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Cover Page Footnote
J.D., cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Columbia College of Columbia University in the City of New York, 2004. The views expressed in this Article are the author’s alone, and do not represent those of the abovesaid entities or any other.

This essay is available in Catholic University Law Review: http://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol65/iss4/10
SEEKING COMMON SENSE FOR THE COMMON LAW OF COMMON INTEREST IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT

Jared S. Sunshine*

“Suffice to say, it is impossible to conclude that the common law, as interpreted in this and other jurisdictions, provides a clear explanation of what a common interest is.”

The attorney-client privilege is the most ancient and revered of the evidentiary protections cognizable at common law. At base, it provides that communications between attorney and client are undiscoverable so long as their purpose is legal and the exchange remains confidential. Its nouveau riche kinsman, the work product privilege, may be later to the scene, but has rapidly established itself as a central aegis of the American adversarial system. Rather than focusing on communications with counsel, it shields any documents prepared in preparation for litigation. Yet both are often frustrated

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3. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389–90 (1981); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 866–67 (1998) (observing that clients can waive the attorney-client privilege by “voluntarily disclosing a communication to third parties, [or] failing to take reasonable precautions to preserve the confidentiality [of information].”).
4. Although many sources use the terminology “protection” rather than “privilege” in regard to work product, this Article adopts the latter in view of the usual outcome that material protected under the work product doctrine is in fact privileged from discovery. See generally Sherman L. Cohn, The Work Product Doctrine: Protection, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.J. 917, 917, 923 (1982). See also, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992) (referring to both attorney-client and work product as privileges); cf. infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing terminology in regard of other evidentiary privileges).
5. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511–12 (1947); Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1050 (D. Del. 1985) (“When compared to the seasoned existence of the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine stands as a virtual newcomer to federal jurisprudence.”).
by the modern complexity of legal actions. Where once the attorney served as confidante to a single client, contemporary corporate counsel regularly find themselves advising sprawling multipartite enterprises working in tandem with others to achieve their goals. As the Supreme Court has explained, given “the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, ‘constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the law’ . . . particularly since compliance with the law in this area is hardly an instinctive matter.”

Adapting venerable common law to such changing times has not proven easy. In particular, the attorney-client privilege has long been said to require strict confidentiality, lest its protections be waived. Commentators have often noted that waiver may be a misnomer, since clients normally do not willingly forgo the privilege, but rather forfeit it involuntarily or inadvertently through actions inconsistent with secrecy. Any sort of third party—even advisors relevant to rendering legal advice—endangers the inviolability of the protected conversation.

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10. Rice, supra note 3, at 853–57 (“In all formal definitions of the attorney-client privilege, whether employed in state or federal courts, the client or the attorney must communicate with the other in confidence, and subsequently that confidentiality must have been maintained.”); see Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (“But the privilege is that of the client alone, and no rule prohibits the latter from divulging his own secrets; and if the client has voluntarily waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the mouth of the attorney.”); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Any voluntary disclosure by the holder of such a privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the privilege.”).
12. 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“One of the circumstances by which it is commonly apparent that the communication is not confidential is the presence of a third person”; e.g., James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Del. 1982) (“The presence of nonessential third parties not needed for the transmittal of the information will negate the privilege.”).
can be unpredictable. Such severe strictures hearken back to the origins of the privilege with barristers as tradesmen-cum-gentlemen, leading to the corollary that the attorney-client privilege was a sort of trade secret attendant to their gentlemanly calling. Behavior inconsistent with secrecy negated the privilege, and such a privilege was by definition confined to the litigation on which the barrister was instructed.

As time passed, however, these traditional contours of privilege law increasingly fell short of serving their desired objectives. Attorney-client privilege expanded from barristers engaged in a case at bar to encompass any legal matter. Indeed, the very purpose of the privilege was reconceived as not an adjunct to the gentle esquire, but a right vested in the client to confide in his chosen counselor. From a public policy perspective, the

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14. See Max Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 487 (1928) (“Since some lawyers were gentlemen almost virtute officii, the common obligation of gentlemen not to betray a confidence reposed in them constituted, as Dean Wigmore has shown, the original basis of the protection accorded to communications between barrister and those who instructed him.”); Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070 (observing that “some of the early cases express the idea that the privilege was that of the lawyer (a gentlemen does not give away matters confided to him)”; id. at 1071 (explaining that “at one time the privilege was thought to belong to the lawyer rather than the client [because] [a] barrister was considered not merely an ‘officer’ of the court but a member of it, who could no more properly be asked to reveal a client’s confidences than a modern judge could be asked to disclose matters heard in camera”).

15. See, e.g., Blackburn, 128 U.S. at 470.

16. See Radin, supra note 14, at 487; see also Hazard, supra note 2, at 1090–91 (“As one can see, ‘tradition,’ both English and American, thus clearly sustained a privilege confined to those communications that are related directly to pending or anticipated litigation.”).

17. See Radin, supra note 14, at 487–91; compare Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070–73, with id. at 1075–85.


19. See Hazard, supra note 2, at 1070 (“as the rule developed the privilege became that of the client to have his secrets protected”); RICE, supra note 2, § 1:3 at 8–9. By contrast, the work product privilege is held jointly by both attorney and client, and can be asserted by either. See In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Accordingly, the work product privilege was adequately asserted below by both the Lawyer and the appellant.”); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding that the “work product privilege belongs to the lawyer as well as the client”).
privileged now sought to encourage clients to consult early and often with learned counsel, both to avoid litigation ab initio, and to preserve counsel’s ability to elicit the full facts necessary to discharge their professional responsibilities without compromising their clients. Nonetheless, the primeval necessity of strictest secrecy has persisted, notwithstanding cogent arguments from respected scholars that it should be relaxed in light of modern circumstances.

This Article explores the contours of confidentiality amongst multiple parties, specifically with reference to communications between competitors and combining companies, and the D.C. Circuit whose precedent is so important in such antitrust matters. Part I sets forth the related joint defense and common interest doctrines that define privilege where more than one client is involved, seeking to slice through the lack of clarity about their parameters to identify how they overlap and differ. In particular, this Part focuses on the so-called litigation requirement, which would problematically deny privilege to multiple parties that are not actively confronting a lawsuit. Part II examines precedent on these issues in the D.C. Circuit, identifying how certain misconceptions have flourished and how they might be resolved. Finally, Part III looks to the rationales behind the best reconciliation of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ precedent with many of its sister circuits and public policy considerations.

As with many issues at law, the commentariat is sharply split as to the proper metes and bounds of privilege. Some have forcefully argued that common interest privilege is an incoherent or ill-conceived excrescence of traditionally narrow privilege law. Others have defended common interest as

20. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 407 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 398 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Radin, supra note 14, at 490; see also United States v. BDO Seidman LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding advance consultation with attorneys “serves the public interest by advancing compliance with the law”); Spectrum, 581 N.E.2d at 1061 (“Legal advice is often sought, and rendered, precisely to avoid litigation”).


22. See generally id. at 888–91, 893–98 (hypothesizing what a more relaxed approach to the attorney-client privilege would be like if the requirement of confidentiality was lost and what it would mean for attorney-client communications).


24. See Geisel, supra note 23, at 475, 480–87. Extending attorney-client privilege in common interest situations has been criticized for “not encour[ing] frank attorney-client
supported by the same rationale as the underlying privilege, with little cost to the
search for truth. And well-heeled scholars have more generally decried the
strictures of confidentiality and called for a still-broader conception of
privilege. Looking to the Supreme Court’s holdings, this author would tend
to side more with a broader privilege, recognizing its invaluable role in the
development of the modern legal profession and representation. Nonetheless,
clarification of the common interest doctrine, notably in the D.C. Circuit, is
imperative to ensure that parties may depend on the application of whatever
view ultimately prevails.

I. THE COMMON LAW OF COMMON INTEREST

Nowhere is secrecy more problematic than where companies collaborate
towards a common legal end, as happens frequently in an age of global
interdependency. If they seek to retain common counsel in a lawsuit, or their
respective counsel cooperate on issues of mutual importance, they might once
have been thought to forfeit their privilege. The judicial response was the
development of two closely related doctrines generally known as joint defense
(or, on the other side of the aisle, joint prosecution) and common interest.
Under these analyses, materials disclosed between parties allied in a lawsuit or
sharing a common legal interest remain privileged from discovery,
notwithstanding the presence of a nominal third party. These doctrines are
not freestanding privileges, but exceptions or exemptions preventing forfeiture
of the underlying attorney-client or work product privilege. Nonetheless, it

communications that can improve legal representation, which is the heart of the privilege’s
purpose.” Id. at 482. In addition, “[o]ther proposed justifying rationales—such as increased
efficiency of representation, increased efficiency of the judicial system, or increased effectiveness
of representation—cannot survive cost-benefit analysis.” Id.

25. See generally Schaffzin, supra note 7; see also James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client
Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging
Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 634 (1997).

Against Selective Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Immunity, 30 Am. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 253 (2006) (illustrating some of the difficulties that arise from strict
confidentiality requirements, including those arising from selective waivers of confidentiality).

27. Rice, supra note 3, at 856–60.

28. See generally supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.

at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2000); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 77–78 (discussing and quoting
at length).

30. See supra notes 7–22 and accompanying text.

31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 75–76 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).

32. See id. § 76 cmt. c.

33. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 (3d Cir. 1992) (common interest
or joint defense allows parties “to exchange privileged communications and attorney work
will be expedient to refer to them as evidentiary privileges rather than mere doctrines, as the result of their application is that otherwise discoverable documents remain privileged. 34 The vast majority of the states,35 and every circuit court of appeals,36 have adopted some form of the joint defense or common interest privilege.

A. The Menagerie: Co-Clients, Joint Defense, and Common Interest

An initial question is whether joint defense and common interest are distinct, or only different names for the same doctrine. Further complicating matters, there is a third animal in this terminological menagerie, co-client privilege.37 The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers draws a line between this distinct co-client privilege, where multiple clients are represented by the same attorney; and common interest, where clients are represented by separate counsel as to a shared issue.38 The Restatement then unhelpfully, if candidly, points out that “[t]erms such as ‘joint defense’—less frequently, ‘common defense’—are sometimes applied to” common interest.39 In fairness, Justice Antonin Scalia rightly observed that the rules propounded in modern Restatements are often “aspirational” rather than descriptive of judicial product in order to adequately prepare a defense without waiving either privilege”); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989); Waller v. Financial Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987).

