Priming Legal Negotiations Through Written Demands

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As I left for work one crisp, sunny, April morning, I spotted a five-by-seven printed form on my car’s front windshield. The form’s message proclaimed, in large, bold letters, “youparklikeanasshole.”¹ The form had a checklist of infractions like “two spots, one car,” “that’s a compact?” and “over the painted lines.”² The bottom of the printed form said,

Parking is far too limited in our overcrowded streets and parking lots, and you happened to park like an asshole. Go to the above web site to see why someone else thought you parked like an asshole.

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² Id.
Don't be too offended, we all do it one time or another—it just so happens you got caught.\(^3\)

My next-door neighbor, who evidently put the note on my car, listed my infraction as “others” with a follow-up explanation written by hand: “You are parking too close to my garage. It’s hard for me to pull my truck in.” I studied the note for a few moments. I felt my heart start to pound and my whole body became uncomfortably warm. I wadded the note and tossed it. I was angry. When I arrived at work twenty minutes later, I was still angry. I told my co-workers about the note. They all agreed with me; it was rude and inappropriate.

When I returned home that evening, I visited with neighbors who were not complaining about my parking. I showed them the note, now crumpled and dirty. They, too, became angry. One neighbor suggested exacting revenge on the note’s author by letting the air out of his tires. Another neighbor excitedly suggested something involving Crisco. Although I am a trained mediator, I became giddy about the prospect of getting even. Perhaps it was a moment of self-reflection that led me to question why I was even thinking of revenge. But that written demand evoked intense emotions in me and in my neighbors. We did not care about investigating appropriate responses or attempting to resolve the problem; we wanted to make my neighbor pay for his rude behavior. Instead of encouraging me to change my behavior in the way my neighbor requested, the note had an entirely different effect. The written demand prompted me to make my neighbor regret placing that note on my windshield.

This incident led me to question the legal demand letters lawyers write. I wondered if demand letters often evoke similar negative emotional reactions in their recipients. And, if so, do those emotions influence the recipients’ behaviors in ways that hinder settlement?

Lawyers routinely begin legal negotiations with a written demand letter\(^4\) and a wealth of multidisciplinary, empirical research exists to assist lawyers as they negotiate on behalf of their clients.\(^5\) However, the application of this empirical research to the written demand letter is largely absent from mediation and negotiation texts.\(^6\) Instead, these texts focus almost exclusively on face-to-face

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3. Id.
5. See infra notes 25-54 and accompanying text.
negotiations. Lawyers and law students seeking guidance on how to

§ 3.2, at 51 (3d ed. 2005) (warning negotiators to “carefully consider their words in order to convey the intended message” and to “concentrate upon what is being verbally communicated” while also acknowledging “the importance of nonverbal communication,” but defining nonverbal communication to include “facial expressions, hand gestures, posture, and eye contact”); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND STRATEGY (2009) (failing to mention written negotiation generally, and the demand letter in particular); CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., NEGOTIATION: PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING (2006) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING] (incorporating interdisciplinary empirical research throughout while ignoring written negotiation and demand letters); MELISSA L. NELKEN, NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 2007) (including a section on “Opening Offers/Demands,” but making no mention of a demand letter); Janice Nadler & Donna Shestowsky, Negotiation, Information Technology, and the Problem of the Faceless Other, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 145-46 (Leigh L. Thompson ed., 2006) (noting that “[t]raditional approaches to research on negotiation do not typically consider the possibility that the type of communication media used by negotiators could be a factor affecting the negotiation itself” and discussing the effects of the pervasive use of e-mail and other information technology on the bargaining process, though failing to recognize written negotiations); see also Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2022 (noting that until recently, demand-letter writing was not mentioned in civil procedure texts). But see Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter, 5 J. OF THE ASSN’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 32, 35 (2008) (urging an approach to writing the demand letter that incorporates some of the principles of negotiation theory). However, as this Article argues, this hard-to-find advice is based on intuition and speculation. No systematic attempt has been made to study or test the effects of the demand letter. Some authors advise against starting negotiations in writing. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, SKILLS & VALUES: LEGAL NEGOTIATING 180–81 (2009) (discussing the problems with e-mail negotiations); MARK K. SCHEONFIELD & RICK M. SCHOENFIELD, LEGAL NEGOTIATIONS: GETTING MAXIMUM RESULTS 356–57 (1988) (pointing out the disadvantages to using letters and other written communications in negotiations).

7. See Nadler & Shestowsky, supra note 6, at 145 (noting that, traditionally, researchers focused on face-to-face negotiations). Many of the titles suggest a focus on “talk only” negotiations. See, e.g., DEBORAH M. KOLB ET AL., WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS (1994); J. ANDERSON LITTLE, MAKING MONEY TALK: HOW TO MEDIATE INSURED CLAIMS AND OTHER MONETARY DISPUTES (2007); Phillip Glenn & Lawrence Susskind, How Talk Works: Studying Negotiation Interaction, 26 NEGOTIATION J. 117, 118 (2010) (“[N]egotiations and mediations succeed or fail based in large part on how participants manage their talk.”); see also FISHER & ERTEL, supra note 6 (failing to mention written forms of negotiation, and instead including a chapter entitled “Communication: Am I Ready to Listen and Talk Effectively?”). Carrie Menkel-Meadow includes the same examples of negotiation in two of her books. One is a lengthy letter from a college student to her parents informing them that she received poor grades. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 137–38 (2005) (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 15–16 (1993) [hereinafter MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION]; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at 80–81 (citing ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 15–16 (1993)). The second is a lengthy written advertisement used by the New Haven Railroad during World War II entitled “The Kid.” MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 139; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at 82. Although both are examples of the power written documents can have on their readers, Menkel-Meadow includes them in a section entitled “Talking Persuasively.” See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 136; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at xii, 78. Neither book advises lawyers how to successfully negotiate in
effectively write a demand letter must look to legal writing texts. But the advice these texts provide lacks a connection to the multidisciplinary, empirical research that is so important in the mediation and negotiation context. This disconnect may serve as an impediment to quicker, more favorable settlements. In fact, the untested advice in legal writing texts could have the opposite effect, causing protracted litigation and less favorable negotiations.

Based on the empirical research available, this Article argues that the current advice on how to write demand letters probably hinders, rather than facilitates, settlement. Of course, to determine what kind of demand letter is most effective in bringing about a more favorable settlement, the advice and methods must be empirically tested. Only then will lawyers know whether their initial demand letters ultimately help or hurt the opportunity for settlement.

Part I of this Article describes the current state of research in the legal-negotiation arena and argues that this well-supported and well-accepted research has all but ignored the written demand. Part II argues that the demand letter is one of the most important documents a lawyer writes because it often initiates negotiations, and that various psychological processes involved at the outset of a negotiation can significantly affect the negotiation’s success. Part II goes on to identify some of these psychological processes, including framing and anchoring, and connects these processes to the written demand. Part III discusses how the demand letter provides the lawyer with the opportunity to tell the client’s narrative, persuasively integrating law and fact in a way that is often hindered by procedural roadblocks once a lawsuit is filed. Several states now require parties to send demand letters before filing suit. These demand letters not only set the stage for negotiation, but they also can limit a plaintiff’s relief or prevent recovery altogether.

writing, though they acknowledge examples of powerfully written documents. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra, at 136–39; MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at 80–82.

8. See infra Part III.B.

9. See infra text accompanying notes 284–86.

10. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 905, 929 (1983) (“[W]e must systematically engage in hypothesis building and testing and we must explore our assumptions and generalizations about negotiations with all the variables and sophistication of the behavior scientist.”); Michael J. Saks, Turning Practice into Progress: Better Lawyering Through Experimentation, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 801, 801–02 (1991) (“A major part of the problem is that the legal profession has no systematic methodology for producing knowledge about its task or about how well it is accomplishing that task.”).

11. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1782(a)(2) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 2006); see also Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2010–11 (noting that a few state consumer-rights laws and federal environmental laws require demand letters).
Part III focuses on one particular area of psychological research—priming. The research in priming demonstrates the power of the written word to drive behaviors. After discussing this research, this Article uses the priming studies to hypothesize that the demand letter may actually hinder rather than facilitate settlement. Research in priming could assist attempts at persuading others to enter negotiations with the optimal mindset for cooperative negotiation.

The Article concludes by urging those in the relevant fields—negotiation, alternative-dispute resolution, and legal writing, among others—not only to recognize the importance of the demand letter, but also to integrate the demand letter into the thriving cross-disciplinary research that touches on legal negotiation.

I. COMMON, WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES INFORM FACE-TO-FACE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION

By now the legal community has come to understand the importance of legal negotiation and mediation. The evidence is undeniable—very few cases reach trial. One reason to favor early settlement is the overwhelming cost of litigation in the United States. Those wishing to reform our litigation process point out not just the cost to particular litigants, but the ancillary costs as well. The expense of litigation strikes fear in some defendants and may deprive plaintiffs of their day in court. Litigation expenses include not only the attorney’s hourly fees, but also court costs, depositions, and expert fees. Litigation often ties up a company’s resources and causes reduced

12. See infra text accompanying notes 214–27.
13. See Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) ("Fewer than five percent of all civil cases filed will result in a verdict; most of the rest will be resolved by negotiation." (internal citation omitted)); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: What the Numbers Tell Us, What They May Mean, 10 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 3 (2004) (estimating that 1.8% of cases are disposed of through trial); see also Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 293 (2006) ("Only a very small percentage of cases actually go to trial . . . ."); Margo Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 35, 36 (2006) (noting a reduction in the number of civil trials before district courts).
15. See id. at 1132–33.
Litigants have come to know, and empirical studies have shown, that parties are probably better off settling than going to trial. Beyond the litigants themselves, litigation drains government resources and decreases funds available for other important functions, such as education. It follows that, the more contentious the litigation, the more costly the trial and the greater the drain on public resources.

