INTRODUCTION

Since the dawn of radio, broadcasters have been regarded as "public trustees:" in return for a free, exclusive license to exploit a valuable public resource, the broadcaster becomes a public trustee, obligated to serve the interests of the community through its broadcasts. ¹ Defining and enforcing this duty to the public is a fundamental part of broadcast regulation and has been subject to constant policy debates and First Amendment challenges.

The transition to digital television has reinvigorated the entire debate over the public interest obligations owed by television broadcasters. As FCC Commissioner Gloria Tristani put it: "The public interest standard—the bedrock obligation of those who broadcast over the public airwaves—has fallen into an unfortunate state of disrepair over the years. It's time to put up the scaffolding and get the restoration underway."² Former Chairman Reed Hundt similarly stressed the implications of digital television for the public interest debate: "Now, as the Commission considers various critical issues relating to the new spectrum set aside for digital broadcast television, we have a rare opportunity. We have a second chance to get television regulation right, to put real meaning into the public interest."³

While these and other observers look to digital television as a reason to expand the public interest obligations of broadcasters—to get something in return for the free use of public spectrum—others argue that digital television undermines the very constitutionality of public interest regulation. The notion that government should define or influence programming content "necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles."⁴ Yet the courts have historically justified content-specific public interest regulation under the First Amendment by relying on the principle of "scarcity"—the idea that the electromagnetic spectrum is incapable of supporting every broadcaster who would like to use it:

A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right . . . to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.⁵

Throughout the public interest debate triggered by the transition to digital television, broadcasters have argued that digital technology, particularly the potential for the transmission of more television programming, undermines the constitutional basis for public interest regulation. Particularly, Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth warned:

The primary rationale for broadcasters' public interest

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¹ See, e.g., STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW & POLICY 118 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter BENJAMIN ET AL.]; see also HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW 115-226 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter ZUCKMAN ET AL.].
obligations has been the theory that broadcast spectrum is a particularly scarce resource. Absent spectrum scarcity, however, the justification for according broadcasters less First Amendment protection than persons engaged in other modes of communication becomes difficult to discern. . . . I believe that the Commission must review the empirical basis of "spectrum scarcity". . . . Should we conclude. . . . that spectrum scarcity is no longer viable as a factual matter, then the instant effort to engage in additional regulation will be highly problematic in constitutional terms.6

This article responds to the concerns of Commissioners Hundt, Tristani, and Furchtgott-Roth and discusses both the policy and constitutional issues implicated by public interest regulation of digital television. The article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the transition to digital television, highlighting important congressional and administrative policy decisions. Part II discusses the policy debate over public interest regulation of digital television. Specifically, it addresses the popular sentiment that digital television presents an opportunity to redefine broadcasters' public interest obligations. This article then discusses the technical question of how public interest obligations will be applied to the multiple programming services that digital broadcasters are able to transmit and the specific capabilities of digital broadcast technologies that will influence public interest regulation. Part III analyzes the constitutional issues raised by digital television and the continued validity of the scarcity doctrine, as well as alternative constitutional foundations for public interest regulation.

The article concludes that public interest regulation is not in constitutional jeopardy as a result of the advent of digital technology. Broadcast licenses remain scarce, and the scarcity doctrine remains good law. The article also concludes, however, that digital television is not the milestone for public interest regulation that Commissioners Hundt and Tristani hope it to be. To a large degree, their arguments are driven by popular sentiment that digital television presents a substantial windfall for broadcasters and thus requires an expansion of their duties to the public. As a result, advocates of greater public interest obligations have failed to ask whether and how the technology of digital television should impact broadcasters’ duty to serve the public interest. Instead, both sides have simply repeated arguments from the public interest debates over analog television. As this article will show, despite the vast possibilities of digital television, there is little reason to alter the current public interest regulation regime.

THE TRANSITION TO DIGITAL TELEVISION

For over sixty years, American television has been broadcasting essentially the same transmission standard. In 1941, the FCC officially adopted a technical standard proposed by the National Television System Committee, and issued its first commercial television licenses based on this standard, commonly referred to as "NTSC."7 Subsequently, the Commission improved television technology in 1953 when it approved the NTSC color standard. The new color standard, however, was still receivable by older, black-and-white televisions, albeit without color.8 Only a few minor improvements (most notably, the addition of stereo audio in 1986) were made in the ensuing half-century, none of which required the replacement of existing receivers.9

In 1987, fifty-eight broadcasting organizations and companies petitioned the FCC to initiate a proceeding to explore advanced television technologies and their possible impact on the television broadcasting service.10 The broadcasters were nominally concerned that alternative media would deliver advanced television to the viewing public, thus placing over-the-air broadcasting at a severe disadvantage. New transmission systems were in fact already being developed for Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") and other media.11 A more immediate concern, however, was a pending proceeding to allot unused UHF spectrum for

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6 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at 21655, Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
8 See id. ¶ 92.
9 See id. ¶¶ 5, 92; In re Advanced Television Sys. and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broad. Serv., Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 17771, ¶ 41 (1996) [hereinafter Fourth Report and Order]; ADVISORY COMM. ON ADVANCED TELEVISION SERV., FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, ADVISORY COMM. ON ADVANCED TELEVISION SERV., ADVISORY COMM. ON ADVANCED TELEVISION SERV., FED. COMMUNICATIONS COMM’N, ADVISORY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION S1 (1995); see also 1987 NOI, supra note 7, ¶ 2; see also 1993 REPORT, supra note 9, § 3.3.
use by two-way, or "land mobile," radio communications.\textsuperscript{12} Suddenly faced with the prospect of losing valuable "beachfront property," broadcasters argued that UHF spectrum was not lying fallow, but instead was earmarked for future television services.

The FCC responded by dropping its land mobile deliberations\textsuperscript{13} and initiating a proceeding to consider the technical and public policy issues of advanced television.\textsuperscript{14} The Commission has since made a number of key decisions concerning the transition to digital broadcasting, but has yet to resolve the question of digital broadcasters' public interest obligations. Many of the FCC's early regulatory decisions, however, shape and drive the current debate over public interest regulation. This Part discusses the technology of digital television and explores the short history of digital broadcasting regulation, identifying the significant regulatory decisions that influence and shape the current debate over public interest obligations.\textsuperscript{15}

A. A Few Words on Terminology

"Advanced television," or "ATV," broadly refers to television technologies developed to replace the current analog NTSC standard. "Digital television," or "DTV," refers to digitally transmitted television signals, and is not necessarily advanced TV. For example, several current services, such as DBS, transmit digitally but then convert the signal to the NTSC analog standard for display on home televisions.\textsuperscript{16} When the Commission opened its advanced television inquiry in 1987, it resolved to consider a variety of advanced systems, both digital and analog.\textsuperscript{17} By 1993, however, the Advisory Committee had decided to focus exclusively on digital systems because of their greater capacity and quality.\textsuperscript{18} For practical purposes, then, the FCC and the broadcasting industry use the terms ATV and DTV interchangeably to refer to advanced television.\textsuperscript{19}

"High-definition television," or "HDTV" refers to a particular type of advanced television. Like ATV, HDTV for all practical purposes will be digital so as to take advantage of the capacity of digital technology, though it is technically capable of displaying analog transmissions.\textsuperscript{20} HDTV offers approximately twice the vertical and horizontal resolution of current NTSC analog broadcasting, which is a picture quality approaching 35-millimeter film, and has sound quality approaching that of a compact disc.\textsuperscript{21} HDTV stands in contrast with several other ATV systems, namely, extended-definition television ("EDTV"), which refers to any number of improvements on the NTSC standard short of HDTV, but which are all NTSC-compatible,\textsuperscript{22} and standard-definition television ("SDTV"), which is a digital television system in which picture quality is approximately equivalent to the current NTSC television system.\textsuperscript{23}
B. The Public Interest in DTV: Pretty Pictures and the Future of the Broadcast Industry

The fundamental policy driving the transition to digital television is the determination that over-the-air broadcast of DTV is in the public interest. The Commission determined at the outset that the public would benefit from "programs with significantly improved video and audio quality." But while other media, such as cable and DBS, were available to provide advanced television, the FCC decided early on to rely on over-the-air broadcast television to deliver ATV to American households. The Commission based this decision on two predictions. First, broadcast television was in the best position to make the transition to ATV. For example, although cable reaches nearly two-thirds of American households and is available to all but five percent of them, broadcast television has achieved even greater penetration, reaching nearly 99% of American households. Second, in order to preserve the benefits of free, over-the-air television, broadcasters would have to be allowed to offer ATV if they were to compete with alternative media:

We conclude that broadcast stations provide services unique in the array of entertainment and non-entertainment programs freely available to the American public. Unlike many other countries, the United States has a strong and independent system of privately-owned and operated broadcast stations that transmit local and regional news, information, and entertainment as well as national and international programs. Therefore, initiating an advanced television system within the existing framework of local broadcasting will uniquely benefit the public and may be necessary to preserve the benefits of the existing system. Also, we believe that the benefits of these new technological developments will be made available to the public in the quickest and most efficacious manner if existing broadcasters are permitted to implement ATV. We emphasize that this decision does not foreclose provision of ATV services by other means, both those that use spectrum and those that do not.

From the beginning, then, the transition to digital television has been about more than better picture and audio. Hand in hand with the desire to improve America's television experience has
been a concern for the competitiveness of free, broadcast television.

The Commission went further and chose to limit initial DTV applications to existing broadcasters. The Commission based its decision on several reasons. First, existing broadcasters had "invested considerable resources and expertise" in the NTSC system and "represented a large pool of experienced talent." Second, the FCC believed that a change in the ownership structure of the broadcasting industry would increase the potential for disruption to the viewing public. This decision was ratified by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("96 Act").

C. Simulcasting and the Transition to DTV

The Commission decided early on that it would go to great lengths to ensure a seamless transition from NTSC to DTV, one that would cause as little disruption to viewers as possible. As research progressed, however, it became evident that NTSC-compatible systems would never equal the picture quality and spectrum efficiency of emerging non-NTSC technologies. Accordingly, the Commission made a key decision in 1990 to abandon the pursuit of an NTSC-compatible system, requiring that broadcasters and viewers invest in entirely new equipment to facilitate the transition.

As an alternative to backwards-compatibility with NTSC sets, the Commission provided for the gradual phasing-in of the new digital signal (and the simultaneous phasing-out of the NTSC signal). The FCC determined that broadcasters would "simulcast"—or simultaneous broadcast—NTSC and DTV signals on two different channels. NTSC broadcasts would continue, and broadcasters would be given a second 6MHz channel to introduce DTV. The idea was that during the transition period, viewers would retain the ability to receive NTSC broadcasts while more DTV programming became available and more DTV receivers went on the market. At the end of the transition period—when DTV had become the prevalent medium—broadcasters would return the 6MHz channel used for NTSC, retaining the other channel only for DTV broadcasting. This dual license regime was codified by Congress in the "96 Act. Congress later set a December 31, 2006 deadline for the termination of NTSC broadcasts, but allowed the FCC to extend the

30 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 4; see also NPRM, supra note 21, ¶ 5-6 (affirming the tentative decision in 1991); see also Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 4 (reaffirming the tentative decision in 1992).
31 NPRM, supra note 21, ¶ 6. Broadcasters had helped to "create and support the Advanced Television Test Center, investing resources and developing expertise in this new technology." Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 6.
32 See NPRM, supra note 21, ¶ 6. Additionally, the Commission believed that restricting initial eligibility would facilitate licensing by avoiding the delay of comparative hearings required by Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1945). See Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶ 26.
33 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999). The FCC decided that once allotments for existing broadcasters were made, it would permit any qualified party to obtain a DTV license if technically feasible. See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 7; NPRM, supra note 21, ¶ 10. In particular, low-power and small, minority-owned stations objected to their exclusion from initial DTV eligibility. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 15-16.
34 See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 4 ("We find that existing service to viewers utilizing NTSC receivers must be continued irrespective of the actual manner in which ATV services are delivered, at least during a transition period. This can be accomplished either by transmitting ATV signals that can be received directly by NTSC receivers or by simulcasting NTSC and incompatible ATV signals on separate channels."); see also 1987 NOI, supra note 7, ¶¶ 85-88 (discussing transition policy options).
35 See First Report and Order, supra note 22, ¶ 7. The FCC earlier had "strong predisposition to require NTSC receiver compatibility." Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 5. In addition to poorer video resolution, NTSC-compatible systems required the allocation of additional spectrum adjacent to the 6MHz licenses already issued. See First Report and Order, supra note 22, ¶ 9. There simply was not enough available spectrum to provide each broadcaster with augmentation spectrum contiguous to their current channel, and the cost of technologies to broadcast on noncontiguous spectrum were greater than those associated with using a separate DTV signal. See id. ¶ 10. On the other hand, advances in technology had produced proposals that would deliver HDTV programming with a 6MHz license. See id. ¶ 6; see also Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 82 (declining to consider non-NTSC-compatible systems that would require more than 6MHz). Although the FCC decided to provide an additional 6MHz channel for DTV, it ultimately planned to recover the spectrum used for the NTSC channel. See NPRM, supra note 21, ¶¶ 6, 13, 34-35; infra note 38.
36 First Report and Order, supra note 22, ¶¶ 1, 9. Additionally, the FCC reasoned that "going from the existing NTSC system to an [DTV] system in one step will minimize the investment required of broadcasters, avoid the need for interim standards for transitional systems and the costs of requiring later systems to be compatible with those systems and speed [DTV] implementation." Id. ¶ 8.
37 See First Report and Order, supra note 22, ¶ 8 & n.1. The Commission reasoned that simulcasting would "minimiz[e] broadcaster and consumer reliance on the ATV channel as a separately programmed service." Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 59.
38 See NPRM, supra note 21, ¶ 6, 13, 34-35.
deadline if fewer than 85% of the station's viewers can receive the broadcaster's digital service either off-air or through satellite or cable television.\footnote{40} Under the statute, the returned spectrum will ultimately be auctioned, providing a financial incentive for the government to facilitate the transition to complete market penetration.\footnote{41}

D. Multicasting, Ancillary Use, and the Evolution of the Public Interest in DTV

As research on advanced television progressed, ATV began to promise a dramatically different media experience from NTSC broadcasts—far more than enhanced picture and audio quality. The Commission began to refer to digital television as "a quantum leap in the benefits that may be derived from television service."\footnote{42} This is due in large part to the ability to "multicast," or send multiple, simultaneous broadcast streams. Digital technology made it evident that multiple, high-resolution television signals could be broadcast within a 6MHz channel, with the possibility of additional spectrum remaining available for other uses such as CD-quality audio signals, computer software distribution, interactive education materials, and "data casting": broadcasting data such as telephone directories, sports statistics, stock market updates, and information concerning commercial products.\footnote{43}

Under the dual license arrangement discussed above, the FCC originally required that licensees should simulcast on their NTSC channel a certain amount of the programming provided on their ATV channel.\footnote{44} This decision was motivated by the FCC's concern for an uninterrupted transition to ATV; it did not want to immediately relegate NTSC viewers to inferior programming or postpone the surrender of one of the 6MHz licenses.\footnote{45} Because the ability of digital broadcasters to multicast could not be replicated on their NTSC channels, however, the simulcasting requirement became a restriction on DTV service.\footnote{46}

Accordingly, in 1997 the Commission reversed course and allowed broadcasters the discretion to offer programming on their ATV channel that dif-

\footnote{40} 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(14) (Supp. V 1999). The FCC had earlier stated that it would set a firm deadline for broadcasters to surrender their NTSC spectrum. See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶¶ 2, 50, 53 ("Although . . . there is a benefit to affording the public a choice between ATV and NTSC programming during the transition years, suggesting that such a choice will remain permanently available would undoubtedly inhibit the growth of ATV."). The '96 Act expressly required the Commission to condition the grant of a digital license on the recovery of one 6MHz license from each licensee. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. V 1999).

\footnote{41} See 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. V 1999); see also 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(14); see also Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 66 ("The more swiftly ATV receiver penetration increases, the more rapidly we will be able to reclaim one 6 MHz channel."); Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 6 (identifying as one of the Commission's two principle goals to "promote spectrum efficiency and rapid recovery of spectrum.").

\footnote{42} Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶ 11.

\footnote{43} Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶¶ 20, 27; Fourth Report and Order, supra note 9, ¶ 5 (footnotes omitted); Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶¶ 4, 19, 23; BRINKLEY, supra note 12, at 207.

In addition to being able to broadcast one, and under some circumstances two, [HDTV] programs, [DTV] allows for multiple streams, or "multicasting," of [SDTV] programming at a visual quality better than the current analog signal. Utilizing [DTV], broadcasters can transmit three, four, five, or more such program streams simultaneously. [DTV] allows for the broadcast of literally dozens of CD-quality audio signals. It permits the rapid delivery of large amounts of data; an entire edition of the local daily newspaper could be sent, for example, in less than two seconds. Other material, whether it be telephone directories, sports information, stock market updates, information requested concerning certain products featured in commercials, computer software distribution, interactive education materials, or virtually any other type of information access can also be provided. It allows broadcasters to send, video, voice and data simultaneously and to provide a range of services dynamically, switching easily and quickly from one type of service to another. For example, a broadcaster could transmit a news program consisting of four separate, simultaneous SDTV program streams for local news, national news, weather and sports; then transmit an HDTV commercial with embedded data about the product; then transmit a motion picture in an HDTV format simultaneously with unrelated data.

Fourth Report and Order, supra note 9, ¶ 5 (footnotes omitted).

\footnote{44} See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶¶ 2, 58 (tentatively deciding on 100% simulcasting).

