Sacrifice in the Public Square: Ciceronian Rhetoric in More’s Utopia and Ultimate Ends of Counsel

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CICERONIAN RHETORIC IN MORE'S UTOPIA
AND THE ULTIMATE ENDS OF COUNSEL

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Abstract. The different rhetorical strategies of the characters in Thomas More's Utopia reveal parallels with Cicero's rhetoric and philosophy. Those parallels resonate with the modern discourse of "counsel," and provide a context through which the nature of the counselor's dilemma—a tension between what should be done and what can be done—is analyzed.

In his work on ideology and utopia, Paul Ricouer speaks of the ideal fantasy world—the "utopia" that exists "nowhere"—as the means by which we rethink nature, life, society, and government. The utopia allows us to evaluate the status quo to decide what is lacking and what is not; in this role, it is valuable. However, when utopia remains at a purely platonic stage, floating so far from the material world that it is of no practical import, it is worse than useless. It traps its champions into perpetually criticizing what does exist in the name of dreams that do not.

While Ricouer's work goes on to explain the intricacies and dynamics of the association, or dissociation, between ideology and utopia, another line of inquiry based on his ideas revolves around utopians themselves; for theirs is a role that has had a place throughout history and manifests itself in strange shapes in modern times. The nineteenth century witnessed true idealistic communities—from Brook Farm to New Harmony—and the twentieth century saw everything from collective farmers to bunker militants. But a more common, if more pedestrian, example is the advisor, the counselor, the "true
believer” in a particular cause, who understands and articulates both the ideology and its utopian materialization.

In our own era, somber-faced men and women, legally trained to the teeth, appear on Sunday morning news shows in the roles of all-around sages. To a flurry of questions from journalists, they retort with a flurry of answers, pat and set. They must do their jobs right, after all, and when it is time for the public dissemination of positions, the time for reflection upon them has passed. The role of governor’s counselor is exchanged for governor’s proxy.

Rather, it is during that prior meeting between counselors and governors that policy is truly built. For however long the session lasts, hours or minutes, the counselors have their forum. They can tell their governors what they must know or should consider. Whether that advice is objective and aimed toward the common good, or sycophantic and aimed toward the counselors’ personal advancement, the public has its own ideas. The general consensus is that counselors with a powerful clientele have two options: they can lie or they can equivocate. They may be trapped within an “interpretive community,” as Stanley Fish would have it, unable to effectuate any counsel outside the parameters of what their audience will hear; or they may be consumed by the hegemonizing “episteme” of their culture, as Michel Foucault would claim, incapable of articulating any position contrary to the dominant power structure. But in the end, the general public sizes up the role of counselor with a more general dismissal: the “Yes Man” is the most familiar of corporate stereotypes.

Of course, this degree of public cynicism is not a modern phenomenon; indeed, it is at least as old (in the English tradition) as the early sixteenth century. In Thomas More’s *Utopia*, the humanist scholar Peter Giles suggests to world-traveler Raphael Hythlodaeus that a man of wide-ranging talents and impeccable education should attach himself to a king, and thereby provide courtly service. Raphael refuses; he has taken care of his family, so that he need not provide for their advancement, and has disposed of the things that would tie him to the world. He would rather remain independent. When Giles says that he meant “service” to a King, not “servitude,” Raphael’s reply is that of the modern cynic: there is but a syllable between the two words.

In this brief exchange, More—lawyer, humanist, and English chancellor—sets the rhetorical complexion and philosophical tension that characterize a counselor’s public service. To be sure, *Utopia* has other, arguably more important, ends. It aims its jibes sharply and accurately at a variety of targets: the injustices of a severe English penal law, the inequities of land enclosures
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throughout Britain, and the perverse attraction to the vanities of an ephemeral life. Five centuries of readers can be forgiven for adopting the Utopian's island world as an alternative model by which to live their lives and organize their cultures (if only dreamily). Critics, too, can be forgiven for their fascination. Analyzed from countless angles, the work has been ridden hard, worn out, and retired to a field with other classics, whose weight and meaning are now more catechized than explored.

But I suggest that More's work does more than offer a commune-in-the-sky for propagandists of every stripe (Marxists as well as Monastics have found More an attractive champion), and more than provide a desperate junior high school teacher with an alternative to *Gulliver's Travels* for the summer reading list. It can be those things, which from an artistic standpoint is high praise. But when analyzed rhetorically, More's *Utopia* offers an objective sketch of the rhetorical positions that characterize the modern discourse of counsel: in the person of Raphael Hythlodaeus, the narrator of the Utopian tale, it presents the fiery-faced rhetor, who speaks in a bluster of clear lines and incontestable choices; his is a rhetoric of clarity without qualification. The tradition of the scholarly humanist stands behind him, for whom sacrifice in favor of political ends proves pointless and to whom the governmental tyrant proves both unappeasable and poisonous. The type is more prophet than counselor.