The realization that lawyers rarely take their cases to trial has shifted focus. Perhaps because of this realization, law schools are offering more classes and clinical opportunities in negotiation and mediation to supplement their offerings in trial advocacy because the skills and strategies required to settle legal disputes often collide with the skills and strategies required to win a trial.

A. Growth of Research in Legal Negotiation and Dispute Resolution

Law school curricula have swelled with course offerings in legal negotiation and alternative-dispute resolution. Likewise, practitioners and courts have

18. THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, supra note 17 ("Extensive discovery, pretrial maneuvering, long trials, and uncertainty over legal outcomes also waste management time and energy, destroy business relationships, and result in lost market opportunities.").


21. See id. (discussing the drain on public resources that litigation causes). The more contentious the parties, the more likely they are to seek the court's intervention, increase discovery demands, and refuse to concede any point. See THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, supra note 17 (discussing the various costs of litigation).


24. Donna Shestowsky, Psychology and Persuasion, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR 361, 362 (Andrea Kuper Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006) ("The kind of training in logic and reasoning that lawyers typically receive in law school and in legal practice can make it challenging for them to truly appreciate that the use of such formal argumentation is but one way to persuade."). One example of this disconnect is the way apologies play out in negotiation and litigation. Although offering a complete apology means that the case will usually settle more quickly, when lawyers get involved they see apologies from the other side as increasing their settlement values because they increase the likelihood of success at trial. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1011-12 (1999); Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Attorneys, Apologies, and Settlement Negotiation, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 349, 381 (2008) (discussing defense attorneys' views on client apologies).

turned to mediation in astounding numbers.\textsuperscript{26} The surge in growth surrounding the study and implementation of alternative-dispute resolution is often traced back to the Pound Conference, assembled nearly thirty-five years ago as a way to address a perceived dissatisfaction with the operation of the justice system.\textsuperscript{27} The widespread use of mediation as a court-ordered tool to control dockets was one outgrowth from that conference.\textsuperscript{28} But, more importantly, the Conference sparked a vibrant debate among scholars, practitioners, and judges about the role of alternative-dispute resolution in the justice system and in society at large.\textsuperscript{29} Scholars also began to study the effectiveness of this alternative process and the ways in which participants in the process could maximize its benefits.\textsuperscript{30} 

\section*{B. Accepted Principles}

Legal-negotiation theory draws upon a wide array of knowledge and expertise to understand why some parties favorably resolve disputes, though others come to an impasse.\textsuperscript{31} This theory operates on certain widely accepted principles, namely that parties are usually better off settling their disputes than litigating them.\textsuperscript{32} Settlement is no longer seen as a simple cost-saving calculation.\textsuperscript{33} Instead, settlement is a way to avoid the ancillary costs of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{26} Thomas J. Stipanowich, \textit{ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of "Alternative Dispute Resolution,"} \textit{1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.} 843, 849–50 (2004).
\item \textsuperscript{27} Dorothy J. Della Noce, \textit{Mediation Theory and Policy: The Legacy of the Pound Conference}, \textit{17 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL.} 545, 546 (2002).
\item \textsuperscript{28} Main, \textit{supra} note 16, at 335–41.
\item \textsuperscript{30} See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, \textit{Chronicling the Complexification of Negotiation Theory and Practice}, \textit{25 NEGOT. J.} 415, 416–19 (2009) (discussing the evolution of alternative-dispute resolution over the years and noting the aim of a "'joint gain' . . . for all of the parties").
\item \textsuperscript{31} Carrie Menkel-Meadow, \textit{Dispute Processing and Conflict Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Policy} xviii (2003) (noting that some “work in conflict theory has been derived from organizational management, labour relations and the applied sciences of decision-making and problem-solving” (internal citations omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{32} Kiser et al., \textit{supra} note 19, at 590.
\item \textsuperscript{33} See Stipanowich, \textit{supra} note 26, at 848 (noting that alternative-dispute resolution is seen “as an intervention strategy to promote what a trial was not designed to accomplish” and including a list of those goals); see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, \textit{Lawyers, Clients, and Mediation}, \textit{73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.} 1364, 1386–87 (1998) (discussing the lawyer’s role in understanding additional factors, such as the client’s emotional concerns as well as the financial costs of litigation).
litigation, such as destroyed relationships, loss of control, lack of creative solutions, and loss of time.\textsuperscript{34}

Negotiation textbooks now include multidisciplinary research from economics, game theory, social psychology, and philosophy.\textsuperscript{35} Legal-negotiation theory sees collaborative negotiations, also known as cooperative or problem-solving negotiations, as more effective than competitive ones; collaborative negotiators understand that emotions play a significant role in the process and they attempt to distribute the benefits of settlement to all parties in a negotiation.\textsuperscript{36} The literature suggests that legal disputes are efficiently and effectively resolved when the parties search for integrative solutions that incorporate a variety of interests, not just money.\textsuperscript{37} Parties are warned to avoid hostility and blame,\textsuperscript{38} to frame solutions as gains rather than losses,\textsuperscript{39} and to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Stipanowich, \textit{supra} note 26, at 848, 855, 859, 861; see also ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., \textit{BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES} 227 (2000) ("Lawyers are often told to settle early—by clients, judges, scholars, and books . . . on negotiation. It’s good advice. The problem in litigation is not that cases don’t settle; it’s that they settle late, after huge costs have been incurred.").
\item See CHARLES B. CRAVER, \textit{supra} note 6, at 153–60 (discussing psychological theories in the context of negotiation techniques); FOLBERG & GOLAN, \textit{supra} note 6, passim (using psychology and game theory in the negotiation textbook); KOROBKIN, \textit{supra} note 6, at 25–90 (using economics and psychology in the negotiation textbook); MENKEL-MEADOW, \textit{supra} note 31, at xvi–xxv (discussing the multidisciplinary areas that dispute resolution incorporates); NELKEN, \textit{supra} note 6, at 197–258 (incorporating psychological principles into the discussion on negotiation theory); CHARLES B. WIGGINS & L. RANDOLPH LOWRY, \textit{NEGOTIATION & SETTLEMENT ADVOCACY: A BOOK OF READINGS} 39–41, 255–59 (2d ed. 2005) (incorporating economics into negotiation techniques).
\item See KOROBKIN, \textit{supra} note 6, at 229–31 (discussing the differences between cooperative and competitive negotiation styles); Menkel-Meadow, \textit{supra} note 29, at 758 (discussing the benefits of the problem-solving style of negotiation); Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet & Andrew S. Tulumello, \textit{The Tension Between Empathy and Assertiveness}, 12 NEGOT. J. 217 (1996), reprinted in KOROBKIN, \textit{supra} note 6, at 228–30 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of negotiations being empathetic, cooperative, and competitive). But see Condlin, \textit{supra} note 29, at 8–16 (showing that there is no support for the notion that negotiators who are more cordial and cooperative are more effective at bargaining).
\item CRAVER, \textit{supra} note 6 at 153–54; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, \textit{Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table}, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 802 (2004) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, \textit{Heuristics}]; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, \textit{Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation}, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 176 (1996) ("Just as the loser-pays system induces excessive litigation, so too does litigation in which both parties view the litigation as a loss.").
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
view the negotiation as a collaborative process rather than a win-win, one-time attempt to settle before trial.\textsuperscript{40}

Although lawyers and courts are now applying these accepted principles more frequently, the principles are aimed almost entirely at face-to-face negotiations or in-the-room mediations.\textsuperscript{41} Legal-negotiation textbooks downplay written negotiations, focusing instead on oral negotiations.\textsuperscript{42} And, when these texts address written communication, they completely ignore the demand letter.\textsuperscript{43} Despite a growing movement toward alternative-dispute resolution,\textsuperscript{44} the principles at its core are being applied too late or not at all.\textsuperscript{45} By the time parties meet face-to-face, they most likely have exchanged correspondence and other documents.\textsuperscript{46} Yet, the documents that enshrine the parties' initial demands and negotiation positions have been nearly ignored in the negotiation literature.\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Gerald R. Williams, \textit{Negotiation as a Healing Process}, 1996 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 33 (1996) (observing that "negotiation unfolds in predictable stages over time").
\item \textsuperscript{41} See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, \textit{Courting Compliance}, in \textbf{THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK: THE DESK REFERENCE FOR THE EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR}, supra note 24, at 271. This focus is especially curious when many writers acknowledge that face-to-face communications likely result in different bargaining styles and lead to different results than other forms of communication, such as phone conferences or e-mail exchanges. See Lynn A. Epstein, \textit{Cyber E-Mail Negotiation vs. Traditional Negotiation: Will Cyber Technology Supplant Traditional Means of Settling Litigation?}, 36 Tulsa L.J. 839, 841–42 (2001).
\item \textsuperscript{42} See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{43} See supra note 6.
\item \textsuperscript{44} See Dorcas Quek, \textit{Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing a Court-Mandated Mediation Program}, 11 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 479, 484 (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{45} Dwight Golann, \textit{Mediating Legal Disputes}, Effective Strategies for Neutrals and Advocates xvii (2009) (noting that mediation often occurs too late in a lawsuit).
\item \textsuperscript{46} Id. Texts and studies on legal negotiation generally apply to the negotiation that focuses on the ultimate dispute; they ignore the reality that, before parties convene in a room together, they have already had a negotiation—a negotiation about whether the parties will meet at all. This negotiation may turn out to be the most difficult. Negotiation theory overlooks the notion that simply convincing another party to meet or to listen is sometimes a major accomplishment. Mediators are advised that the parties have often become bitterly embroiled in conflict before they mediate the dispute. Id. One commentator, in a book written for mediators, explains that parties in [serious legal disputes] hire lawyers, make serious allegations against each other, and often endure years of bitter and expensive litigation before they think seriously about settling their dispute. By this time, whatever interest the litigants may have had in relating with each other is usually gone, and many would prefer not even to talk with the other.
\item \textsuperscript{47} See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For example, Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie claim that "the opening settlement offer is perhaps the most important aspect of the bargaining strategy employed by a litigant" because exchanges are typically limited; they fail to mention anything about written demands, however. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, \textit{Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way}, 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, \textit{Opening Offers}].
\end{itemize}
Perhaps the experts fail to consider the written demand because they believe that the advice about negotiations has an obvious connection with the written demand, and it therefore needs no comment—lawyers would obviously know how to apply the advice about face-to-face negotiations to their written offers to settle. The current negotiation literature, however, seems to challenge this assumption because scholars are now beginning to pay particular attention to written negotiations in the electronic medium—that is, e-mail and texting. Advice regarding negotiating via e-mail has become fairly common but remains rather cursory. And because the literature covers e-mail negotiations but not demand letters, it feasibly could lead a student or practitioner to believe that demand letters are not part of the negotiation process.