\footnote{45} See NPRM, supra note 21, ¶ 45. The Commission, recognizing that "some number of consumers, unaware of the transition to digital television or unable to afford replacement equipment, may continue viewing analog television throughout the transition period," feared a Hobson's choice "of either terminating analog service, causing such viewers to lose their only source of free broadcast service, or, alternatively, allowing analog broadcasting to continue, thereby depriving the broad general public of the benefits that we believe are to be found from the recovery of one of the channels." See Fourth NPRM, supra note 28, ¶ 41. The Commission also believed that its ability to reclaim one of the 6MHz licenses would be threatened if the two channels carried separately programmed services. See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 12.

\footnote{46} See Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶¶ 37-39; Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 51.
ferred from that broadcast on their NTSC channel.\(^47\) One of the main reasons for the change was the Commission’s determination that the ability to offer multiple simultaneous programming services would make DTV far more attractive to consumers and would therefore expedite the transition from NTSC to DTV.\(^48\)

The ability to multicast different services raised the possibility that DTV licenses might be used to broadcast non-television signals. In 1997, the Commission extended to DTV licensees its practice of allowing broadcasters to use a portion of their spectrum for ancillary or supplemental uses that do not interfere with the primary broadcast signal.\(^49\) The FCC’s hope was that allowing broadcasters to “experiment with innovative offerings and different service packages” would facilitate the transition to DTV, especially at the early stages when DTV penetration was low.\(^50\) It also believed that ancillary revenues “would increase the ability of broadcasters to compete in an increasingly competitive marketplace.”\(^51\) To recoup some of the value of spectrum used for ancillary purposes, the FCC requires that broadcasters pay the government a fee of 5% of gross revenues received from spectrum use additional to the free programming service.\(^52\)

At the same time that the Commission opened new revenue-generating opportunities for digital broadcasters, it narrowed the scope of required services. Although the Commission had originally expected that broadcasters would “take full advantage of ATV technical capabilities,”\(^53\) i.e., high-definition television, the FCC later decided only to require that licensees offer one “free digital video programming service the resolution of which is comparable to or better than that of today’s service.”\(^54\) The Commission declined to impose a minimum amount of HDTV programming, but instead left this decision to the discretion of licensees.\(^55\)

The decision not to mandate a certain amount of high definition broadcasting illustrates the evolution of the relationship between DTV and the public interest. In 1987, the Commission justified its inquiry into the future of television by finding that the public would benefit from “programs with significantly improved video and audio quality.”\(^56\) By 1997, however, the benefit to the public was not “pretty pictures,” but the po-

\(^{47}\) See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 55.

\(^{48}\) See id. (noting that “many consumers’ decisions to invest in DTV receivers will depend on the programs, enhanced features, and services that are not available on the NTSC service”). The FCC, however, did not entirely abandon its simulcasting order. Simulcasting was still necessary in order to ensure that the final switch from NTSC to DTV did not result in the loss of NTSC programming to which the public was accustomed. See id. ¶ 56. Instead, it simply deferred its operation until later in the transition process, with the requirement phasing in gradually towards a 100% requirement by 2005, and only required stations to simulcast NTSC content on DTV channels, and not the other way around. See id. ¶¶ 51, 54.

\(^{49}\) Id. ¶ 21. The Commission had explicit authority to allow ancillary use of DTV license under the ‘96 Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a)(2) (Supp. V 1999). Moreover, the Commission believed that ancillary use furthered congressional intent “[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.” Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 31 (quoting pml., 110 Stat. at 56). The Commission had considered supplemental use of DTV spectrum before the ability to multicast became evident. In its 1988 Tentative Decision, the FCC expressed concern that the complexities of DTV would cause licenses to transition to DTV at varying paces and that spectrum would go unused while the transition proceeded: “Therefore we are considering allowing supplemental spectrum to be used for non-DTV purposes for some interim period.” Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 132.

\(^{50}\) Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 7. See id. ¶¶ 6, 35 (“By permitting broadcasters to assemble packages of services that consumers desire, we will promote the swift acceptance of DTV and the penetration of DTV receivers and converters.”); Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶ 28; Third Report and Order, Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast Service, 7 F.C.C.R. 6924, ¶ 77 (1992) [hereinafter Third Report and Order]. The Commission previously allowed ancillary use of a frequency to initiate the development of DBS. See United States Satellite Broad. Co., Inc., 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 977, 977 (1986).

\(^{51}\) Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶ 29; see Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶¶ 5, 7, 29 (reasoning that ancillary use “will help broadcast television to remain a strong presence in the video programming market that will, in turn, help support a free programming service.”).

\(^{52}\) In re Fees for Ancillary or Supplementary Use of Digital Television Spectrum, MM Docket No. 97-247, Report and Order (adopted Nov. 19, 1998; released Nov. 19, 1998) [hereinafter Ancillary Use Order]. The ‘96 Act required the FCC to levy such a fee to recover some of the value that would have been received had ancillary services been licensed through auctions. 47 U.S.C. § 356(e)(2) (Supp. V 1999).

\(^{53}\) Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶ 65.

\(^{54}\) Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 28.

\(^{55}\) See id. ¶ 41.

\(^{56}\) See Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 1. The FCC’s advanced television proceedings had begun to explore “new television technologies designed to improve significantly upon television picture.” 1987 NOI, supra note 7, ¶ 1. Although the Commission had avoided a premature definition of ATV programming, see Third Report and Order, supra note 50, ¶ 76, improved video and audio continued to provide the basis for the FCC’s early DTV decisions. For exam-
potential role that digital television would play in the nation’s evolving information infrastructure.\(^\text{57}\) During its deliberations on a DTV transmission standard, the FCC began to insist on compatibility with computer applications in order to ensure “seamless, interactive, user driven access to the widest range of information,” particularly video-rich applications.\(^\text{58}\) Additionally, because the government plans to auction off NTSC channels at the end of the transition, the FCC believes that the public has a monetary interest in the success of DTV.\(^\text{59}\)

One theme has remained constant throughout the FCC’s DTV proceedings. The Commission has held to the belief that DTV is necessary to enable broadcasters to compete in a converging information marketplace, and has viewed emerging capabilities such as multicasting and ancillary use as additional means to this end.\(^\text{60}\)

PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 expressly provides that DTV broadcasters will be subject to public interest obligations:

[N]othing in this section shall be construed as relieving a television broadcasting station from its obligation to serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. In the Commission’s review of any application for renewal of a broadcast license for a television station that provides ancillary or supplementary services, the television licensee shall establish that all of its program services on the existing or advanced television spectrum are in the public interest.\(^\text{61}\)

Prior to the ‘96 Act, the Commission’s DTV proceedings “reflect[ed] the assumption that pub-
lic interest obligations would attach to ATV broadcasting. Indeed, that broadcasters 'have an obligation to serve the public interest' is one of our reasons for limiting initial eligibility for ATV channels to existing broadcasters.\(^6\) Pursuant to the '96 Act, the Commission formally announced in 1997: "As we authorize digital service, however, broadcast licensees and the public are on notice that existing public interest requirements continue to apply to all broadcast licensees. Broadcasters and the public are also on notice that the Commission may adopt new public interest rules for digital television."\(^6\)

A. Broadcast and the Public Interest

Broadcasters are said to be "public trustees:" in return for a free, exclusive license to exploit a valuable public resource, the broadcaster undertakes an obligation to serve the interests of the community.\(^6\) This duty to serve the public interest has been a fundamental part of broadcast regulation since the Hoover administration, although its logical and constitutional basis has remained elusive.\(^6\) The public trustee regulatory model, currently codified at 47 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1994), is part of the compromise Congress fashioned between full, private ownership of the spectrum and a system of common carrier regulation.\(^6\) This compromise is credited with fostering the development of the broadcast industry while at the same time preserving a measure of public control over a national resource.\(^6\)

While not affirmatively obligating broadcasters to serve the public interest, Section 303 authorizes the Commission to perform certain regulatory functions "from time to time, as the public convenience, interest, or necessity requires." Moreover, under Sections 309 and 310, the grants, modifications, renewals, and transfers of licenses are subject to the FCC's determination that the "public interest, convenience, or necessity would be served" thereby.

Courts, commissioners, and commentators have adopted various definitions of "public interest" over the years. The Supreme Court has described the public interest standard as a "comparative and not an absolute standard when applied to broadcasting stations."\(^6\) In NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the Court stated generally, "The 'public interest' to be served under the Communications Act is thus the interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more effective use of radio.'\(^6\) At its most basic level, the obligation to

\(^{62}\) Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶ 33; see also id. ¶ 34 ("We remain committed to enforcing our statutory mandate to ensure that broadcasters serve the public's airwaves.").

\(^{63}\) Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 50; see also id. ¶ 48 ("In enacting §§ 336(d), Congress clearly provided that broadcasters have public interest obligations on the program services they offer, regardless of whether they are offered using analog or digital technology."); id. ¶ 49 ("In the digital television era, although many aspects of the business and technology of broadcasting may be different, broadcasters will remain trustees of the public's airwaves.").

\(^{64}\) See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1967) ("Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium."); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, ch. 6; ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 115-226.

\(^{65}\) Regulation based on the public trustee model was one of several Hoover Administration concepts that were found to violate the Radio Act of 1912, which was construed by the courts not to provide authority to regulate broadcasting beyond the initial license grant. See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-15 (1943); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.11. Congress subsequently codified the public trustee model in the Radio Act of 1927. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162. The 1927 Act was replaced by the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, which retained the public trustee model. Constitutional attacks on the public trustee model are discussed infra, Part III.

\(^{66}\) Congress expressly retained government ownership of the airwaves:

It is the purpose of this chapter, among other things, to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.


Congress, however, declined to impose a common carrier regime on broadcast. Rather than require licensees to make their frequencies available to the public on a first-come, first-served basis, the public trustee model relies on broadcasters' editorial discretion in selecting content. See, e.g., Fed. Communications Comm'n v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984) ("Unlike common carriers, broadcasters are entitled under the First Amendment to exercise the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties]." (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original)).

\(^{67}\) See CHARTING THE DIGITAL BROADCAST FUTURE: FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS OF DIGITAL TELEVISION BROADCASTERS at 18-19 (1998) [hereinafter GORE REPORT].


\(^{69}\) NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1994)).
serve the public interest concerns "the ability of the licensee to render the best practicable service to the community reached by his broadcasts." To a large extent, the Court has deferred to the judgment of the Commission, noting that the public interest standard "is as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit," and "serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy." The FCC, in turn, has varied its approach to public interest regulation over the years. For a time, the FCC mandated the methods by which broadcasters ascertained and addressed the needs and interests of their communities and imposed rigid standards for decency, programming format and advertising. Over the last three decades, however, the Commission has deferred to viewer preferences, finding that "market incentives will ensure the presentation of programming that responds to community needs and provide sufficient incentives for licensees to become and remain aware of the needs and problems of their communities." The FCC believes that these incentives promote the public interest more effectively and efficiently than traditional command-and-control regulation.

The '96 Act requires the FCC to renew broadcast licenses—its principal source of leverage—if the broadcaster has served the public interest and committed no serious or abusive violations of the code or Commission rules. Current FCC regulations require broadcasters to file a quarterly statement describing their programming dealing with community issues, which is evaluated by the Commission during renewal proceedings. The Commission, however, no longer considers competing applications during renewal hearings, and, as discussed above, the FCC has abandoned attempts to quantify the public interest standard. Moreover, the Commission has shifted its focus away from the individual licensee to the overall range of programming available to viewers: "It appears, therefore, that the failure of some stations to provide programming in some categories is being offset by the compensatory performance of other stations. In this respect, market demand is determining the appropriate mix of each licensee's programming." In addition to the broader public trustee model, Congress has imposed specific public interest obligations on broadcasters in six areas. First, the Children's Television Act of 1990 ("CTA") requires the Commission, when renewing licenses, to consider whether the licensee "has served the educational and informational needs of children through the licensee's overall programming." Second, Congress imposes a number of obligations concerning political cam-

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70 FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940), quoted in NBC, 319 U.S. at 216.
73 The Commission listed specific categories of programming it believed served the public interest and required consultation with community leaders. See Programming Inquiry, 44 F.C.C. Rcd 2905, 2512 (1960) (en banc); ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 171-72.
74 In its 1984 Report and Order on Television Deregulation, the FCC eliminated regulations concerning local, news, and public affairs programming, the methods by which broadcasters ascertained the needs and interests of their communities, record-keeping duties, and maximum commercials per hour. 98 F.C.C. 2d 1076, ¶ 2 (1984) [hereinafter Deregulation Report]; see also FCC v. WCNM Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 593 (1981); BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 39-41; ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 119-21 (1999) ("The Commission assumed that the remote control is a better regulator of broadcaster behavior than the government.").
paigns, including the "equal time" and "lowest unit charge" rules. Third, Congress has made it a crime to broadcast "obscene" programming and has restricted the broadcast of "indecent" programming to between ten o'clock at night and six o'clock in the morning. Fourth, Congress has required that television manufacturers include a "V-chip" in all new television sets larger than thirteen inches. The V-chip allows viewers to block out certain content by reading embedded, descriptive data transmitted along with the programming. Fifth, broadcasters are subject to a number of consumer protection and public safety rules. Finally, Congress has sought to enhance television access for the hearing and visually impaired through closed captioning and other technologies.

To the extent that these specific obligations target market failures—or politically charged issues—they have resisted the trend towards deregulation. In enacting the CTA, for example, Congress found that market forces were not sufficient to ensure that commercial stations would provide children's educational and information programming. Because over-the-air commercial broadcast stations earn their revenues from the sale of advertising time, the FCC has reasoned that broadcasters have little incentive to promote children's television where audiences are relatively small. The disincentive is even greater for educational programs for children. Similarly, Congress found that market forces may produce a "race to the bottom" with respect to indecency and violence.

Not surprisingly, broadcasters have favored deregulation and continue to argue that the market is a far better judge of what the public is interested in than the FCC. As one broadcasting association commented, "With the ever-increasing competition in the information marketplace, stations have even more incentive to provide such programming and locally-oriented service in the digital era."

Critics of deregulation—the self-styled advo-
icates of the public interest—complain that the Commission’s definition of the public interest includes too much of what broadcasters provide for profit. As former Chairman Hundt recently wrote, “The FCC essentially dismantled the public interest standard in the early 1980s by conflating the ‘public interest’ with anything sponsors will support.”

The former Chairman went further stating:

By providing news, sports, and entertainment for free, and by responding to market forces and providing programming that people want to watch and advertisers want to support, broadcasters undeniably serve the public. ... But it is clear that Congress meant to require broadcasters to do more than what they would do anyway in order to compete in the video marketplace for audience and for advertising revenue. There would be no need for the Commission to determine whether a licensee is serving the public interest if all that means is that the broadcaster is in business competing against other broadcasters and other providers of video programming, such as cable operators and operators of satellite systems. Clearly, broadcasters are subject to distinct public interest obligations not imposed on other media.

In the Commission’s Notice of Inquiry on the subject, Commissioner Tristani reasserted the argument that the public interest must mean something more than what sponsors will support:

The public interest standard must have some substantive meaning. It cannot simply be “whatever interests the public.” That is simply an attempt to deprive the term of any real meaning. It also assumes that Congress puts meaningless requirements in statutes. After all, if a broadcaster’s private interests always served the public interest, Congress didn’t have to say a word. Congress does not enact meaningless or unnecessary language—much less language that has been as scrutinized and debated over the years as much as the public interest standard.

Advocates of greater public interest regulation thus insist that the Commission’s market-oriented definition of the public interest ignores a more crucial question: whether the broadcaster has really done anything in return for the license as opposed to exploiting the license for financial gain. Similarly, while the FCC’s global focus on the overall range of programming available to viewers may be allocatively efficient. Insofar as it seeks to mandate no more programming than the public wishes to watch, critics argue that it ignores the individual obligations of each licensee as a public trustee, as well as the substantial benefit that the broadcaster receives in the form of a free license.

B. Digital Television and the Future of Public Interest Regulation

The transition to digital television, along with the advent of spectrum auctions, has reinvigorated the entire debate over public interest obligations for over-the-air television broadcasters. To some advocates of increased public interest obligations, the advent of digital television presents a milestone at which to reassess the current regulatory regime. These advocates matter-of-factly reason, “[D]igital television broadcasting is a new service, requiring a new look at the ‘public interest, convenience, and necessity standard’ so firmly imbedded in broadcast policy.”

To other advocates of increased obligations, the transition to DTV provides more than a mere opportunity to reassess public interest regulation; DTV is a reason to increase regulation. These advocates are driven by the popular sentiment that the transition to digital television has resulted in a substantial windfall for broadcasters, and that the duty to serve the public interest should be expanded as a result. On the one hand, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provides that broadcast licenses will be granted through auctions, but specifically exempts the digital television licenses granted to existing television broadcasters. In the eyes of critics, television broadcasters continue to use their licenses free of charge while others are forced to pay. On the other hand, the versatility of DTV now allows broadcasters to exploit a valuable national resource to generate

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94 Hundt, The Public’s Airwaves, supra note 92, at 1094.
95 Id. at 1090.
96 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at ¶1. Separate Statement of Commissioner Gloria Tristani.
97 Comments of People for Better TV, In Re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 2 (Mar. 27, 2000).
99 See infra notes 118-47 and accompanying text (discussing what has been called the "great giveaway"). While initial license assignment is done through comparative hearing, licensees are free to transfer their licenses to third parties for consideration, thereby creating a private market for broadcast licenses. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1994). The Commission must approve the transfer by finding that it will serve the public interest, but may not consider whether the public interest would be better served by another transferee. See also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981) (allowing Commission to rely on market forces to determine programming format).
substantial revenues in addition to advertising on one programming stream.\textsuperscript{100}

Government policymakers have responded to the popular sentiment that public interest obligations should be reexamined as the conversion to DTV takes place. In 1997, President Clinton appointed an Advisory Committee to make recommendations on DTV's impact on public interest regulation.\textsuperscript{101} In December 1998, the committee, known as the "Gore Committee" because of its duty to report to Vice President Gore, offered ten recommendations concerning specific public interest obligations that DTV broadcasters should assume in exchange for the free use of a new digital channel:

1. Disclosure of Public Interest Activities by Broadcasters: Digital broadcasters should be required to make enhanced disclosures of their public interest programming and activities on a quarterly basis, using standardized checkoff forms that reduce administrative burdens and can be easily understood by the public.