Not so much set against Raphael as in distinction from him is the character of Morus, the civil servant who serves as the cool-headed apologist for diplomatic counsel. There is little doubt that Morus stands firmly for his own humanistic principles, but his is a dialogue of more questions than assertions, of conciliation rather than division—a rhetoric of accommodation without compromise. He is more akin to Plutarch's "friendly" counselor: "The friend is always found on the better side [of a man's nature] trying, after the manner of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound and to preserve it."  

The third type, disparaged by both Morus and Raphael, is the alternative that characterizes the liar/equivocator of the modern stereotype. When lawyers act as counselors today—whether the client be king or president, minister, mogul, or common man—the roles by and large still fall somewhere among these three types of counselors. Largely, it depends on the tension the lawyer experiences between what is ethical and what is possible, between what the client should hear and what he does.

In this article, I will first explore the rhetorical dimensions of More's *Utopia* and explain the meta-rhetorical aspects that at once reinforce the *ethos* of the
two characters and leave both of their respective messages as viable alternatives. Ultimately, the work’s model is that of a Ciceronian dialogue, which presents all views for the readers’ consideration without disposing of any. In this way, it can be distinguished from the more familiar Socratic dialogue, in which one side is clearly victorious over the other. Whether More made this rhetorical choice because he himself was ultimately unsure which was better, or because he wanted to leave the argument open for centuries of readers, is a matter of irresolvable debate. Rather than consider this issue, I argue that More’s choice of the Ciceronian dialogue is consistent with the work’s theme, and does justice to the complex tensions at play in the role of the counselor. It does not reduce one side at the expense of the other, which would make the work into an ideological tract. I will also explain the philosophical and social positions behind what amounts to Raphael’s empirical demonstration of his case—his relation of the island Utopia—and the philosophy behind Morus’ position.

In the second part of the article, I will analyze the work’s two positions on the counselor’s civic duty. Each has its dangers: Raphael insists on acceptance at the cost of disownment; Morus argues for influence at the peril of indictment. That Utopia lies at the end of one, and the scaffold at the end of the other, complicates rather than explicates the counselor’s choice.

RHETORICAL METHOD

Although centuries apart, both the Roman statesman Cicero and the English humanist Thomas More considered their troubled times to have arisen from the same societal ills: profligacy, greed, and a disordered idea of individual obligation. And for both, these dangers could manifest themselves in a variety of forms. Cicero considered the republic to be threatened by tyranny, which might take the shape of despotism, oligarchy, or mob rule. “Hurry back to Rome,” he writes to his friend Atticus, “Come and look at the empty husks of the real old Roman Republic we used to know. See money distributed before the elections tribe by tribe, all in one place openly; get the whiff of a dictatorship in your nostrils, enjoy the public holiday and the universal free for all.” In much the same way, More felt English society to be threatened by dominating monarchs, sycophantic nobles, and impoverished masses. Humanists such as More viewed themselves as missionaries to a soul-sick world. In
response to these dangers, both men used persuasive works to level criticisms at their societies, as well as to suggest proper models for the areas of politics, education, and religion. And both Cicero and More considered their young rulers, Octavius Caesar and Henry VIII, respectively, to be the best hope for a new society, and sought to guide them in making wise choices for the state. In light of the similarity of their tasks, it is not surprising that parallels exist between their persuasive works.

More’s regard for classical rhetoric is evidenced by a letter he wrote to his friend, the Dutch humanist Erasmus, concerning the need for a more diligent study of the subject: “For if we were driven from childhood to follow diligently the authority of Cicero and Fabius... there would not be, I think, such a poverty of speech, such deplorable lack of eloquence, such shameful stammering even among those who profess oratorical learning.” With impeccable school credentials, legal training, and the friendship of the best humanist writers of his day, More’s knowledge of rhetoric was extensive. It is likely his study included Cicero’s *De Inventione*, the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad herennium*, as well as Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratorio* and the *Declamations* then attributed to him. Although large parts of Cicero’s *De re publica* were not discovered until the nineteenth century, More knew the work through reading Augustine’s *De Civitas Dei*. In fact, rhetors such as Quintilian (Fabius) and Cicero were so popular as classical stylists that a Renaissance fad, “Ciceronianism,” swept throughout Renaissance Europe. Its devotees tried to scourge from the literary sphere any who employed vocabulary that the master, Cicero, had not used himself, or any who used images and allusions not of the classical variety. Mountains had to be compared to “Olympus,” cities to “Athens” or “Troy,” heroes to “Hercules,” etc. The controversy of the time regarding Ciceronian imitation eventually culminated in Erasmus’ *Ciceronianus* of 1528, in which the author satirized those who apishly imitated the statesman. Although he admired and consulted Cicero, and advocated him as a guide for writers, Erasmus publicly foreswore matters of style and form when they took precedence over substance.