More likely, experts fail to consider the written demand due to a belief that written documents are different from face-to-face negotiations, that emotions do not drive our responses to written communication, and that written communication invokes a cognitive reaction that is free from the emotional binds that plague our face-to-face negotiations. The empirical research, however, contradicts this belief.

48. Nadler & Shestowsky, supra note 6, at 145-46 (noting that, traditionally, researchers have focused on face-to-face negotiations and arguing that the growth of information technology, especially e-mail, requires scholars to focus on these new forms of media and their effects on negotiations); see also Epstein, supra note 41, at 839-40.

49. See, e.g., FOLBERG & GOLANN, supra note 6 (allocating only seventeen pages in a nearly four-hundred-and-fifty-page textbook to e-mail negotiations); Epstein, supra note 41, at 842-43 (contemplating the use of well-known negotiating techniques in e-mail—making extreme demands, splitting the difference, and providing successive concessions—but warning that these may backfire and are probably borderline unethical, therefore ultimately advising lawyers to be straightforward in written e-mail exchanges).

50. Epstein, supra note 41, at 842 (“A written communication avoids the psychological games lawyers often engage in during face-to-face negotiations.”). Michael Moffitt notes that written pleadings can serve as an impediment to settlement because these written documents fail to construct a complex vision of the past, eliminate the emotion from problems, look to past events rather than future events, and limit solutions to those that are law-based. Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 747 (2005). Moffitt’s solution is not to change the manner of pleading, but, instead, to create face-to-face, pre-suit conferences so that the parties can negotiate before the pleadings constrain their problem-solving. Id. This solution has two problems: first, it ignores the power of the written word to shape people’s views, ignite their emotions, and drive their behavior, and, second, it assumes that “[l]egal disputes begin with the pleading.” Id. at 728. Legal disputes, however, do not begin in the court system; they seek resolution in the court system. And, before suit is filed, parties have almost certainly engaged in failed written and verbal negotiations. Therefore, the search for solutions to the negotiation impasse should begin much earlier than the pleading stage.

51. See infra Part III.A. The empirical research calls into question the whole idea of conscious, rational thought and its supreme role in decision-making. If anything, the research in social psychology is changing the definition of rational decision-making. Until recently, rational thought was seen as a conscious, deliberate thought process. See Ap Dijksterhuis, Automticity and the Unconscious, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 252 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert & Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010). But social psychologists have taught that conscious deliberation is not necessary for rational decision-making. See id. Studies continue to
Written words can spark emotions and drive people's behavior in ways of which they are completely unaware.\(^{52}\) The current research makes it impossible for lawyers to ignore the extra-textual effects that written communication may have on a client's demand.\(^{53}\) Perhaps the recipient of a carefully reasoned demand letter fully and logically contemplates the lawyer's well-reasoned arguments, but psychologists have demonstrated that a lawyer's words have effects far beyond conscious reason.\(^{54}\) Because demand letters are often precursors to further negotiations, lawyers should seek to understand their potential effects on the recipients before committing their original positions to writing.\(^{55}\)

II. THE DEMAND LETTER AS AN IMPORTANT EARLY STEP IN NEGOTIATION

Generally, legal negotiations start with some form of written demand, sometimes addressed to the party and sometimes addressed to the party's legal counsel.\(^{56}\) Although very little research has been conducted on written negotiation,\(^{57}\) there are several reasons to believe that the demand letter is an important piece of the legal-negotiation process.\(^{58}\) First, the demand letter directly addresses the relevant party rather than a third-party judge or mediator.\(^{59}\) It often establishes the first impressions of the parties in a negotiation, and studies confirm that these first impressions are extremely hard to overcome,\(^{60}\) perhaps driving the course of the litigation.\(^{61}\) Second, the
demand letter may be the only opportunity to present the opposing side with an "integrated narrative of law and fact." This integration is important for settling disputes, but the rules of civil procedure often fail to give parties the opportunity to make this integration before trial. Finally, the American legal system has somewhat institutionalized the demand letter, often requiring one before a plaintiff may file suit. Therefore, whether it is required by law or written as an invitation to settle, the demand letter plays an important role in legal negotiations.

A. First Impressions Are Difficult to Overcome

Lawyers should carefully consider how to initially approach a negotiation because this approach can have lasting effects throughout the negotiation. There are many well-tested examples of the way first impressions influence the course of negotiations. Experts try to understand these processes in order to avoid unproductive negotiations or to gain an advantage in a particular negotiation. Therefore, to understand the potential effects the demand letter may have on its recipient, it is necessary to understand the psychological biases and short cuts at work when negotiations begin.

1. Initial Biases

Studies confirm that first impressions are extremely hard to overcome. Once a party takes an initial position, that party is likely to value evidence that supports that position and devalue evidence that does not. Furthermore, 

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62. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2002–03.
63. Id. at 2001; see also Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Untold Stories: Restoring Narrative to Pleading Practice, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 3 (2009) (“Over the centuries, this narrative aspect of the complaint, the telling of plaintiff’s tale through substantive allegations, has been eclipsed by the several instrumental functions of complaints even as those functions—invoking the court’s jurisdiction, providing notice to the defendant, narrowing the issues, uncovering facts—have themselves waxed and waned in importance.”); Moffitt, supra note 50, at 728 (discussing the disconnect between what pleading rules require and what negotiation theory suggests to facilitate settlement from the outset).
64. See infra Part II.C.
66. See infra Part II.A.1–2.
67. See infra Part II.A.1–2.
68. See Adler, supra note 65, at 712–13.
70. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2101–05 (1979) (demonstrating that both those people with strong pro-death penalty beliefs and those with strong anti-death penalty beliefs viewed the same subsequent evidence as confirming their respective positions); see also Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 470–71 (explaining that study participants tended to better recall information supporting their perspectives).
people generally take self-interested positions and assess their positions in a biased way.\textsuperscript{71} Placing people in a partisan role only strengthens their biases.\textsuperscript{72} For example, in one study, participants were divided into two groups: jury members and non-jury members.\textsuperscript{73} Those in the jury group received background information and information on both sides of each case.\textsuperscript{74} Non-jury members received only partial information, either background or one-sided information.\textsuperscript{75} Researchers directed all participants to guess how a jury of twenty members would have voted on the specific cases.\textsuperscript{76} Those with plaintiff-only information believed that more jurors would vote for the plaintiff, and those with defendant-only information believed that less jurors would vote for the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{77} Each group was biased toward the side for which they had been selected even though they knew that they had not been provided the arguments for the other side.\textsuperscript{78} More importantly, those with only partial information recorded higher certainty in their predictions than those who received full and balanced information on the cases.\textsuperscript{79} The researchers expected that less information would result in a lower degree of certainty, but the effect was the opposite.\textsuperscript{80}

In addition to the tendency to see facts with a self-interested bias, when confronted with anger or other negative emotions, people tend to escalate their anger.\textsuperscript{81} Anger creates a desire to retaliate, and the parties enter a cycle of

\textsuperscript{71} Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 109, 112–13 (1997) (demonstrating that participants will predict higher awards in a hypothetical case for the side to which they had been randomly assigned, even though both sides were given the same information); Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130–32 (1954) (confirming through an empirical study that Dartmouth and Princeton students viewed a football game between the two teams with significant bias in favor of their own team); Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 470–71; see also Birke & Fox, supra note 13, at 14 ("In general, people have great difficulty divorcing themselves from their idiosyncratic role sufficiently to take an objective view of disputes in which they are involved.").

\textsuperscript{72} Babcock, supra note 71, at 120. Babcock and Loewenstein note that “differences in roles” can cause one to gravitate to his own biases. Id.

\textsuperscript{73} Lyle A. Brenner et al., On the Evaluation of One-Sided Evidence, 9 J. OF BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 59, 61 (1996).

\textsuperscript{74} Id.

\textsuperscript{75} Id.

\textsuperscript{76} Id.

\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 63.

\textsuperscript{78} Id.

\textsuperscript{79} Id.

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 68.