2. Voluntary Standards of Conduct: The National Association of Broadcasters, acting as the representative of the broadcasting industry, should draft an updated voluntary Code of Conduct to highlight and reinforce the public interest commitments of broadcasters.

3. Minimum Public Interest Requirements: The FCC should adopt a set of minimum public interest requirements for digital television broadcasters in the areas of community outreach, accountability, public service announcements, public affairs programming, and captioning.

4. Improving Education Through Digital Broadcasting: Congress should create a trust fund to ensure enhanced and permanent funding for public broadcasting to help it fulfill its potential in the digital television environment and remove it from the vicissitudes of the political process.

When spectrum now used for analog broadcasting is returned to the government, Congress should reserve the equivalent of 6 MHz of spectrum for each viewing community in order to establish channels devoted specifically to noncommercial educational programming. Congress should establish an orderly process for allocating the new channels as well as provide adequate funding from appropriate revenue sources. Broadcasters that choose to implement datacasting should transmit information on behalf of local schools, libraries, community-based nonprofit organizations, governmental bodies, and public safety institutions. This activity should count toward fulfillment of a digital broadcaster's public interest obligations.

5. Multiplexing and the Public Interest: Digital television broadcasters who choose to multiplex, and in doing so reap enhanced economic benefits, should have the flexibility to choose between paying a fee, providing a multicasted channel for public interest purposes, or making an in-kind contribution. Given the uncertainties of this still-hypothetical market, broadcasters should have a 2-year moratorium on any fees or contributions to allow for experimentation and innovation. Small-market broadcasters should be given an opportunity to appeal to the FCC for additional time. The moratorium should begin after the market penetration for digital television reaches a stipulated threshold.

6. Improving the Quality of Political Discourse: If Congress undertakes comprehensive campaign finance reform, broadcasters should commit firmly to do their part to reform the role of television in campaigns. This could include repeal of the "lowest unit rate" requirement in exchange for free airtime, a broadcast bank to distribute money or vouchers for airtime, and shorter time periods of selling political airtime, among other changes. In addition, the television broadcasting industry should voluntarily provide 5 minutes each night for candidate-centered discourse in the 30 days before an election. Finally, blanket bans on the sale of airtime to all State and local political candidates should be prohibited.

7. Disaster Warnings in the Digital Age: Broadcasters should work with appropriate emergency communications specialists and manufacturers to determine the most effective means to transmit disaster warning information. The means chosen should be minimally intrusive on bandwidth and not result in undue additional burdens or costs on broadcasters. Appropriate regulatory authorities should also work with manufacturers of digital television sets to make sure that they are modified to handle these kinds of transmissions.

8. Disability Access to Digital Programming: Broadcasters should take full advantage of new digital closed captioning technologies to provide maximum choice and quality for Americans with disabilities, where doing so would not impose an undue burden on the broadcasters. These steps should include the gradual expansion of captioning on public service announcements, public affairs programming, and political programming; the allocation of sufficient audio bandwidth for the transmission and delivery of video description; disability access to ancillary and supplementary services; and collaboration between regulatory authorities and set manufacturers to ensure the most efficient, inexpensive, and innovative capabilities for disability access.

9. Diversity in Broadcasting: Diversity is an important value in broadcasting, whether it is in programming, political discourse, hiring, promotion, or business opportunities within the industry. The Advisory Committee recommends that broadcasters seize the opportunities inherent in digital television technology to substantially enhance the diversity available in the television marketplace. Serving diverse interests within a community is both good business and good public policy.

10. New Approaches to Public Interest Obligations in the New Television Environment: Although the Advisory Committee makes no consensus recommendation about entirely new models for fulfilling public interest obligations, it believes that the Administration, the Congress, and the FCC should explore alternative approaches that allow for greater flexibility and efficiency while affirmatively serving public needs and interests.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{100} See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{101} See GORE REPORT, supra note 67.

\textsuperscript{102} Id. at xiii-xv.
Following its receipt of the Gore Report, the FCC issued a Notice of Inquiry on December 20, 1999 seeking comment on the subject.\footnote{See 1999 NOI, supra note 2, at 21660.} Among other things, the FCC sought comments on: (1) whether "a licensee's public interest obligations attach to the DTV channel as a whole, such that a licensee has discretion to fulfill them on one of its program streams, or to air some of its public interest programming on more than one of its program streams" or whether "the obligations attach to each program stream offered by the licensee"\footnote{Id. \textsuperscript{110}} as well as to ancillary and supplemental uses\footnote{See id. \textsuperscript{113}}; (2) proposals to increase the number of required hours of children's programming or the amount of information regarding content transmitted under the voluntary ratings system;\footnote{See id. \textsuperscript{111}} (3) the Gore Committee's recommendations regarding ascertainment studies and programming disclosure obligations;\footnote{See id. \textsuperscript{112}} (4) proposals to increase the amount of emergency and disaster information broadcasters should be required to transmit;\footnote{See id. \textsuperscript{113}} (5) whether the FCC should impose minimum public interest requirements for broadcasters as opposed to voluntary industry measures;\footnote{See id. \textsuperscript{114}} and (6) measures to enhance access to the media for persons with disabilities and to provide ancillary services to those individuals.\footnote{See id. \textsuperscript{115}}

Arguments for expanded public interest obligations, including those made by the Gore Commission and before the FCC, contain little consideration of whether and how the technology of digital television should impact broadcasters’ duty to serve the public interest. Instead, these arguments perceive DTV as a milestone from which to reexamine the entire public interest debate. Besides the alleged windfall to have been bestowed on broadcasters, however, these arguments fail to explain why digital television requires a change in public interest regulation.

Commissioner Tristani, for example, appeared to simply take the Gore Committee’s queue: “This proceeding is long overdue. The public interest standard—the bedrock obligation of those who broadcast over the public airwaves—has fallen into an unfortunate state of disrepair over the years. It’s time to put up the scaffolding and get the restoration underway.”\footnote{Id.} Years earlier, Chairman Hundt characterized the issue as follows: “Now, as the Commission considers various critical issues relating to the new spectrum set aside for digital broadcast television, we have a rare opportunity. We have a second chance to get television regulation right, to put real meaning into the public interest.”\footnote{Id.}

Conversely, broadcasters resist any change in public interest regulation as a threat to an industry in its infancy, but do not address the very real differences in their broadcasting capabilities and revenue-generating opportunities. Broadcasters have taken advantage of the lack of concrete technological discussion and have rested in part on the argument that “the agency should resist calls to expand the public interest obligations of television broadcast licensees simply because they will be utilizing a new technology to provide broadcast service to the public.”\footnote{Id.} As CBS put it:

\footnote{Hundt, A New Paradigm, supra note 3, at 529; see also Reed Hundt, A New Paradigm for Digital Television (Sept. 30, 1996), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh639.txt (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).}

[T]he answer to the question of how much public interest programming is enough requires, first, an estimate of the revenues necessary to sustain the economic success of digital TV, and second, a statement of what is missing in our broadcast media today. Little or no debate has occurred in Congress or in the FCC on the connection of either of these broad and terrifically important questions to digital TV.

\footnote{Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 3 (Mar. 27, 2000).}
C. The Great Giveaway

Perhaps the most contentious point of debate over DTV policy is whether broadcasters have been substantially enriched at the public’s expense or whether they are instead making a costly and precarious investment in the nation’s information infrastructure. Many commentators continue to criticize the initial policy decisions regarding DTV. Their objection is that Congress and the FCC have essentially given “a national resource to an affluent industry in return for abstract gains.” They challenge the government’s failure to exact tangible public interest commitments, not only as a general matter with regard to both NTSC and DTV broadcasts, but more specifically in light of the greater ability of DTV broadcasters to exploit ancillary uses beyond the single required free programming service.

The public has allowed broadcasters to build a business on rent-free public property in return for the broadcasters’ promise that they will provide a service that will benefit the public. Now broadcasters want to build a new and improved business on more rent-free property while still holding their original allocation and not committing to the date they are going to give any of it back. This is a great deal for broadcasters. But is it a good deal for the public who will have to reinvest billions of dollars in television receivers in order to gain access to the new business, Advanced Television? The public should get the best deal when deciding who gets access to the new business, Advanced Television? The public should get the best deal when deciding who gets access to the new business, Advanced Television? The public should get the best deal when deciding who gets access to the new business, Advanced Television?

Consequently, pragmatic questions on how public interest obligations will differ for digital technology have been largely overshadowed by...
demand in some quarters for a reassessment of public interest regulation of television.

I. The Decision to Give Away

As discussed above, the FCC decided as early as 1990 to pursue a dual license transition initially restricted to existing broadcasters. Yet the merits of granting an additional free license to broadcasters were hotly debated in Congress's deliberations during passage of the '96 Act. This was primarily due to Congress's realization that spectrum auctions were capable of generating billions of dollars for the Treasury. Previously, the FCC held a hearing to determine which user would best serve the public and simply awarded the license to the victor. However, between 1993 and 1996, after enactment of the 1993 Balanced Budget Act, the FCC raised over $20 billion in auction revenues and "auction fever" became a driving influence underlying the '96 Act.

Accordingly, then-Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) called the idea of granting DTV licenses for free a "'giveaway' worth up to $70 billion to TV broadcasters." Dole, along with Senators on both sides of the aisle, labeled the dual license plan "corporate welfare." Activists, journalists, and commentators have called the DTV licensing regime the "lobbying coup of the decade" and a "rip-off on a scale vaster than dreamed of by yesteryear's robber barons."

Concerns that the transition to DTV would unjustly enrich broadcasters were heightened by the Commission's flexible policy over use of the DTV channels. Digital compression techniques make it possible to broadcast multiple signals within the 6MHz channel, but Congress and the Commission have required only that broadcasters provide one free SDTV service. Broadcasters need not offer improved picture and audio and can use the bulk of their spectrum for non-television pay or subscription services, giving them a significant revenue-generating resource.

Broadcasters have rejected the great giveaway argument as a "myth." Their principle argument is that the additional 6MHz license is a merely a "loan" to facilitate the FCC's goal of a seamless transition from NTSC to digital while break for the '96 Act may very well have been Dole's decision to run for President. Shortly thereafter, the new Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and House Speaker Newt Gingrich sent a letter to the FCC canceling the Dole agreement and instructing the Commission to proceed with the issuance of DTV licenses. See Hazlett, supra note 118, at 940; Taylor, Superhighway Robbery, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 20 [hereinafter Taylor].

Taylor, supra note 126, at 20.


Taylor, supra note 126, at 28; supra note 49 and accompanying text.

broadcasters and viewers upgrade their equipment.\textsuperscript{132} At the end of the transition period, broadcasters will return their NTSC channel, resulting in a spectrum “wash.”\textsuperscript{133} Moreover, under the ‘96 Act the FCC requires that broadcasters pay the government a fee of 5\% of gross revenues received from spectrum use additional to the free programming service.\textsuperscript{134} Broadcasters argue that without the additional DTV channel and the ability to exploit ancillary uses, penetration of DTV receivers will be delayed and the switch to digital will necessarily cause a more abrupt displacement of viewers who rely on analog broadcast.\textsuperscript{135}

Broadcasters also argue that the focus on spectrum overlooks the “immense financial burdens associated with transitioning to digital services.”\textsuperscript{136} They claim that “[m]aking broadcasters pay ‘would wreak havoc on the broadcast industry’ and ‘kill off digital altogether before it even has a chance to get off the ground.’”\textsuperscript{137} Robert C. Wright, the president of NBC, characterized proposals to auction DTV spectrum as a “tax on broadcasters, forcing them to pay the government to stay in business.”\textsuperscript{138}

The financial costs of DTV broadcasting are primarily the fixed costs of transmission equipment, for which estimates range between $1 million to $30 million per station.\textsuperscript{139} High-definition programming already exists in abundant supply—most movies and prime-time programs were recorded on 35mm film, a high-definition format.\textsuperscript{140} Additionally, DTV is a guaranteed market: by the end of 2006, NTSC broadcasts will cease, and DTV will be the only broadcast format.\textsuperscript{141} Finally, broadcasters’ estimates do not account for the revenue potential of multicasting.

Yet even the most conservative equipment estimates exceed the value of some smaller stations,\textsuperscript{142} and DTV has yet to meet its “killer app”—the use that will make everyone purchase a DTV set and create a return on broadcasters’ investments. The broadcasters’ concerns have been at the heart of the FCC’s proceedings on DTV since its beginning. As discussed in Part II, the FCC determined that a dual licensing regime initially limited to existing broadcasters would bring about the most rapid transition to DTV and the earliest recovery of spectrum.\textsuperscript{143} Existing broadcasters had invested heavily in digital research and were in the best position to begin digital broadcast.\textsuperscript{144} Moreover, simulcasting would “minimiz[e] broadcaster and consumer reliance on the ATV channel as a separately programmed service,” ensuring that viewers would retain access to broadcast television until DTV penetration had reached comfortable levels.\textsuperscript{145} Broadcaster’s arguments are also reflected in the FCC’s decision to allow ancillary use of DTV spectrum.\textsuperscript{146} The FCC’s rationale was that ancillary revenues would facilitate the transition to DTV, especially at the end of the advanced television inquiry. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{132} See Hearn, supra note 125, at 1 (quoting House Commerce Committee chairman Rep. Thomas Bililey (R-Va.) in a speech to Virginia broadcasters).

\textsuperscript{133} See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{134} See Ancillary Use Order, supra note 52, ¶ 20.

\textsuperscript{135} See Andrews, supra note 125, at D1.

\textsuperscript{136} Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at iv (Mar. 27, 2000).

\textsuperscript{137} See Hearn, supra note 125, at 1 (quoting House Commerce Committee chairman Rep. Thomas Bililey (R-Va.) in a speech to Virginia broadcasters).

\textsuperscript{138} See Andrews, supra note 125, at D1. Broadcasters aired 30-second commercials showing clips of popular shows such as “Seinfeld,” “Jeopardy,” and “60 Minutes” fading to black with an announcer saying, “Some people in Washington want to tax local TV broadcasters billions of dollars in order to balance the budget.” The commercials ended with the announcer urging viewers to call their representatives and tell them to vote against the “TV tax”: “Call now you still can.” Hickey, supra note 128, at 39; Taylor, supra note 126, at 20.

\textsuperscript{139} See BRINKLEY, supra note 12, at 204.

\textsuperscript{140} See id. at 201.

\textsuperscript{141} See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Broadcasters would certainly respond to this argument by defining the market to include all video services, as they did at the outset of the advanced television inquiry. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{142} See Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 19-21 (Mar. 27, 2000).

\textsuperscript{143} See supra notes 27, 37-41 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{144} See Second Report and Order, supra note 27, ¶¶ 4, 6. The FCC decided that once allotments for existing broadcasters were made, it would permit any qualified party to obtain a DTV license if technically feasible. See id. ¶ 7.

\textsuperscript{145} See id. ¶ 59; First Report and Order, supra note 22, ¶ 8.

\textsuperscript{146} See supra note 49. Thus, contrary to those who argue that non-DTV supplemental use constitutes an addition windfall to broadcasters, it appears that such use has always been considered desirable insofar as it extracts as much beneficial use out of DTV licenses as possible. Moreover, for some time NTSC broadcasters have been allowed to “utilize the vertical blanking interval to distribute textual communications unrelated to their main programming.” Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 153 n.177; Third Report and Order, supra note 50, ¶ 77. Nevertheless, if the FCC’s primary concern was simply the provision of a free SDTV service, it could have reduced the bandwidth allocated to broadcasters or auctioned the spectrum to others reserving “must-carry” rights for broadcasters. See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 10.
early stages when DTV penetration was low.\textsuperscript{147}

2. Misplaced Criticism

The windfall to broadcasters, therefore, is not the additional 6MHz license, the initial exclusive eligibility for that license or the ability to multicast pay services. Instead, advocates of greater public interest obligations are really objecting to the fundamental assumptions behind the DTV regulatory regime and not the policy decisions of that regime. Harold J. Krent and Nicholas S. Zeppos captured the two salient criticisms: first, “[t]he public interest in ensuring rapid development of high definition television per se is elusive,” and second, “No sound reason exists to think that broadcasters lacked the incentive to develop high definition television if they thought it would be profitable.”\textsuperscript{148} It would appear that the two rationales are mutually exclusive: if there is public demand for DTV, then government subsidy would seem unnecessary. Yet, if no market incentive exists, it would seem hard to explain why digital television is in the public interest.

The government offers three reasons why digital television is in the public interest. The first is that the public interest would benefit from better picture and sound quality in television. As one broadcasting association stated: “When the DTV transition is complete, the public will receive very substantial benefits in the form of free over-the-air services with greatly improved signal quality . . . and expanded programming choices . . . In other words, the transition to DTV, in and of itself, serves the public interest.”\textsuperscript{149} Of course, non-broadcast video providers were already experimenting with digital services so it is not entirely clear why broadcast digital television, in and of itself, is necessary to satisfy the public interest in picture quality and programming choices.\textsuperscript{150} Furthermore, current regulations only require that broadcasters provide one “free digital video programming service the resolution of which is comparable to or better than that of today’s service.”\textsuperscript{151} That service need not be interactive, and the remaining services offered by broadcasters may only be offered on a subscription basis or may not even be targeted to the public at all. Therefore, even assuming that the public interest demands better video resolution and CD-quality sound, it is terribly difficult to reconcile DTV regulation with this premise.