If Erasmus’ work is used to check *Utopia* for apish Ciceronianism, More passes the test. Raphael refrains from classical imagery; he makes no “Rome” out of Utopia and no “Jove” out of God; the Utopians themselves are “Roman” in their consummate rationality, but they are open to change, and therefore do not consider theirs to be the perfect classical society. Instances of Ciceronianism are inserted in jest, as discussed below, not in seriousness. The Utopians
are also admired for teaching in their own tongue, a neglect of Latin that Ciceroians would frown upon, but humanists like More and Erasmus would condone. In fact, in one of the prefatory letters to the work, the author makes a preemptive attack on critics of his *Utopia*: “The barbarian rejects as harsh whatever is not positively barbarian. The smatterers despise as trite whatever is not packed with obsolete expressions. Some persons approve only of what is old; very many admire only their own work.” The dig at Ciceronian pedantry is clear. In the end, Cicero’s social and political philosophy informs *Utopia*, while his style serves more of a meta-rhetorical purpose.

Also, Erasmus considered a more concise style of writing preferable to Cicero’s. It seems that this is exactly what Raphael offers, or at least what Morus says he is after when mimicking Raphael’s simplicity. Judging by Erasmus’ interest in the work, the author of the *Ciceronianus* gave at least his tacit approval to the work. Erasmus stayed with More for a month, during which time More worked on Book One. He also edited style, added notes, and penned his prefatory letter of praise. In addition, Erasmus and More were both scholars interested in satires, especially Lucian satires. The biting wit Lucian directed at his culture, even religious culture, appealed to men like More and Erasmus. Both found much in their own worlds worthy of satire—particularly religious culture. That More was a devotee of Lucian satire perhaps partly explains why the author used the Ciceronian mode in a work of the utopian genre. There is a sly gibe at rhetorical pedantry in using the formal structure in a work of fancy. The fantastic tale itself, likely inspired by the discovery of the new world, allowed More, the highest legal authority in the land outside the king, to critique existing legal practices and laws.

In other works, More takes to task those who question authority, particularly the authority of the church. Take, for example, his exchange with Christopher St. German. More abominated St. German’s *Treatise Concerning the Division Between the Spirituality and The Temporality*, which suggested Parliament set up a great council to control many things, including the clergy. True, says Richard Marius:

[Utopia] had blazed with the ideal of a united harmonious commonwealth. But there the secular authority and the religious institutions existed together like body and soul. Nobody forced the clergy to be good. . . . But in St. German’s program, the English Parliament was to take hold of the Catholic Church in England and force it to be good. But who was to make Parliament good? God’s
Spirit inspired the Holy Catholic Church, leading it (as More said repeatedly, quoting the promise of Christ) into all truth. No wicked priest was ever told by the church that his wickedness was goodness. But no divine promise granted a similar infallibility of the moral dictates of the secular government. Kings could be evil and indeed usually were.

One reason they usually were was because they received evil counsel. Beneath the fantastic tale, *Utopia* deals with this central problem: how the tale might be articulated by a counselor, if at all.

Structurally, *Utopia* falls into three parts. First come the accompanying letters, the *parerga*. Although several letters precede the relation of events, only two are works of fancy, intended as part of the story itself: Morus's letter to fellow humanist Peter Giles (hereafter, the Morus/Giles letter), which purports to accompany the word-for-word account of the two men's meeting with Raphael Hythlodaeus (the account is being sent for Giles' review); and Giles' letter to Busleyden (hereafter, the Giles/Busleyden letter), in which Giles sends the account on to Busleyden, a scholar in the court of Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. After the *parerga* comes Book One, the account of More and Giles meeting with Raphael in Antwerp. The three men conduct a dialogue about European problems, civic responsibility, and the ideal state. Finally, in Book Two, Raphael describes what he witnessed in Utopia.

In organizing the work along these lines, More moves the discourse of criticisms and reforms through nearly every rhetorical vehicle: classically-styled letters, a dialogue, and an oration. Imaginatively, the discussion may begin as a private exchange between men of good will, but the *parerga* pretend to bring the dialogues of Books One and Two within the public discourse, the civic arena of Charles V's court. The ascent to the perfect commonwealth may seem the stuff of mere musings—conjecture without import—but it must be read within the frame of the accompanying letters. Conjecture they may be, but the two books are imagined as resting in the hands of Busleyden, a real humanist, with real influence over a very real court. In this way, the fictive work creatively enters the realm of ideas, and seeks influence it may have on the world formed by those who act on ideas.