\textsuperscript{81} Daniel L. Shapiro, Preempting Disaster: Pre-Mediation Strategies to Deal with Strong Emotions, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION 311 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006) ("[E]ach party’s strong emotions can fuel their own escalating emotions . . . ."); see also Robert S. Adler et al., Emotions in Negotiation: How to Manage Fear and Anger, 14 NEGOT. J. 161, 164 (1998) (explaining that negative emotions tend to engage more quickly because of their primal use in instinctual human survival); Jefferey L. McClellan, Marrying Positive Psychology to
agitation that is hard to break.\textsuperscript{82} Therefore, although a lawyer could expect the recipient of a demand letter to take a self-interested position at the outset of a negotiation, once the recipient becomes angry and defensive, the likelihood of efficient resolution becomes remote.\textsuperscript{83} This is because anger changes the way the brain operates;\textsuperscript{84} people become less creative and cooperative, and, instead, become more vindictive.\textsuperscript{85}

Similarly, the perception of unfairness, like anger, has a powerful, negative influence on negotiations and can lead a person to give up something of value simply to punish the person who is perceived to be acting unfairly.\textsuperscript{86} Using variations on an experiment known as the “Ultimatum Game,” researchers have demonstrated a person’s propensity to suffer losses in order to punish another who has behaved unfairly.\textsuperscript{87} The game involves two players and a sum of money—for example, one hundred dollars. The first player must offer a portion of the one hundred dollars to the second player. If the second player accepts the offer, both players get to keep the money.\textsuperscript{88} If the second player rejects the offer, both players walk away with nothing.\textsuperscript{89} Both know that these are the rules of the game before they play it.\textsuperscript{90} As economists postulate, a rational second player would accept any offer, even just one dollar because one dollar is more than nothing, and nothing is what the second player would receive if she rejected the offer.\textsuperscript{91} But this rarely happens. First players generally offer between forty and fifty percent of the money, here forty or fifty dollars.\textsuperscript{92} If the offer is less than an even split, the second player will often reject the offer and the first player will walk away with nothing.\textsuperscript{93} This results

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\textsuperscript{82} McClellan, supra note 81, at 31; see also Adler et al., supra note 81, at 168–69 (“[T]he two most intense emotions that confront negotiators are fear and anger.”).
\textsuperscript{83} Korobkin, supra note 13, at 300–01; Shapiro, supra note 81, at 311–12.
\textsuperscript{84} McClellen, supra note 81, at 31.
\textsuperscript{85} Adler, supra note 65, at 169 (“[A]nger motivates us to retaliate when we are attacked.”); Korobkin, supra note 13, at 300–01; McClellan, supra note 81, at 31; Shapiro, supra note 81.
\textsuperscript{86} Korobkin, supra note 13, at 300–01 (“A party with a malevolent utility function places a positive value on preventing the opposing party from obtaining what she wants from the lawsuit.”).
\textsuperscript{87} Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289 SCI. 1773, 1773–74 (2000).
\textsuperscript{88} Id. at 1773.
\textsuperscript{89} Id.
\textsuperscript{90} Id.
\textsuperscript{91} Birke & Fox, supra note 13, at 36 n.152; Nowak et al., supra note 87, at 1773.
\textsuperscript{92} Nowak et al., supra note 87, at 1773.
\textsuperscript{93} See id. (concluding that half the responders reject offers below thirty percent); see also Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 367, 368 (1982).
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because the second player would rather take nothing than allow what she sees as an unfair windfall to the first player.94

Because of these reactions, experts advise negotiators to expect a biased participant and to avoid insults, shame, blame, and other techniques that would cause the other party to erupt in anger, and, rather, to focus the other party on fair outcomes.95 Of course, negotiators are wise to heed the experts’ advice. But, what if the other party is already angered by a shaming demand letter or feels unfairly treated after receiving an insulting offer? The appropriate time to consider these biases is when the parties initiate their communications, whether face-to-face or in writing.96

2. Favorable Heuristic Reasoning97

In contrast to negative emotions, which can impede settlement, initial positive emotions can facilitate settlement.98 First, when a person has positive feelings toward someone, that person is apt to reason through heuristics, or mental shortcuts.99 On the other hand, negative, distrustful emotions cause a person to reason more logically, and thus require more proof before making a decision.100 Therefore, a letter that emits negative emotions will likely generate the need for heightened persuasion.101 Alternatively, a letter that generates positive emotions may set the stage for more favorable, heuristic reasoning.102

94. Güth et al., supra note 93, at 368.
95. Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 470–73.
97. People often use mental shortcuts when making decisions. Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 252–53. These mental shortcuts, or heuristics, are intuitive judgments driven by automatic processes outside our conscious awareness. Id. at 252–53. Many researches describe heuristics as highly adaptive human behavior because humans cannot consciously and carefully weigh each judgment or decision they face. Id. at 253. The problem with heuristic reasoning is that it is susceptible to systemic biases. See id. at 252–53.
99. G. Robert J. Hockey et al., Effects of Negative Mood States on Risk in Everyday Decision Making, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 823, 825 (2000); see also Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 15–16 (discussing the effects of positive and negative emotions on cognitive function and decision-making); Tsay & Bazerman, supra note 38, at 473–74.
100. See Hockey et al., supra note 99, at 825 (discussing the studies on the effects of negative mood on mental processing and decision-making); Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 15 (“The result of pessimism . . . is a narrowed focus of attention and motivation to process information more deeply and systematically.”).
101. See Hockey et al., supra note 99, 825.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99.
One example of a favorable heuristic is the foot-in-the-door effect. Strategies that take advantage of this favorable heuristic rely on studies that demonstrate people’s willingness to comply with more imposing requests if they first accede to an initial, smaller request. Once people give in to a demand or make a concession, they are much more likely to give in to larger demands or make more substantial concessions. For example, people who previously agreed to sign a socially conscious petition to “keep California beautiful” will more likely agree later to “put a big sign on their lawn . . . advocating safe driving.” Achieving that first point of agreement, then, becomes crucial to making more significant advancements later in the negotiating process.

Unconscious anchors may also cause favorable heuristic reasoning because they affect people’s later, seemingly unrelated, perceptions. An anchor is a value that serves as an initial reference point. Even when this initial value is completely unrelated to an estimate or a negotiation, the initial value affects the subsequent estimated value or offer. For example, in one of the first studies on the effects of anchoring, researchers asked participants to spin a wheel that contained random numbers and then asked them to guess what percentage of African countries are members of the United Nations. The answers were affected by the number upon which the wheel landed. If the wheel landed on the number ten, participants were more likely to guess around twenty-five percent, but if the wheel landed on sixty-five, participants were more likely to guess closer to forty-five percent. Thus, the number on the wheel, which had no relation to Africa or international political organizations, served as an unconscious anchor for participants’ later choice.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 418 n.27 (citing DANIEL O’KEEFE, PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 169 (1990)).
107. One can imagine that even a relatively small request—perhaps simply to meet in person—sets the stage for a larger request later.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
In negotiations, extreme initial offers can actually result in better settlement terms for the offeror, probably due to the effects of anchoring. A study conducted by Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie demonstrates this effect. Korobkin and Guthrie gave two groups identical information about a defective new car and asked participants to play the role of the car purchaser. The participants were told that, to avoid a lawsuit, the dealer made a final offer to pay the purchaser $12,000 if the purchaser kept the defective car. In one group, the participants were told they had already rejected the dealer’s initial offer of $2,000 and continued ownership of the car. The other group was told it had rejected the dealer’s initial offer of $10,000 and the option to keep the car. The participants in the group with the $2,000 initial offer were more likely to accept the $12,000 final offer than those in the group where the dealer offered $10,000 initially.

This study supports the argument that extreme initial offers likely result in a more favorable settlement simply due to the subconscious effects of anchoring. The initial offer anchored the value of the settlement. Those who received a $2,000 initial offer saw the $12,000 as a vast improvement—a good deal. Those who received the $10,000 initial offer saw the $12,000 as too similar to the initial rejected offer. Therefore, the initial offer may act as an anchor, having lasting effects on the amount of a final settlement. For these reasons, lawyers would be wise to cautiously choose the number they use when initiating negotiations, especially in writing.

Finally, framing can be a powerful way to harness favorable heuristics. Many authors have discussed the power of framing in negotiations, especially

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115. See Guthrie, supra note 108, at 44 (“[A] negotiator can use an extreme opening offer to anchor her counterpart.”); Korobkin & Guthrie, Heuristics, supra note 39, at 806 (noting that extreme opening demands increase the likelihood of recharging a settlement agreement); Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 47, at 3–5 (“Because pretrial bargaining typically includes few exchanges, the opening settlement offer is perhaps the most important aspect of the bargaining strategy employed by a litigant, and it deserves special attention.”).

116. Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 47, at 1, 4–5.
117. Id. at 11–12.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 12–13.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 13.
122. Id. at 13, 19.
123. Id. at 19.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 3 (“Because pretrial bargaining typically includes few exchanges, the opening settlement offer is perhaps the most important aspect of the bargaining strategy employed by a litigant, and it deserves special attention.”).
the effects of framing losses as gains. For example, researchers have shown that the simple framing technique of reporting outcomes in terms of gains rather than in terms of losses significantly affects participants' choices. One early study, known as the "Asian disease" problem, asked participants to assume six hundred people were facing exposure to a lethal disease. The participants were then asked to choose between two courses of treatment. With program A, two hundred people would be saved. With program B, there would be a one-third chance of saving all six hundred people, but a two-thirds chance of not saving anyone. Given these two choices, most participants chose program A—to take the certain gain of saving two hundred people. However, results changed drastically when a different group of participants were given the same choices, but the scenarios were framed in terms of losses instead of gains. In this study, participants chose between program A where four hundred people certainly would die and program B, where there was a one-third chance nobody would die, and a two-thirds chance that six hundred people would die. Given this new, negative frame, a majority of the participants chose program B instead of A, even though the actual data had not changed.