Picture and audio quality were early objectives of DTV policy. As research on advanced television progressed, the benefit to the public was not “pretty pictures,” but the potential role that digital television would play in the nation’s evolving information infrastructure.\textsuperscript{152} The second public interest identified by the government, therefore, is that digital television will facilitate the development of new technologies and communications services.\textsuperscript{153} Again, even accepting this premise, it offers at best a tenuous explanation of current policy. DTV regulations give broadcasters no particular incentive to direct their ancillary use to new services. DTV broadcasters have no greater economic incentive to innovate than if their licenses were auctioned; they simply avoid the sunk cost of a license. Since non-broadcast entities were already experimenting with digital services, the only conceivable advantage to pursuing innovation through television broadcasters is the development of new services somehow linked to free broadcast television.

The fundamental public interest in DTV is therefore something intrinsic to broadcast television. Throughout its DTV proceedings, the Commission articulated a third public interest in free, over-the-air television itself:

Unlike many other countries, the United States has a strong and independent system of privately-owned and operated broadcast stations that transmit local and regional news, information, and entertainment as well as national and international programs. Therefore, initiating an advanced television system within the existing framework of local broadcasting will uniquely benefit the public and may be necessary to preserve the benefits of the existing system.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{147} See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶¶ 7, 33.

\textsuperscript{148} Krent & Zeppos, supra note 118, at 1740.

\textsuperscript{149} Comments of Belo, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 19 (Mar. 27, 2000).

\textsuperscript{150} See supra note 11 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{151} Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶ 28.

\textsuperscript{152} See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{154} Tentative Decision, supra note 12, ¶ 39.

Our objective is not to launch a new and separate video service . . . Rather, our goal is to encourage beneficial technical change in the existing terrestrial broadcast service by allowing broadcasters to assimilate ATV technology. Thus our intent is to preserve and improve the existing broadcast service and the benefits that this service delivers to the public. In addition, given the risks inherent in ATV, it appears to us that rapid development of
The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s policy of preserving free-over-the-air television service in other contexts. In *Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (*Turner I*), the Court had “no difficulty” concluding that the government’s interest in free, over-the-air local broadcast television is “important.”

Accepting that broadcast digital television is in the public interest, the government’s subsequent policy decisions fall into place. Krent and Zeppos’s second criticism is that “[n]o sound reason exists to think that broadcasters lacked the incentive to develop high definition television if they thought it would be profitable.” In other words, if there is a public interest in broadcast DTV, there should be a public demand for DTV, and a regulated, subsidized transition is unnecessary.

During its proceedings, however, the FCC purported to identify several market failures that justify a forced, subsidized transition to DTV. First, a natural shift to digital television threatens to displace NTSC viewers, cutting them off from this public necessity. The Commission therefore determined that a dual licensing regime is necessary to ensure the smoothest possible transition to DTV. During its proceedings, however, the FCC purported to identify several market failures that justify a forced, subsidized transition to DTV. First, a natural shift to digital television threatens to displace NTSC viewers, cutting them off from this public necessity. The Commission therefore determined that a dual licensing regime is necessary to ensure the smoothest possible transition to DTV. The Commission further reasoned that ancillary services would draw viewers away from NTSC before they would otherwise do so for enhanced picture quality alone. These policy decisions fall into place. Krent and Zeppos’s second criticism is that “[n]o sound reason exists to think that broadcasters lacked the incentive to develop high definition television if they thought it would be profitable.” In other words, if there is a public interest in broadcast DTV, there should be a public demand for DTV, and a regulated, subsidized transition is unnecessary.

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cisions were thus partly intended to prevent the dislocation of NTSC viewers.

A second market failure identified by the FCC is the “chicken and the egg” dilemma. Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Va.), defending the ‘96 Act’s codification of the dual licensing regime, stated: “It’s a chicken-and-the-egg problem. Consumers won’t buy advanced televisions, and manufacturers won’t make them, until broadcasters offer up a digital signal. And no broadcaster will pay for digital spectrum—not to mention make the investment in digital equipment and transmitters—until the audience is there.” The Commission resolved this dilemma when it decided early on that DTV broadcasts would begin before viewer demand developed:

The availability of ATV programming to the public is likely to be a major factor driving ATV receiver penetration. Unless broadcast stations are transmitting ATV programs, such programming is unlikely to be available in sufficient quantity to stimulate receiver sales. We therefore believe that broadcast transmission is likely to be a precondition for substantial receiver penetration.

Similarly, the decision to set a deadline for broadcasters to surrender NTSC spectrum was designed to overcome the incentive to delay transition to DTV created by equipment costs, the absence of demand and uncertainty over when DTV viewership would translate into additional advertising revenue. Similarly, the FCC justified ancillary use partly to create market incentives, or “first-mover advantages,” and its decision not to impose requirements beyond one, free digital video service was designed to subsidize the DTV transition.

While each of these rationales supports the existing DTV regime, a final market failure may be simply that the transition is too expensive and that a subsidy, in the form of a free license, is necessary to preserve advertiser-supported, over-the-air television from elimination by alternative digital video delivery systems. This premise, in turn, requires an additional assumption—that broadcasters would be unable to fund the transition to digital themselves. To the extent that the FCC relies on a public interest in free, over-the-air television, it appears to have accepted this assumption. While the Commission has “long recognized that [broadcasters] must make the switch to digital technology,” its DTV proceedings have always hinted that a government subsidy is necessary: “Unless digital television broadcasting is available quickly, other digital services may achieve levels of penetration that could preclude the success of over-the-air, digital television.”

Perhaps the concern is simply that the FCC’s transition plan may differ from what broadcasters would have done on their own, and that allowing free use of spectrum licenses will make up for the accelerated schedule. But the Commission’s language suggests that what is truly at stake is “the ability of broadcasters to compete in an increasingly competitive marketplace.”

Past predictive judgments regarding the instability of the broadcast industry have been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court—most notably in *Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC*, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (*Turner II*). *Turner II* upheld the must-carry provisions of the 1992 Cable Act after determining that substantial evidence supported Congress’s forecasts regarding the ability of broadcasters to compete with cable operators’ growing market power over local video programming markets. The Court reasoned that it must be especially deferential to “congressional judgments concerning regulatory schemes of inherent complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries undergoing rapid economic and technological change.” The need for similar must-carry rules—a subsidy by a different name—in the digital era is the subject of an ongoing proceeding on must-carry requirements for digital broadcasters. The FCC has decided that non-carriage continues to threaten the viability of television broadcasters in the digital age and has ordered mandatory carriage of DTV signals at the end of the transition period.

Certainly, citizens and academics owe no such “deference” to government policymakers. The point, however, is that the great giveaway argument does not so much challenge the decision to continue to allow broadcasters to use a 6MHz channel of spectrum for free, but instead the decision that broadcast television, digital or not, is in the public interest and deserving of government subsidy. Once one accepts this premise, the government’s subsequent policy decisions are entirely reasonable. The great giveaway argument is therefore little more than an attempt to refight a legislative and regulatory battle that was lost nearly a decade ago and is only incidentally related to digital television.

Whether one accepts that there is no objectionable windfall to broadcasters, the question still remains whether there is anything inherent in digital technology that requires adjustment of broadcasters’ duty to serve the public interest. Moreover, assuming that digital licensees should bear increased public interest obligations because of their additional subsidization begs the question of what those obligations should be and how they should be imposed.

The responses to these questions have been utterly inadequate, particularly because the debate has been clouded by the sentiments outlined above. The remainder of this Part will attempt to fill the void. It first addresses the threshold ques-
tion of how public interest obligations will be applied to the multiple programming services that can be transmitted by digital broadcasters. Finally, it discusses specific capabilities of digital broadcasting that require a reassessment of the type of public interest obligations we expect from television broadcasters.

D. Multicasting and Public Interest Obligations

The '96 Act expressly provides that DTV broadcasters will be subject to public interest obligations. As the FCC realized early on, however, "these public interest requirements were developed for the analog world, in which each broadcast licensee could do no more than send one signal over its single channel." Digital television presents two conceptual obstacles to the current public interest regime. The first problem concerns the ability of digital broadcasters to multicast. Acknowledging that, at a minimum, the current NTSC obligations discussed in Section A will continue to apply to digital broadcasts, there is disagreement over the extent to which those obligations should attach beyond the single free, over-the-air television stream currently required of DTV licensees. As discussed below, this is essentially a legal issue, turning on the relevant portions of the '96 Act. Once these legal questions are resolved, a second, more difficult problem remains: whether or not to increase the quantitative or qualitative programming requirements designed to further the public interest.

1. Legal Multicasting Issues

There is a strong argument directly from the '96 Act that public interest obligations should attach to each stream the broadcaster offers. Section 336(d) states: "In the Commission's review of any application for renewal of a broadcast license for a television station that provides ancillary or supplementary services, the television licensee shall establish that all of its program services on the existing or advanced television spectrum are in the public interest." The statute also requires that the Commission "adopt regulations that allow the holders of [DTV] licenses to offer such ancillary or supplementary services on designated frequencies as may be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity."

Despite the language "all of its program services," broadcasters argue that obligations should only apply to the required free television stream because the '96 Act was intended to facilitate broadcasters' ability to experiment with new public services. They rely on the Preamble to the '96 Act, which indicates Congress's intent "to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Broadcasters also cite Section 336(b)(3), which directs the Commission to "apply to any other ancillary or supplementary service such of the Commission's regulations as are applicable to the offering of analogous services by any other person." Broadcasters argue that, under the statute, their ancillary services should be subject to the same regulatory treatment as comparable services offered by non-television licensees and should not be competitively disadvantaged by public interest obligations.

47 U.S.C. § 336(d) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed as relieving a television broadcasting station from its obligation to serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.").

Fourth NPRM, supra note 23, ¶ 9.


See Comments of CBS, Corp., In Re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 36-41 (Mar. 24, 2000). As a threshold matter, the Association of American Public Television Stations argued that § 336(d)'s reference to "program services," by definition, does not include "ancillary or supplementary services." Comments of Association of American Public Television Stations, In Re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licen-


designed for television. As a legal matter therefore, broadcasters argue that congressional intent precludes an interpretation of Section 336(d) that conflicts with the broader goal of quickly rolling out DTV and recovering analog spectrum, or that inhibits experimentation with new combinations of telecommunications services.

Broadcasters further argue that Congress did not intend obligations to apply to ancillary services because the ‘96 Act expressly provides for a service fee that, “to the extent feasible, equals but does not exceed” the lost auction value of the spectrum. Pursuant to the statute, the FCC requires that broadcasters pay the government a fee of 5% of gross revenues received from ancillary uses of DTV spectrum. According to broadcasters, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that Congress intended to require double payment for the license, in the form of public interest obligations and ancillary use fees.

Each of these concerns was at the heart of the FCC’s decision to allow ancillary use in the first place, which explicitly referenced the preamble to the ‘96 Act. The FCC’s rationale was that ancillary revenues would facilitate the transition to DTV, especially at the early stages when DTV penetration was low. The FCC also believed that ancillary revenues “would increase the ability of broadcasters to compete in an increasingly competitive marketplace.”

But while the argument against extending public interest obligations beyond the required free programming service may be compelling from a policy standpoint, it is by no means legally conclusive. As an initial matter, the statute is clear that regulations concerning ancillary use, including fees, must still “be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Moreover, the analogous services provision is only one component of a broader regulatory authority over ancillary services. That authority also includes a separate command to “prescribe such other regulations as may be necessary for the protection of the public interest, convenience, and necessity.”

Finally, the fact that Congress sought to recover the auction value of DTV spectrum used for ancillary services does not preclude the attachment of public interest obligations. For one, the fact that the fee is exacted as a percentage of gross revenues means that, to the extent that broadcasters are required to direct extra spectrum away from feeable services and towards the public, their fee will decrease. At any rate, nothing in the statute or the FCC’s Ancillary Use Order suggests that the “value” sought to be recovered was the value of the spectrum without public interest obligations. Instead, the value recovered through ancillary fees could just as well be discounted by the separate and additional requirement that all services on DTV spectrum serve the public interest. The ‘96 Act seeks to recover “the amount that would have been recovered had such services been licensed pursuant to the provisions of section 309(j) of this Act.” Section 309(j) does not prohibit the imposition of public interest obligations on the license auctioned or the consideration of the public interest in determining eligibility.

2. Multicasting Policy

The more difficult issues are the policy implications of extending public interest requirements, originally designed for analog television, to digital broadcasts. As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine how requirements such as the mandatory three hours of children’s programming would translate to non-video services. The real policy

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184 Ancillary Use Order, supra note 52, ¶ 20.


186 See supra note 49.

187 See Fifth Report and Order, supra note 16, ¶¶ 7, 33.

188 Id. ¶ 19; see also id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 29.


191 See Ancillary Use Order, supra note 52, ¶ 2 (describing the authority to prescribe regulations in the public interest as an addition to the requirement that the Commission set a fee and apply regulations imposed on analogous services).

192 See id. ¶ 13.


questions are therefore: (1) whether current regulations will apply to additional television services beyond the single required service; and (2) whether public interest obligations should attach to non-television services.

As to digital television services, the main policy argument made by advocates of increased regulation is that imposing public interest obligations on each programming stream would prevent broadcasters from segregating certain programming streams, e.g., local affairs, programming for minorities, political discourse, or children’s programming, from other more economically profitable ones, and placing those types of programs on channels with less desirable features.195 This reasoning does not really take into account the various goals and features of different obligations. On one hand, the purpose of captioning services, “provid[ing] persons with hearing disabilities with the same opportunities to share the benefits provided by television programming that is available to others,”196 would be defeated if captions were provided on only one of the programming streams offered to the public. The same reasoning applies to video description; unless these obligations are imposed on each free, over-the-air television stream, digital television will develop to the exclusion of those with hearing and sight disabilities.

With children’s television, on the other hand, one of the main goals of advocates and recent regulation has been to require children’s programming during “core” viewing hours.197 Because of the value of these time slots, broadcasters have strongly opposed restrictions on the content that can be provided.198 Moreover, even children’s television advocates acknowledge that quantity of programming rarely translates into quality.199 Allowing broadcasters to provide programming that is most attractive to advertisers while simultaneously providing children’s educational television on another programming stream would offer the best of both worlds, the availability of children’s educational television during prime-time as well as the ability of broadcasters to offer programming that maximizes prime-time’s revenue potential.200

As to non-television services, advocates of greater public interest obligations have argued that broadcasters who multiplex ancillary services should be required to provide datacasting services to local schools and libraries.201 This argument, however, is predicated on the great giveaway assumption—that ancillary use is an unjust windfall to broadcasters, and some additional public interest obligations should be imposed to compensate for this otherwise self-interested exploitation of spectrum. To the contrary, insofar as ancillary use facilitates the transition to DTV, it has always been considered to serve the public interest in and of itself.202

The appropriate policy question regarding public interest obligations for non-television services is whether they will interfere with the primary purpose of ancillary use—to facilitate transition. At this moment, it is not clear how broadcasters will configure their services to maximize the potential of their DTV licenses.203 Many of the af

198 See id. ¶¶ 29-32.
200 See, e.g., Comments of the Center for Media Education et al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 7-8 (Mar. 27, 2000) (suggesting that it would be better to devote an entire channel to public interest programming, or to at least air additional hours on one channel proportional to the total hours of multicast programming, rather than impose existing obligations on each stream).
201 The Gore Committee recommended that such services be used to "transmit course-related materials, such as lesson plans and teacher and student guides, as part of instructional video programming. Schools, libraries, and other educational institutions could use datacasting as a large "digital pipe" to deliver computer-based educational materials during off-peak hours." Gore Report, supra note 67, at 53. The Commission believes that such services would likely be relatively inexpensive.
202 See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
203 A survey conducted by the Harris Corporation, a provider of broadcast and radio equipment, found that as recently as December 1997, 44 percent of broadcasters were not sure exactly what they would do with DTV programming. Some 33 percent said they planned to offer multicasting; another 23 percent said they definitely would offer high-definition television. For those broadcasters who will use high-de-
firmative datacasting obligations demanded by
demand public interest advocates may turn out to be cash
cows for broadcasters, while others may serve no
clear, therefore, should be required to return
more to the public.

For example, the Gore Committee’s first re-
mandating greater or lesser obligations than have been imposed on NTSC
broadcasters. To a large degree, the Gore Report
other calls for increased obligations appear to
regard digital television as a milestone from which to
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ion television, most plan to do so during primetime, but
not during other times of the day. Of the broadcasters who
plan to multicast, 50 percent predicted they would offer news
and regular network programming; 47 percent said they
planned to transmit information services; and 26 percent
planned to air local news and public affairs. Two of the more
significant findings of the Harris survey were that broadcast-
ners will move to local digital program origination faster than
generally anticipated and that they expect to offer more lo-

See GORE REPORT, supra note 67, at 10.

204 See, e.g., Comments of the Benton Foundation, In re
Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees,
MM Dkt. No. 99-360, at 1 (Mar. 27, 2000) (“Digital technolo-
gies do not reduce the needs for public interest obligations:
to the contrary, the radical transformation of television
broadcasting made possible by digital technology makes a
NPRM outlining the public interest obligations of broad-
casters even more urgent.”). Benton’s argument for a “Viewers'
Bill of Rights,” however, has nothing to do with digital tech-
ology, but is premised on its concerns that (1) broadcasters
are not providing local public affairs programming and mar-
ket incentives do not effectively encourage such program-
m; (2) broadcasters do not provide quality local television
news; and (3) the public is unaware of broadcaster’s public
interest obligations. See id. at 2-5.