This was a tenet of the humanist credo, that scholastic enterprise could have an impact on worldly endeavor. The humanists' duty, says J.H. Hexter, was "to set forth the ideal standard in all things as an example, a challenge and a rebuke to the world." More's work makes that challenge to the world by
moving between various modes and levels of reality: a rhetorical exercise, full of whimsy; a satire, full of bite; and most importantly, a dialectic among different theories of counsel, one engaged upon by the author and by the reader.

If it is assumed that the work was to be passed around the humanistic circles of Europe, as was the custom, then *Utopia* also becomes a work of humanistic self-reflection—a cautionary tale, as it were. For the humanists had no small political influence in the Renaissance. With that influence came attendant dangers and risks. *Utopia* does not give answers to the difficulties faced by the counselors of the time, but prompts them to face the difficult questions. A mind prepared to look at a problem was better prepared to attain its resolution. Understanding something like the height of Everest—being disabused of sophistries on what it meant to face it—was a good ways toward achieving Everest. Although encountering the actual problem might still cause the soul to blanch, it would not be the first time it had blanched—not if the mind had prepared the soul for the confrontation. And in many ways the humanist’s goal was to prepare the soul to see life’s questions for what they were, and to deal with them honestly.²⁶

This philosophy lay behind the civic humanist’s theory of counsel, but it was not the only one offered by the humanists. The scholastic humanist, as Gerard Wegemer calls Raphael,²⁷ believed that study revealed truth, and a truth revealed was one that a reasonable, informed man of courage would acknowledge and declaim. In this particular manifestation of the scholastic humanist, Raphael Hythlodaeus, another opinion can be divined: If the world is not full of reasonable people (i.e., those who will face and acknowledge truth), then that is the world’s problem. The world is to come to the truth, not the truth to the world.²⁸

**Raphael’s Theory of Counsel**

More establishes Raphael’s character in terms of the classical orator, investing him with *ethos, pathos,* and *logos* that the rhetorical masters required.²⁹ Richard Schoeck points out that in More’s *Life of John Pics* (the great Renaissance humanist Pico della Mirandola), the author followed the Ciceronian prescriptions for elaborating on a man’s character, including details of Pico’s parentage, early life, and personal attributes.³⁰ More used a similar technique in his *Letter to Dorp*, in which he indirectly outlined the constitution of a humanist scholar.³¹
Raphael is reported to have a “sun-burnt countenance” like that of a sea captain, and is compared to Ulysses and Plato. A native of Portugal, Raphael shows great temerity in traveling around the world with Amerigo Vespucci, asking leave from his lord in order to explore exotic lands. Raphael is judged to be a fine scholar, more learned in Greek than in Latin, as he found only Cicero and Seneca to be of value in the latter. Not only is this a bow to the humanists, it is also a meta-rhetorical reference: Ciceronian style was the alternative to the Senecan. Raphael has studied both masters, and the manner he uses—the unadorned Senecan—says something about the choice he has made.  

More also uses the Giles/Busleyden letter to praise Raphael’s forthright delivery, drawing the orator’s mantle close around the traveler. Raphael is possessed of a world-knowledge “superior to Ulysses,” and has no equal in “the last eight hundred years.” Being an eyewitness to the Utopian world also contributes to Raphael’s emerging ethos. He is not a man who relates the tales of others; rather, he offers evidence of his own experience and is ready to be judged on it. He does not excuse challenges to his credibility by asserting that they are actually a third-person account.  

More writes that no particular art or labor went into the book, as it follows the simple, unadorned style of Raphael’s speech: “Therefore the nearer my style came to his careless simplicity the closer it would be to the truth, for which alone I am bound to care.” Morus and Giles report Raphael to have a forthright and convincing effect on them, which testifies to his pathos. He is also radically committed to his position. On the evils of private property, the excesses of the aristocracy, the inequities of the law, and the duplicities of public service, Raphael brooks no quarter.

More uses the “Cardinal Morton dialogue” to expand upon this radical quality of Raphael’s humanism and the power he brings to it by way of his oratory. Raphael explains that Morton, a humanist in whose home More served as a boy, once invited Raphael to dinner at his home. There the voyager recounts his many experiences to a less than friendly crowd. Pitted against a room full of profligates—including lawyers, counselors, and prelates—Raphael defends his positions on the ideal state, answering objections before they can be raised. With regard to capital punishment, he draws upon examples of the Polylerite society’s equitable treatment of criminals, as opposed to the barbaric English practice of executing even those who steal out of desperation. As to the size of the manageable kingdom, and to temperance in the face of power, he offers
the example of the Achrian society, whose King was obliged to surrender a conquered territory to another ruler because it would be too costly to maintain. In the use of societal analogues, Raphael employed the same mode of persuasion as Cicero in his Republic, where the statesman analogizes the societies of Rome and Athens.

