismatic Russians. In the doctrine of Sarmatianism the idea of a special relationship between the Polish national character and Catholicism was for the first time elevated as the leitmotif of Polish political thought.

In the 18th century this stereotype of the Sarmatian

knights, who was presumed to spend most of his life on a horse fighting the enemies of the state and the Christian religion, was gradually superseded by the model of the Sarmatian landholder, who was always ready to leave his comfortable mansion-home to defend the Fatherland. There was, however, an obvious discrepancy between this ideal and the sybaritic life-style of an average landholder. The model was submitted to further evolution. Polish political literature of the 18th century located the reasons for the decay of soldierly spirit in the adoption of foreign customs and a Western style of life. The stereotype of the Polish nobleman changed so as not to emphasize his knightly attributes but, rather, his kindheartedness and friendliness, manifested in his relations with his family and neighbors, in his interest in farming, his care for the well-being of the peasants, his attachment to religion and its moral principles, and eventually in his service for the state. "Virtue" became the most important—even though the most vague—attribute of the Polish gentry. It was used as a catchword, both by those who strove for justice and by those who abused the law. This paved the way for a substantial criticism of Sarmatianism, which was said to stand for anarchistic defense of the gentry's liberties, the disintegration of law and morality, and the religious fanaticism of the Polish nobility. The Enlightenment, with its rationalist and secularist propensities, undermined but did not destroy the popular belief that the relationship between the Polish nation and Catholicism rested on special charismatic bonds.

At the end of the 18th century Poland lost its freedom. It is easy to understand why, with the nation divided into three sections with no Polish national government, the idea of special chains binding Poles with the Catholic Church became especially attractive. Catholicism, though suppressed in the Russian and Prussian segments of the divided country, was still the religion of the great majority

of Poles. It was their primary unifying factor, and it also called to mind their common cultural and religious traditions. In addition, the position of the Catholic Church was consolidated with the strong support of conservatism, still the prevailing mentality of the Polish nobility, who remained the most powerful social group, both within the country and among the Polish exiles. This espousal of Catholicism included opposition to all concepts of rapid social change, along with support for a conservative concept of society and its hierarchical structure. It gave supernatural sanction to conservative ideas, and protected the primacy of the Catholic Church by demanding protection for the church's vast landholdings and property.

It is clear that this unofficial alliance strengthened the positions of both partners (the conservative movement and the Catholic Church), but such claims for a superior position for the Catholic religion led to collisions with the interests of non-Catholic minorities. The idea of religious tolerance or a full freedom of faith was of the highest importance under these conditions. The nation which had fought for its independence could not abandon the idea of nationwide solidarity and could ill afford any internal animosities. For this reason even conservatives emphasized that in Poland, where even in the times of the Inquisition religious executions were unknown, the idea of tolerance should be treated as a very important principle.

Romanticism, the cultural style of the 19th century, brought a new tide of religious emotionalism to Poland. The religious vivacity of the first half of the century, combined with a national depression which accompanied the unsuccessful Polish uprising, created an atmosphere conducive to the restoration of the old thesis of the special relationship of the Polish nation and Catholicism. When successive politically motivated insurrections were crushed, Polish émigrés, especially those assembled in France, argued that the Polish nation should seek nonpolitical

ways to achieve Poland's restoration. Loyalty to Catholicism and mystical contemplation were to open new ways for the nation. This passive attitude was especially typical of Polish ultramontanists, who laid the fate of the nation solely in the hands of Providence. Ultramontanists, meeting as the Congregation of the Lord's Resurrection (established in exile in 1842) argued that all Poland's troubles should be treated as an unrecognized national stigmata. The fate of the nation depended upon the special mission imposed by God on the Polish nation, which was to begin a new Slavic epoch in the history of human civilization.<sup>2</sup> This superiority and the special mission of the Polish nation were to stem from the unique "instinct of Christian politics" which Poland had gained as the only Christian European state. Ultramontanists argued that for many centuries Poland had tried to convert other pagan nations by attracting them with the so-called superiority of Western civilization, rather than by use of the sword, as other Christian nations had done. Thus, the lack of imperial and dynastic interests in Poland had hindered the formation of institutions powerful enough to compete with neighboring countries using violence as their main political means. Poland, a Christian vanguard in Europe, was alone in its mission and therefore had been defeated by invading neighbors.