The evidence on framing effects should caution attorneys writing demand letters. Lawyers should understand that people would rather opt for a certain gain rather than a certain loss. But, more importantly, people choose uncertain losses over certain losses. Because settlement offers are usually certain losses, typically described as a stated amount of money, parties receiving demand letters are probably more inclined to choose the uncertainty of a future loss at trial than a certain loss today. Lawyers would be wise to work on reframing their offers, especially those they commit to writing.

For these many well-tested reasons, parties should concern themselves with the other side's initial impressions. Although many people tend to think of

128. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 39, at 118–28 (providing an extensive discussion of the framing effects in litigation).
129. Id. at 123.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 453–54.
139. See Rachlinski, supra note 39, at 128–29 (demonstrating through statistical data that a defendant is less likely to accept a monetary settlement offer that will result in a certain loss).
140. See Adler, supra note 65, at 712–13 (explaining that initial impressions, even if false, may dominate the entire negotiation).
negotiations as face-to-face interactions, they often start in writing. Attorneys should contemplate the potential first impressions their letters will have on opposing parties because those initial impressions are likely to have long-lasting consequences in the way future negotiations play out. Therefore, the demand letter, although a written document, cannot be ignored.

B. The Importance of Law-Fact Integration

Evidence suggests that the earlier a party is able to tell her story to the other side through integrating the facts and the law, the more likely the parties will settle.\(^\text{141}\) One way to integrate law and fact effectively is through narrative.\(^\text{142}\) Legal writing scholars have increasingly focused on the importance of narrative in composing a compelling legal argument,\(^\text{143}\) and the demand letter provides an ideal forum for persuasive narrative.\(^\text{144}\) These experts have employed techniques used in other disciplines to study the well-accepted principle that narrative is an essential element in persuasion.\(^\text{145}\) A story works better as a tool of persuasion than does simple logic.\(^\text{146}\)

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\(^{141}\) See Gary Paquin & Linda Harvey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation and Narrative Mediation: A Natural Connection, 3 FLA. COASTAL. L.J. 167, 170 (2002) (explaining that allowing each party the opportunity to tell her story can be therapeutic and invoke feelings of empathy in the other party, increasing the likelihood of settlement); Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2018 (citing Jason Corriden, Woolf Reforms Target Inefficiency and Inequity in UK Court System, INSIDE LITIG. July 1999, at 1, 2, 4) ("[G]etting potential litigants to tell their stores in advance makes sense . . . and this will help many of them settle earlier and with more information.").


\(^{143}\) See, e.g., id. at 130–32 (asserting that the use of narratives is advantageous in writing appellate briefs); Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 15 ("[T]he careful drafter’s job is to use traditional storytelling techniques to the client’s advantage"); J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 57 (2008) (discussing how the use of narratives can lead to positive outcomes in trial); Ruth Anne Robbins, An Introduction to Applied Storytelling, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 7 n.18 (2008) ("[H]ave we not reached the point where we can just take judicial notice that stories are an important form of human communication?"); see also Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 7 (suggesting the use of priming to influence the reader’s view of the facts in written advocacy).

\(^{144}\) Rappaport, supra note 6, at 46.


\(^{146}\) Rideout, supra note 143, at 60. Of course, stories must adhere to logic and consistency in order to persuade. See Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 17 (explaining that the soundness of a story is critical to its success).
Stories form a person's understanding of the world, and her place in the world.\footnote{See Bandes, supra note 145, at 383 ("We make sense of the world by ordering it into metaphors, and ultimately into narratives.")} Stories, unlike facts, incorporate our underlying values and a sense of order.\footnote{See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 1985 ("[H]umans attempt to understand reality by identifying some of the many variables in a given situation and then weaving them into a comprehensible story.").} Stories give shape to human reality.\footnote{Rideout, supra note 143, at 59.} Humans have used stories as an effective form of communication for so long that some scholars believe the narrative schema is "innate."\footnote{See Fajans & Falk, supra note 63, at 22 (arguing that "narrative fidelity is achieved when our clients can recognize their own stories"); Paquin & Harvey, supra note 141, at 170 (asserting that allowing a client to tell her story can be "cathartic").} Furthermore, there is inherent value in a client simply telling her story.\footnote{See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2001–02 (suggesting that, in the multitudes of settlement cases, a client's story may be overlooked). Bandes persuasively argues that narrative is present in every legal dispute, but the narrative may be different in different contexts. Id. at 384–85. Traditional legal narrative reinforces the status quo, preferring narratives of formalism to narratives of empathy. See id. at 387–89. Therefore, although the client's story is not dislodged from an emotional and value-laden narrative, it is told through a narrative entirely inappropriate for the task of healing and reconciling.} Too often, legal disputes become disconnected from the narrative that allows people to make sense, not only of the legal claims, but also of the human emotions and values that underlie the legal claims.\footnote{Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client's Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero's Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 768-69 (2006).} Finally, humans often see the world in the context of certain narrative forms—the hero versus the villain,\footnote{Linda H. Edwards, Once upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming fall 2010) (manuscript at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1462570.} the mythic birth or rebirth,\footnote{Philip N. Meyer, Retelling the Darkest Story: Mystery, Suspense, and Detectives in a Brief Written on Behalf of a Condemned Inmate, 58 MERCER L. REV. 665, 667 (2007).} the mystery.\footnote{See Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 368 (1996) ("Facts do not speak for themselves, and stories do not tell themselves. The good lawyer fits the story that he has to tell into the available stock of culturally recognized narratives that connect his client to familiar and recognizable themes."). Kathryn Stanchi argues that priming studies can help lawyers chose a theme of the case when writing their briefs, noting that "[o]ne of the earliest decisions a legal advocate must make is what the overarching theme or feel of the case is going to be." Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 8–9. This is good advice, but the choice should be made much earlier than when lawyers begin writing briefs for their cases. Lawyers must decide on the way they will present their clients' stories before the negotiations begin. Of course, the story may change once a case is filed because the audience is} The lawyer's job is to identify a fitting narrative for her client's case that will provide the appropriate lens through which others will see her moral and legal plight.\footnote{Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 368 (1996) ("Facts do not speak for themselves, and stories do not tell themselves. The good lawyer fits the story that he has to tell into the available stock of culturally recognized narratives that connect his client to familiar and recognizable themes."). Kathryn Stanchi argues that priming studies can help lawyers chose a theme of the case when writing their briefs, noting that "[o]ne of the earliest decisions a legal advocate must make is what the overarching theme or feel of the case is going to be." Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 8–9. This is good advice, but the choice should be made much earlier than when lawyers begin writing briefs for their cases. Lawyers must decide on the way they will present their clients' stories before the negotiations begin. Of course, the story may change once a case is filed because the audience is}
Although narratives undoubtedly play an important role in legal persuasion, our rules of civil procedure fail to foster an integration of law and fact into a meaningful narrative before trial.\textsuperscript{157} The modern rules of civil procedure require plaintiffs to offer only a "short and plain statement" when initiating a lawsuit.\textsuperscript{158} Plaintiffs' facts are often separated from the legal claims. Defendants answer by simply admitting or denying each allegation in the complaint.\textsuperscript{159} Likewise, the rules of discovery do not require the parties to set forth any sort of factual narrative.\textsuperscript{160} In fact, Rule 26 assumes that the parties will disclose documents based on their understanding of what evidence is relevant to the legal claims at issue.\textsuperscript{161}

Not until the summary-judgment stage does this process of law-fact integration occur at any meaningful level.\textsuperscript{162} However, some formulaic local rules require parties to separate the facts from the relevant law, even in motions for summary judgment.\textsuperscript{163} In some jurisdictions, parties file a statement of undisputed facts in a document entirely separate from the brief containing the party's legal arguments, making the integration awkward at best.\textsuperscript{164} Under the current rules of
procedure, the all-important law-fact integration may not actually happen until trial.\textsuperscript{165}

Although the rules of procedure operate against telling a client's coherent narrative, lawyers are finding ways to present their clients' stories outside the formal rules.\textsuperscript{166} Stephen Subrin and Thomas Main call this the "parallel procedural universe"—a sphere outside the formal procedures where lawyers are finding creative ways to meaningfully integrate law and fact.\textsuperscript{167} In this realm, which is divorced from procedural formalities, lawyers are using demand letters, exchanging notebooks, sending settlement brochures, and producing sophisticated documentaries in order to effectively tell their client's story persuasively with the hope that a favorable settlement will soon follow.\textsuperscript{168}

Lawyers operating in this parallel universe, using extra-procedural narratives to facilitate settlement, probably have the right instincts about what techniques effectively lead to settlement. However, they are operating on intuition and experience.\textsuperscript{169} Because their informal techniques are outside the formal procedures and often shrouded from view, they are nearly inaccessible to empirical study, resulting in a problematic lack of knowledge regarding the reasons lawyers use these informal tactics.\textsuperscript{170} Furthermore, these settlement documents are frequently privileged communications.\textsuperscript{171} Rules of evidence parties to intermingle their "[c]haracterizations, inferences, and legal conclusions" with the statement of facts).

\textsuperscript{165} Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2000–01. Some have argued that, even in court-ordered mediation, clients may be denied the opportunity to provide the other side with their own narrative because lawyers have supplanted mediation with a lawyer-driven "bargaining paradigm" that values economically grounded, rational negotiation. Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 802–05 (2001).

\textsuperscript{166} See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2017 ("If we are right, the lawyers, largely on their own, usually without a rule, and without a standard, seem to be fulfilling the need to integrate law and fact into an advocacy narrative, and to share it with the opposition, their own clients, and when desirable, with mediators.").

\textsuperscript{167} Id. at 2001–02.

\textsuperscript{168} Id. at 1983.