At the close of Raphael’s dinner speech, a duly impressed, but nevertheless boldly assertive, lawyer promises to devastate Raphael’s argument. He will use classical oratory in his refutation: “First, I shall repeat, in order, what you have said; then I shall show in what respects ignorance of our conditions has deceived you; finally I shall demolish and destroy all your arguments. So, to begin with what I promised first.” Raphael sizes up the lawyer as typical of those disputants who are “more careful to repeat what has been said than to answer it.” Repetition here is the forerunner to a modern rhetorical tactic, avoiding a substantive reply by focusing on the question itself—its illegitimacy, its poorly-framed nature, etc. Memoria cannot, or should not, replace res. But before the lawyer can start, the Cardinal preempts his disquisition, noting that such a long prologue does not signal brevity. The Cardinal is aware that oratory can be either enlightening and pleasurable, when exercised by an orator such as Raphael, or deadly and tedious when not. The power of a man’s ethos is not lost on the Cardinal, and it is reciprocated in Raphael’s appreciation of the prelate’s position: “When the Cardinal had finished speaking, they all vied in praising what they all had received with contempt when suggested by me.” The cardinal’s office adds to the dignity of the speech. Morton obliquely rewards Raphael’s independent stand against the common opinion represented by those in the room.

Although Raphael’s positions are indeed radical for the times, they are not utterly uncompromising. Reminiscent of Cicero’s opinion that public administrators should care for the welfare of the whole body politic, and not serve their own selfish interests, Raphael suggests special legislation to control overweening monarchs, monopolies, and land waste. It is true that he enthusiastically supports the communal aspect of Utopian life, but in this instance acknowledges a modified version of the commonwealth that may be more appropriate for England. And as one aspect of Ciceronianism in Renaissance England was a slavish dedication to Ciceronian ideas as well as style, Raphael is in many respects uncharacteristic of Cicero. This is especially true in areas of social and political thought, discussed below.

By ending the Book One dialogue with the standard objections to egalitarian,
communal living (i.e., idleness resulting from disincentives to work, mayhem resulting from no authority) More provides Raphael with a staging ground to meet all objections in Book Two. In effect, Raphael is to explain the nature of the ideal state. He meets the challenge with a rhetorical demonstration, Utopian Society, and a refutation of alternatives, British society of the day. 44

Raphael blends eloquence with narrative drive to assert his demonstration. For after a general discussion of current problems in England, including the dissolute landed gentry, the disproportionate nature of capital punishment, and the evils of private property, he praises the perfect state of the Utopians and promises to describe it for his eager listeners. In essence, Book One treats and dismisses all other alternatives before introducing the only real solution in Book Two45 by means of an exhortrium. Although Book Two is often described as a discourse, or even a monologue, Edward Surtz says that Book Two is actually a one-sided dialogue. Raphael’s “answers to supposed objections, the antagonism of the invisible rich, the imperatives and exclamations, the consciousness of an audience,” all establish the environment of an exchange. 46 This one-sided dialogue is proper, since the commonwealth is not being described in the abstract, but in the particular. Other than rhetorical questions, which would turn the debate into catechism, 47 the others could add nothing to Raphael’s eyewitness account.

Since Book Two was written before Book One, 48 it seems the author tailored the questions of Book One to fit the answers he had already given in Book Two. 49 If that is the case, then the orator created in the first part, and allowed to take his forum in the second, was actually created backward: the man fashioned from the oratory. Perhaps this explains Raphael’s dominating presence, even when the Utopian narrative is in full flower. As eccentric, visionary, and radical, he rails against evils in a manner that would be impressive to a sixteenth century audience skilled in rhetoric. 50 And by establishing the powerful voice and logos first, More was able to reason back to the ethos behind it. The characters of More and Giles—and five centuries of interested readers—are testament to the emotional impact, pathos, of the work.

But Raphael is as severe in his method as he is direct in his style. As Gerard Wegemer points out, whatever rhetorical devices Raphael uses, they are blunt, even ad hominem: “Raphael begins his response by categorically and universally denying that any philosopher-advisor could do any good without eventually ‘sharing the madness of others’ in his attempt ‘to cure their lunacy.” 451

In Raphael can be seen the forerunner of the uncompromising idealist, the
pioneer who will settle for nothing less than the realization of perfection. He offers proof, after all, not theory. He has seen in Utopia that ideas can take concrete form, and that man is capable of more than pious aspiration. His face still shining from Mt. Sinai, he will not settle for adulterated versions of reality. Indeed, his gaze is always half turned back in that direction. This is as true in his ideas as it is in his rhetoric. When speaking of those consummate rhetoricians, lawyers who "cleverly manipulate cases and cunningly argue legal points," Raphael approves of their absolute banishment: "Thus there is less ambiguity and the truth is more easily elicited when a man, uncoached in deception by a lawyer, conducts his own case and the judge skillfully weighs each statement and helps untortured minds to defeat the false accusation of the crafty." The Utopians have few laws; therefore, every man can be an expert in them. In addition, the most obvious interpretation of the law is that which is considered the most fair. The Utopians, it seems, are in favor of "plain-meaning" statutes.