This thesis of a special position for the Polish nation, meant to introduce a new Slavic era, was interpreted in various ways. On the one hand it could have emerged from Poland's unique national history, the geopolitical situation of the Polish state, and the age-old attributes of the Polish national character. This set of circumstances could be rationally discussed. On the other hand, this mission could be also assumed *a priori* as a special charisma given by God. This interpretation was implicit behind Polish messianism, which tried to compare Poland with the suffering Christ: Poland was to redeem the fam-

ily of the Christian nations as Christ had redeemed mankind. These messianic ideas were severely questioned, both by the Orthodox Church and the ultramontanists. Still, one cannot underestimate the impact of these concepts on the political culture of the Polish nation and its attachment to Catholicism.

These concepts of the messianists and the ultramontanists met with strong criticism at the end of the 19th century from representatives of other currents of political thought. The 1890s witnessed a new strength within the Polish left. Peasant groups and socialists worked out new organizational lines. The democratic camp was slowly breaking up, while conservatives continued their activity as a political coterie. This period also saw the emergence of a group of Polish positivists and of national Democrats: new partners in political dialogue. All these new groups (except for the peasants' movement, traditionally Catholic) questioned the political status of the Catholic Church in Poland, because of its criticism of their unsuccessful attempts at national uprisings. Also, the universalism of the church seemed to be incompatible with Polish national aspirations. Positivists and socialists attacked, among other things, the concept of the special mission of Poland among the European family of nations. A. Swietochowski, one of the most prominent representatives of Warsaw Positivism, wrote ironically, "We, as the chosen people, receive our knowledge through afflations, directly from heaven. Heaven we conceive of as a great attic, which, to be perfectly honest, is spread over the whole world, but whose only opening is over our country, and there we have the primary right to dry our clothes."<sup>3</sup>

Nationalists promoted the concepts of "national egoism" and "national expansiveness," both of which were distinctly incompatible with the principles of Catholic moral philosophy. "Relationships between an individual and a nation and between nations themselves lie, as a

matter of fact, beyond the sphere of Christian ethics,"<sup>4</sup> wrote R. Dmowski, one of the leaders of the movement. Yet, in the second decade of the 20th century, there was some shifting in the nationalists' politics, which gradually made possible the chance of dialogue with the Catholic hierarchy.

Retreating from their previous position critical of the Catholic Church, nationalists began to admit that, during the period of partition, religion had consolidated Poles and had been of extremely important consequence in shaping the national character. Religion, seen previously as an instrument in the struggles for the survival of the Polish nation, had gradually identified itself with the attributes of the Polish national character. Dmowski, in *Church, Nation and State*, argued that the Roman Church, as the traditional educator of moral values, should possess a special position in the state because the Polish state is a national state and the Polish nation is Catholic.<sup>5</sup> "Catholicism," he wrote, "is not a supplement to the Polish national character, but is inherent in its very essence. It can be, to a considerable degree, identified with this essence. Attempts to separate Catholicism from the Polish national character and endeavors to detach the nation from religion and from the church would tear asunder the very essence of the nation itself."<sup>6</sup>

Slogans such as "Catholic Poland" and "A Pole: a Catholic" were appropriated by other movements, specifically Catholic Action and Christian Democracy. Catholic activists were effective in popularizing the idea that Poland will either be Catholic or it will cease to exist, that Catholicism in Poland is connected with the history of Latin civilization and that without Catholicism the impact of this civilization on the Polish culture would be destroyed.<sup>7</sup>

The outbreak of World War II ended the brief history of a Polish independent state in the 20th century. During the period of Nazi occupation, as in the past, clergy joined

laity in their struggles against the invaders, and shared the sufferings of the whole Polish nation. During the war some 1,200 priests perished in German concentration camps and one of them, Father Maximilian Kolbe, has been canonized.