34. E.g., United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989) (defining “joint defense privilege”); Waller, 828 F.2d at 583 n.7 (same); In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429, 437 (N.Y. 1992) (defining “common interest’ privilege’); United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (defining joint defense and common interest privilege). But see also Oxy Res. Cal. LLC v. Sup. Ct. of Solano Cty., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 634–35 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“The ‘joint defense privilege’ and the ‘common interest privilege’ have not been recognized by statute in California. For this reason, we will refer to the joint defense or common interest doctrine, rather than the joint defense or common interest privilege, to avoid suggesting that communications between parties with common interests are protected from disclosure by virtue of a privilege separate from the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, or any other statutorily recognized evidentiary privilege.”) (citations omitted). By way of comparison, see supra note 4 (discussing terminology anent work product).

35. See Greg A. Drumright & W. Rick Griffin, Chapter 3: The Joint Defense Doctrine—Cohesion Among Traditional Adversaries in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 35, 42–43 (Defense Research Institute 2008) (chart showing adoption by state); see also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 52–53 n.7.

36. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 41 (chart showing adoption by circuit); see also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 52–53 n.7.

37. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.

38. Compare RESTATMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (co-client privilege), with id. § 76 (common interest privilege).

39. See id. § 76 (reporters note).
consensus. Still, many authorities have echoed the Restatement’s fundamental division based on singular or multiple counsel.

The Restatement is quite correct, in any event, that courts and commentators alike have conflated joint defense and common interest doctrines at times. Some expressly make no distinction at all, implicitly finding the difference to be mere nomenclature. Others, getting closer to the reality, describe the earlier development of joint defense theory and its eventual development into modern common interest doctrine. Many fail to clearly distinguish co-client representations at all, viewing them simply as joint defense or common interest arrangements with shared rather than separate counsel—despite nigh-unanimous admonitions by commentators against conflating co-client with joint defense or common interest relationships. At least a few courts,

40. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 574 U.S. 1045, 1064 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I write separately to note that modern Restatements . . . are of questionable value, and must be used with caution . . . . And it cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement provision describes rather than revises current law.”); see also Jeffrey P. Schomig, The Ability of Trade Associations to Receive Advice on Antitrust and Other Legal Risks: Are These Communications Protected from Discovery?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: ANTITRUST & TRADE, Vol. 4, No. 6 (2011) (noting that the Restatement of Law is “a guide that carries no independent authority”).

41. See generally, e.g., Giesel, supra note 23, at 521–23, 533–34.

42. See Jason M. Rosenthal, Joint Defense Agreements and the Common Interest Privilege in A YOUNG LAWYER’S GUIDE TO DEFENSE PRACTICE 147, 148 (2008) (“The courts frequently use the terms ‘joint defense privilege’ and ‘common defense (or common interest) privilege’ interchangeably.”); Epstein, supra note 11, at 275 (“Federal courts have use the term ‘joint defense privilege’ to refer to both the joint client privilege and the ‘common interest’ privilege.”).

43. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The joint defense privilege [is] also known as the common interest rule[,]”); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (opining the “joint defense privilege” should be called the “common interest rule”); Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38 (“While the doctrine is occasionally referred to by courts and legal scholars as the joint defense privilege or the joint defense doctrine, the more appropriate name . . . is the common interest doctrine.”).

44. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990). See also Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 61–63.

45. In re Teleglobe Comm’n Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363 n.18 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[M]uch of the caselaw confuses the community-of-interest privilege (which is the same as the ‘common-interest privilege’ . . . ) with the co-client privilege.”) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Michael Pavento, Daniel H. Marti, Tracie Siddiqui & Patrick Eagan, Applicability of the Common Interest Doctrine for Preservation of Attorney-Client Privileged Materials Disclosed During Intellectual Property Due Diligence Investigations in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE 353, 353 (2009) (describing joint litigant privilege as a subset of common interest in which the clients are “represented by the same attorney or different attorneys”).

46. See e.g., Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 37 (“The terms joint defense doctrine and joint defense privilege should not be confused with the term ‘joint client doctrine.’ The joint client doctrine protects confidential communications between co-parties and their common, as opposed to separate, counsel.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Co-client representations must also be distinguished from situations in which a lawyer represents a single client, but another person with allied interests
however, have managed to penetrate the doctrinal disarray to clearly identify
the three basic species of multi-party privilege: “joint client” (i.e., what the
Restatement calls co-client), “joint litigant” (i.e., what most courts call joint
defense or joint prosecution privilege), and “common interest.” For the sake
of consistency and of adhering to the most frequently used terms, this Article
will follow the Restatement in denoting these three species: co-client, joint defense, and common interest privilege.

The threesome are best seen as various overlapping stages in the protracted
evolution of multi-party privilege. Codefendants have long had the right to
coordinate a common front and defense by retaining joint counsel, without
chancing that their strategizing be disclosed. Such co-client representations
were regular occurrences in the early United States, and although they had
their origin in criminal prosecutions, there has never been any bar to clients
jointly seeking a lawyer’s advice on a civil matter, or in matters unconnected
to litigation at all. Corporate persons may avail themselves of co-client
arrangements no less than natural persons. However, the approach and

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47. E.g., Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342, 347–48 (N.D. Ohio 1999); see Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 148 (discussing Libbey Glass); see also Fischer, supra note 25, at 634–35 (distinguishing the three species).

48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 75–76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). Despite its use in the foundational common interest decision Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., this Article rejects the major competitor to the “common interest” terminology, “community of interest,” as adding prolixity but not clarity. 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (D.S.C. 1974). The two are tantamount at law, however. See In re Teleglobal, 493 F.3d at 363 n.18 (“[T]he community-of-interest privilege . . . is the same as the ‘common-interest privilege[,]’”).

49. See Giesel, supra note 23, at 522–23 (“[H]istorically the attorney-client privilege has protected communications in joint client settings. Early cases in the United States do not treat this application of the privilege as controversial. Rather, it is treated as an accepted and indisputable point of law—an inherent side-effect of clients being clients as a group.”).

50. See id.; see also, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, Conspirators’ Privilege and Innocents’ Refuge: A New Approach to Joint Defense Agreements, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1449, 1481 (2002) (indicating that early joint-defense agreements were often in criminal matters).


52. See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (in which co-clients were involved in corporate divestiture); see also In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 121 B.R. 794, 796 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (same).

53. See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:23; see also e.g., Mirant, 326 B.R. at 648 (in which parent and subsidiary corporation were co-clients); Santa Fe, 121 B.R. at 796 (same).
positions taken by the co-clients must be strictly the same; a single lawyer could not ethically pursue divergent tactics simultaneously for each of multiple co-clients. This requirement follows naturally from the very definition of co-client arrangements: singular counsel representing plural clients.

The more generalized joint defense doctrine, allowing for separate counsel, arose in criminal suits against natural persons only in the nineteenth century. Like the co-client setting, joint defense has since been applied to companies targeted by criminal and civil cases with regularity under the same rationale.

54. See Rice, supra note 2, § 4:30 at 195 (“When the same attorney simultaneously represents two or more clients on the same matter, the individuals being represented are considered joint clients.”); e.g., FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he joint client exception presupposes that communications have been ‘made in the course of the attorney’s joint representation of a ‘common interest’ of the two parties.’ The term ‘common interest’ typically entails an identical (or nearly identical) legal interest as opposed to a merely similar interest.” (citations omitted)); Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 854–55 (7th Cir. 1974); Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998) (“The court concludes from these factors that the MacKays also shared the same common legal interest as H & B and Jack MacKay. Accordingly, the court rules the MacKays had a joint attorney-client relationship with Mr. Jacobson.”); see also Rudow v. Cohen, No. 85 Civ. 9323, 1988 WL 13746, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1988) (finding that the shared privilege only extends to the specific subject matter of the joint representation, not other matters). But see sources cited infra note 84 (cataloguing authorities holding that very similar interests can suffice).

55. See Rice, supra note 2, § 4:30 at 198 (“Such joint representation is permissible from the attorney’s perspective as long as it does not create a conflict of interest that will require a division of the attorney’s loyalties.”); Giesel, supra note 23, at 481, 519–22; e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1446 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that when co-clients’ interests “diverge and become antagonistic, their lawyer must be absolutely impartial between them, which usually means that he may represent none of them.” To hold otherwise would undermine the loyalty and trust upon which the attorney-client relationship is based.”) (quoting Henry S. Drinker, Legal Ethics 112 (1953)); see also E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 396–97 (S.D. Tex. 1969); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the corporate counsel in a derivative securities suit must be different from that for the company and directors). But see, e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that the parties were co-clients even whilst the shared lawyer secretly colluded with one co-client against the other on a different matter, notwithstanding the patent ethical issues); infra note 90 and accompanying text.