This is revelatory. The Utopians, according to Raphael, have an insight into the truth and are more accepting of that truth without a need for rhetoric. What is simple in itself, the law, can be simply perceived. There is no need for interpretation, no need for legal "spin." What accounts for their receptivity is not fully explained, but it raises another question. In a civilization less inclined to simplicity, does not rhetoric have its place? In a world in which laws address complicated situations, is their interpretation not necessary? If it is granted that Raphael and Morus agree on what the truth is (for Renaissance humanists: the honorable Christian society) their difference lies in the view of rhetoric. Raphael will not concede the necessity of rhetoric as a means of mediation. For him, mediation is not only indirect, but it is also dangerous. It can confuse the mediator of his role, make him split hairs, convince him that in his quest for the median, the median is all that should be sought. It would seem that Raphael's caution to such mediating rhetoric would be "half a good is not better than all of a good." For Raphael, it is Morus, Giles, and their kind who are constantly in danger of corruption. Such a counsel of "mediation" quite readily becomes deviation, equivocation, and ultimately prevarication. There is no room for shadows, and diplomacy in counsel is one vast forest floor. On the other hand, as Wegemer says, "Rhetoric leads people to accept law, and thus makes government possible"; this view is in line with that of Morus.

In a way, Raphael is actually anti-rhetorical. His argument denies a need for mediatory rhetoric. Both Senecan and Ciceronian rhetorics take for granted
the power to cast substance in an attractive way and thereby move the audience toward acceptance of whatever truth that substance stands for. The difference between them is a matter of which is the best style: simplicity or adornment. The belief at the very heart of rhetoric is that in some way the intended audience stands in either opposition to, or is apathetic about, what is being championed, and that the audience can be won over by the art of speech. Of course, rhetoric can be aimed at a friendly audience: the preacher's proverbial "choir." But even in that case, the audience stands at a level of fervor below that which the rhetor would have. He must win them to a deeper conviction, a higher zeal, than they presently enjoy, and his obstacle in accomplishing this is not diminished by the willingness of the audience to be moved. Political conventions testify to the fact that a crowd, however devoted to the speaker, can fail to be moved by his rhetoric. The Utopians' pseudo-conversion to Christianity, based on demonstration, meets with approval because it is so rational and complete. It does not need the rhetoric of music, art, or homily that missionaries employed—with mixed success—in the world that More knew.

For Cicero, speech is the very thing that unifies men:

[W]e must trace back to their ultimate sources the principles of fellowship and society that Nature has established among men. The first principle is that which is found in the connection subsisting between all the members of the human race; and that bond of connection is reason and speech, which by the processes of teaching and learning, of communicating, discussing and reasoning associate men together and unite them in a sort of natural fraternity.5

But Raphael believes more in the power of example than that of rhetoric. He will relate his tale, and his tale will convince any reasonable man, pure and simple. If he is persuasive, it is not directly because of his persuasiveness, but because he has demonstrated his argument by way of his first-hand account of Utopia. Raphael is the empiricist who will devastate with his demonstration, or the logician who will triumph with his syllogism. But although Raphael is in this way anti-rhetorical in philosophy—or at least a-rhetorical—More, in a move that throws a red herring to his readers, draws Raphael, not Morus and Giles, as the classical rhetor.

The demonstration that Raphael offers, his relation of the Utopian way, reveals a world that is itself parallel to Cicero's political and social thought. In particular sections, highlighted here, the discussion revolves around the
philosophical concepts of justice, honesty, and accountability—all central concerns for the counselor. Scholarly opinion holds that though More uses Plato’s *Republic* as a paradigm for his work, he goes to Cicero and Seneca for his philosophy.64 *Utopia* draws heavily from Cicero’s *De Officiis* and *De Finibus* for its ideas. Because Raphael heartily advocates the Utopian way of life, its policies and beliefs can be attributed to him fairly.

Much of *Utopia*, including its idea of the state, is organized around a few basic Ciceronian concepts—*honestum*, *utile*, and *decorum*. In fact, a brief sketch of Cicero’s “ethical man” can help explain the Utopian view of the same. Evidently relying on Aristotle’s discussion of comparative goods in the *Rhetorica*, Cicero sets out three types of “good” which man should seek: 1) that which is intrinsically good (*honestum*), such as virtue, knowledge, and truth;57 2) that which is productive of good (*utile*), such as money; and 3) that which is preservative of good, such as friendship and honor (*De Inventione*).58 An individual disposed toward these goods will be well-tempered, properly balanced, etc. (*decorum*).59 A society consisting of such individuals will itself be ordered. It will not only preserve morality, but will also produce order. Hexter suggests that Utopian social and political institutions are the cause of their civic virtue, not the other way around.60 Adopting the proper models can produce, if not “unfallen people,” at least rational, and therefore “better,” people.