The outcome of the war placed an atheistic government in confrontation with the ethnically homogeneous and overwhelming faithful Roman Catholic population. The church, which had by now embraced the great majority of citizens and which exerted colossal moral and social influence in Poland, had to be recognized by the regime as a respected ideological enemy. Although the state used various strategies to disrupt the position of the church, it was forced finally to tolerate its presence. Administrative pressure against the clergy rarely turned to open persecution.

The church owes its current exceptional position to the role it had played in the history of the Polish nation and to the fact that, in the political consciousness of the great majority of Poles, attachment to religion has always been a primary attribute of the national character. This exceptional position also resulted from the fact that the church was the only independent institution recognized by the Polish government. Thus, it was able to provide society with a system of moral and social values as an alternative to Communism. In this situation, an affirmation of Catholicism became a patriotic duty for many people who were never reconciled to the Communist regime in Poland. Traditional religious, emotional and purely political factors have combined to produce this paradoxical coexistence of Communism and the Catholic Church as the two most important powers in Poland.

The Communist regime, uncomfortable with this anomaly, has attempted to weaken the position of the church. At first it encouraged the split of the Catholic intelligentsia in Poland into two groups, one which supported the idea of reconciliation of Catholic and Marxist

doctrines, and the other which remained traditionally attached to Rome. The first camp, led by Piasecki, established the Pax group, which seemed to reject the materialistic outlook of Communism while trying to reconcile Polish patriotism with the social and economic principles of Marxism. This group, also called the Progressivists, split in 1955-56 when Piasecki was accused by Polish exiles of close cooperation between the Polish Ministry of Public Security and the Progressivists. The young intellectuals who left Pax reassembled around *Wież*, the monthly which was trying to find a middle road between the position of the Progressivists and the group of orthodox Catholics.

The second camp (the *Znak* group) of loyal Catholics was formally suspended between 1953 and 1956. Yet the leaders of this group, who gathered around the weekly, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, survived this period of persecution and restored the movement in 1956. At that time Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, seemed to understand that the Polish nation would never accept a regime which was opposed to the Catholic religion. After a meeting between Gomulka and the intellectuals of the *Tygodnik Powszechny* circle, the *Znak* group was restored and even allowed to form its own parliamentary caucus. *Tygodnik Powszechny*, the best of the Polish weeklies, retained its exceptional position among the Polish mass media.

In 1956, Polish Primate Cardinal Wyszyński was released from confinement and began arrangements for celebrations of the millennium of Polish Catholicism. He declared that 10 years of work would transform Poland internally. Communism was doomed in Poland. Wyszyński argued that Catholicism in Poland would be so great a moral power that it would be able to defeat Communism. In his homilies, Poland was again presented as a "rampart of Catholicism" defending Europe against Communism.<sup>8</sup> Some arguments of the Catholic activists were a little

out of date. Their division of society between Poles (Catholics) and Socialists (non-Catholics), who were not real Poles, did not have any great chance for popularity in the Poland of the 1960s. Poles were ready to admit that the traditional relationship between Catholicism and Polish culture had had a great impact on Polish society, but they would not agree with the idea that Catholics had a monopoly on patriotism. Despite all the challenges and controversies, one must acknowledge that the celebration of the millennium of Catholicism in Poland restored religious symbols and stereotypes to the consciousness of Polish Catholics, stimulated religious emotionalism, and elevated even higher than before the position of the clergy and especially of the "relentless Cardinal Wyszyński," who was recognized as a national hero. In his homilies, he criticized the government's human-rights policy and defended the right of dissident movements to a free presentation of views and opinions.

The elevation of Cardinal Wojtyła of Krakow to the position of pope electrified the Polish nation. Poles, who felt that in his person they could find a powerful protector against Communism, celebrated his 1979 visit in Poland as a nationwide feast. During his visit priests, intellectuals, workers and even militiamen supervised crowd control and traffic at his public appearances. His visit had enormous unifying effects. Workers, intellectuals, students—all who had up to that time opposed the Communist regime in successive but uncoordinated upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976—realized the significance of those ideas and moral values which were common to them and which isolated them from the moral and ideological elite of the Communist Party. His visit was an important factor which helped to organize these different social groups into a nationwide front opposing the policy of the regime in August, 1980.