56. See, e.g., Ogden, 202 F.3d at 461.


58. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 287 (“The concept of a joint or common defense has long since been extended to the civil context.”); Rice, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 254 nn.22–23 (“The protection is available in both criminal and civil contexts.”); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 59–60 (“In the 1942 case Schmidt v. Emery, the Supreme Court of Minnesota became the first court to extend this joint defense privilege beyond the criminal context into the civil arena.”); Giesel,
By its nature, joint defense focuses on the alignment of the parties for a specific litigation, whether overtly threatened or pending. This can be seen vividly in the emergence of the mirror-image, joint prosecution privilege to protect communications and work product exchanged by co-plaintiffs. The privilege extends to any statements in furtherance of defense strategy and positioning, even if the individual approach actually taken differs between defendants to the point of adversity. Although some loosely labeled “joint defense” arrangements involve co-clients represented by the same counsel, joint defense as a distinct privilege implies separate counsel acting in concert. This distinction is crucial; unlike the co-client posture, there is no ethical or practical bar to separate counsel coordinating strategy but ultimately making different choices that are best for their respective clients. As the Fourth Circuit summed up:

\[\text{supra note 23, at 531 ("First applied in Chahoon v. Commonwealth as a privilege applicable only in allied lawyer settings involving criminal matters in reference to a joint defense, courts now apply the privilege in both criminal and civil settings." (citations omitted)); see also W. Fuels Ass'n, Inc. v. Burlington N.R. Co., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984).}

\[\text{59. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 38 (The privilege “affords protection to confidential communications among jointly aligned co-parties and their separate counsel . . . .”); Welles, supra note 57, at 324–25; see also, Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1965) (in which the husband and wife were both prosecuted for income tax infractions).}


\[\text{61. See Welles, supra note 57, at 328–30 (citing cases for the ‘reality of joint defense—namely, that defendants’ interests often coincide only on certain issues’); 2 JACk B. WINEsTInE & MARGARET A. BERGER, WINEsTInE’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.03 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court Standard 503, lawyer-client privilege); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787–88 (3d Cir. 1985) (“We agree with the district court’s ruling that the correspondence was privileged, since it is best viewed as part of an ongoing and joint effort to set up a common defense strategy between a defendant and an attorney who was responsible for coordinating a common defense position. Communications to an attorney to establish a common defense strategy are privileged even though the attorney represents another client with some adverse interests.”) (citing United States v. McPartlin, 395 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979)); Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184–85 (describing criminal co-defendants contemplating whether each should testify against the other); see also Cont’l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349–50 (9th Cir. 1964).}

\[\text{62. See, e.g., Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (describing the ‘joint-defense privilege’ where two or more co-defendants are frequently represented by a single attorney); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 353.}

\[\text{63. See, e.g., Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184–85; Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d at 249.}

\[\text{64. See sources cited supra notes 45–46; see also, e.g., Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184 (in which separate counsel was obtained “[b]ecause of a possible conflict of interest” between husband and wife).}

\[\text{65. See JEROME G. SNIDER, HOWARD A. ELLINS & MICHAEL S. FLYNN, CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION § 4.06 (2006) ("In the joint defense context, each}
Whether an action is ongoing or contemplated, whether the jointly interested persons are defendants or plaintiffs, and whether the litigation or potential litigation is civil or criminal, the rationale for the joint defense rule remains unchanged: persons who share a common interest in litigation should be able to communicate with their respective attorneys and with each other to more effectively prosecute or defend their claims.60

What then is common interest? By comparison to the previous two privileges, the common interest doctrine reaches further, protecting materials communicated amongst cooperating parties and their separate counsel on any matter in which they share a common legal interest.67 Such an interest would not necessarily depend upon alignment in adversarial proceedings (as in joint defense),68 nor upon the retention of common counsel (as for co-clients).69

individual party has his or her own attorney and attorney-client relationship, there may be clear conflicts of interest among the parties, and communications among the parties may be guarded. In the multiple client context, there is only one lawyer for all the parties, the parties have either no conflicts of interest or have agreed to take the risks involved in such a situation, and generally speak freely when communicating with the common lawyer.”); see also In re Teleglobe Commc’n’s Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In particular, because co-clients agree to share all information related to the matter of common interest with each other and to employ the same attorney, their legal interests must be identical (or nearly so) in order that an attorney can represent them all with the candor, vigor, and loyalty that our ethics require . . . . In the community-of-interest context, on the other hand, because the clients have separate attorneys, courts can afford to relax the degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying that their attorneys’ ability to represent them zealously and single-mindedly will suffer.” (internal citations omitted)).


67. See Epstein, supra note 11, at 290 (“Unlike the joint defense privilege, the common interest does not require or imply that an actual suit is or ever will be pending. It does require, however, that a definable common interest exist.”); Rice, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 244–45 (“The ‘community of interest’ rule is distinguished from the ‘joint defense’ rule by the fact that the collaboration between the parties need not be related to a pending legal action.”); Fischer, supra note 25, at 632–34.

68. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76(1) (Am. Law Inst. 2000); Rice, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 244–45; Epstein, supra note 11, at 275 (“For instance, one can have a common interest which will allow the sharing of privileged communications without waiver without having a ‘joint defense’ to any pending or prospective litigation at all, either actual at the time that the privilege is shared or prospective.”); id. at 290; Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“The privilege does not require that the interest be in litigation or that litigation be actual or imminent for communications to be privileged. So, the fact that Ms. Salela is not a defendant in this case—which plaintiff suggests scuttles the common interest doctrine—does not matter.” (internal citations omitted)).

69. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 76 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”); id. cmt. b (“Clients thus can elect separate representation while maintaining the privilege in cooperating on
Parties may wish to cooperate in literally innumerable legal situations outside of litigation: for example, ensuring that mutually beneficial advertising is not misleading, applying for patents, conducting due diligence, or avoiding any liability in the first place to prevent a lawsuit. Courts have regularly recognized that the common interest privilege serves the same purpose as the underlying privilege: “the free flow of communication to enhance the quality of legal advice.”

The common interest privilege is the most evolved of these doctrines discussed because it allows for separate counsel, like joint defense, whilst looking beyond litigation to allow collaboration in any legal matter, as with co-client privilege. It is not a surprise that a Delaware court recently concluded, perhaps a bit strongly, that “[a]lthough the common interest doctrine has its origin in the joint defense privilege, it has completely replaced that privilege for information sharing among clients with different attorneys.” There remains a place for joint defense where parties to a case want to coordinate strategies without necessarily proceeding in the lockstep demanded by a common interest. In practice, however, common interest should apply to the substantial majority of valid multi-party privilege postures.

To be sure, some courts and state codes demand that, like joint defense, common interest can arise only where litigation is impending or pending.

common elements of interest”); see also Pampered Chef, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 965 n.5 (finding retention of a single attorney unnecessary to common interest).

71. E.g., In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
72. See generally Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45.
73. E.g., United States v. BDO Seidelman LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Applying the common interest doctrine to the full range of communications otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege encourages parties with a shared legal interest to seek legal ‘assistance in order to meet legal requirements and to plan their conduct’ . . . this planning serves the public interest by advancing compliance with the law . . . .”); Regents, 101 F.3d at 1390–91; see also SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976) (“Corporations should be encouraged to seek legal advice in planning their affairs to avoid litigation as well as in pursuing it.”).
74. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 62 & n.41.
75. See id. at 57–62.
77. See, e.g., Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184–85 (9th Cir. 1965).
78. See Fischer, supra note 25, at 652 (implying a broad application of the common interest privilege, limited by the qualifying principle that “information shared must be for the purpose of furthering the legal interests of the members of the arrangement). Cf. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
79. E.g., ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (“A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose . . . confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client . . . by him or his representative or his lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action
Such an approach mirrors that of the model Uniform Rules of Evidence. A litigation requirement would dramatically restrict the scope of the common interest privilege, or at least incite parties to contrive attenuated *post hoc* theories of having anticipated some litigation that eventually ensued. The intertwining of the common interest privilege with litigation may have its roots in the earlier joint defense privilege; similarly, some courts’ misconception that common interest can apply only to co-clients confuses the modern privilege with a predecessor. Surreptitiously importing inapposite requirements from earlier privileges makes little sense and only serves to blur lines that should be clear.

The better and more prevalent argument, both amongst commentators and in the courts, is that parties should be permitted to privily consult counsel together whenever they have an identity of interest. (Indeed, some courts would allow very similar but not identical interests to suffice, despite the fact that the parties may later be adverse.) This approach has been adopted by

and concerning a matter of common interest *therein . . . ”*) (emphasis added); HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 2001); see Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 74–75.

80. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE ACT 32-34 (amended 2005); see also Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 41 (“Other states have adopted a statutory form of the joint defense doctrine based on Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(b), which requires pending litigation for the doctrine to apply.”).

81. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 715–16.

82. See Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 58–62; Epstein, supra note 11, at 276 (“The ‘common interest exception’ arose in the criminal context where separate counsel for multiple defendants aligned possible defenses or at least discussed their litigations strategy.”).

83. E.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974); see also Fischer, supra note 25, at 634 (“This Article will examine the common interest arrangement and whether preserving the confidentiality of information-sharing arrangements should be restricted to matters in litigation. I believe that no valid reasons exist for such a limitation as long as our legal system continues to recognize the underlying privilege itself.”); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 76–78 (explaining why “jurisdictions should uniformly reject the limitation of the common interest doctrine to pending or anticipated litigation”); Epstein, supra note 11, at 275 (“There is no need for parties to be allied in a given litigation although it often is the case that they are. What is essential is that their legal interests be fully aligned.”).

84. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. Del. 2010) (“The privilege applies where the interests of the parties are not identical, and it applies even where the parties’ interests are adverse in substantial respects. The privilege applies even where a lawsuit is foreseeable in the future between the co-defendants.”); GUS Consulting GMBH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539, 541–42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (“Although some federal courts have held that the doctrine applies only where the nature of the parties’ common interest is ‘identical, not similar’ . . . other courts, [i]n recognizing the exigencies of the joint-defense privilege . . . have not required a total identity of interest among the participants. The privilege applies when a limited common purpose necessitates disclosure to certain parties. Thus, even where a later lawsuit is foreseeable between
statute in Delaware, the nation’s bellwether of corporate law.\textsuperscript{85} It has been endorsed in the Third Restatement.\textsuperscript{86} And it has been recommended by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{87} The Federal Rules of Evidence Manual recognizes its role in upholding privilege’s basic purpose: “In many cases, it is necessary for clients to pool information in order to obtain effective representation. So, to encourage information pooling, the common interest rule treats all involved attorneys and clients as a single attorney-client unit, at least insofar as a common interest is pursued.”\textsuperscript{98} Free of a litigation requirement, parties may properly maintain privilege on one discrete matter while pursuing divergent strategies elsewhere.\textsuperscript{89} In extraordinary cases, privilege may apply even as companies secretly and separately prepare claims against one another.\textsuperscript{90}

This is not to say that the presence or absence of litigation has no bearing on the question of common interest. Mutual business and commercial interests, regardless of similarity, cannot suffice for the common interest privilege,\textsuperscript{91} just
as they cannot suffice for the attorney-client or work product privileges. The pendency of a lawsuit surely helps to segregate the legal from the lay. However, the ease of administration cannot abridge the privilege itself, and there is far more to the legal profession than litigation. Indeed, some subjects may present both business and legal questions, and the existence or overlap of commercial concerns does not and should not foreclose privilege as to the legal aspects. And from a normative perspective, the law should not dissuade


92. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 72 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (extending privilege to communication for the purpose of legal advice and “not predominantly for another purpose.”); see, e.g., W. Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., 139 F.R.D. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1991) (“Attorney-client communications concerning business matters are not within the attorney-client privilege.”).