For Cicero, the decorous and the moral are nearly synonymous. He states that: “[W]hat is proper morally is morally right, and what is morally right is proper . . . whatever is just is decorous.”61 For Cicero, to live according to nature means to live a virtuous life. The natural should be selected only if it does not conflict with virtue.62

This sentiment is echoed in the philosophy of the Utopians, who define virtue as living according to nature, since to this end did God create man.63 The Utopians’ philosophical inquiries include an investigation “of the good: of the soul, of the body and of the external gifts.”64 They also discuss virtue and pleasure (the subject of *De Finibus*), and happiness. For the Utopians, the highest good is happiness, which is generally defined as pleasure. Although this Epicurean strain is at first unsettling to Raphael, it is blended with a Stoicism that considers only the good to be pleasurable.65

Cicero says that “a wise man rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, and endures pains to avoid worse pains.”66 No matter the cost, the good should never be sacrificed in favor of the expedient.67 Similarly, the Utopians
hold that a lesser pleasure should never interfere with a greater, and that no pleasure that brings pain should be pursued. Guided by these principles, Utopia maintains its decorum by seeking honestum and utile by various means.

What might be considered the basis for Raphael's theory of counsel can be seen in the concepts of truth and honesty that he relates. Utopian imperatives, and the way the islanders understand them, are similar to Cicero's thought. The obligation to keep one's word is a positive duty to the Roman, though he doubts whether any in the decadent Rome of his day would understand it: "I see that men do not normally consider it (deceit) immoral and that neither the law nor civil statutes forbid it; and yet the law of nature forbids it."6 In emphasizing the strictness of truth, Cicero cites the example of the soldier, Regulus. Captured by the enemy, he was sent back to Rome to negotiate the release of enemy hostages. Regulus journeyed home, advised the Romans not to release the hostages, then fulfilled a promise to return to his enemies.7 "Nowadays," says Cicero, "it seems amazing that Regulus would go back, but in those days . . . oaths were strong."71 The Rome of Cicero's day fairs poorly compared to times past.

Likewise, Raphael's relation of the Utopian appreciation for truth and honesty contrasts with the Europe of More's day. Of course, Raphael's idea of counsel stops at an appreciation and relation of honest thought; it does not include applying a rhetorical cast to that thought, or delaying its relation until the audience can best consume it. To the islanders, the concepts of truth and honesty are so integrated into Utopian communal life that there is no incentive for a person to be false. As each person is provided with the same home, clothing, food, and opportunities, social injustice is practically non-existent. And they deal with foreigners in the same aboveboard way, always keeping their truces and indemnities.72 However, due to the rest of the world's characteristic perfidy, they do not bother themselves with treaties.73 In fact, justice is so much a part of Utopian life that it can best be defined in terms of offenses against it: traveling without a permit, committing adultery,75 inciting riot in the name of religious oppression,76 and remaining unrepentant.77 Criminals of a lower stripe (i.e., those citizens who commit heinous crimes) are committed to slavery, the lot of prisoners of war and ascetics. The only capital offenses are those that are destructive of the state and, by extension, of all the goods that the state enables. These offenses include conspiracy,78 criminal recalcitrance,79 and espionage.80

In De Officiis, Cicero states that trust is basic to justice, for without it there
can be no stability in promises and agreements. Justice is owed to everyone, even inferiors and slaves. In practice, the first function of justice is to see that no man shall harm another unless he has been wounded by wrongdoing. The second function is to see that each man uses public property for public benefit, and private property for himself. Cicero states, “we should take care also that the punishment should not be out of proportion to the offense, and that some should not be chastised for a fault for which others are not even called to account.” Again, there is an implicit concept of appropriateness.

Moving to Cicero’s political thought and its influence on *Utopia*, the same organizing concept of *decorum* is apparent. Cicero discusses three forms of government in his *Republic*, but decides that a mixed constitution best meets the demands of society. For Cicero, society forms as a result of a bond of nature. Reason and speech are the unifying principles among men, contributing to the formulation of the public persona. And while he rests much of his thought on proportionate equality, he says, “If Nature ordains that one shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common.” The state born from this society of men exists to provide for the common interests of virtue, preservation, and security. It preserves and produces the goods that its people seek. However, any state must be governed by some form of deliberative body, consisting of the one (monarchy), the few (aristocracy), or the many (democracy). Each of these governmental forms is prone to a type of distortion: tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule.