205 See, e.g., Comments of the Office of Communication,
Inc. of the United Church of Christ et al., In re Public Interest
Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-
360, at 3-4 (Mar 27, 2000) (“With all the capabilities and ad-
ditional sources of revenue inherent in DTV, there is only
one clear beneficiary of the transition to digital at the mo-
ment: the DTV broadcasters themselves. The Commission
must adopt public interest obligations now to insure that the
public, as well as the broadcasters, will benefit from the tran-
sition to digital television.”).

206 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.


208 See Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo: What Broad-
(Book Review) (hereinafter Rubin) (“Although broadcasters
readily acknowledge their obligation to serve the public in-
terest through their programming, they still balk at any at-
tempt to quantify what, exactly, it is that they should pro-
vide.”). Broadcasters contradict themselves when they rely
on positive predictions that minimum standards are unneces-
sary because economic forces will voluntarily allow them to
fulfill the statute’s public interest requirements, thereby “pay-
ing” for the free license, while relying on negative predic-
tions that substantial requirements will threaten their eco-

209 See Comments of CBS Corp. In re Public In-
imum standards ought to be, the Gore Committee actually supports FCC policy that such standards are unfeasible.

Other recommendations are explicitly motivated by non-digital concerns or are entirely exhortative. The Gore Committee recommended that broadcasters adopt an updated voluntary Code of Conduct to reinforce their public interest commitments, and drafted a "Model Voluntary Code of Conduct for Digital Television Broadcasters." The only apparent link between the model code and DTV is the Gore Committee's belief that public interest objectives are "especially important" in light of innovations in communication technology. Instead, the recommendation stems from the Gore Committee's determination that a collective agreement would not offend antitrust laws that had doomed earlier industry codes. Likewise, many of the Gore Committee's recommendations regarding political broadcasting have far more to do with campaign finance reform than with digital television.

Yet while the Gore Report fails to reconcile many of its suggestions with emerging digital realities, other recommendations do raise uniquely digital issues. Obviously, digital technology offers the potential for high-resolution, interactive public interest programming, but this observation alone provides no useful metric by which to set public interest obligations. This is especially so during the transition period, where it remains to be seen whether entertainment television will take advantage of DTV's interactive depth and picture quality or simply use the volume capacity to offer more SDTV choices or ancillary services. Accordingly, demands that existing requirements exploit DTV's possibilities or expand in proportion to the number of video streams offered are premature in advance of any indication of how broadcasters will configure their digital channels.

Similarly, advocates have suggested that DTV broadcasters provide broadband Internet access to local schools, libraries and other public institutions. "Indeed, broadcasters are favored with several inherent competitive advantages, including currently deployed network, wireless distribution, ubiquity in the local market, cost-effectiveness in scale and the ability to support IP multicasting . . ." The Gore Committee also recommended that broadcasters be encouraged to offer datacasting services to public institutions to fulfill...
their public interest obligations. Of course, the amount of spectrum available for Internet and datacasting depends on how broadcasters allocate their channels among different services, so the benefit of Internet and datacasting obligations relative to other combinations remains to be seen. Like the potential for interactive children’s television, broadcaster’s datacasting potential cannot be overlooked and must hover in the background as broadcasters roll out—or fail to roll out—their DTV programming.

Instead, any immediate alterations to broadcasters’ public interest obligations must identify present, salient features of digital television that merit a change. Perhaps the most obvious example is the potential for enhanced closed-captioning. The ’96 Act required the FCC to ensure that broadcast television “is fully accessible through the provision of closed captions.” The Act particularly commanded the Commission to study the use of “video descriptions,” verbal descriptions of video content to make television available to persons with visual impairments. The ability to provide subtitles, video descriptions, and translations improves vastly with digital technology, as the amount of bandwidth available for such services increases.

Digital television also presents substantial opportunities to further develop and implement filtering technologies. The ability to provide the embedded data on program content that facilitates filtering improves exponentially with digital compression technology. Digital broadcasters will be able to broadcast substantially more content information than the current, voluntary ratings system; information that, in turn, can be read by filters like the V-chip to block out certain content. Accordingly, while broadcasters generally reject disclosure requirements as a resurrected obligation that has nothing to do with digital technology, more disclosure may be especially necessary in the near-digital future.

At a minimum, additional disclosure would augment current filtering technology. But the expected convergence of broadcast and the Internet also allows for increasingly interactive advertising. Furthermore, it allows for the collection, not only of programming choices, but the success of past advertising at generating interest. Digital television thus raises many of the same issues regarding privacy, access to information, and advertising to children that were reflected in the CTA and that are of increasing concern with the Internet. For example, in passing the CTA, Congress determined that “special safeguards are appropriate to protect children from over-commercialization on television.” As a result, the CTA limits advertising in children’s programming to 12 minutes per hour on weekdays and 10.5

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219 Datacasting could transmit course-related materials, such as lesson plans and teacher and student guides, as part of instructional video programming. Schools, libraries, and other educational institutions could use datacasting as a large "digital pipe" to deliver computer-based educational materials during off-peak hours. Public television stations are already developing innovative applications of datacasting for use in conjunction with their video programming as well as in entirely new instructional applications. See Gore Report, supra note 67, at 52-54.


223 See Balkin, supra note 86, at 1174; see also 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (1994 & Supp V 1999) (requiring the Commission to amend its filtering rules to account for advances in video technology).


225 See Comments of the Center for Media Education et al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12-18 (Mar 27, 2000) (urging the FCC to update children's advertising rules and prohibiting links to advertising or sales on web sites or online services that are accessible during children's programming); Comments of the Consumer Federation of America at 4-5, 17-19, filed as Appendix C-2 to the Comments of People for Better TV, In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360 (Mar. 27, 2000).

226 See Comments of the Benton Foundation, In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12 (Mar 27, 2000) (“Licensees that provide interactive services should be prohibited from collecting personal information from children under 13 without the prior parental consent.”).


minutes per hour on weekends.\textsuperscript{229}

Similarly, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 ("COPPA") "prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in connection with the collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information from and about children on the Internet."\textsuperscript{230} The COPPA requires, with certain limited exceptions, that operators of websites directed to children and operators who knowingly collect personal information from children must: (1) provide parents notice of their information practices; (2) obtain "verifiable parental consent" before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information of children; (3) allow parents to review any personal information collected from their children and prevent the further use of that information; (4) limit collection through online games, prizes, or other activities to information that is reasonably necessary for the activity; and 5) establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of the personal information collected.\textsuperscript{231} Advertising and privacy, therefore, are areas where a prophylactic rule may be necessary to prevent identified dangers. Existing regulations applicable to television and the Internet should be temporarily engrafted on all services offered by DTV broadcasters, even before it becomes clear what services will be offered and which will be targeted at children.\textsuperscript{232} Moreover, the Commission should closely observe broadcasters' marketing, sales, and advertising practices to determine whether the general public needs the protections currently afforded to children.

The Gore Committee also recommended that broadcasters develop more effective means to transmit disaster warning information.\textsuperscript{233} The Emergency Alert System ("EAS") is currently designed to relay emergency messages, typically from the National Weather Service, through commercial broadcasting AM, FM, and television stations.\textsuperscript{234} Because the EAS typically interrupts station programming, a relatively small percentage of severe weather warnings issued by the National Weather Service reach citizens.\textsuperscript{235} Moreover, an effective warning delivery system needs to reach only those people at risk, because the broadcast of warnings to viewers to whom those warnings do not apply causes viewers to generally ignore all warnings.\textsuperscript{236} Digital television allows warning information to be broadcast to select households, in multiple languages, and without interrupting programming for those not a risk, thereby reducing the tendency of warnings to be ignored.\textsuperscript{237}

Although most of the Gore Committee's recommendations regarding political broadcasting appear completely unrelated to DTV, digital technology can be used to circumvent the "equal time" rule, which requires broadcasters who give airtime to one candidate for public office to "afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office."\textsuperscript{238} Whereas with analog television, the potential for discrimination among candidates is generally limited to time slots;\textsuperscript{239} with DTV, a broadcaster who grants access to one programming stream might attempt to limit the access of other candidates to different streams with different audiences.\textsuperscript{240} The same concerns apply to application of 47 U.S.C. Section 312(a)(7) (1994), which gives candidates for federal office an affirmative right to purchase reasonable amounts of broadcasting time.\textsuperscript{241} In the digital era, reasonableness will have to account for the ability of broadcasters to transmit multiple programming streams, with varying features and target audiences.\textsuperscript{242}

\begin{itemize}
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{230} See 47 U.S.C. § 303a(b) (1994).
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{231} Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (2001).
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{233} See Comments of the Center for Media Education et al., In re Public Interest Obligations of Television Broad. Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 12-18 (Mar. 27, 2000).
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{234} See Gore Report, supra note 67, at 60.
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{235} See 47 C.F.R. § 11.1 (2000).
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{236} See Working Group on Natural Disaster Info., Sv., NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EFFECTIVE DISASTER WARNINGS 6 (2000).
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{237} See id. at 6-7.
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{238} See id. at 7; Comments of the Community Technology Policy Council at 12, MM Docket No. 99-360 (stressing the need for multilingual emergency warning messages).
\item[equal sign]\textsuperscript{240} See Comments of the Office of Communication, Inc. of the United Church of Christ ET. AL, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 34-36 (Mar. 27, 2000).
\end{itemize}
A final salient feature of DTV is its potential for noncommercial-educational television, including public television. The fact that the government stands to generate increased revenue from broadcasters who multiplex ancillary services allows for greater ability to fund independent public television. Moreover, when the NTSC licenses are turned in at the end of the transition period, substantial bandwidth will become available for additional public channels, which in turn could employ multicasting to create self-sustaining, independent, non-advertiser based television.

The Gore Committee recommended that Congress allocate many of the resources created by DTV "to ensure enhanced and permanent funding for public broadcasting to help it fulfill its potential in the digital television environment and remove it from the vicissitudes of the political process." One specific proposal of the Gore Committee that received support from broadcasters during the comment period is that "Congress should reserve the equivalent of 6 MHz of spectrum for each viewing community in order to establish channels devoted specifically to noncommercial-educational programming." The Gore Committee also recommended that Congress establish a trust fund for auction and ancillary use receipts that would be reserved specifically for digital public broadcasting. In addition to Congressional funding, public digital broadcasters have the potential to exploit their licenses for ancillary use, thereby subsidizing their video programming themselves.

Moreover, the Gore Committee recommended that commercial broadcasters have the flexibility to choose between paying a fee on ancillary revenues as required under the '96 Act and providing a multicasted channel for public interest purposes or making an in-kind contribution. Under the first alternative, broadcasters would dedicate a portion of bandwidth beyond the required SDTV signal to public interest activities. Under the second alternative, broadcasters would provide in-kind contributions, such as studio time and technical assistance to organizations producing public interest programming. Neither option would count against the specific statutory obligations that apply to the required free television service and that may be applied to other services offered by the broadcaster.

Aside from these limited examples, there is little about digital television technology that influences the debate over what sort of content specific public interest obligations broadcasters should be required to fulfill. Even accepting that digital licenses should return more to the public to compensate for the greater value of a digital license, digital technology itself says very little about how that payment should be made (beyond, perhaps, that public interest content should be high definition or interactive) and even less about whether the FCC or the market should define content. Instead, arguments over public interest obligations inevitably devolve into the debate over whether market forces fail to effectuate consumer preferences and whether any such failure should be remedied through regulation.

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244 Gore Report, supra note 67, at 49.
245 Id. at 49-54; see also Comments of the Association of American Public Television Stations, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 22-24 (Mar. 27, 2000); Reply Comments of Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 28-30 (Mar. 27, 2000). Because the '96 Act appears to require that returned bandwidth be auctioned, see 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994, Supp. V 1999), it is not clear that the FCC currently has the authority to turn it over to public broadcasters.
246 See Gore Report, supra note 67, at 50.
248 See Gore Report, supra note 67, at 52, 54-55; see also Comments of the Center for Media Education et al., In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broad. Licensees, MM Docket No. 99-360, at 20-22 (Mar. 27, 2000).
249 See Gore Report, supra note 67, at 55. Others have recommended a regime that offers broadcasters the choice whether to "play or pay"—either complying with public interest requirements or paying someone else to put public interest programming on the air. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 538. If broadcasters choose either alternative, they will still be adding to the amount of DTV programming on the air. Instead, so the argument goes, a play or pay approach would maximize the amount of quality public interest content on the air, allowing broadcasters, rather than the government, to decide on the most effective, least expensive method of achieving the desired amount of content. Sunstein, supra note 75, at 539. Any payment as a substitute for public interest obligations would be in addition to ancillary use fees exacted by the Commission. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
F. Summary

The shape of the public trustee model in the near-digital future will bear a striking resemblance to the current public interest regime and will be fundamentally different from what public interest advocates argue for. In large part, this is because the current debate over public interest regulation is only nominally connected to the transition to digital television. For the most part, the public interest debate surrounding digital television has simply inherited the decades-old argument over whether and how the FCC should define "the public interest, convenience, or necessity," and whether and how it should regulate programming content according to that definition. Each side's perspective on this issue is completely detached from emerging digital technologies. Instead, the arguments on both sides have simply been recycled from the past.

The nominal connection to digital television is the "great giveaway" debate over whether the transition to DTV is an unnecessary windfall to broadcasters. But this debate itself is disconnected from DTV policy. Instead, it really concerns the merits of the government's determination that digital television serves the public interest and not the approach that Congress and the Commission have chosen to implement the DTV transition.

Beyond this controversy, DTV has served merely as a milestone from which to re-advance policies long since rejected or abandoned. Whether this is a debate that needs to be reheard is beyond the scope of this article. But, as this Part has shown, preoccupations with previously made arguments have generated little consideration of whether and how the technology of digital television should impact broadcasters' duty to serve the public interest. A closer examination of these issues reveals that, aside from a handful of salient features, a hasty decision to expand public interest obligations would be to require them to pay for resources from commercial use of the spectrum that can be channeled to public broadcasting. Accordingly, a better approach to public interest regulation in general would be to extract public interest obligations from commercial use of the spectrum and to use the proceeds to fund children's educational television and campaign advertising. As this Part has shown, digital television's greatest potential to further the public interest and not the commercial interests of the television industry for failing to meet their obligations as public trustees: "Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries is overdue. Never have so few owed so much to so many." Minow argued that commercial television had become "a procession of game shows, violence, audience participation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western bad men, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more violence and cartoons," laced with "commercials—many screaming, cajoling, and offending."

Public interest advocates are entirely correct that little has changed. Ironically, the "vast wasteland" of 1960s television is now considered the golden era of broadcasting. At the same time, public television has successfully provided programming that consistently surpasses the public interest standard applied to commercial broadcasting. Indeed, the debate over public interest regulations triggered by DTV shows the general futility of simply "demanding more" from broadcasters. Such demands require a government agency to make difficult qualitative judgments regarding programming content without providing any metric to guide its deliberation. The fact that advocates themselves cannot articulate the programming content that will serve the public interest raises grave doubts that the FCC ever will.

In 1961, then Chairman Newton N. Minow described commercial television as a "vast wasteland." Addressing a conference of the National Association of Broadcasters, he scolded the television industry for failing to meet their obligations as public trustees: "Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries is overdue. Never have so few owed so much to so many." Minow argued that commercial television had become "a procession of game shows, violence, audience participation shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western bad men, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more violence and cartoons," laced with "commercials—many screaming, cajoling, and offending."

Public interest advocates are entirely correct that little has changed. Ironically, the "vast wasteland" of 1960s television is now considered the golden era of broadcasting. At the same time, public television has successfully provided programming that consistently surpasses the public interest standard applied to commercial broadcasting. Accordingly, a better approach to public interest regulation in general would be to extract resources from commercial use of the spectrum that can be channeled to public broadcasting. Chairman Hundt suggested as much when he said, "The only coherent alternative to requiring broadcasters to live up to specific public interest obligations would be to require them to pay for their spectrum and to use the proceeds to fund children's educational television and campaign advertising." As this Part has shown, digital television's greatest potential to further the public interest and not the commercial interests of the television industry for failing to meet their obligations as public trustees: "Gentlemen, your trust accounting with your beneficiaries is overdue. Never have so few owed so much to so many."
interest may be the new and innovative ways to re-inforce and expand the services provided by non-commercial-educational television.

DIGITAL PUBLIC INTEREST REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

As the Supreme Court has noted, "the 'public interest' standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles." Rather than streamline or clarify the contours of public interest regulation, however, the First Amendment imposes yet another layer of complexity on broadcast regulation. Accordingly, analysis of the impact of digital television on public interest regulation demands an assessment of the continuing validity of constitutional doctrines erected to justify the public interest regime.

Since the inception of the public trustee model, the relevant statute imposing public interest obligations has also prohibited the FCC from engaging in censorship. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court accepted early on that "the [1934] Act does not restrict the Commission merely to supervision of the traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of determining the composition of that traffic." By adopting a licensing as opposed to a common carriage regime, those unable to obtain licenses have no rights with regard to the spectrum beyond the statutory demand that licensees serve the public interest. Content-specific public interest regulation has therefore been defended from First Amendment attack on the ground of scarcity—the idea that, whether because of the physical attributes of the electromagnetic spectrum, or the decision to employ a licensing regime itself, the spectrum is incapable of supporting every broadcaster who would like to use it.

As far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.