93. See Tr. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“There is no clearer example of when the privilege is protected than in this case, where the transferor and transferee are engaged in related litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues.”); Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004) (looking to whether litigation was anticipated in assessing whether asserted common interest was business or legal); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976) (“The timing and setting of the communications are important indicators of the measure of common interest; the shared interest necessary to justify extending the privilege to encompass intercorporate communications appears most clearly in cases of co-defendants and impending litigations but is not necessarily limited to those situations.”); see also Fischer, supra note 25, at 642; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 74 (discussing common interest in the context of the litigation requirement).

94. Cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981) (“While it would probably be more convenient for the Government to secure the results of petitioner’s internal investigation by simply subpoenaing the questionnaires and notes taken by petitioner’s attorneys, such considerations of convenience do not overcome the policies served by the attorney-client privilege.”).

95. See SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 513 (“The [common interest] privilege need not be limited to legal consultations between corporations in litigation situations, however.”).

clients—whether singular or multiple—from soliciting legal advice that encourages adherence to rule of law and preserves judicial resources by avoiding lawsuits entirely.\textsuperscript{97}

The co-client, joint defense, and common interest privileges are thus best seen as forming an incompletely overlapping Venn diagram.\textsuperscript{98} The following table summarizes the best view of each of the doctrines hitherto discussed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Co-Client</th>
<th>Joint Defense</th>
<th>Common Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Clients</td>
<td>multiple</td>
<td>multiple</td>
<td>multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Counsel?</td>
<td>shared</td>
<td>separate</td>
<td>separate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litigation Requirement?</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identical Interest?\textsuperscript{99}</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, the common interest relationship is a complement to co-client privilege, allowing clients to choose between mutual (co-client) and separate (common interest) representation in any matter in which they have identical interests.\textsuperscript{100} By contrast, joint defense is somewhat different, in that it requires an underlying litigation against which to jointly defend, but allows greater leeway in variance of tactics once that fundamental alignment of interests is established.\textsuperscript{101} The community of interest in joint defense is common interest doctrine does not encompass a joint business strategy which happens to include as one of its elements a concern about litigation."

\textsuperscript{97} See United States v. BDO Seidelman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2007).

\textsuperscript{98} See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336–37 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. Del. 2010); see also supra Section I.A.

\textsuperscript{99} As mentioned above, some courts would find very similar but not identical interests sufficient. See supra note 84. For the purposes of these distinctions, “identical” will be used to encompass both standards.

\textsuperscript{100} See Fischer, supra note 25, at 638–39 (“The common interest arrangement represents an interpretation of the attorney-client privilege that avoids forcing defendants to elect between either common counsel, with the associated ‘conflicts of interests’ such representation presents, or separate counsel, with its cost of forfeiting the confidentiality of the shared information.’’); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”).

\textsuperscript{101} See GUS Consulting GmbH v. Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539, 541–42 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008) (“[I]n recognizing the exigencies of the joint-defense privilege, [courts] have not required a total identity of interest among the participants.”); accord In re Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc., 189 B.R. 562, 572 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995); 2 JAC. B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.03 (1982) (discussing the Supreme Court
circumscribed by the litigation; in common interest, it is bounded by the identical stratagem pursued.\textsuperscript{102} The burdens imposed on the privilege’s proponent also differ sharply.\textsuperscript{103} Co-clients are established based on traditional principles of legal retention;\textsuperscript{104} codefendants might present a docket sheet as predicate for joint defense;\textsuperscript{105} but putative parties in common interest must show their strategies actually coincide.\textsuperscript{106} Though intimately related, each has a place in the protection of both professional representation and the broader adversarial system, the central concerns of the attorney-client, and work product privileges respectively.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{102} See generally supra Section I.A.

\textsuperscript{103} Cf. United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 525 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating in the common interest context that “a party asserting a privilege exemption . . . bears the burden of demonstrating its applicability.”) (quoting \textit{In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp.}, 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001)); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 63 n.43 (“As with all evidentiary privileges, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to apply the common interest doctrine.”).

\textsuperscript{104} See Giesel, supra note 23, at 528 (“In the joint client representation scenario, a heightened requirement of common interest is not necessary. The common interest is inherent in the nature of the representation. As long as the communication is in the context of the joint representation and as long as it satisfies the other elements of the attorney-client privilege, then the communication should enjoy the privilege.”); \textit{e.g.}, Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932, 936–37 (D.C. Cir. 1984); \textit{In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig.}, 449 F. Supp. 828, 830–31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). \textit{Compare} Sky Valley Lts. P’ship v. ATX Sky Valley, Ltd., 150 F.R.D. 648, 652–53 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing eleven factors for determining co-client status) with Epstein, supra note 11, at 281 (citing six factors).

\textsuperscript{105} See generally Stephen A. Messer and Scott J. Seagle, \textit{Combining Forces: A Primer on the Joint Defense Agreement in Civil Litigation}, 30 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 7–8 (2011) (explaining that courts have often afforded the joint defense privilege to codefendants by virtue of their participation in a common defense); \textit{see also} RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 260 & n.37 (“[S]ome courts have assumed this intention [of furthering a joint defense] when the parties are codefendants or prospective codefendants.”) (citing cases).

\textsuperscript{106} See FDIC v. Ogden Corp., 202 F.3d 454, 461 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Thus, the proponent of the exception must establish cooperation in fact toward the achievement of a common objective.”); \textit{In re Leslie Controls, Inc.}, 437 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. Del. 2010); \textit{see also} United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 1993).

\textsuperscript{107} Ogden, 202 F.3d at 461.
B. Privilege Amongst Competitors and Combinations

The antitrust and merger contexts present special challenges for corporate common interest.108 Market rivals clearly cannot be allowed to conceal anticompetitive collusion behind a fig leaf of putative common interest, which would impermissibly co-opt the shield of privilege for violations of the law.109 Competitors who claim their interests coincide inherently raise a certain quantum of suspicion.110 To use a recurring example, claims of mutual privilege proponed by competing members conferring under the umbrella of a trade association have yielded a diversity of holdings: some older decisions favored viewing members as co-clients of the association’s lawyers, but more modern courts typically reject that presumption as unwieldy and unwarranted, and demand a specific showing that the competitors mutually sought legal counsel in the matter under dispute.111 Whether this then places the various members in a common interest privilege stance, or merely confirms their status as co-agents or co-clients, remains largely unclear from the cases.112

108. See Anne King, Comment, The Common Interest Doctrine and Disclosures during Negotiations for Substantial Transactions, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1411, 1412–13 (2007) (stating that “most courts conclude that disclosures made during transaction negotiations work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and thus courts decline to allow common interest protection. But a few courts hold that disclosures during negotiations for a substantial transaction may be protected under the common interest doctrine. Hence, with respect to substantial transactions, courts are split as to whether common interest protection applies to disclosures made during negotiations.”).

See generally Schomig, supra note 40.

109. See Gregory B. Mauldin, Invoking the Common Interest Privilege in Collaborative Business Ventures, 56 Fed. Law 54, 58 (2009); United States v. Duke Energy Corp., 214 F.R.D. 383, 388 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (voicing concern over extending privilege to antitrust matters due to the likelihood of abuse, and inadequate regulatory measures); Epstein, supra note 11, at 277 (“The greatest push to expand the common interest privilege comes from corporate attorneys representing multiple clients often in an antitrust context. It is precisely in such a context that the potential for abuse is the greatest. The ‘common interest’ privilege may be nothing but a cover for an antitrust conspiracy.”); cf. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The attorney-client privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword.”).

110. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 514 (D. Conn. 1976) (directing proponent of privilege as to common interest in antitrust consultations with competitor to submit affidavit of the content of the discussions to the court for in camera inspection, noting that the “individual postures relevant to the antitrust discussions in point are undefined”). See supra note 109 and accompanying text.

111. Compare Schomig, supra note 40, at 10 (“Several older trial court opinions have, with little analysis, held that all members of a trade association enjoy an attorney-client relationship with the association’s legal counsel.”), with id. at 10–11 (“Some more recent court decisions have analyzed the privilege status of attorney-client communications made between trade association members and the association’s attorney in a manner that takes into account many factors governing both the general nature of the attorney-member relationship and the circumstances surrounding the particular communications at issue.”).

112. Schomig, supra note 40, at 10–11.
Antitrust concerns were discussed at length in the Fifth Circuit’s decision to deny common interest privilege to competitors in In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp.\(^{113}\) in which privilege was sought on a memorandum on labor law circulated amongst several offshore drilling companies\(^{114}\). In demurring, the court expressed serious fears about according privilege to market rivals who might well be engaging in price fixing or other antitrust violations.\(^{115}\) To be sure, under the crime-fraud doctrine, no privilege could apply to exchanges constituting antitrust (or any other) legal infractions.\(^{116}\) The panel majority’s holding is troubling, however, insofar as it prescribes an especially severe litigation requirement:

In the present case, Santa Fe admits in the motion for reconsideration it filed in the district court that the communications it claims are protected by the privilege were not made in anticipation of future litigation. Instead, the documents were “circulated for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the antitrust laws and minimizing any potential risk associated with the exchange of wage and benefit information.” In sharing the communications, therefore, they sought to avoid conduct that might lead to litigation. They were not preparing for future litigation.\(^{117}\)

Given the opinion’s stated concerns, such reasoning seems perverse, penalizing companies whose recourse to counsel was to avoid violation of antitrust laws. Yet the majority was nonchalant as to any policy concerns stemming from providing disincentives for companies to mutually ensure their behavior is legal.\(^{118}\) It was left to the dissent to forcefully, if futilely, expound the better

\(^{113}\) Id. at 709.

\(^{114}\) Id. at 709.