The crisis of 1980 demonstrated the close ties between



the new independent trade union Solidarity and the Catholic hierarchy. Workers openly identified their program with moral values represented by the Catholic Church. Religious symbols, crosses, portraits of the pope and Cardinal Wyszyński were displayed in the factories and shipyards during strikes. Solidarity's leaders went to confession and communion openly. Cardinal Wyszyński received strikers at an informal audience and he and other church officials did not conceal their sympathy with the workers' movement. Both workers and clergy benefited. Solidarity gained the support of the most influential anti-Communist institution, the church. Thanks to the claims of workers, the church gained the powerful position of mediator between Solidarity and the government, and along with it the right to broadcast Catholic Masses each Sunday, greater access to the media, and permission to build new churches.

The imposition of martial law placed the church in a very difficult position. On the one hand, the Catholic hierarchy in Poland was strongly sympathetic to Solidarity; on the other, it did not want to lose the extraordinary position of influence gained over the preceding two years. Archbishop Glemp, who had replaced Cardinal Wyszyński after his death, seemed to be aware of the great risks facing the church. The military junta of General Jaruzelski, isolated from society and deprived of all intermediate structures, was eagerly seeking allies. On the other hand, if the church came forward with an extreme condemnation of Communist policy, it could easily bring down upon itself the same persecution as Solidarity had. The regime could subvert the influence of religion by coercion, by forbidding the building of churches, by closing the Catholic University. Usually, clergy in Communist countries are prepared for this kind of treatment, which ends the Catholic hierarchy with the halo of martyrdom, but this time it really had too much to lose. By now the

church in Poland was not only a spiritual leader. By mediating between the government and Solidarity, the church had gained exceptional social and even political influence. The church did not possess this position in any other European country. Yet, it was also obvious that it could not afford to disappoint an oppressed society which was convinced that the methods of the regime were at odds with the system of Catholic moral values.

All these factors produced a wait-and-see policy. The church openly condemned martial law and the terrorism of the military junta, but it did not exhort the people to resistance. Rather, it tried to calm the tensions in Poland, and Archbishop Glemp reiterated in his homilies that "the Church could not be a tool, either in the hands of social groups or of the state."<sup>9</sup> He stated that anger is a bad counsellor, and that the people and the government should return to the path of dialogue.

Sermons of other bishops were sometimes much more militant. "The church had been with the nation for the last thousand years," said Bishop Tokarczuk, "and the church will go with the nation for better or worse. No one should have any illusions that manipulation of excerpts from homilies of the Holy Father, the Primate or other bishops could split the church from the nation, or workers from farmers. A Pole will never accept the role of a slave or an object."<sup>10</sup>

Local clergy even more openly supported workers who struck or participated in street-fighting with police. Some priests were imprisoned; others visited internment camps or tried to help the families of those arrested.

Nevertheless, the church met with criticism from a number of groups. Cardinal Glemp was accused of not sustaining the nation's will to resistance, because his homilies encouraged the renunciation of opposition against the terror of the military junta, or because his statements were awkward and naive, or because he did

not follow the uncompromising policy of Cardinal Wyszyński.<sup>11</sup> Others, however, argued that the church should not point out methods of resistance or set the agenda for the fight. It should explain what is good and what is bad, but its mission was not to make tactical decisions in the fight against occupying forces or aggressors.<sup>12</sup> The defenders of the church's political stand condemned the theology of liberation, popular in South America, which was used to justify the attitude of some priests who, convinced that God was on their side, had joined guerilla troops and fought with other partisans.<sup>13</sup>

In the period preceding the pope's visit to Poland in June, 1983, the prudence of the Polish Catholic hierarchy seemed to be better justified. Cardinal Glemp felt that the visit of John Paul II was the primary goal, since the influence of the visit would be incalculably greater than any direct challenge to governmental authority.