Broadcasters have argued that the emerging potential for innumerable video outlets, as a result of DTV, undermines the constitutional basis for public interest regulation. While not affirmatively challenging the Commission's authority to impose content-based public interest regulations, broadcasters have advised that advances in technology should "give the Commission pause as it considers adopting an extensive new regulatory scheme for digital television—a medium [that] has a multichannel capacity which would make the relevance of the scarcity doctrine to its regulation all the more tenuous." Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth stated at the outset of the inquiry:

The primary rationale for broadcasters' public interest obligations has been the theory that broadcast spectrum is a peculiarly scarce resource. Absent spectrum scarcity, however, the justification for according broadcasters First Amendment protection than persons engaged in other modes of communication becomes difficult to discern. . . . I believe that the Commission must review the empirical basis of "spectrum scarcity" . . . Should we conclude . . . that spectrum scarcity is no longer viable as a factual matter, then the instant effort to engage in additional regulation will be highly problematic in constitutional terms.

The remainder of this article will respond to the constitutional arguments raised by broadcasters and attempt to calm Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth's concerns over the continuing legitimacy of content-based, public interest regulation. This Part will first discuss the scarcity doc-

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255 See Zuckman et al., supra note 1, at 118.
258 In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., the Court explained that Congress "rejected the argument that the broadcast facilities should be open on a nonselective basis to all persons wishing to talk about public issues." 412 U.S. 94, 105-08 (1973); see also Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. at 474.
261 1999 NOI, supra note 2, Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
trine and its continued validity in the context of digital broadcasting. It will then identify alternative constitutional foundations for imposing on broadcasters' speech that may compensate for the perceived shortcomings of the scarcity doctrine. As illustrated by Congress's clear mandate that digital broadcasters are required to serve the public interest, reports of the demise of public interest regulation are greatly exaggerated.

A. Scarcity

The Supreme Court has justified its distinct First Amendment approach to the regulation of broadcasting on the grounds that broadcast frequencies (or at least broadcast licenses) are a scarce resource. Multiple signals broadcast at the same time on the same frequency will interfere with each other, preventing reception. Consequently, use of the spectrum must be allocated, both to specific users as well as specific


263 In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 736 (1978), the Supreme Court provided a distinct, two-pronged rationale for negative restrictions prohibiting the broadcast of indecent speech. First, the Court relied on the "uniquely pervasive presence" of broadcast media. Id. at 748. "Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder." Id. Second, the Court in Pacifica reasoned that broadcast is "uniquely accessible to children" such that "the government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in their own household' justifies restrictions on indecent programming. Id. at 749-50 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-640 (1968)). Commentators have argued that Pacifica's logic applies to violent programming as well. See Hundt, The Public's Airwaves, supra note 91, at 1097.

Over the years, courts have tended to rely on broadcast's accessibility to children rather than protecting adults from unexpected program content. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866-67 (1997); Action for Children's Television v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 38 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (upholding indecent programming restriction based on government's interests in supporting parental supervision of children and in children's well-being, but declining to address whether the government's interest in protecting adults' privacy would support the restriction). Partly, this is because the characterization of broadcast as an invasion of privacy rests on a factual judgment regarding how likely it is that an adult might be unexpectedly offended and how easy it is to protect themselves.

It is not clear that Pacifica would justify imposing affirmative public interest obligations on broadcasters. For one, Pacifica dealt with language that "surely lie[s] at the periphery of First Amendment concern." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743. Moreover, while not relying on scarcity, Pacifica was clearly predicated on the determination that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. (contrasting the treatment of broadcasting under Red Lion and newspapers under Tornillo). As one commentator has noted, "Pacifica consequently cannot fill the shoes of the scarcity rationale in providing a broader justification for regulating broadcast speech under the First Amendment." Logan, supra note 125, at 1706.

264 Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 213 (stating that "[t]here is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that can operate without interfering with one another").

265 See id. at 213 ("Regulation of radio was therefore as vital to its development as traffic control was to the development of the automobile."); Benjamin et al., supra note 1, at 1.26-29, 2.1-2; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 ("Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.").

266 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89 ("It would be strange if the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering communications, prevented the Government from making radio communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd the spectrum."); see id. at 396-97 ("Scarcity is not entirely a thing of the past. Advances in technology, such as microwave transmission, have led to more efficient utilization of the frequency spectrum, but uses for that spectrum have also grown apace.").

267 See id. at 369.

268 Id. at 388.

269 See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Different communications media are treated differently for First Amendment purposes."); Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 ("We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.").
economic scarcity in the sense that it describes the relation-

concurring). Allocational scarcity has also been referred to as

messages expressed by private individuals.”). Nevertheless, the Court rejected the

not countenance governmental control over the content of

subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does

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while opponents focus on numerical scarcity and the growing number of video outlets, both broad-

The Supreme Court’s cases are ambiguous on the precise definition of scarcity, appearing to

count both the number of speakers and the number of channels. Red Lion itself discussed both

perspectives. The Court seemed concerned with

speakers when it stated, “Where there are substan-

tially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit

an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every indi-

vidual to speak, write, or publish.” Yet, Red Lion also focused on outlets: “It is the right of the pub-

clic to receive suitable access to social, political, estheti,

the right of the Federal Government in regulation of the broad-

The Court focused on the vast number of viewing

choices offered by cable:

Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and

ship between the demand for spectrum rights and the supply of broadcast licenses. See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitution-

ality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 990, 1016

(Id. at 256; see also Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n. of the Blind, 487

U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (striking down regulations on personal

charitable solicitation and stating that “government, even

with the purest of motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of speakers and listeners; free

and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the govern-

ment”); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641 (“[T]he First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does not countenance governmental control over the content of

messages expressed by private individuals.”)."

See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.

See id.

See id.

See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5054, "enforced 867 F.2d 654, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Starr, J., concurring). Allocational scarcity has also been referred to as economic scarcity in the sense that it describes the relation-

“scarce.” The FCC has noted two possible perspec-

tives from which scarcity can be measured: numerical and allocational scarcity. Numerical scarcity focuses on the number of broadcast outlets available to the public, while allocational scarcity focuses on the number of individuals who want to broadcast relative to the number of available fre-

quencies.275 Adherents to the scarcity doctrine tend to focus on allocational scarcity and the neces-

sarily finite number of broadcast speakers,276 while opponents focus on numerical scarcity and the growing number of video outlets, both broadcast and non-broadcast.277

The Supreme Court’s cases are ambiguous on the precise definition of scarcity, appearing to
count both the number of speakers and the number of channels. Red Lion itself discussed both

two First Amendment questions. First, should the scarcity principle be applied to DTV in the same way it has been applied to traditional NTSC broadcasting? Further, would the rationale require extension or translation or does it simply carry over to digital broadcast? Second, and more fundamentally, will DTV become the straw that breaks the camel’s back and brings about the demise of the scarcity doctrine entirely?

B. Allocational v. Numerical Scarcity and the Application of Red Lion in the Digital Age

Application of the scarcity doctrine depends on how one identifies the referent to the adjective

270 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 250.

271 Id. at 251. “A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legis-

272 See infra notes 323-28 and accompanying text.

273 See id.

274 See id.

275 See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5054, "enforced 867 F.2d 654, 682-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Starr, J., concurring). Allocational scarcity has also been referred to as economic scarcity in the sense that it describes the relation-

276 See id.

277 See id.
digital compression technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium. Nor is there any danger of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to share the same channel. In light of these fundamental technological differences between broadcast and cable transmission, application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First Amendment validity of cable regulation.281

In declining to extend Red Lion to cable, the Court in Turner I stated: "The broadcast cases are inapposite in the present context because cable television does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast medium.282 Although Turner I refers to speakers, it clearly was counting channels, for cable is often considered a natural monopoly such that, by its nature, there will only be one cable service provider.283

Similarly, the unique characteristics of the Internet allowed Justice Stevens to refer to speakers and outlets simultaneously in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), where the Court declined not to extend Red Lion to the Internet. Justice Stevens wrote:

[T]he Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds. The Government estimates that "as many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999. . . . Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought." We agree with its conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.284

The uncertainty surrounding the application of the scarcity principle to new media is illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s opinions in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996).285 Among other things, Time Warner concerned a requirement that Direct Broadcast Satellite ("DBS") operators reserve four to seven percent of their channel capacity for noncommercial educational and informational programming.286 The government argued that DBS regulations were entitled to the less demanding First Amendment scrutiny applied to the broadcast medium.287 A three-judge panel agreed, reasoning that "b[ecause the United States has only a finite number of satellite positions available for DBS use, the opportunity to provide such services will necessarily be limited."288 Consequently, the set-aside provision "should be analyzed under the same relaxed standard of scrutiny that the court has applied to the traditional broadcast media."289

Five judges voted to re-hear the case en banc, however, believing "there were fatal defects in the panel’s legal theory for upholding" the set aside provisions.290 In an opinion dissenting from the denial of rehearing, the judges argued that Red Lion should not be extended to DBS, because "DBS is not subject to anything remotely approaching the ‘scarcity’ that the Court found in conventional broadcast in 1969 and used to justify a peculiarly relaxed First Amendment regime for

281 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 639.
282 Id. at 638-39.
283 Instead, the Court appears to characterize the cable service provider as a common carrier, available to all who wish to broadcast their programming across the cable network. See id. ("given the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital compression technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable medium"). But cable service providers are not common carriers and, beyond certain statutory obligations, retain discretion over what programming they will offer.
284 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
286 See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1) (1994); Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 976. "A direct broadcast satellite ("DBS") service utilizes satellites to retransmit signals from the Earth to small, inexpensive terminals. It operates on a specified band of the radio frequency spectrum. The FCC prescribes the manner in which parts of that spectrum are made available for DBS systems." See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 973 (citing 47 C.F.R.

§ 100).
287 Interestingly, the government had not raised at trial the argument that "that DBS systems are analogous to broadcast television and therefore subject to no more than heightened scrutiny." Time Warner, 93 F.3d. at 974-75. In fact, a District Court for the District of Columbia had struck down the set-aside provisions finding that, under a more rigorous standard of First Amendment review, ".[t]here is absolutely no evidence in the record upon which the Court could conclude that regulation of DBS service providers is necessary to serve any significant regulatory or market-balancing interest." Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1993).
288 See Time Warner, 93 F.3d at 975.
289 See id.
290 See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 105 F.3d 723, 724 (1997). A motion for rehearing will only be granted if a majority of the judges of the court in regular active service vote in favor of rehearing. With the D.C. Circuit split 5-5 (two judges did not participate), rehearing was denied, and the three-judge panel decision was left standing.
such broadcast."  

The original three judge panel in Time Warner seems to have construed Turner I to require a counting of speakers. Judge Williams, urging the en banc court to rehear the case, insisted that the relevant perspective was channels and argued that "[t]he new DBS technology already offers more channel capacity than the cable industry, and far more than traditional broadcasting." Judge Williams construed Turner I to distinguish cable from broadcast on the basis of the number of channels available in each medium, stating: 

\textit{Turner}, to be sure, appears in part to ground its distinction between cable and broadcast on technological characteristics independent of sheer numbers. "If two broadcasters were to attempt to transmit over the same frequency in the same locale, they would interfere with one another's signals, so that neither could be heard at all." But this can hardly be controlling. Alleviation of interference does not necessitate government content management; it requires, as do most problems of efficient use of resources, a system for allocation and protection of exclusive property rights. . . . Accordingly, it seems to me more reasonable to understand \textit{Red Lion} as limited to cases where the number of channels is genuinely low.

This problem with the scarcity rationale is acutely visible in the torturous journey of the FCC's fairness doctrine, which required broadcasters "to cover vitally important controversial issues of interest in their communities" and to "provide a reasonable opportunity for the presenta-

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item[291] See id. at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting).
  \item[292] See \textit{Time Warner}, 93 F.3d at 975 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Because the United States has only a finite number of satellite positions available for DBS use, the opportunity to provide such services will necessarily be limited.").
  \item[293] See \textit{Time Warner}, 105 F.3d at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting); id. at 725 ("Thus, even in its nascent state, DBS provides a given market with four times as many channels as cable, which (even without predicted increases in compression) offers about 10 times as many channels as broadcast. Accordingly, Red Lion's factual predicate—scarcity of channels—is absent here.").
  \item[294] Williams dismissed the observation that \textit{Red Lion} has been retained despite increases in the number of broadcast channels. See id. at 724 ("While this number of channels is greater than those available in 1969 when \textit{Red Lion} was decided, it pales in comparison to cable or DBS."). (citation omitted).
  \item[295] Id. at 725-26; see also supra text accompanying notes 323-28 (discussing the apparent disconnect between the concept of scarcity and a regulatory regime beyond channel allocation).
  \item[296] \textit{Syracuse Peace Council}, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, ¶ 1 n. 2 (1987). The FCC concluded in a 1985 inquiry that new media outlets ensured public access to a multitude of viewpoints without federal regulation, that the fairness doctrine therefore unnecessarily interfered with the journalistic freedom of broadcasters, and that the doctrine actually inhibited the presentation of contrasting viewpoints" on those issues. The Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine in its 1969 \textit{Red Lion} decision. In 1987, however, the Commission repealed the fairness doctrine on two grounds. First, it found that "the dramatic growth in the number of both radio stations and television stations has in fact increased the amount of information, as well as the diversity of viewpoints, available to the public." No longer necessary to ensure diversity, the FCC concluded that the doctrine's "intrusive means of interfering with broadcasters' editorial discretion [could] no longer be characterized as narrowly tailored to meet a substantial government interest." Second, the Commission found that, "instead of promoting access to diverse opinions on controversial issues of public importance, the actual effect of the doctrine was to 'overall lessen . . . the flow of diverse viewpoints to the public.'"

In its decision, the FCC discussed the two alternate conceptions of the scarcity rationale, and concluded that neither justified a different First Amendment standard for the broadcast medium. In addition to determining that numerical scarcity did not exist, the FCC questioned whether numerical scarcity was ever the proper perspective:

As stated above, we no longer believe that there is scarcity in the number of broadcast outlets available to the
\end{itemize}
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public. Regardless of this conclusion, however, we fail to see how the constitutional rights of broadcasters—and indeed the rights of the public to receive information unencumbered by government intrusion—can depend on the number of information outlets in particular markets. Surely, a requirement of multiple media outlets could not have formed the basis for the framers of the First Amendment to proscribe government interference with the editorial process.302

Instead, the FCC believed that allocational scarcity was the more plausible definition.303 Rather than question the factual validity of allocational scarcity, however, the FCC attacked the logic by which this type of scrutiny is used to justify lesser First Amendment protection for the broadcast medium.304 The Commission reasoned that allocational scarcity was nothing more than an excess of demand for licenses over the available supply, a characteristic of all markets:

All goods, however, are ultimately scarce, and there must be a system through which to allocate their use. . . . Whatever the method of allocation, there is not any logical connection between the method of allocation for a particular good and the level of constitutional protection afforded to the uses of that good.305

On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission’s decision as a matter of policy, but declined to determine whether the fairness doctrine was unconstitutional.306

With the constitutional question left open, the FCC reversed course in 1999, relying on allocational scarcity to justify the retention of public interest rules originally adopted to effectuate the fairness doctrine.307 When broadcasters demanded that the rules fall along with the fairness doctrine, the FCC split 2-2 on whether to repeal the rules.308 In voting to retain the rules, Commissioners Ness and Tristani made clear that “the dicta in Syracuse Peace Council regarding the appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny has been rejected by Congress, this Commission, and the courts.”309

The fundamental error of the Commission’s decision in the portion of Syracuse Peace Council that has been repudiated was its confusion of the rationale underlying the fairness doctrine with the basis for public interest regulation of the broadcast spectrum. . . . The standard of Red Lion, however, was not based on the absolute number of media outlets, but on the fact that the spectrum is a public resource and there are substantively more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate. As both the U.S. Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have explained, [a] licensed broadcaster is ‘granted the free and exclusive use of a valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations . . . [T]he long-standing basis for the regulation of broadcasting is that the radio spectrum simply is not large enough to accommodate everybody. Under our Nation’s system for allocating spectrum, some are granted the exclusive use of a portion of this public domain, even though others would use it if they could. That is why it is idle to posit an unbridgable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish.”310

Commissioners Ness and Tristani’s distinction be-

302 Id. ¶ 74.
303 Id. ¶ 75.
304 See id. ¶ 76.
305 Id. ¶ 78; see infra note 323 (describing this criticism of the scarcity rationale).
306 See Syracuse Peace Council v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 867 F.2d 654, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Happily the Commission’s opinion is not written in exclusively constitutional terms. First, its intermediate conclusions, if accepted, compel a finding that the doctrine fails to serve the public interest . . . [T]he FCC’s decision that the fairness doctrine no longer serves the public interest is a policy judgment.”).
307 Two such rules were: (1) the personal attack rule, which guarantees a right to reply to individuals who are attacked in the course of a discussion of controversial issues; and (2) the political editorial rule, which gives political candidates the right to reply to editorials opposing them or favoring their opponents. See Radio-Television News Dir. Ass’n v. Fed. Communications Comm’n (RTNDA), 184 F.3d 872, 876-77 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
308 See id. at 878. Chairman Kennard recused himself from the proceeding, leaving four commissioners to vote on repeal. The D.C. Circuit rejected broadcasters’ argument that “the demise of the fairness doctrine necessarily lead[s] to the demise of the two rules.” Id. at 879 (“A broad rule can be flawed for reasons that do not affect its narrower adjuncts. . . . In short, while the challenged rules do not necessarily persist after the fairness doctrine, they need not share its fate.”).
309 Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 15 F.C.C. Reg. 19973, ¶ 17 (2000). Although the Commission based its decision in Syracuse Peace Council largely on its view that the standard of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC should be abandoned, the D.C. Circuit did not affirm on that basis. Subsequently, in enacting the Children’s Television Act of 1990 (CTA), Congress made clear that broadcasters should be subject to public interest obligations reviewed under the Red Lion standard, and Congress’s views on that matter are entitled to “great weight.” The Commission agreed that Red Lion sets the appropriate standard of review, as it made clear in its Order implementing the CTA, which expressly repudiated the dicta from Syracuse Peace Council.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
310 Id. ¶ 19 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
tween the rationale for lesser First Amendment scrutiny of broadcast regulation on the one hand, and the justification for the fairness doctrine on the other, echoes comments made by Judge Starr in his concurring opinion in the appeal of Syracuse Peace Council:

There is, to be sure, language in Red Lion with respect to the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum and the consequent tendency toward unrequited demand for frequencies. Under Red Lion, however, that sort of scarcity seems to constitute a necessary (rather than sufficient) condition of the fairness doctrine's legitimacy. That is, alloca
tional scarcity accounts for the fundamental difference in First Amendment treatment of print and broadcast media. However, spectrum scarcity, without more, does not necessarily justify regulatory schemes which intrude into First Amendment territory. In short, petitioners confl ate the Supreme Court's choice of a standard for evaluating broadcast regulation with the court's application of its chosen standard to the interests assertedly advanced by a particular regulatory regime.311

As explained by Judge Starr, the deferential standard of constitutional review premised on allocational scarcity does not give the government a free hand to regulate the broadcast medium as it sees fit. Proceeding on the basis of this more relaxed First Amendment scrutiny, Red Lion specifically upheld the fairness doctrine on the grounds that alleviated the problem of numerical scarcity—it furthered the public's interest in "suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences" by "present[ing] those views and voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves."312

Although Judge Starr's account is by far the most precise distinction to be drawn by the judiciary, given the conflicting language discussed above, there is no clear answer as to which formulation of the scarcity rationale continues to guide the Supreme Court. As a result, whether Red Lion's scarcity principle will be extended to digital television will be strongly influenced by whether scarcity is approached from an allocational or numerical perspective—whether scarcity is characterized by the number of speakers using the DTV medium or the number of video outlets added by DTV.