\(^{115}\) Id. at 714 (“[T]he record in this case is neither clear nor indisputable with respect to Santa Fe’s motive for sending its inhouse counsel’s memorandum to its horizontal offshore drilling competitors. It is possible that the disclosures were made to facilitate future price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws, as the plaintiffs contend.”); see also id. at 711 (holding “there must be a palpable threat of litigation at the time of the communication, rather than a mere awareness that one’s questionable conduct might some day [sic] result in litigation, before communications between one possible future co-defendant and another, such as the ones here made between one horizontal competitor and another, could qualify for protection”).

\(^{116}\) See id. at 714 n.9 (“If so, they would fall outside the scope of any attorney-client privilege as communications made for criminal or fraudulent purposes.”); Duplan Corp v. Deering Milliken, Inc, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1196–97 (D.S.C. 1974) (finding that a “prima facie showing of an antitrust violation establishes the tort exception to the attorney-client privilege, requiring production of at least some of the confidential communications that show the opinions of the associates’ attorneys”); see also United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563–64 (1989) (providing an explanation of the crime-fraud exception); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).

\(^{117}\) Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 713.

\(^{118}\) Id. at 714 (“There is no justification within the reasonable bounds of the attorney-client privilege for horizontal competitors to exchange legal information, which allegedly contains confidences, in the absence of an actual, or imminent, or at least directly foreseeable, lawsuit. . . .
holding: “the parties claiming protection under the rule only need share ‘a common legal interest’ about a matter, and there need be no actual litigation in progress.”

In any event, the Fifth Circuit’s approach to common interest is distinctly ungenerous compared to its sister circuits. Other courts have had little doubt that competitors “shared a common legal interest regarding compliance with antitrust and other laws.” Society’s interest in promoting lawful behavior is paramount, and “manifestly does not require that there be actual or contemplated litigation. Indeed, in response to the explosion of regulations from federal and state agencies, business entities routinely seek the advice of lawyers precisely so that they may avoid litigation by planning for the future.” Such concerns are at their zenith in the antitrust setting, given that attorneys are the primary actors ensuring corporate compliance. Without competent counsel capable of consulting confidentially with their counterparts, companies cannot be expected to discern the delicate bounds that define antitrust law. And, vexingly, the continued “undifferentiated use” of the terms “joint defense” and “common interest” to describe legal arrangements involving separate counsel has only exacerbated the uncertainty of whether privilege attaches in these situations.

[If] the disclosures were perhaps made in the sole interest of preventing future antitrust violations, as the defendants argue in their motion for reconsideration, . . . they hardly could be seen as the commencement of an allied litigation effort.”).

119. Id. at 719 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 1985), United States v. Fortna, 796 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir.1986), and United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989)).

120. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 357 (“In the Fifth Circuit, the two types of communications protected under the common interest doctrine are: (1) communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their counsel, and (2) communications between potential co-defendants and their counsel. These oft-cited categories of protected communications are quite narrow when compared to the limits established in other circuits, and thus district courts in this circuit may arguably be reluctant to extend the common interest doctrine any further.”); see also Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 719–20.


122. Id. at 416; cf. supra text supported by note 9.

123. Duplan Corp v. Deering Milliken, Inc, 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974) (“This court recognizes that it is not the federal government that is primarily responsible for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws but rather the lawyers who advise their corporate clients. Unless corporate personnel on a fairly low level can speak to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is likely to be adversely affected.”).

124. See id.; see also In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It is often prior to the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped either to help clients avoid litigation or to strengthen available defenses should litigation occur. For instance, lawyers routinely . . . consider whether business decisions might result in antitrust or securities lawsuits.”); supra text supported by note 9.

A New York appellate court recently sorted through some of these considerations thoughtfully in *Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.* The factual setting was the archetypal corporate collaboration: materials shared between companies undertaking a merger and its attendant legal complexities. At issue were hundreds of documents shared during pre-merger discussions that the trial court had ordered produced, finding that “that the common-interest rule, an exception to the attorney-client privilege, does not apply unless the parties share a common legal interest that impacts potential litigation involving all parties, and that to hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the narrow scope of the attorney-client privilege.” After reviewing contrary authority, the appellate panel disagreed:

We find, however, that this line of cases does not adequately address the specific situation presented here: two business entities, having signed a merger agreement without contemplating litigation, and having signed a confidentiality agreement, required the shared advice of counsel in order to accurately navigate the complex legal and regulatory process involved in completing the transaction. As BAC aptly asserts, imposing a litigation requirement in this scenario discourages parties with a shared legal interest, such as the signed merger agreement here, from seeking and sharing that advice, and would inevitably result instead in the onset of regulatory or private litigation because of the parties’ lack of sound guidance from counsel. This outcome would make poor legal as well as poor business policy. Accordingly, the court rejected the litigation requirement and instead adopted the better rule that privilege is not forfeited so long as the parties to the attorney-client communication share a common legal interest.

The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed in a fractured 4-2 decision. The majority ruled against a backdrop of twenty years during

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128. Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 331–32.
129. Id. at 332.
130. Id. at 336–37.
131. Id. at 337.
which New York courts had “restricted the common interest doctrine to pending or anticipated litigation,” declining the invitation to expand the privilege further in light of modern developments. In particular, the majority fretted that untethering common interest privilege from litigation would render it unadministrable and prone to abuse, and opined that its litigation requirement had occasioned no “corporate crisis” in merger practice during those twenty years. The dissent, by contrast, adopted much of the appellate panel’s reasoning, emphasizing that the attorney-client privilege has no litigation requirement itself, promoting the free flow of information between client and counsel, and that encouraging privilege in the merger context could only support companies’ compliance with the law. It rejected as speculative any potential for abuse, noting robust protections deriving from the crime-fraud doctrine and requirement of legal rather than commercial commonality. And it noted that eschewing a litigation requirement would have brought New York into synchrony with many other state and federal jurisdictions.

Indeed, the appellate panel in Ambac had observed that its rule has been widely adopted in the federal courts, calling it the “federal approach,” echoing other courts that have noted that “federal case law makes clear that the common interest doctrine applies even where there is no litigation in progress.” This is no exaggeration: the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits have all rejected a strict litigation requirement, while only the Fifth has embraced it. As mentioned earlier,

133. Id. at *18.
134. Id. at *18–19.
135. Id. at *18.
136. Id. at *25–26 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at *38–40.
138. Id. at *39–40.
139. Id. at *10 & n.1.
140. Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 334–35 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016). (“Neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has yet considered the propriety of a litigation requirement for the common-interest privilege. However, the federal courts that have addressed the issue have overwhelmingly rejected that requirement.”).
142. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F.Supp.2d 52, 60 (D. Mass. 2001) (quoting the Restatement that common interest applies to both “a litigated or unlitigated matter); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989) (It is “unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress for the common interest rule of the attorney-client privilege to apply.”); In re Teleglobe Commun’ns Corp, 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Community-of-interest privilege . . . applies in civil and criminal litigation, and even in purely transactional contexts.”); United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 (4th Cir. 1996) (“But it is unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress
the Supreme Court itself has proposed a federal rule of common interest without any such requirement.\textsuperscript{144} One court of appeals even upheld common interest between parties to a merger that eventually collapsed, leaving them adversaries in the ensuing legal action.\textsuperscript{145} Such jurisprudential concord is vital to companies contemplating combinations,\textsuperscript{146} where mutual discussions with antitrust counsel are often undertaken.\textsuperscript{147} Imposing a litigation requirement inefficiently exposes merging companies to potentially protracted discovery rather than encouraging them to forestall a lawsuit entirely.\textsuperscript{148} The irony that Ambac points to is that a litigation requirement for common interest would increase the risk of those very suits.\textsuperscript{149}

On the other hand, more latitude may be afforded by work product privilege. Some courts have recognized the assessment of potential antitrust litigation occasioned by a merger as sufficiently concrete to qualify as being prepared for this privilege to apply,\textsuperscript{143} United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[C]ommunications need not be made in anticipation of litigation to fall within the common interest doctrine.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting the Restatement that common interest applies to both “a litigated or nonlitigated matter”); Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964) (Common interest applies “irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated.”); In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Common interest “is not limited to actions taken and advice obtained in the shadow of litigation.”).

\textsuperscript{144} See supra note 87. However, Congress declined to codify the privilege and instead directed federal courts to apply traditional common law. See Fed. R. Evid. 501.


\textsuperscript{146} See, e.g., In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Securities Litig., No. 06-CV-4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) (“[A]fter the parties to the merger signed the merger agreement, they shared a common interest in ensuring that the newly agreed merger met any regulatory conditions and achieved shareholder approval.”); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. CL 81833, 2002 WL 34217931 (Ia. Dist. Ct. April 15, 2002) (“The Purchaser and Director Defendants’ common interest began with the execution of the merger agreement. From this point forward, . . . they had a common interest - legal strategies for seeking regulatory approval and discussions relating to the joint defense of this lawsuit - in effectuating the merger agreement. . . . communications prepared in reference to regulatory approval after the merger agreement was executed are protected.”).

\textsuperscript{147} Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336–37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev’d, No. 80, 2016 N.Y. LEXIS 1649 (N.Y. June 9, 2016); see also Kathryn M. Fenton, Conflict and Ethics Issues Arising from Joint Defense/Common Interest Relationships, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Dec. 2009) (“It is common for companies under investigation for possible cartel activities to enter into a JDA [joint defense agreement] to facilitate fact gathering and development of a coordinated strategy. Similar interests might motivate formation of common interest groups in merger reviews or civil antitrust lawsuits.”).

\textsuperscript{148} See Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296. But see Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 149 (“Parties cooperating in conjunction with a business transaction, such as a merger or business deal, are not necessarily pursuing a common or joint defense.”).