\textsuperscript{169} See Saks, supra note 10, at 802. Kathryn Stanchi argues that "the study of persuasive writing has been dominated by a kind of 'armchair psychology'—a set of conventions and practices, handed down from lawyer to lawyer, developed largely from instinct and speculation." Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 412. Lawyers must "reexamine the validity of conventional wisdom" to determine whether the conventional wisdom is wrong. Id. at 413.

\textsuperscript{170} Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.

often bar them from view, and they are not usually part of the record.172 As a result, researchers know almost nothing about this uncharted universe from an empirical standpoint.173 They do not know what kinds of materials are effective or what principles are driving lawyers' decisions about how to present their clients' narratives.174 Lawyers are creating a sphere of practice that instinctively works to more efficiently resolve their cases.175 However, without any empirical testing of their methods, we cannot really know what works, why it works, or how it can be improved.176

C. Demand Letters Often Required by Law

Lawyers no longer write and send demand letters simply as a common practice or custom. Rather, they send demand letters based on statutory requirements.177 For example, the law requires pre-suit letters in many consumer-protection disputes178 and actions to collect a debt.179 These statutory requirements were enacted to encourage settlement and limit damages,180 yet little attempt has been made to incorporate negotiation theory into these legally necessary demand letters.181

Although the purpose behind requiring letters is pre-litigation settlement,182 these statutory requirements seem to contradict good negotiation practice in several ways. First, on the most fundamental level, these laws almost certainly

172. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (stating that settlement communications are not admissible “to prove liability for, [or] invalidity of” the claim or its amount); Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.
173. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.
175. Id. at 801–02.
176. See id. at 802.
177. Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2005 (“[V]arious provisions of substantive law now require, or make it otherwise desirable, that an initial letter or other document explaining the plaintiff’s legal and factual position be sent to the defendant as a prerequisite to filing suit.”).
178. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 2006); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (West 2002).

The demand letter serves a dual function. The first of these functions is to encourage negotiation and settlement by notifying prospective defendants of claims arising from allegedly unlawful conduct. This gives the addressee an opportunity to review the facts and the law involved to see if the requested relief should be granted or denied. The second function of the letter is to operate as a control on the amount of damages which the complainant can ultimately recover if he proves his case.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
181. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
182. See Slaney, 322 N.E.2d at 779 (noting that demand letters are used to encourage settlement).
frame the negotiation as a one-time shot rather than a multistage process. Under the consumer-protection laws, for example, the claimant is required to "reasonably identify the unfair or deceptive act or practice" and "the injury suffered." The letter's recipient then has the option of tendering an offer of settlement in writing. If the claimant rejects the offer and presses on with litigation, the claimant's damages are limited to the amount of the tendered offer if the offer was reasonable. The limitation on recovery is meant to create an incentive for the plaintiff to settle at the first sign of a reasonable offer because, at trial, the plaintiff may only receive the amount of the first offer, and the plaintiff who takes his case to trial risks the uncertainty of not receiving any payout at all.

One problem with these statutes requiring pre-litigation demand letters is that the statutory language is not designed to follow the procedure of typical legal negotiations, with stops and starts, offers, counter-offers, and re-evaluations. Another problem is that these consumer protection statutes create a distributive negotiation frame in which the participants view the outcome as zero-sum or a fixed-pie. The statutes generally limit a party's recovery to money damages. For example, a plaintiff would have no incentive to ask for non-monetary remedies or to coax the potential defendant into cooperative negotiation if the initial letter would ultimately limit the plaintiff's monetary recovery to the written demand presented in the first demand letter. Therefore, even though parties with a consumer dispute could avoid the statute's limitations altogether by negotiating a settlement that considers compensation other than money, the required pre-litigation notice seems to limit the lawyer's negotiation tools at the outset.

If the purpose of these legally required demand letters is to facilitate settlement, there is no evidence that this additional pre-litigation requirement is

183. Cf. MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., PROCESSES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING, supra note 6, at 3-4 (discussing the myriad of skills and the general complexity of negotiation).
184. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3).
185. id.
186. Id. Of course, the definition of "reasonable" has been hard to pin down. Courts have held that the reasonableness of a settlement offer under the Massachusetts statute is a question of fact. See Kohl v. Silver Lake Motors, Inc., 343 N.E.2d 375, 378 (Mass. 1976).
187. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3); Kohl, 343 N.E.2d at 380 (explaining the parameters of § 9(3)).
188. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3); see also Williams, supra note 40, at 33-35 (stating that there are multiple stages in legal negotiations).
189. See THE ESSENTIALS OF NEGOTIATION 48-50 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Press, Soc'y for Human Res. Mgmt. 2005) ("In a distributive negotiation, the parties compete over the distribution of a fixed sum of value.").
190. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3). Requiring these types of demand letters creates the same kind of bias Michael Moffitt identifies in the pleading requirements—they give the perception that the "[p]roblems . . . boil down to, 'Do you owe me money?'" Moffitt, supra note 50, at 728.
working. In fact, demand letters may actually hinder settlement and prolong litigation, thwarting the intent of legislative schemes. If a demand letter can actually hinder settlement, legislators would not necessarily be wise to require them. Again, empirical study could inform about the most effective avenues to bring about faster settlements and less-congested dockets, but that empirical testing has not yet been conducted.

III. THE DEMAND LETTER AS A PRIMING DEVICE

By now, this Article should have convinced the reader that demand letters cannot be ignored when developing and implementing a negotiation strategy. These written negotiations set parties’ initial impressions and spark their initial emotions. They bring about certain psychological and emotional forces that can either act as barriers to settlement or pave the road to favorable negotiation. Demand letters provide lawyers the opportunity to tell their clients’ stories in an integrated, persuasive narrative, and they are increasingly required by law.

These reasons alone should convince the legal profession to consider more seriously the demand letter. But, if any research could convince lawyers that the words they pen can have lasting consequences for future negotiations, it is the research into the effects of priming. When a person’s recent perceptions incidentally and unknowingly influence his behavior, his behavior has been “primed.” For instance, when people play a word game that contains terms “relevant to the elderly,” like grey, old, wrinkle, and Florida, they walk more slowly after finishing the word game than people who played a word game with “age non-specific words” like birds, tree, and book. Unbeknownst to the players with the first set of words, they were primed to conjure the “elderly” stereotype. By unconsciously priming this stereotype, the players behaved more like their perception of the stereotype, that is, they walked more slowly.

Because the written words used to convey a settlement demand likely influence the recipient’s subsequent behavior, the effects of priming on the overall negotiation process should be carefully considered and empirically

191. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Opening Offers, supra note 47, at 3–4.
192. See id. Although well-intentioned, statutes simply assume, without testing, that requiring parties to make reasonable settlement offers from the outset will promote settlement. The empirical evidence does not support this notion. See id.
193. See supra Part II.A.
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. See supra Part II.B.
197. Id. at 236–37.
198. Id. at 237.
studied. Although little research has been done on the effects of priming in negotiations, the words lawyers use in a demand letter almost certainly have some priming effect on their recipients.

Recall my neighbor’s written demand that I change my parking habits. My neighbor chose the written word to convey his message. He wanted me to change my behavior; he wanted me to park farther away from his garage. Having only written words in front of me, my emotions took control. I became extremely angry, and the anger did not dissipate over the course of the day. When I came home, I was still angry. My emotions controlled my reaction to his demand.199 Instead of complying with his request, I was driven to seek revenge despite my conscious awareness that revenge would probably be counterproductive. I was amazed at my own reaction to my neighbor’s written demand, and I experienced, first hand, the power of the written word to ignite emotions and to initiate and guide behaviors. My emotions flared, not because I was offended by my neighbor’s body language or intimidated by his size and demeanor, but absent any personal contact. The written words drove my subsequent behavior.

My experience with my neighbor is merely an anecdote. But my emotional reaction and resulting uncooperative behavior conformed to the findings of social psychologists who have researched the effects of priming on our behavior and decision-making.200

A. Priming Studies Demonstrate the Power of the Written Word to Influence Behavior, Decision-Making, and Goal Setting

Somewhat recently, social psychologists began testing whether they could automatically initiate certain behaviors in their subjects by priming them.201 These priming studies provide powerful evidence that written words drive unconscious emotions and behaviors.202 The research challenges the notion that people intentionally weigh their options with careful contemplation before choosing a course of action.203 To the contrary, our behaviors do not result

199. Interestingly, my emotions also ignited my neighbors’ emotions. They, too, became vengeful even though the demand did not address them.

200. See, e.g., Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 246–55 (discussing the study “in which priming the category of elderly led to changes in walking speed,” thus demonstrating how priming can have an impact on physical behavior); see also C. Neil Macrae et al., On Activating Exemplars, 34 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 330, 344 (1998) (“Despite the firm intuition that behavior almost invariably has its origin in the intricate workings of the conscious mind, this conviction turns out to rest on little more than a seductive illusion.”).

201. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 33. Although the bulk of the studies on priming are recent, other researchers studied the effects of priming hostility on participants’ behavior as early as 1976, paving the way for the current studies. See John A. Bargh, Why We Thought We Could Prime Social Behavior, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 216, 218 (2003).

202. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 33.

203. Id. at 34.
solely from conscious thought. In fact, conscious thought is likely to result from unconscious processes.

Priming occurs when exposure to certain cognitive categories unconsciously activates related categories of knowledge, or activates goal formation, which more directly drives behavior. For example, people who watch a movie about a mugger victimizing tourists in the city streets tend to interpret the act of a stranger bumping into them later as hostile or aggressive. People who view an Inspector Clouseau movie, however, tend to attribute the same act to the stranger’s clumsiness. The movie primes a certain cognitive category that becomes easily accessed later to interpret the stranger’s act. Similarly, people exposed to a Formula One auto-racing champion’s name, later, in an ostensibly unrelated task, read a series of words faster; people exposed to a picture of a “skinhead” display more racist attitudes; and people exposed to the scent of an all-purpose cleaner expended more effort to keep their area clean when they ate. In the latter example, the prime—the scent of an all-purpose cleaner—activated a schema with concepts related to cleaning; this drove participants to behave in a way related to that concept, such as taking care to keep themselves and the area around them clean.