If Cardinal Glemp's tactics in this regard were to risk his personal authority (by his allegedly soft stand against the government) to make possible the pope's visit, he was fully successful. John Paul II's visit to Poland was an international event, and it not only reinvigorated Poles, built up and solidified the ties between various social groups and the church, but proved again what are the real political attitudes and sympathies of the great majority of the Polish people. Millions of Poles covering the grassy slopes around the Jasna Gora monastery, the runways of airports, the soccer stadium in Warsaw, the sites of the pope's Masses in Poznan, Wroclaw, Katowice, Niepokalanow and Krakow spoke for themselves for the first time since martial law was imposed. Thousands of hands in the air in a V-for-victory sign, red-and-white banners bearing the word "Solidarity," antigovernment demonstrations left no illusions about the Polish spirit of defiance. Demonstrations arranged by Solidarity could not have had such an impact on the West. As a Warsaw University student

said to American reporters: "The pope's presence gave the people courage to say what they think. What you saw here is the real Poland."<sup>14</sup> If this was the true goal of the Polish Catholic hierarchy, this goal was fully achieved.

John Paul II did not conceal his sympathy with the workers' claims that their rights were being denied. He made it clear that the "national understanding," expected by General Jaruzelski should be preceded by the resumption of the interrupted dialogue with the Polish people. Of course the junta did not neglect this opportunity to declare its good faith and readiness to end martial law along with further normalization of the situation in Poland. Yet it was obvious for all foreign observers that the visit was a failure rather than a victory for Jaruzelski's politics. The papal visit promoted stabilization, but not at any price. It confirmed once more that Jaruzelski's government can be recognized by the West only if it will take the path of social compromise. Any eventual cooperation of the church and the Polish regime will be beneficial for the Polish people only if society actively and consciously participates in the reform. Poland obviously needs economic recovery, but first it needs democratic transformations. The failure of such sociopolitical experiments during Gierek's regime proved what will be the outcome of future programs deprived of social control. Clearly, the church cannot demand too much. If Poles are to be the real beneficiaries of this eventual cooperation, each step in the coming dialogue must be carefully considered and subject to the broad control of the whole society. It is the only way to initiate the real process of stabilization of the Polish economy and normalization of Polish life.

To sum up these few remarks, it must be admitted that the policy of the Polish Catholic Church after the imposition of martial law included a certain amount of ambiguity. The church could not incite riots, unrest and street fights. Yet some argue convincingly that it sometimes

went too far in encouraging various social groups to cooperate with the government. The visit of the pope strengthened the impression that this was only of tactical significance, but it remains true that the hierarchy knows that political ramifications will accompany its every decision. The church will move cautiously. It may in fact lose its social and political position, but it cannot risk its authority over the Catholic Polish people. Thanks to the church's authority and the Polish people's special attachment to religion, they may be the victims of Communism, but they will never be its obedient children.

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|   |  | 9  | The letter of M. Pila, <i>Solidarnosc. Biuletyn Informacyjny</i> , No. 40 (27 November 1982).  |
|   |  | 10 | Compare also the letters of: J. Balta, <i>Kilka uwag o roli Kosciola</i> , <i>ibid.</i> , No. 41 (4 November 1982), and letter of Christian, <i>Czy Ochronimy sie przed Nienuwiscia</i> , <i>ibid.</i> This letter was published also in <i>Tygodnik Mazowsze</i> , No. 9, April 1982. |
|   |  | 11 | The letter of A. Czuma, <i>Solidarnosc. Biuletyn Informacyjny</i> (Solidarity Information Office in Sweden), No. 16-17 (July 1982).  |
|   |  | 12 | The letter of M. Wildawski, <i>Krolerstwo Moje nie jest z tego Swiata</i> , <i>ibid.</i>   |
|   |  | 13 | The letter of M. Wildawski, <i>Krolerstwo Moje nie jest z tego Swiata</i> , <i>ibid.</i>   |
|   |  | 14 | <i>Time</i> (23 June 1983), p. 34.   |