From an allocational perspective, the transition to DTV has certainly not expanded the limited number of speakers on the airwaves. Instead, Congress and the FCC have simply increased the amount of spectrum already owned by the broadcast industry by granting existing broadcasters, and only existing broadcasters, a second channel.313 Digital television has therefore temporarily exacerbated the condition of allocational scarcity observed in Red Lion. Moreover, Congress's December 31, 2006 deadline for the surrender of NTSC spectrum can be extended by the FCC if fewer than 85% of the station's viewers can receive the broadcaster's digital service.314 Although the recovery of spectrum has become a primary concern of the Commission in the transition to DTV, it is far from clear when this target will be achieved.315

In his concurring statement in the Notice of Inquiry regarding DTV public interest obligations, Commissioner Powell attempted to focus the debate on numerical scarcity:

[As we undertake this inquiry we have a solemn obligation to evaluate honestly the extent to which scarcity can still justify greater intrusion on broadcaster's First Amendment rights. It is ironic . . . that as we enter the digital age of abundance and tout its myriad of opportunities for more information through more outlets, we simultaneously propose greater public interest obligations that infringe upon speech, justified on the crumbling foundation of scarcity.]316

Yet even from a numerical perspective, DTV only has the potential to increase the number of television

311 Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 689-85 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Starr, J., concurring). Unlike the majority of the panel in Syracuse Peace Council, see supra note 306 and accompanying text, Judge Starr found the constitutional question inextricably related to policy question.

312 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-90; Syracuse Peace Council, 867 F.2d at 683-84 (Starr, J., concurring).

313 See supra notes 30-32, 37-38 and accompanying text; Judge Starr found the conflict of television with the Internet may make it technologically feasible to allow everyone to use the broadcast medium, thus removing DTV from the facts of Red Lion and placing it under the facts of Reno.

314 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.

315 See supra note 42; see also Julie Macedo, Meet the Televisi

sion of Tomorrow, Don't Expect to Own It Anytime Soon, 6 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 283, 283 (1999).

316 1999 NOI, supra note 2, Concurring Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell; see also In re Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, Order and Request to Update Record, 15 F.C.C. Rcd. 19,973, 19,996 (2000) (Commissioner Powell, dissenting) (making an identical argument); Richard L. Weber, Note, Riding on a Diamond in the Sky: The DBS Set-Aside Provisions of the 1992 Cable Act, 40 WM. & Mary L. Rev. 1795, 1833-34 (1999) ("Both the scarcity and free television theories underlying public interest become almost entirely untenable when examining the transition from the traditional NTSC television broadcast signal to the HDTV signal.")
sion outlets available to the public.\textsuperscript{317} Broadcasters are only required to provide one "free digital video programming service the resolution of which is comparable to or better than that of today's service."\textsuperscript{318} How broadcasters use the rest of the bandwidth on their 6MHz license remains to be seen. A 1997 poll of broadcasters revealed that only thirty-three percent planned to multcast and only half of those planned to broadcast multiple television services.\textsuperscript{319} Accordingly, whether one adopts an allocational or a numerical perspective to scarcity, digital television does not alter the factual basis on which \textit{Red Lion} was decided. In the end, like the arguments of public interest advocates for increased obligations, broadcasters do not actually connect their First Amendment critique of public interest regulation with the technology of digital television but essentially argue that DTV is a milestone from which to reexamine the constitutional foundation of \textit{Red Lion}.

C. Alternatives to Scarcity - Quid Pro Quo

Criticism aside, \textit{Red Lion}'s scarcity principle has been reaffirmed in every case in which it has been implicated.\textsuperscript{320} Congress appeared to indicate recent support for \textit{Red Lion}'s rationale for public interest regulation when it enacted the CTA.\textsuperscript{321} \textit{Red Lion}'s scarcity principle therefore continues to be good law. Yet the Court has suggested that it might be willing to reexamine the principle.\textsuperscript{322} The most pervasive judicial criticism of the principle has been the disconnect between reality of allocational scarcity and content-specific public interest regulation.

Judges and commentators have argued that scarcity is not a unique characteristic of the spectrum, but an attribute of every resource.

It is certainly true that broadcast frequencies are scarce [in the sense that demand would exceed supply if they were being offered free] but it is unclear why that fact justifies content regulation of broadcasting in a way that would be intolerable if applied to the editorial process of the print media. All economic goods are scarce, not least the newsprint, ink, delivery trucks computers and other resources that go into the production and dissemination of print journalism. Not everyone who wishes to publish a newspaper, or even a pamphlet may do so. Since scarcity is a universal fact, it can hardly explain regulation in one context and not another. The attempt to use a universal fact as a distinguishing principle necessarily leads to analytical confusion.\textsuperscript{323}

More to the point, even assuming that scarcity justifies licensing broadcasters and regulating their transmission to prevent interference, it is not clear why scarcity justifies content-specific restrictions on broadcast speech. "Alleviation of interference does not necessitate government content management; it requires, as do most problems of efficient use of resources, a system for allocation and protection of exclusive property rights."\textsuperscript{324}

While refusing to extend \textit{Red Lion} to cable, the

\textsuperscript{317} Whether the current number of media outlets undermines the continuing validity of \textit{Red Lion} is beyond the scope of this article. Of course, the Court has not directly addressed the constitutional validity of public interest regulation in since the prevalence of cable, DBS, and DIRECT TV.


\textsuperscript{319} See \textit{Gore Report}, supra note 67, at 10.


\textsuperscript{322} In \textit{FCC v. League of Women Voters}, the Supreme Court appeared to invite an administrative challenge to the scarcity doctrine:

Critics [of the scarcity doctrine] charge that with the advent of cable and satellite television technology, communities now have access to such a wide variety of stations that the scarcity doctrine is obsolete. We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far
eight-member majority in *Turner I* declined to question the continuing validity of the scarcity doctrine.footnote{325} The Court, however, expressed some discomfort with the principle when it stated, "the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation."footnote{326} *Turner I* clearly recognized the disconnect between scarcity and public interest regulation. While the Court accepted that "[t]he scarcity of broadcast frequencies thus required the establishment of some regulatory mechanism to divide the electromagnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular broadcasters," it appeared to hedge when it continued, "the inherent physical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the broadcast medium has been thought to require some adjustment in traditional First Amendment analysis to permit the Government to place limited content restraints, and impose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast licensees."footnote{327} More recently in *Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC*, 518 U.S. 727, Justice Thomas, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, noted that the Court's First Amendment distinctions between media were "dubious from their infancy."footnote{328}

Criticism of this perceived logical gap in the scarcity principle has generated a number of proposed alternative rationales.footnote{329} One possible response is that *Red Lion* never relied *solely* on allocational scarcity to justify regulation beyond licensing, but instead implicitly recognized a separate, intermediate step. Matthew L. Spitzer and Charles W. Logan have explored a "quid pro quo" argument that content-specific public interest regulation is the consideration the government receives for the exclusive use of a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.footnote{330} Rather than relying on the fact of scarcity as a justification for content regulation, this argument relies on the government's control of the spectrum and the Court's forum analysis jurisprudence to justify public interest regulation. Scarcity thus describes the physical condition of the electromagnetic spectrum necessitating licensing, as well as the condition of

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footnote{325} See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 275 (discussing industry structure, accessibility, and government property rationales); see generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Comment: Into the Woods: Broadcasters, Bureaucrats, and Children's Television Programming, 45 Duke L.J. 1195 (1996) (analyzing broadcast regulation as regulation of commercial speech). Interestingly, the Gore Committee, heavily influenced by one of its members, Professor Cass Sunstein, focused on the primacy of deliberative democracy among the goals of the First Amendment. The Gore Committee argued that public interest regulation "has sought to meet certain basic needs of American politics and culture, over and above what the marketplace may or may not provide. It has sought to cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, and more robust, culturally inclusive communities." *Gore Report*, supra note 67, at 21. The Committee's report gives weight to Sunstein's "Madisonian" notion that the First Amendment is not offended by regulation that seeks to "cultivate a more informed citizenry, greater democratic dialogue, diversity of expression, a more educated population, and more robust, culturally inclusive communities." *Id.*; Cass R. Sunstein, Selling Children, New Republic, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38 (reviewing *Newton N. Minow & Craig L. LaMay, Abandoned in the Wasteland: Children, Television, and the First Amendment* (1995)).

On this view of the First Amendment, there is no tension between constitutionalism and democracy, or between individual rights and majority rule, properly understood; robust rights of free expression are a precondition for both democracy and majority rule, properly understood. In this way, private autonomy is in no tension with, but is on the contrary inextricably intertwined with, the notion of popular sovereignty.

Sunstein, supra note 75, at 524.

footnote{329} See *Logan*, supra note 125, at 1790-34; *Spitzer*, supra note 275, at 1028-41; see also Benjamin et al., supra note 1, at 6.11. But see Robert Corn-Revere, Regulation and the Social Compact, in RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS 43-45 (Robert Corn-Revere ed. 1997).
the spectrum under the government’s licensing regime. More important is Congress’s decision to dedicate the limited spectrum available or allocated to television broadcasting to the service of an evolving notion of “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” “Scarcity” merely describes the limited amount of spectrum available and/or allocated to this purpose. The government’s ability to restrict the use of government property reconciles public interest regulation with the First Amendment.

Indeed, hints of this argument appear throughout the Court’s First Amendment analysis of broadcast regulation. Red Lion itself can be read to support a quid pro quo rationale:

A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a ... frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary ... 351

The Court in Red Lion expressly characterized public interest obligations as a condition attached to the license.

To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness to present representative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.352

In rejecting the argument that scarcity no longer existed because of technological advances, Red Lion clearly identified the broadcast license as a substantial government subsidy:

Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the fact remains that existing broadcasters have often attained their present position because of their initial government selection in competition with others before new technological advances opened new opportunities for further uses. Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing broadcasters a substantial advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is technologically possible. These advantages are the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government.353

Former Chief Justice Burger subsequently stated in CBS, Inc. v. FCC: “A licensed broadcaster is ‘granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.’”354 Burger was actually quoting an earlier opinion he had written while on the D.C. Circuit: “[A] broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty.”355

In his dissent from denial of rehearing in Time Warner, Judge Williams suggested that the DBS set-asides might be saved “as a condition legitimately attached to a government grant.”356 He argued that “[i]f the [set aside provisions] can be sustained at all, ... it would only be on the theory that the government is entitled to more leeway in setting the terms on which it supplies ‘property’ to private parties for speech purposes (or for purposes that include speech).”357

In summary, allocational scarcity does justify a more relaxed First Amendment standard for the broadcast medium, albeit in three steps rather than one. First, because the number of speakers who can use a given frequency is limited, some sort of regulation is required to prevent interference.358 Second, for various policy reasons, the government has chosen a licensing regime as opposed to either a private property or common carrier regime as the best mechanism to allocate use of the spectrum.359 Third, the government has

351 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
352 Id. at 394.
353 Id. at 400.
355 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003.
356 See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 726 (Williams, J., dissenting).
357 See id. at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
358 See NBC, 319 U.S. at 215–16.
359 See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text (discussing the choice of a licensing regime). Commentators have long debated the merits of administrative regulation as opposed to relying on traditional common law property rights. See Ronald H. Coase, Testimony Before the FCC (en banc), Study of Radio and T.V. Broadcasting, No. 12782, vol. 4, at 895 (1995), reprinted in BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2:3; Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 39 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1996) (hereinafter Hazlett, Rationality); Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Market-based Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 207 (1982). Indeed, several authors have argued that the quid pro quo regime has achieved permanence precisely because it inures to the benefit of broadcasters. See Hazlett, supra note 118, at 943 (“[P]laying the quid pro quo game against policymakers (government and public interest) remains a stale, even accounting for the potential expense of additional public interest obligations.”); Hazlett, Rationality, supra note 359 (arguing that public interest regulation serves to camouflage a system of broadcaster rents in the form of entry barriers against competition and political power over a pervasive social medium); Rubin, supra note 208, at 692.
demanded various forms of consideration in exchange for the issuance of spectrum licenses, in some cases money, in other cases a commitment to air certain amounts of programming in the public interest.

D. Spectrum As Government Property

The premises of the quid pro quo rationale have been subjected to several criticisms. For one, commentators have challenged the premise that the spectrum is a government-owned good with which it can bargain. The spectrum, so one argument goes, exists only by virtue of electromagnetic radiation. This energy, which is produced by a privately owned transmitter, is sent through space that is not susceptible to ownership. As the dissenters in Time Warner noted:

There is, perhaps, good reason [to hesitate] to give great weight to the government's property interest in the spectrum. First, unallocated spectrum is government property only in the special sense that it simply has not been allocated to any real "owner" in any way. Thus it is more like unappropriated water in the western states, which belongs, effectively, to no one. Indeed, the common law courts had treated spectrum in this manner before the advent of full federal regulation.

To the extent that this argument undermines the entire broadcast licensing regime, it seems unlikely to succeed. The Court has long recognized

that spectrum rights are part of the "public domain," and as such, are subject to disposition by the government.

Indeed, Congress expressly retained government ownership of the airwaves when it adopted a licensing regime:

It is the purpose of this Act, among other things, to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission; and to provide for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by persons for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license.

Of course, the law has never known a single, integrated definition of "property." Rather, it has recognized individual "sticks" in the bundle of rights that make up property ownership. The Government's allocation and licensing regime determines how spectrum will be used and who will be excluded from that use, traditionally the most important stick in the bundle. Similarly, the advent of spectrum auctions makes ownership, and consequently the quid pro quo rationale, even more compelling.

Outside of the Commission's public interest inquiry, it appears beyond argument that the government may auction frequencies to the highest bidder, granting licenses in exchange for consideration.

Perhaps the government's interest in spectrum

(describing the right to exclude others as "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property") (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176). Therefore there is no consequence in Commissioner Robinson's argument that references to government ownership of spectrum are "simply another way of articulating the scarcity argument—the notion being that because the frequencies were scarce, their use had to be licensed and the licensing power was tantamount to public ownership." Robinson, Electronic First Amendment, supra note 343, at 911-12.

Some might respond that auctions are simply a temporarily efficient method of distributing licenses, or an instrument of taxation, and not an exercise of "ownership" rights. See, e.g., Spectrum Property Law, supra note 343, at 619-620.

To my knowledge, no individual or entity has challenged the Commission's licensing authority, through comparative hearings or competitive bidding, on the basis that the government does not "own" the spectrum. Instead, cases interpreting § 309(j) proceed on the assumption that Congress properly delegated this proprietary authority to the FCC. See, e.g., Nat'l Pub. Radio, Inc. v. Fed Communications Comm'n, 254 F.3d 226, 227-28 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fresno Mobile Radio, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 165 F.3d 965, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1999); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 110 F.3d 816, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mobile Comm. Corp. of Am. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 77

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340 Most notable of these critics is former Commissioner Glen Robinson. See Glen O. Robinson, Symposium, Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609 (1998) (hereinafter Robinson, Spectrum Property Law); accord Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKEL.J. 899, 911-12 (1998) (hereinafter Robinson, Electronic First Amendment). But while Commissioner Robinson argues for greater recognition of the property rights of licensees, in part on the grounds that the licensee "produces" the electromagnetic radiation that creates the phenomenon of spectrum, he fails to note that the government exercises or limits the spectrum. First, unallocated spectrum is government property only in the special sense that it simply has not been allocated to any real "owner" in any way. Thus it is more like unappropriated water in the western states, which belongs, effectively, to no one. Indeed, the common law courts had treated spectrum in this manner before the advent of full federal regulation.

342 See Time Warner, 105 F.3d at 727 (Williams, J., dissenting).

343 See, e.g., Comments of CBS Corp., In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 27-29 (Mar 27, 2000); Reply Comments of NAB, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 28 (Mar 27, 2000).