Like a violent movie, the scent of cleaning solvent, or a famous racecar driver’s name, written words on a page also have a priming effect. In fact, words on a page can automatically initiate complex behaviors in the reader—from behaving more aggressively, to performing better on a test, to playing a game more cooperatively—because the words prime certain related traits. For example, an early study in priming demonstrated the power of words to initiate either rude or polite behavior. The study used a scrambled sentence

204. Id.
205. Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 258.
206. Ferguson & Bargh, supra note 52, at 34–36.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Macrae et al., supra note 200, at 345–46.
213. Id. at 691–92.
214. Id. at 692. In fact, many priming studies involve the use of scrambled sentence exercises or word-hunt games to prime participants. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 244–48 (discussing various behavioral priming studies to show that priming can utilize categories and traits as primes); Stanchi, The Power of Priming, supra note 60, at 1–8 (explaining that priming can use sentence structure and word games).
exercise to prime the study's participants. An experimenter gave study participants a list of five words and asked them to write a complete sentence using just four of the words. Some participants were given word groupings with words relating to the trait "rude," such as bother, brazen, and aggressively. Those participants would take the words in a grouping such as "they her bother see usually" and change them into a four-word sentence, such as "they usually see her" or "they usually bother her." Other participants were given words related to the trait "polite." They would take the words in a grouping such as "they her respect see usually" and change them to either "they usually see her" or "they usually respect her." After completing the exercise, participants left the lab to find the experimenter to receive directions about the next part of the study. They found the experimenter engaged in conversation and oblivious to their presence.

Participants who were primed with the words relating to rude were about three times more likely to interrupt the experimenter's ongoing conversation than participants who were primed with words associated with polite. Of course, none of the participants were

217. Id.
218. Id. at 233.
219. Id. at 234 (noting that other examples include: "bold, rude, . . . disturb, intrude, annoyingly, interrupt, audaciously, . . . impolitely, infringe, obnoxious, aggravating, and bluntly").
220. JONATHAN HAIJT, THE HAPPINESS HYPOTHESIS 13 (2006); Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior, supra note 196, at 234.
221. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior, supra note 196, at 234 (explaining that some of the critical stimuli included "respect, honor, considerate, . . . patiently, . . . polite, [and] courteous").
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 234–35. After removing those participants who did not interrupt at all from consideration, it was apparent that over sixty percent of those primed with the construct "rude" interrupted, between thirty and forty percent of those not primed with either "rude" or "polite" interrupted, and only between ten and twenty percent of those primed with the construct "polite" interrupted. Id. Moreover, when the researchers designed the study, they did not anticipate the significant effects of priming on the subjects' behavior. Bargh, supra note 201, at 216. The researchers gave participants the same instructions: to complete the scrambled sentence test and, when they had completed the test, to deliver the completed test to the test's administrator down the hall before receiving further instructions. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior, supra note 196, at 234. When the participants completed the sentence exercise and were ready to receive further instructions, the test administrator was purposely involved in a conversation with a colleague. Id. The colleague tracked the time between when the participant came into the hall and when the participant interrupted the conversation in order to get further instructions. Id. To their dismay, the researchers found that more than eighty percent of those who were primed with the construct "polite" waited a full ten minutes without interrupting—a striking result considering the study took place in New York City. Id. at 234–35. On the other hand, those primed with the construct "rude" interrupted more frequently and much sooner. Id. at 234. The control group, not primed with either word, interrupted more frequently and sooner than those primed with "polite" words, yet waited longer to interrupt than those primed with "rude" words. Id. at 235.
aware that they had been primed with words relating to the constructs "rude" or "polite." They made no connection between the words in the scrambled sentences and their later behavior.

Priming research has gone far beyond the initial studies that use words to prime simple behaviors. For example, researchers in the Netherlands have primed mental performance. They demonstrated that when participants simply wrote down their thoughts about professors before taking a general knowledge test, they scored thirteen percent higher than those who wrote about secretaries, and ten percent higher than those who did not write about anything. On the other hand, participants who wrote about "soccer hooligans" before taking the test scored eight percent lower than those who were not asked to write about anything. The test asked general knowledge-based Trivial Pursuit questions, such as "Who painted La Guernica?" or "What is the capital of Bangladesh?" The questions had no obvious connection to professors or soccer hooligans. One might think that a test taker either knows or does not know the capital of Bangladesh. Amazingly, though, by priming participants with the professor stereotype ("intelligence"), the researchers were able to increase the participants' scores by sixteen percent over those primed with the soccer hooligan stereotype ("stupidity"). This priming changed the participants' abilities to answer general-knowledge questions about what the participants already knew, something usually seen as a highly controlled behavior and fixed characteristic.

In yet another study, researchers gave a group of participants word-hunt games containing words associated with achievement. Those primed with achievement words performed better on a later word-scramble game, and, in a related study, were also much more likely to cheat by going past the time allotted for the exercise than their counterparts who were not primed for achievement. Additionally, in a second related experiment, participants

227. Id.
229. Id. at 869.
230. Id. at 872 (comparing participants primed for nine minutes with those not primed at all).
231. Id. at 869.
232. Id. at 871–72.
233. See id. at 874 ("Participants do not become more knowledgeable as a result of the prime . . . . The effect must have come about because the prime triggered behaviors beneficial to performance on a general knowledge task that already were part of the participants' behavioral repertoire.").
235. Id. at 1017, 1023.
primed for achievement were more likely to persist with a word-scramble problem than to switch to a more enjoyable exercise. And, finally, when those in the achievement-primed group were interrupted while pursuing their goal, they were not deterred; they were more likely to return to the task than those who had not been primed.

Most significantly, researchers have demonstrated that people can be primed to unconsciously pursue particular goals. In one study, researchers demonstrated that, when asked to first play a word-hunt game that contained words relating to cooperation, participants who later played a scarce-resources game played the game more cooperatively. Those who were not subject to the first exercise did not act as cooperatively as their primed counterparts in the second. A related study also showed that, when a person's goals are primed, the priming effect increases until the goal is reached. Moreover, the goal enforced through priming is not easily disrupted.

Although few studies have attempted to link the effects of priming to legal negotiations, a couple of studies are of particular importance to lawyers crafting initial demands. An early study in priming demonstrated that exposing participants to competitive words, even subliminally, led participants to play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game more competitively. The prime had particularly strong effects on participants already predisposed to competitive behavior. Therefore, demand letters delivered in a framework of competition with competitive terms may likely cause already competitive lawyers to intensify their aggressive behaviors.

On the other hand, lawyers who abandon competitive words for words that invoke a sense of fairness may get better results. One study shows that sellers can maintain their desired profits while increasing buyers' satisfaction by priming the buyers to consider the fairness of the transaction. As noted earlier, researchers have shown that people's perceptions of fairness can

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236. Id. at 1023–24.  
237. Id.  
238. Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 248–51.  
239. Bargh et al., The Automated Will, supra note 234, at 1017–18.  
240. Id. at 1024.  
241. Id.  
242. Id.  
243. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 252 (arguing that researchers in the area of decision-making have been slow to incorporate the studies on automaticity and priming because they have been influenced by economists' emphasis on rationality, blinded to the fact that people cannot consciously weigh each alternative before making a choice because "this requires a degree of introspection that people simply cannot achieve").  
244. Neuberg, supra note 207, at 221.  
245. Id.  
influence negotiated outcomes.247 This is because fairness reflects a concern for the group, rather than a single-minded concern for maximizing self-interest.248

In the study, participants played the role of a used-car buyer.249 The buyers were asked to negotiate a sales price for a particular car and researchers provided them a description of the car for which they were bargaining, including information about the selling price of cars with similar features.250 The similar cars sold for prices ranging from $8,300 to $8,900.251 With this information, half the participants were “asked to give the lowest and highest fair prices for the used car” before beginning their negotiations.252 Requiring these participants to think about a fair price was intended to prime a concern for fairness in their negotiation behavior.253 On the other hand, researchers expected those not asked to give a range of fair prices to behave in a more self-interested way during the price negotiation.254

The priming had significant effects on the bargaining process and the buyers’ satisfaction with the process.255 Although primed buyers did not make significantly higher opening bids ($5,653) than the control group ($5,045), they made larger concessions and moved the negotiations more quickly to settlement.256 Although the primed group and the control group settled at about the same price ($8,408 and $8,352, respectively), the primed buyers reported that the settlement price exceeded their expectations and the control group reported that it fell short of theirs.257 The primed group negotiated a quicker settlement price, perceived the process as fairer, was more satisfied with the outcome, and was more willing to negotiate with the seller in the future.258

Priming may not be the panacea to significantly increase settlement values, but this study shows that one can prime behavior essential to successful negotiations. More collaborative negotiations most likely will prove less costly and more satisfying.259 It also provides for the resolution of a greater

247. Id. at 548.
248. Id. at 549.
249. Id. at 554.
250. Id. at 554–55.
251. Id. at 555.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 550–51.
254. Id. at 551.
255. Id. at 558, tbl.1.
256. Id. at 556–57.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 557–58.
259. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?: Mediation’s ‘Value-Added’ for Negotiators,” 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 20–21 (1996); Maxwell et al., supra note 246, at 548 (noting that, in negotiations, coordinative behaviors rather than
number of issues, "making the execution of any agreement reached[] more likely."\textsuperscript{260} By priming group-oriented concerns, demand letters have the potential of drawing another party into negotiations with more cooperative behavior that will lead all the parties to a more satisfactory settlement.