\textsuperscript{149} Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
“because of” litigation, and thus within the work product privilege.\textsuperscript{150} Their reasoning is straightforward: to permit discovery of such an assessment would flout the very concerns central to the Supreme Court’s recognition of the work product privilege in \textit{Hickman v. Taylor}: “asked by a client to evaluate the antitrust implications of a proposed merger and advised that no specific claim had yet surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected would not likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum assessing the merger’s weaknesses.”\textsuperscript{151} Even when competitors are collaborating towards a common end, claims of common interest in work product may find a more sympathetic ear because of the work product privilege’s built-in nexus to litigation.\textsuperscript{152}

\section*{II. Some Common Missteps Anent Common Interest in the D.C. Circuit}

Yet for all its ubiquity elsewhere, the federal approach—that is, rejection of the litigation requirement in the attorney-client common interest context—has enjoyed unsettled application in a vital jurisdiction for merging companies, the D.C. Circuit, where antitrust actions are often filed and precedent is made.\textsuperscript{153} No circuit has been immune from some degree of confusion about common interest.\textsuperscript{154} But the district courts in the D.C. Circuit have generated a notably disjointed corpus of precedent,\textsuperscript{155} with some imposing a litigation requirement and others not. Broadly speaking, the lack of cohesion has two wellsprings. The first and more fundamental flows from gauzy treatment of the divergent rationales for common interest in maintaining work product privilege on the one hand, and the attorney-client privilege on the other.\textsuperscript{156} The second arises from conflation of modern common interest doctrine with its conceptual forebears in the joint defense or even co-client privilege.\textsuperscript{157} Where these currents of confusion have intersected, the law of common interest has become

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} See e.g., \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 146 F.3d 881, 886–87 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
\item \textsuperscript{151} \textit{Id.} at 886 (proceeding to explain how such a situation would defy \textit{Hickman v. Taylor}, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947): “Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing, note-taking, and communications so critical to effective legal thinking would, in \textit{Hickman’s} words, ‘demoraliz[e]’ the legal profession, and ‘the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.’”).
\item \textsuperscript{152} See Schomig, supra note 40, at 12–13.
\item \textsuperscript{153} See Spencer Weber Waller, \textit{Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts}, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 741, 741 (2006) (“In this brief comment, I will use the debate over the enduring meaning of \textit{Microsoft} to argue that the D.C. Circuit has surpassed the United States Supreme Court as the most important and articulate antitrust court and has outshone the highest court in the land in crafting honest and true antitrust doctrine consistent with history, precedent, and policy.”).
\item \textsuperscript{154} See generally Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, \textit{supra} note 45 (discussing common interest concerns in each circuit).
\item \textsuperscript{155} Take, for example, the despondent sentiment expressed in the epigram to this Article by one of those district courts in \textit{Miller v. Holzmann}, 240 F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007).
\item \textsuperscript{156} See infra Section II.A.
\item \textsuperscript{157} See infra Section II.B.
\end{itemize}
a hazardous morass for companies seeking surety for their secrecy.\textsuperscript{158} Such confusion is all the more perplexing—and readily resoluble—given the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions that point to consistent answers.\textsuperscript{159}

A. Work-Product Versus Attorney-Client Privilege

Some of the entanglement originates from the oft-cited decision of the D.C. Circuit in \textit{United States v. AT&T}.\textsuperscript{160} MCI, a litigant in a separate antitrust suit against AT&T, had disclosed documents subject to work product privilege to the United States, and attempted to intervene in the government’s case to defend its privilege, but the district court denied both intervention and work product protection.\textsuperscript{161} The court of appeals then reversed, finding MCI’s intervention mandatory,\textsuperscript{162} and upholding MCI’s work product claims despite the disclosure to the government, citing the common interest doctrine:

\begin{quote}
We do not endorse a reading of the \textit{GAF Corp.} standard so broad as to allow confidential disclosure to any person without waiver of the work product privilege. The existence of common interests between transferor and transferee is relevant to deciding whether the disclosure is consistent with the nature of the work product privilege. But “common interests” should not be construed as narrowly limited to co-parties. So long as transferor and transferee anticipate litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues, they have strong common interests in sharing the fruit of the trial preparation efforts.\textsuperscript{163}
\end{quote}

By its terms, the \textit{AT&T} court’s holding on common interest was therefore cabined to the work product privilege, which presupposes adversarial litigation.\textsuperscript{164} Indeed, the court grounded its holding in the starkly contrasting purposes of attorney-client and work product privileges, observing that the “purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect information against opposing parties, rather than against all others outside a particular confidential relationship, in order to encourage effective trial preparation.”\textsuperscript{165} Common interest in the work product context is inherently and unobjectionably tethered

\begin{footnotes}
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See, e.g., \textit{In re Lindsey}, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998); \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 29 F.3d 715, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1994); \textit{United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.}, 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
\footnoteref{160}
Am. Tel. & Tel., 642 F.2d at 1299–1300.
\footnoteref{161}
\textit{Id.} at 1288.
\footnoteref{162}
\textit{Id.} at 1295.
\footnoteref{163}
\textit{Id.} at 1299.
\footnoteref{164}
\textit{Id.}
\footnoteref{165}
\textit{Id.}
\end{footnotes}
to the lawsuit that animates the work product privilege itself.\footnote{166} Work product applies only to documents created “because of” litigation.\footnote{167} To be sure, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that work product privilege may attach in advance of the lawsuit being filed, or based on work to avoid legal action on a particular claim.\footnote{168} The requisite “eye toward litigation” may be attenuated, but there must still be a nexus.\footnote{169} Modern attorney-client privilege, by contrast, undeniably has no litigation requirement whatsoever.\footnote{170}

The problem arose when lower courts later mistakenly cited to AT&T for common interest reasoning in the wholly different posture of the attorney-client privilege, even though the court of appeals had distinguished it sharply.\footnote{171} The first such case, \textit{Holland v. Island Creek Corp.},\footnote{172} cited AT&T alone for the proposition that “[u]nder the common interest rule, individuals may share information without waiving the attorney-client privilege if: (1) the disclosure is made due to actual or anticipated litigation . . . .”\footnote{173} Others courts in the D.C. Circuit followed apace.\footnote{174} Some selectively quoted AT&T as to the litigation requirement whilst trimming away the holding’s limitation to the work product privilege.\footnote{175} Inexorably, district courts came to be citing their

\begin{quote}
\textbf{166.} \textit{See In re Sealed Case}, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The work product privilege protects any material obtained or prepared by a lawyer ‘in the course of his legal duties, provided that the work was done with an eye toward litigation.’”) (quoting \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); \textit{see also} Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
\textbf{167.} United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that most circuits apply the “because of” standard to work product).
\textbf{169.} \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 29 F.3d at 718 (quoting \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 676 F.2d at 809).
\textbf{170.} \textit{See Welles, supra} note 57, at 325–26 (“The attorney-client privilege currently extends to any communication made in order to facilitate the rendition of legal services to a client, ‘irrespective of litigation begun or contemplated’”) (quoting \textit{WIGMORE, supra} note 12, §§ 2294–95); \textit{see also} Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chemical Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061 (N.Y. 1991) (“The prospect of litigation may be relevant to the subject of work product and trial preparation materials, but the attorney-client privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation.”).
\textbf{171.} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 164–65; \textit{see also} United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
\textbf{173.} \textit{Id.} at 6.
\end{quote}
own colleagues’ holdings, creating a false impression of consensus about
common interest based on a single mistaken predicate.

Perhaps, this is partly the result of the passage of time since the \textit{AT&T}
decision; the earliest of these misconstructions was issued in 1995, fifteen
years after the original holding.\footnote{177} One district court even recognized that
\textit{AT&T} spoke only to common interest in the work product privilege, but
nonetheless assumed “that the common interest rule is equally applicable” to
attorney-client privilege, whilst noting “it is possible that the precise scope of
the common interest rule will vary as applied to each privilege because of the
differing purposes of the privileges.”\footnote{178} Another also conceded \textit{AT&T}’s basis
in work product theory, yet still found the holding supports the requirement of
pending litigation even for the attorney-client privilege.\footnote{179} The latter court’s
frustration shows through in the opinion, as when it pronounces, with certain
hint of resignation, “Suffice to say, it is impossible to conclude that the
common law, as interpreted in this and other jurisdictions, provides a clear
explanation of what a common interest is . . . ”\footnote{180} Such a sentiment is hardly
original, as many courts and commentators have offered similar laments.\footnote{181}

Such pessimism, however, discounts the many trial courts and appellate
panels in the D.C. Circuit that have gotten \textit{AT&T} right. Only two years later,
the court of appeals followed \textit{AT&T} faithfully in distinguishing the purposes of
the attorney-client and work product privileges, and quoted its holding on
common interest only for the latter.\footnote{182} Subsequent court of appeals decisions
followed suit.\footnote{183} And numerous district court decisions have similarly read

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{177.} \textit{Holland}, 885 F. Supp. at 6.
\item \textit{179.} \textit{See Miller}, 240 F.R.D. at 22 (quoting United States v. Amer. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (“More to the point, in this Circuit, the court of appeals has indicated that the work product privilege is not lost even if it is shared by entities that are not co-parties in litigation so long as ‘transferor and transferee anticipate litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or issues.’ While the court was speaking of the work-product privilege, the decision at least points away from any greater requirement than a common interest in litigation against a common adversary.”).
\item \textit{180.} \textit{Id.}
\item \textit{181.} \textit{See, e.g., Giesel, supra note 23, at 551–53; Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 51–54.}
\item \textit{182.} \textit{See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817–18 (D.C. Cir. 1982)} (“We have held that a party waives its work product protection in civil litigation if it discloses the privileged material to anyone without ‘common interests in developing legal theories and analyses of documents.’”).
\item \textit{183.} \textit{E.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP}, 610 F.3d 129, 139–40 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“As we explained in \textit{AT&T}, the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine serve different purposes: the former protects the attorney-client relationship by safeguarding confidential communications, whereas the latter promotes the adversary process by insulating an attorney’s litigation preparation from discovery.”); United States v. Williams, 562 F.3d 387, 394 (D.C. Cir.}
\end{itemize}
}
AT&T as speaking only to the work product privilege’s requirement of litigation, and clearly differentiated the rationales for assertion and waiver of attorney-client privilege.\textsuperscript{184}

In fairness, \textit{AT&T} might be read as questioning whether common interest is available at all in the attorney-client context, given its emphasis on confidentiality.\textsuperscript{185} At least one district court has thought as much.\textsuperscript{186} But in 1994, the court of appeals explained in \textit{In re Sealed Case}\textsuperscript{187} that “common interest privilege protects communications between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest,” without expressing any reservation about litigation.\textsuperscript{188} (It is inconvenient but unavoidable, given the secrecy of the grand jury context in which matters of privilege often arise, that the appellate court has decided so many cases anent privilege under the caption \textit{In re Sealed Case}.\textsuperscript{189})
The *Holland* court’s failure the very next year in 1995 to follow the
guideposts in *Sealed Case*, and its choice to instead transplant *AT&T*’s logic
regarding work product, is perplexing.¹⁹⁰ Nor did the court of appeals view
*AT&T* itself as pointing in a different direction; three years after *Holland*, it
read *AT&T* and *Sealed Case* together as establishing that common interest
applied not only to work product but also to attorney-client privilege, and again
omitted any litigation requirement for the latter: “as a usual rule, disclosure of
attorney-client or work product confidences to third parties waives the
protection of the relevant privileges; however, when the third party is a lawyer
whose client shares an overlapping ‘common interest’ with the primary client,
the privileges may remain intact.”¹⁹¹ Several district courts have found
common interest may attach in the attorney-client context.¹⁹² Whatever the
source of confusion in other district courts between work product and attorney-
client privilege, the court of appeals has made its own reasoning passably
clear.