344 See, e.g., Comments of CBS Corp., In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 27-29 (Mar 27, 2000); Reply Comments of NAB, In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 28 (Mar 27, 2000).


346 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994)
is better analogized to the power of eminent domain.\textsuperscript{349} Regardless, whether spectrum is property that can be owned is something of a red herring. Accepting the Commission’s authority to auction, the fact remains that Congress has continued to allow broadcasters to use their spectrum for free, thereby conferring upon them a benefit. Public interest obligations can thus be seen as an alternative form of consideration.\textsuperscript{350} Whether one refers to the “quid” as property, subsidy, or otherwise, it is a thing of value, and the corresponding “quo” is currently lacking.\textsuperscript{351}

E. Unconstitutional Conditions

A second criticism of the quid pro quo theory is the argument that the government may not bargain for the surrender of a constitutional right. In Syracuse Peace Council, the FCC argued that “there is nothing inherent in the utilization of the licensing method of allocation that justifies the government acting in a manner that would be proscribed under a traditional First Amendment analysis.”\textsuperscript{352} This conclusion was based on the premise that speech restrictions are “unconstitutional conditions” in that the government may not condition the receipt of a public benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional right.\textsuperscript{353}

In contexts other than broadcasting, for example, the courts have indicated that where licensing is permissible, the First Amendment prohibits the government from regulating the content of fully protected speech.\textsuperscript{354} Analogizing to the newspaper industry, Judge Bork argued that content regulation of broadcasting could not be premised on the government’s licensing function:

Neither is content regulation explained by the fact that broadcasters face the problem of interference, so that the government must define usable frequencies and protect those frequencies from encroachment. This governmental definition of frequencies is another instance of a universal fact that does not offer an explanatory principle for differing treatment. A publisher can deliver his newspapers only because government provides streets and regulates traffic on the streets by allocating rights of way. Yet no one would contend that the necessity for these governmental functions, which are certainly analogous to the government’s function in allocating broadcast frequencies, would justify regulation of the content of a newspaper to ensure that it serves the needs of the citizens.\textsuperscript{355}

The analogy is not entirely accurate as a matter of fact. While government provides a number of
benefits enjoyed by all speakers, from public commons and rights of way to the enforcement of property rights, broadcasters enjoy a unique, enormously valuable subsidy that is not provided to the general public—the “fruit of a preferred position conferred by the Government." \[356\] Moreover, as a legal matter, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is far from absolute; to some degree it has always competed with doctrines justifying various “strings" attached to ubiquitous government affiliations and benefits. \[357\] The Court has upheld speech restrictions imposed as conditions on government benefits where the state can provide “appropriate reasons." \[358\]

One particular justification for speech-restrictive conditions is where the government opens public property for expressive use by certain groups, or for discussion of certain subjects, without being opened for all expressive activity. The Supreme Court has applied a categorical analysis to speech restrictions on government property, which can be seen as specific application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. \[359\] In each category, the government may impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions that are “narrowly tailored to achieve a significant state interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." \[360\] The level of scrutiny applied to content-based restrictions varies with each category, but the basic inquiry is “whether the manner of expression is basically compatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." \[361\]

The first two categories of government property are the traditional public forum and the designated public forum. The traditional public forum is one that has “inmemorably been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." \[362\] Designated public fora consist of property that the government “has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." \[363\] Traditional and designated public fora are distinguished only by their history of expressive use, and speech restrictions in both fora are “subject to the highest scrutiny” and “survive only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest." \[364\] The government may thus not prohibit speech outright in these fora, and content-based restrictions must withstand strict scrutiny.

The third category encompasses all other public property. \[365\] This category includes property that is not a forum at all, i.e., property that has not been opened for expressive activity. \[366\] Speech restrictions in nonpublic fora “need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagree-

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\[356\] *Red Lion*, 395 U.S. at 400 (1967). Although broadcasters argue that a functioning market for licenses exists by virtue of the transferability of the license, see *supra* note 99; Comments of CBS, Inc., *In re Public Interest Obligations of TV Broadcast Licensees*, MM Dkt No. 99-360, at 24 (Mar 27, 2000) (citing *Syracuse Peace Council*, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. at 5055). This argument completely ignores the absence of an initial payment to the public for the use of spectrum. Given current estimates that this value might be, see *supra* note 125, it is far from clear that any initial auction price would simply represent a sunk cost or would otherwise not affect the aftermarket for licenses.


\[359\] See Smolla, *supra* note 357, at 7-2 to 7-3, 8-2; Logan, *supra* note 125, at 1734-35. Early cases treated the government like any other property owner and allowed it the right to exclude whomever it wished. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). Subsequent opinions backed away from this approach, although the Court continues to recognize that "the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls." Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee ("ISKC"), 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).

\[360\] Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The Court has said that time, place, or manner regulations "must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests, but . . . need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so." Instead, the regulation will survive if "the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798, 800 (1989).

\[361\] Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116.


\[363\] Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.

\[364\] ISKC, 505 U.S. at 678; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46 ("Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum."); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).


\[366\] *Id.*
ment with the speaker's view." More importantly, the government can open a nonpublic forum for expressive use by certain groups, or for discussion of certain subjects, without creating a designated public forum. The Court has referred to these fora as "limited" public fora, but has distinguished them from designated public fora.

The question is one of government intent: "To create a [designated public forum], the government must intend to make the property 'generally available,' to a class of speakers. . . . A designated public forum is not created when the government allows selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers." When it opens a limited forum, government "must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set," and "may not exclude speech where its distinction is not "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum." Moreover, the government may not "discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint."

Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction between, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.

Commentators have argued that forum analysis offers a more precise framework within which to view broadcast regulation. The Court has recognized that forums often exist "more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable. Specifically, the Court has extended its forum analysis to cases involving government subsidies as opposed to the use of government property. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), the Court reasoned, "When the government creates a limited forum for speech, certain restrictions may be necessary to define the limits and purposes of the program. The same is true when the government establishes a subsidy for specified ends." Notably, Justice Stevens recently described Red Lion for the proposition that "reasonable restraints may be placed on access to certain well-regulated fora."
The broadcast medium is arguably a limited public forum. The decision to adopt a licensing regime over common carrier regulation or a system of private property rights precludes the broadcast medium from being characterized as a designated public forum; a finite number of speakers are given the exclusive right to speak on particular frequencies.\textsuperscript{378} Because the government has provided for "selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers," broadcast spectrum cannot fairly be characterized as a designated public forum.\textsuperscript{379} The government has done "no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission,' [through an application for a license and subsequent renewal] to use it."\textsuperscript{380}

Consequently, the broadcast medium may be regulated on the basis of content if the regulation reasonably preserves the purposes of the limited forum, but regulations based on viewpoint are presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.\textsuperscript{381} A speech restriction in a limited public forum "need only be reasonable; it need not be applicable to non-public fora. In Rust, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that prohibited funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act from being spent on programs where abortion is a method of family planning, as well as federal regulations that prohibited Title X projects from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-81. The government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. Id. at 193.

Rust distinguished Perry "because here the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized." Id. at 196. The essential characteristic of Rust, however, is that it dealt with the government as a speaker—as a participant in the marketplace of ideas—and the restrictions at issue in that case were upheld because they were designed to preserve the government's message from dilution by the private parties used to transmit it. See Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 540-43, 547-548; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. The Court later insisted that "It does not follow... that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers." Id. at 834.

Unlike the subsidy in Rust, broadcast licenses are "designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a governmental message." Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 542. The public trustee model is premised on the editorial discretion of broadcasters and has always forbidden the government to engage in censorship. See, e.g., Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 673-74; Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 130-31 (1973); cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35. In Legal Services Corp., the Court noted that a strong indicator that government is involved in regulating private speech as opposed to its own message is when it "seeks to use an existing medium of expression and to control it, in a class of cases, in ways which distort its usual functioning." Legal Services Corp., 531 U.S. at 543. The Court, in that case, specifically referred to the accepted usage of broadcast frequencies for private speech when it noted that government could not use that "fo-

\textsuperscript{378} \textit{See supra} notes 64-66 and accompanying text; \textit{Free Speech v. Reno}, 200 F.3d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (finding that the radio spectrum is not a public forum the regulation of which warrants strict scrutiny and holding that the broadcast licensing scheme embodied in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-359, is not unconstitutional). The trial court in \textit{Free Speech}, in an unpublished decision, found that even if radio spectrum were subject to public forum analysis, the spectrum would constitute a nonpublic forum in which regulation is reviewed for reasonableness so long as it is viewpoint neutral and determined that the broadcast licensing scheme is in fact both viewpoint neutral and reasonable. \textit{Id. at 679.}

\textsuperscript{379} \textit{Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n}, 523 U.S. at 679. "Designated public fora, in contrast, are created by purposeful governmental action. 'The government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public discourse.'" \textit{Id. at 677. But See ISKC, 505 U.S. at 678} ("Where the government is acting as a lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its actions as a lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.").

\textsuperscript{380} \textit{Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n}, 523 U.S. at 679-80 (quoting \textit{Cornelius}, 473 U.S. at 804).

\textsuperscript{381} Judge Williams, in his dissent from denial of rehearing en banc in \textit{Time Warner}, suggested that the Supreme Court's opinion in \textit{Rust v. Sullivan} might support government authority to impose conditions on broadcast licenses. See \textit{Time Warner}, 105 F.3d at 724 (Williams, J., dissenting) (citing \textit{Rust}, 500 U.S. at 195). \textit{Rust}, however, suggests an even more deferential approach to speech restrictions than those
the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation."\textsuperscript{382} Here, the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the broadcast medium falls into place. Application of the First Amendment to the broadcast medium has jealously guarded against viewpoint discrimination to secure the "public's interest in receiving a wide variety of ideas and views through the medium of broadcasting."\textsuperscript{383} The Court has ensured that broadcasters are "entitled under the First Amendment to exercise 'the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties].""\textsuperscript{384}

Instead, the Court has implicitly recognized that public interest regulation reasonably preserves the purpose Congress has assigned to this property—an evolving notion of "the public interest, convenience, or necessity." The cases upholding public interest regulation based on the scrum in an unconventional way to suppress speech inherent in the nature of the medium."\textsuperscript{385} Id. (citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 296-97 and Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 676).

Moreover, Rust's distinction between conditions on a grant and conditions on a grantee make an analogy to broadcast tenuous. \textit{Rust} emphasized that "[t]he regulations govern the scope of the Title X project's activities, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activities."\textsuperscript{386} Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-97. The Court expressly distinguished "unconstitutional conditions" cases such as \textit{League of Women Voters}, which struck down a ban on editorializing that applied to any station receiving money from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), \textit{League of Women Voters}, 468 U.S. at 366. Under the law at issue in \textit{League of Women Voters}

[a] noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of its overall income from CPB grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing. The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all nondirectorizing activities, and, more importantly, it is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity.

\textit{League of Women Voters}, 468 U.S. at 400.

Accordingly, \textit{League of Women Voters} concerned "a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program,"\textsuperscript{387} Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-97, whereas in \textit{Rust}, neither the law nor the regulations "force[d] the Title X grantee to give up abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities."\textsuperscript{388} Id. at 196; \textit{see also} Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983) (upholding a law granting tax deductions for contributions made to veterans’ groups engaged in lobbying, while denying that favorable status to other charities which pursued lobbying efforts, in part on the basis that the other organizations could segregate their lobbying activities by creating a separate, non-exempt affiliate to pursue its lobbying efforts). Unlike the ability to provide abortion counseling or to engage in lobbying activities, the ability to speak over the airwaves exists solely by virtue of the broadcast license. Thus, any restriction on the license is necessarily a restriction on the speaker. \textit{But see} ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 101 (noting that the distinction between condition and recipient may be "more semantic than real," because the Title X funded programs had to be both physically and financially separate from abortion related activities, resulting in the situation, identical to \textit{League of Woman Voters}, where the recipient could not use its facilities to engage in private speech that clashed with the government restriction). That the reasoning in \textit{Rust} cannot be extended to broadcast is not for want of trying. Then-Justice Rehnquist, the author of \textit{Rust}, dissented from \textit{League of Woman Voters} because he believed that "Congress has rationally concluded that the bulk of taxpayers . . . would prefer not to see the management of local educational stations promulgate its own private views on the air at taxpayer expense. Accordingly Congress simply has decided not to subsidize stations which engage in that activity."\textit{League of Women Voters}, 468 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); \textit{see also} Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The reason that denial of participation in a tax exemption or other subsidy scheme does not necessarily 'infringe' a fundamental right is that—unlike direct restriction or prohibition—such a denial does not, as a general rule have any significant coercive effect.").

\textsuperscript{382} ISKC, 505 U.S. at 683.

\textsuperscript{383} \textit{League of Women Voters}, 468 U.S. at 382.

\textsuperscript{384} Id. at 378 (CBS, 453 U.S. at 395) (quoting Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. at 110).

\textsuperscript{385} NBC, 319 U.S. at 216; accord \textit{League of Women Voters}, 468 U.S. at 378-80 (discussing the relationship between restrictions upheld by the court and the public interest); \textit{see also} Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc., 518 U.S. at 771 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing Red Lion in a parenthetical as "approving access requirement limited to 'matters of great public concern'"); Logan, supra note 125, at 1739 (noting that this relationship comports with the concept of "germaneness" in the Court's unconstitutional conditions cases).

\textsuperscript{386} \textit{League of Women Voters}, 468 U.S. at 380.

\textsuperscript{387} NBC, 319 U.S. at 216 (quoting Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. at 475).
broadcasting and advertisements, as well as requirements that broadcasters implement filtering technology, are reasonably designed to prevent the broadcast forum from use beyond Congressional intent. Finally—and most importantly—the existence of numerous alternative video outlets such as cable and DBS, rather than undermining the constitutional basis of broadcast regulation, militate in favor of its reasonableness by leaving open a number of other forums in which a speaker may exercise his or her First Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{388}

Characterizing the broadcast medium as a limited public forum bridges the apparent gap between allocational scarcity and content-specific public interest regulation. Rather than justifying regulation in and of itself, allocational scarcity simply describes a unique and valuable resource at the government's disposal. The government, in turn, has dedicated a portion of that resource to the provision of mass media services to the nation. The public trustee model defines the outer boundaries of the licensee's invitation to enter the broadcast forum and fulfill Congress's objectives. Access to the forum is predicated on the licensee's promise to serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity."\textsuperscript{389}

F. Summary

Contrary to the concerns of broadcasters and Commissioners Powell and Furchtgott-Roth, public interest regulation is not in constitutional jeopardy as a result of digital technology. Broadcast licenses remain scarce, and the scarcity doctrine remains good law. Instead, Congress and the FCC have simply increased the amount of spectrum already owned by the broadcast industry. Moreover, even from a numerical perspective, DTV only has the potential to increase the number of television outlets available to the public. Whether broadcasters provide more than the one required video service remains to be seen. Accordingly, whether one adopts an allocational or a numerical perspective of the scarcity doctrine, digital television does not alter the factual basis upon which \textit{Red Lion} was decided.

Even if the Court were to disavow the scarcity doctrine, its public forum jurisprudence will provide an adequate foundation on which to sustain the existing public interest regulatory regime as a "quid pro quo" for the grant of a broadcast license. Moreover, given language supporting a quid pro quo rationale, and to the extent that scarcity alone never really justified regulation beyond the allocation of broadcast frequencies, the Court could comfortably argue that the "quid pro quo" model has been an implicit element of the scarcity doctrine since its inception.

CONCLUSION

Despite the impassioned arguments of public interest advocates and broadcasters, public interest regulation in the near-digital future will bear striking resemblance to the regulatory regime developed for analog television. This is because the current debate over public interest regulation is only nominally connected to the transition to digital television. For the most part, the controversy surrounding the public interest standard in a DTV-world has simply inherited the decades-old arguments over (1) whether public interest obligations infringe on broadcasters' First Amendment rights, (2) how the FCC should define "the public interest, convenience, or necessity," and (3) whether and how the Commission should regulate programming content according to that definition. Each side's perspective on these issues is completely detached from emerging digital technologies. Instead, the arguments on both sides have simply been recycled from past public interest controversies.

For advocates of increased public interest obligations, the nominal connection to digital television is the "great giveaway" debate over whether the transition to DTV is an unnecessary windfall to broadcasters. But this debate itself is disconnected from DTV policy. Instead, it really concerns the merits of the government's determination that digital television serves the public interest and not the approach that Congress and the Commission have chosen to implement the DTV transition.

\textsuperscript{388} See ISKC, 505 U.S. at 684-85 (noting that a regulation prohibiting solicitation inside an airport terminal did not prohibit solicitation on the sidewalks outside the terminals: "In turn we think it would be odd to conclude that the Port

For opponents of governmental definitions of the "public interest, convenience, and necessity," the nominal connection to digital television is the undermining of the scarcity principle on which the constitutionality of public interest regulation rests. Yet broadcast licenses remain scarce—indeed, they have been further consolidated under the broadcast industry's control—and the scarcity doctrine remains good law. Instead, whether *Red Lion* should be reconsidered is a question that goes to the logic of that decision in the first place and is entirely distinct from digital television.

Whether these are debates that need to be reheard is beyond the scope of this article. But, as this article has shown, that debate has little to do with DTV and has generated little consideration of whether and how the *technology* of digital television should impact broadcasters' duty to serve the public interest. A closer examination of these issues reveals that the constitutional foundation of public interest regulation remains as sure (or as shaky) as it ever was, but that aside from a handful of salient features, a hasty decision to expand public interest obligations will likely conflict with other policy objectives, particularly market penetration of DTV receivers and a smooth and timely transition to all-digital television.