Priming studies demonstrate that written words have the power to unconsciously motivate behavior even in unrelated contexts and in ways of which the reader is completely unaware.\textsuperscript{261} Recall my reaction to the note my neighbor left on my car. Did the words on the page guide me to behave in a way consistent with my perception of an "asshole"? There is certainly evidence from social psychology that supports this conclusion. Because of the powerful connection between written words, a person's behavior, and goal formation, we cannot continue to ignore written negotiation.\textsuperscript{262} Priming studies provide a compelling reason to delve more deeply into the possible effects of the words we ink when we initiate negotiation through demand letters.

**B. What Behaviors Do Our Demand Letters Prime?**

Analyzing the typical demand letter is difficult because not much is known about the kinds of letters lawyers are writing.\textsuperscript{263} Lawyers have found a variety of ways to initiate legal negotiations.\textsuperscript{264} Outside of a few statutory exceptions, demand letters are not bound by any format.\textsuperscript{265} Procedural rules do not hinder the parties' written negotiations. Furthermore, procedural rules often protect these letters from public disclosure.\textsuperscript{266}

To understand what lawyers are writing, one can look to what lawyers may have learned from legal-writing texts.\textsuperscript{267} Although many legal-writing texts offer no advice on how to write a demand letter,\textsuperscript{268} some devote a few pages to competitive behaviors "tend to expedite the negotiation process and increase the possibility of mutual satisfactory win-win agreements").

\textsuperscript{260} See Paquin & Harvey, supra note 141, at 170.
\textsuperscript{261} See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 246–55.
\textsuperscript{262} See id.
\textsuperscript{263} Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2020.
\textsuperscript{264} Id. at 1983.
\textsuperscript{266} See FED. R. EVID. 408; see also Kerwin, supra note 171, at 668–69.
\textsuperscript{267} As this Article has already noted, legal-negotiation texts offer no advice on how to write a demand letter,\textsuperscript{268} some devote a few pages to
written negotiation. The advice offered, however, is untested and seemingly contradictory, both to other legal-writing texts and to the methodologies now used in the mediation and negotiation fields.

Most legal-writing books that mention demand letters offer advice on strategy, substance, and style. Authors claim that the demand letter ought to be concise, with an accurate and realistic recitation of the facts, coupled with a specific demand and a specific deadline for compliance. Authors focus on the effects a demand letter will have on its reader. They advise about the letter's tone, warning that the letter may have many audiences, including the judge overseeing the litigation. Aside from instructing lawyers to "look at
things from the reader’s point of view,” these writing texts fail to incorporate the rich and abundant research from the mediation and negotiation arena. In fact, the authors seem to teach lawyers to write letters in a way completely disconnected from the foundational principles that drive the best negotiated settlements. The letters discussed in these legal-writing texts fail to contemplate collaborative bargaining and, instead, adopt the language of competitive, zero-sum negotiation.

For example, Bryan Garner proclaims that the demand letter “should attempt to goad the adversary to capitulate” and “should convey the threat of litigation and its attendant costs and headaches.” Garner defines a good demand letter as one with “a threatening tone yet with a sensible suggestion for resolving the dispute.” Another author advises lawyers to write a letter that will “make the other side afraid of something.” Still another author writes that the “most persuasive style in a demand letter is one that the reader does not notice, one that focuses the reader’s attention on your demands, justifications, and threats.”

Although adopting the language of threats and fear, the authors of these writing texts seem to understand, without articulation, some accepted principles about negotiation. They advise that a demand letter goes too far if it inflames the recipient or backs the recipient into a corner. They warn lawyers not to bully or to deeply offend, and counsel them to use threats as a last resort and appear cooperative as long as compromise is still possible. However, this advice, unattached to any explicit theories of negotiation, conflicts with the general principles of negotiation theories, which advise negotiators to avoid threats, blame, and shame; to view the negotiation

275. See Neumann, supra note 56, at 274; see also Garner, supra note 269, at 367 (“You must get inside the recipient’s head to understand what type of approach will succeed.”).

276. See Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 413 (arguing that current information on persuasive legal writing fails to recognize the “growing body of research from other disciplines that would provide some evidence about whether the conventional wisdom is an accurate account of human decisionmaking [sic]”).

277. See, e.g., Calleros, supra note 269, at 526–27 (recommending that a lawyer engage in competitive behavior by never conceding a weaker claim in a demand letter, but not mentioning anything about the benefits of collective bargaining).


279. Id. at 370.


281. Calleros, supra note 269, at 523.

282. See Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 415 (“Persuasive legal writers may not be familiar with the psychological term ‘priming,’ but much of the conventional wisdom of legal writing incorporates the concept.”).


284. Id. at 368; Neumann, supra note 56, at 275.


286. Ray & Cox, supra note 269, at 343.

287. Shapo et al., supra note 269, at 347.
as a collaborative rather than a competitive process; to avoid focusing on zero-
sum solutions; and to frame the negotiation as a win-win proposition. The
authors of legal-writing texts seem to be saying that a minor threat may be
necessary, but they caution lawyers not to go overboard. There is no
discussion of why a party should make a specific rather than a general demand
with a specific rather than an open-ended deadline. And the advice seems to
assume that the letter’s recipient is a completely rational actor who can be
persuaded by strong, logical arguments. Of course, the research in
negociation theory contradicts these untested assumptions.

Because texts on negotiation fail to cover the demand letter, lawyers seeking
advice on how to start negotiations in writing can only turn to common
practice or legal-writing texts. But the practitioners and writing experts may
be getting it wrong. If the empirical research in negotiation behavior and
priming is right, these model demand letters may cause protracted disputes and
less favorable settlements. On the other hand, advice that incorporates the rich,
cross-disciplinary research of legal-negotiation theory could dramatically
change the course of negotiations.

IV. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND THE WRITTEN DEMAND

The empirical evidence strongly suggests that written demand letters affect
their readers far beyond the intentions of the lawyers who write them. By
following the traditional advice on demand letters, attorneys could be priming
their adversaries for a long, competitive, hostile negotiation process. Empirical
research, however, may assist lawyers to write demand letters that would
appeal to the other side’s values, focus on the other side’s gains, and offer an
invitation to negotiate in an atmosphere where infinite solutions are available.
Moreover, lawyers would probably serve their clients better by priming
cooperation, fairness, and empathy. Rather than creating a fixed-pie bias from
the outset, lawyers could prime creative thinking about interest-based
solutions.

By integrating interdisciplinary research into the written demand, lawyers
can more effectively and efficiently resolve disputes. With written demand

that they can compel the other to concede by the use of persuasive arguments, threats, delays and
other competitive tactics[, but the] use of such tactics is ordinarily costly . . . [and] such costs are
not worth the candle.”).

289. See CALLEROS, supra note 269, at 523; NEUMANN, supra note 56, at 274–77.
290. See Moffitt, supra note 50, at 739–40.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 282–90.
292. Glenn & Susskind, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing for better negotiation training because
the critical movements in a negotiation often happen quickly, with little time for reflection);
Stanchi, THE SCIENCE OF PERSUASION, supra note 103, at 413 (“Advocacy is most effective when
the lawyer has the tools to make deliberate, conscious decisions about the persuasive device to
employ and how and when to employ it.”).
letters, lawyers have more control over their written product. With face-to-
face negotiations, people often behave unpredictably and emotions can flare. With the demand letter, lawyers can put their carefully crafted negotiation strategies to work with less fear that their emotions will thwart their well-made plans. Second, demand letters may have long-lasting positive effects on the recipient if a lawyer can effectively prime the recipient's goal formation. Finally, demand letters often provide opposing parties with their first impressions of the factual and legal claims. By focusing on the client's narrative early in the process, a client's lawyer may gain the client's trust while also creating a better opportunity to settle the case favorably. Michael Saks proclaimed in an article about trial tactics, "[s]ooner or later, litigators and scholars of advocacy will come along who really want to know what works, and they will begin systematic empirical testing of various tactics and techniques." If lawyers are to accomplish better and more efficient settlements, they must investigate what happened before the first face-to-face negotiation or the first court-ordered mediation. They must understand what sets the parties' framework for negotiations, what behaviors and goals have been primed, and what emotions have been ignited before the parties begin their personal interactions. By the time the parties meet face-to-face, their emotions and positions may be too hostile and fixed to overcome.

Important legal negotiations start with written demand letters. The principles and practices that work in face-to-face negotiation may help lawyers craft demand letters that facilitate settlement. However, lawyers have not often asked whether their techniques are empirically sound. Instead, lawyers have relied on methods derived from intuition and tradition. Only by empirically testing methods can lawyers know whether they are helping or hindering negotiated settlements. The time has come to engage in this most

294. Id. at 37–39.
295. A lawyer writing a demand letter may have more control over her emotions before she sends the final product to the recipient because she would have time to reflect and revise without the pressures of an emotionally charged environment. This assumes something that has not been tested, however.
296. See Dijksterhuis, supra note 51, at 248–52.
297. See Subrin & Main, supra note 4, at 2002–03.
298. See id. at 2008.
300. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion, supra note 103, at 412 (“[T]he study of persuasive writing has been dominated by a kind of ‘armchair psychology’—a set of conventions and practices handed down from lawyer to lawyer, developed largely from instinct and speculation.”).
301. Saks, supra note 10, at 802 (“Effective answers about ‘what works’ will come not from reflection or intuition but from empirical inquiries: from concrete experience, from experimental
fundamental research so that what we teach lawyers and law students coincides with what actually persuades.