**B. Joint Defense (and Co-Client) Versus Common Interest Privilege**

Just as district courts in the D.C. Circuit have often confused common
interest principles in the work product and attorney-client contexts, they have
also conflated the common interest privilege itself with its predecessor in the
joint defense privilege.¹⁹³ And once again, such confusion is puzzling because
the court of appeals has spoken directly to the issue.¹⁹⁴ In *Sealed Case*, the
panel clearly recognized and distinguished between discrete joint interest and
common interest privileges, holding that appellant had properly raised each
before the lower court and thereby preserved both claims.¹⁹⁵ The court
described joint defense privilege as follows:

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¹⁹¹. *In re Lindsey*, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
¹⁹². *See* *Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs*, 722 F. Supp. 2d
66, 74 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The attorney-client common interest privilege ‘protects communications
between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest.’ It applies to
both ‘communications subject to the attorney-client privilege’ and ‘communications protected by
the work-product doctrine.’”) (citations omitted).
¹⁹³. *See, e.g.*, *Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.*, 471 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15–16
¹⁹⁵. *Id.* (“The appellant also argues that the common interest privilege bars disclosure of his
communications with the Lawyer. Specifically, he contends that he, Z and the foreign company
share an attorney-client privilege regarding their consultations with the Lawyer. Therefore, he
argues, any waiver of the privilege that he made was ineffective because a jointly held privilege
can be waived only by all of its holders. In response, the Government claims that the appellant
waived his common interest privilege argument by failing to raise it below. We disagree.
The joint defense privilege protects communications between two or more parties and their respective counsel if they are engaged in a joint defense effort. The party asserting the privilege must show: “(1) the communications were made in the course of a joint defense effort; (2) the statements were designed to further the effort; and (3) the privilege has not been waived.” The district court rejected the joint defense privilege because there was no “actual or potential litigation” or strong possibility thereof at the time the appellant consulted the lawyer.\textsuperscript{196}

As with work product, the joint defense privilege by its very terms requires an actual or potential litigation against which to jointly defend.\textsuperscript{197} Not so with the distinct common interest privilege, which looks only to sharing a “matter of common interest.”\textsuperscript{198} Indeed, AT&T had only a few years before expressly rejected cramped restrictions even in the work product context, finding that “‘common interests’ should not be construed as narrowly limited to co-parties.”\textsuperscript{199}

Despite this critical difference, district courts in the D.C. Circuit have regularly conflated the two and thereby imported the joint defense litigation requirement into the common interest privilege.\textsuperscript{200} The first such case, \textit{United States v. Hsia},\textsuperscript{201} enigmatically cites directly to \textit{Sealed Case} for the proposition that the “joint defense privilege, often referred to as the common interest rule, is an extension of the attorney-client privilege that protects from forced disclosure communications between two or more parties and/or their respective counsel if they are participating in a joint defense agreement.”\textsuperscript{202} Such an equation of the two privileges cannot be found in \textit{Sealed Case}, yet Hsia’s gloss has proven influential. It was quoted wholesale in \textit{United States v. Philip Morris}\textsuperscript{203} and \textit{Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp.},\textsuperscript{204} the latter of which was in turn cited in \textit{NLRB v. Jackson Hospital Corp.}\textsuperscript{205} for the
observation that the “common interest doctrine is also sometimes referred to as
the joint defense privilege when applied to codefendants.”

Resting on this tottering tower of authority, these later courts denied common interest privilege
for lack of a mutual adversary.

They also relied on another district court case, which warrants slightly more elaboration. Like the others, began by excerpting at length. But it then highlighted the difficulties resulting
from joint defense and common interest being shoehorned into a single
document, declaring that protected documents “must be disclosed pursuant to a
common legal interest and pursuant to an agreement to pursue a joint
defense.”

Similarly, directly juxtaposes one out-of-circuit authority that “the party seeking to claim privilege still must demonstrate that
the specific communications at issue were designed to facilitate a common
legal interest; a business or commercial interest will not suffice” with
another finding the privilege “arises out of the need for a common defense, as
opposed merely to a common problem.” The result is no more handsome
than Dr. Frankenstein’s work, demanding that parties simultaneous meet the
requirements for both the joint defense and common interest doctrines does
service to neither.

Finally, courts in the D.C. Circuit have occasionally collapsed the
historical and doctrinal gaps between co-client and common interest
privileges. In Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of

206. Id. at 312.
207. See Intex, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (“A party which relies on the joint defense privilege or
common interest doctrine must establish that ‘the parties had agreed to pursue a joint defense
strategy.’”); NLRB, 257 F.R.D. at 312 (holding that “the definition of ‘common interest’ is not
entirely settled, but in any event the parties must have a common interest in the prosecution of a
common defendant”).
210. Id. at 15–16.
211. Id. at 16.
212. Id. (referencing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D.
437, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
213. Id. (quoting Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., 689 F. Supp. 841, 845
(N.D. Ill. 1988)) (alteration removed).
214. See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN; OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS
(LACKINGTON, HUGHES, HARDING, MAVOR & JONES 1818).
215. E.g., Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 722 F. Supp. 2d 66,
74 (D.D.C. 2010); see also United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No.
216. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 cmt. a (AM. LAW
 INST. 2000) (“This Section states the common-interest attorney-client privilege. The rule differs
from the co-client rule of § 75 in that the clients are represented by separate lawyers.”).
Eng’rs,\textsuperscript{217} the district court looked to Sealed Case for precedent on attorney-client common interest privilege.\textsuperscript{218} It properly made no mention of a litigation requirement, yet then went on to conclude that “the privilege applies only where the same attorney represents each of the clients.”\textsuperscript{219} In fairness, the “common interest” posture in Sealed Case itself described a single attorney representing multiple clients—properly, co-client privilege—but the court hardly limited its reasoning on common interest to that factual posture.\textsuperscript{220} If nothing else, Chesapeake Bay vividly illustrates the confusion occasioned by describing doctrine for common interest and co-client privilege in one breath.\textsuperscript{221} Nonetheless, only two years earlier, the court of appeals had more clearly defined common interest as applying amongst multiple attorneys.\textsuperscript{222} Prior appellate decisions had found that common interest attached in situations beyond the co-client context.\textsuperscript{223} Ambivalent terminology aside, Chesapeake Bay simply cannot be reconciled with such controlling precedents. (And in any event, there is no litigation requirement in the co-client context in the D.C. Circuit.)\textsuperscript{224}

Lest the muddle be thought impenetrable, other D.C. Circuit district courts have had little trouble distinguishing between joint defense and common interest. For example, Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs.\textsuperscript{225} treated each of the two individually, and enumerated the distinct factors required for each.\textsuperscript{226} Meanwhile, after setting forth distinctions between the attorney-client and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[218] \textit{Id.} at 74.
\item[219] \textit{Id.}
\item[220] \textit{See In re} Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The appellant also argues that the common interest privilege bars disclosure of his communications with the Lawyer. Specifically, he contends that he, Z and the foreign company share an attorney-client privilege regarding their consultations with the Lawyer.”). Indeed, the court made clear separately that the “joint defense privilege protects communications between two or more parties and their respective counsel if they are engaged in a joint defense effort.” \textit{Id.} at 719 n.5.
\item[221] \textit{See} sources cited \textit{supra} notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
\item[222] \textit{In re} Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
\item[223] \textit{See}, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
\item[224] \textit{See}, e.g., Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. MacKay, 26 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127 (D.D.C. 1998) (“This conduct shows that both [co-clients] Jack MacKay and H & B had a common legal interest in the development of the aluminum bat patent application.”).
\item[226] \textit{Compare} \textit{id.} at *3 (“The joint prosecution privilege protects disclosures between two or more parties and their respective counsel if their communications are conducted under a joint prosecution agreement.”), \textit{with id.} at *4 (“The common interest privilege protects disclosures between a lawyer and two or more clients regarding a matter of common interest or common interests.”). Then again, \textit{Pogue} mistakenly imported the litigation requirement from the work product context, and it arguably shared Chesapeake Bay’s misconception of common interest as applying only to co-clients, so it is hardly a model of clarity. \textit{Id.}
\end{footnotes}
work product privileges, *Purcell v. MWI Corp.* discussed *Sealed Case* at length and explained the differing definitions and purposes for the related but distinct joint defense and common interest privileges. In short, as was manifest in *Sealed Case*, D.C. Circuit courts "recognize both a joint-defense privilege and a common-interest privilege." Having completed this comprehensive tour of evidentiary protections, the *Purcell* court concluded that the "overarching principle that governs these privileges remains the same—protecting attorney-client correspondence on matters of common interest and ‘protecting attorneys’ preparations for trial and encouraging the fullest preparation without fear of access by adversaries." But like goals do not make for identical privileges, and delicate discrimination is necessary to navigate the jurisprudential jungle of multi-party privilege.

III. COMMON SENSE AND COMMON INTEREST: A WAY FORWARD

The D.C. Circuit has often treated claims of privilege parsimoniously as compared to other jurisdictions. As this author has written elsewhere, some of its jurisprudence demands disclosure of seemingly privileged material, to the point that the Department of Justice has advised that such precedents are no longer good law in light of contrary Supreme Court rulings. Its court of appeals has been particularly severe with regard to waiver of the attorney-client privilege due to disclosure to a third party: until 2008, “any disclosure automatically constitutes[ed] waiver, even in the case of inadvertent disclosure,” and that draconian rule was only displaced by the Supreme Court’s promulgating Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b). The court of appeals has historically demanded absolute secrecy as the “traditional price” of

228. See id. at 25.
229. See id.
230. See id. (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
233. See Amobi, 262 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Just over a year ago, parties in defendants’ position in this Circuit would have no argument to protect against waiver; they would simply be dead in the water with an inadvertent disclosure. The District of Columbia Circuit found that any disclosure automatically constitutes waiver, even in the case of inadvertent disclosure. [] Rule 502(b), enacted on September 19, 2008, overrides the longstanding strict construction of waiver in this Circuit.” (citation omitted)).
234. Id.
the privilege.\textsuperscript{235} It is therefore not entirely surprising that the D.C. Circuit has been unhurried in clearly setting out the exact circumstances under which multiple parties may share in the attorney-client privilege through the application of common interest.

There can be no doubt, however, that circuit law recognizes the common interest privilege, however cautiously. True, this has largely been in the context of the work product rather than the attorney-client privilege,\textsuperscript{236} but several opinions have addressed the latter, albeit more *en passant* than *vis-à-vis*.\textsuperscript{237} Most of the heavy lifting is already done: the court of appeals distinguished early and often between common interest in the work product and attorney-client contexts,\textsuperscript{238} and between modern common interest and joint defense standards.\textsuperscript{239} What is lacking is a definitive statement on the subject from the court of appeals, repudiating the litigation requirement and reaffirming the sacrosanctity of privilege even when multiple parties confer on legal matters, even before any particularized claim by or against others is contemplated.\textsuperscript{240}

Speaking to the work product context, the court of appeals has already articulated the right rationale persuasively, writing that

a contrary ruling would undermine lawyer effectiveness at a particularly critical stage of a legal representation. It is often prior to the emergence of specific claims that lawyers are best equipped either to help clients avoid litigation or to strengthen available defenses should litigation occur. For instance, lawyers routinely . . . consider whether business decisions might result in antitrust or

\textsuperscript{235} See *In re* Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (quoting *Permian Corp. v. United States*, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

\textsuperscript{236} See *United States v. Deloitte LLP*, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010); *see also* Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598 (D.C. Cir. 2001); *United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980).


\textsuperscript{240} See supra text supported by notes 236–39 (showing that the breadth of cases on this topic do not provide a definitive statement on this aspect of privileges).
securities lawsuits . . . [A]sked by a client to evaluate the antitrust implications of a proposed merger and advised that no specific claim had yet surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected would not likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum assessing the merger’s weaknesses, jotting down on a yellow legal pad possible areas of vulnerability, or sending a note to a partner—“After reviewing the proposed merger, I think it’s O.K., although I’m a little worried about . . . . What are your views?” Nor would the partner respond in writing, “I disagree. This merger is vulnerable because . . . .” Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing, note-taking, and communications so critical to effective legal thinking would, in Hickman’s words, “demoraliz[e]” the legal profession, and “the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.”

Indeed, the court anticipated Ambac’s logic in concluding that “[w]eakening the ability of lawyers to represent clients at the pre-claim stage of anticipated litigation would inevitably reduce voluntary compliance with the law, produce more litigation, and increase the workload of government law-enforcement agencies.”

The D.C. Circuit should apply the same reasoning when it comes to common interest. Particularly in the antitrust and merger setting, Ambac’s commonsensical rebuke to the litigation requirement serves both equity and economy by facilitating companies’ sidestepping any illegality ab initio.

Eight circuits have already agreed in principle, whilst the courts of appeals for four circuits—including the D.C. Circuit—have not yet made a clear pronouncement. Only the Fifth Circuit stands in open rebellion, and given that it has stood by its precedent, and that two of the three states over
which it has geographical jurisdiction have codified litigation requirements.\textsuperscript{248} It seems likely to remain so. Unlike the other three circuits that apparently remain undecided,\textsuperscript{249} the D.C. Circuit has evaluated common interest with some regularity, and wants only for a decisive formulation.\textsuperscript{250} Its court of appeals therefore has a felicitous opportunity to resolve this thorny and recurring issue once and for all.

The Supreme Court often repeats by rote the conflicting mandates tugging at privilege law: protecting the attorney client relationship and adversarial process more broadly, at the cost of a less comprehensive truth-finding mission.\textsuperscript{251} Certainly the D.C. Circuit has mouthed that “familiar platitude.”\textsuperscript{252} Yet the Supreme Court has also sharply criticized whittling away at the margins of “one of the oldest recognized privileges in the law,” and concluded that what evidence exists indicates that a robust privilege serves vital ends.\textsuperscript{253} The D.C. Circuit has at times agreed, writing that “[l]imitations on the attorney-client privilege have therefore been drawn narrowly, to remove the privilege only where the privileged relationship is abused.”\textsuperscript{254} And the Supreme Court admonished, in an oft-quoted passage from \textit{Upjohn}, that an “uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”\textsuperscript{255} The present confusion in the D.C. Circuit as to the litigation requirement for the common interest privilege spurns \textit{Upjohn}’s admonition, and in the absence of a definitive statement on common interest by the court of appeals (or the Supreme Court), the disarray is likely to persist.

\textsuperscript{248} See TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). Louisiana is the outlier, providing that a “client has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another person from disclosing, a confidential communication . . . by the client or his lawyer, or a representative of either, to a lawyer, or representative of a lawyer, who represents another party concerning a matter of common interest.” L.A. CODE. EVID. art. 506(b)(3).

\textsuperscript{249} See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 358 (discussing the Sixth Circuit); id. at 363 (discussing the Tenth Circuit); id. at 364 (discussing the Eleventh Circuit).

\textsuperscript{250} See supra text supported by notes 236–40.


\textsuperscript{252} Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2001) (“The familiar platitude is that the privilege is narrowly confined because it hinders the courts in the search for truth.”); e.g., \textit{In re Lindsey}, 158 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1998); \textit{In re Sealed Case}, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Each of the recognized privileges protects a substantial individual interest or a relationship in which society has an interest, at the expense of the public interest in the search for truth.”).


\textsuperscript{254} Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

\textsuperscript{255} Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
In any event, the D.C. Circuit’s joining the emerging consensus against a litigation requirement will not heal all the woes of common interest doctrine for merging companies. Ambac addressed the situation in which the companies had already executed merger and non-disclosure agreements, lending substance to their claims of commonality. Where does that leave parties contemplating the antitrust implications (or any other legalities) of a merger prior to signing an agreement? An Illinois court professedly could not understand how market participants could share a common interest antedating a signed agreement: “Prior to the merger, these organizations stood on opposite sides of a business transaction. From a business standpoint and from a legal standpoint, the merger parties’ interests stood opposed to each other. They had no common interest, and indeed, their interests were in conflict.”

This is probably the more broadly-held view: “of the cases addressing a party’s disclosure of confidential information during negotiations, almost all have held that such disclosure waives the privilege.” Some, however, have been more open to finding common interest even whilst deals are still being negotiated, claiming the weight of case law points to privilege. Such reasoning seems particularly persuasive in the antitrust context, where even prior to an agreement, both parties have the same legal interest in assessing the defensibility of the ensuing combination.

And what of intermediate stages, for example, where the parties have signed non-disclosure but not merger agreements? Courts do look to non-disclosure agreements as evidence of confidentiality supporting common interest. But the prudent practitioner should at least reduce any understandings between

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potential merger participants to a written common interest agreement.\footnote{261} In any common interest arrangement, and particularly in exploratory merger discussions, the parties may ultimately fail to come to terms, and litigation may ensue.\footnote{262} The parties may be pursuing other interests that are divergent or even adversarial.\footnote{263} Counsel for both sides must therefore weigh the advantages of sharing information against the disadvantages;\footnote{264} a written agreement can set forth the parties’ obligations in the event of the common legal interest’s cessation or the parties’ divergence.\footnote{265}

Common interest presents knotty issues of law, which are made none the easier by ostensible doctrinal disarray. But the confusion is not as intractable as some commentators would have it. One complained that courts are widely split as to whether a written agreement is necessary, whether there is a litigation requirement, and whether the common interest need be identical.\footnote{266} But in fact there is general consensus that an oral agreement may suffice for the privilege just as it would for any other contract,\footnote{267} and that a litigation requirement is counterproductive, at least in federal courts.\footnote{268} In fairness, there is much variation as to the necessary degree of similarity of interests.\footnote{269} All in all, however, much of the confusion with common interest is more semantic.

\footnote{261} See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 35, at 44 (quoting In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1986)); Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 81–83; Fischer, supra note 25, at 649–50; Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 151–52. Common interest does not require a writing, but memorializing any agreement is undoubtedly prudent both to avoid misunderstandings and provide evidence to any court. See Schaffzin, supra note 7, at 81–82; Fischer, supra note 25, at 649–50; e.g., HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 72–73 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“While Nordbank and the non-party lenders wisely chose to reduce their common agreement to writing, their decision to do so does not mean that there was no prior agreement. To the contrary, Nordbank has made a persuasive showing that the parties shared a common interest . . . ”); Denney v. Jenkens & Gilchrist, 362 F. Supp. 2d 407, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2003).


\footnote{265} Rosenthal, supra note 42, at 151; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 45, at 365–66.

\footnote{266} See Giesel, supra note 23.

\footnote{267} See RICE, supra note 2, § 4:35 at 246 n.10; supra note 261.

\footnote{268} See supra Section I.B.

\footnote{269} See, e.g., supra text supported by note 84.
than substantive, and resolvable largely by more careful selection of language in arguments and opinions. Common interest serves a vital role in increasingly entangled legal representations, and a clarified understanding of its posture vis-à-vis joint defense and co-client privilege is essential to fully realizing its value.