As far as kings are concerned, Cicero says that only men of high moral character should be made sovereigns, so that the people might enjoy greater justice. In Surtz’s opinion, the morality of kings is one of the tacit subjects of *Utopia*. The work’s catalogue of natural virtues, based roughly on those listed in Cicero’s *De Officiis*, is a commonplace among humanistic themes. As a dialogue of counsel meant to instruct a new ruler, *Utopia* would have informed the young Henry VIII by supplying a positive example of good rule. Notably, *Utopia*’s good kings are all fictional, a point that would not have been lost on its readers.

Most significantly, Raphael calls for the restoration of hoarded land: “The rich leave no ground to be tilled; they enclose every bit of land for pasture; they pull down houses and destroy towns, leaving only the church to pen the sheep in. And as if enough of your land were not wasted on ranges and
preserves of game, those good fellows turn all human habitations and all cultivated land into a wilderness."93 As in the area of man's intrinsic equality, Raphael parts company with Cicero on the issue of private property. Private property is a benefit owed to the aristocrat, in Cicero's opinion, and the observance and protection of private property is one of the chief functions of the state.94 He concedes that in nature, no property is private; but, by long use, conquest of war, or stipulation, property eventually becomes privatized.95 Indeed, Cicero states that one reason men seek out communities is to protect their private property. He considers criminal the tribune Phillipus' equal distribution of property96 and praiseworthy Aratus of Sicyon's restoration of confiscated lands.97 In fact, any type of leveling process, such as cancellation of debt, is wrong to Cicero. It is unjust toward those whose intelligence or valor entitles them to their claims.98

Of course, Utopian society is founded on nothing so much as the idea of community property. Everything in Utopia, from houses to chamber pots, is publicly owned, a fact suggested as the fundamental reason for their bliss. Prior to his Book Two narration, Raphael states that "the one and only road to the general welfare lies in the maintenance of equality in all respects. When every man aims at absolute ownership of all the property he can get, even if there is ever so great abundance of goods, it is all shared by a handful who leave the rest in poverty."99 Although the character Morus defends private property, Hexter says the author More's "whole life and Christian character are a living repudiation" to the defense of private property he places in his own mouth: "without exchange of money there would be an overthrow of all nobility, magnificence, splendor and majesty."100 The joke carries More's characteristic irony, as well as his veiled seriousness.

To the Utopians, anything less than community property would lend itself to Cicero's oligarchy. To Cicero, anything less than private property would lend itself to mob rule. It is the ease with which the third form of government—democracy—slips into such chaos that causes Cicero to praise it least of all. He cites the plight of the Athenians as precedent for the dangers in democracy.101 Perhaps owing to his opinion that wisdom and virtue are rare, even in educated men, Cicero was wary of entrusting the state's future to the masses.102

Without elaborating on specific divisions of power, Cicero suggests a mixed constitution as preferable to any of the three basic forms.103 A mixture would provide power for the magistrate, authority for the nobles, and liberty
for the people. Each area has its rights and duties, and together they produce harmony and balance akin to musical symmetry.\textsuperscript{104} Such a society may contain inequities, but it seeks to administer its citizens’ lives in tune with reason and thereby with nature.\textsuperscript{105} This suggests the Utopians, guided by their quest for decorum and openness to revelation, could expect their civilization to reach a level that Cicero’s had been denied and that Renaissance Europe’s had neglected to achieve.

The “sometimes Ciceronian” basis of Utopian society establishes the example by which Raphael intends to convince. His entire disquisition is the offering of his proof. In unadorned fashion, it is laid before the readers—be they sovereigns or servants, rulers or counselors—to accept or reject. Ironically, Raphael appreciates Ciceronian decorum when it is objectively realized, as in the balanced society of Utopia, but not as a rhetorical tool, as a balanced means of persuasion. It is Morus who is decorous both in championing rhetoric and in appreciating a decorous Utopia.

**Morus’ Theory of Counsel**

The much smaller character of Morus is the alternative to Raphael’s dynamic personality. Morus’ rhetoric is not as simple as Raphael’s, and considering his stance against Ciceronianism, More indulges in self-humor by putting Asiatic periphrasis in his own mouth. He describes Raphael as a “Ulysses” or a “Plato” and having a pedant’s punctiliousness. For example, in the Morus/Giles letter, the author asks for confirmation of only one fact: the length of a particular bridge over the Utopian river, Anydrus.\textsuperscript{106} But these touches, together with Morus’ statement that he had “rather be honest than wise,” establishes an exactness that confirms both the account and Morus’ trustworthiness as a reporter.\textsuperscript{107} Wegemer points out the lengths More takes to draw Morus as a civic humanist. In the Morus/Giles letter, the character prays excuse for his tardiness in completing the work, as affairs of state, family, and friends have kept him from his studies.\textsuperscript{108}

Morus’ character seems altogether more humble than Raphael’s, but in the conventional way of the humanist writer. For example, in the Morus/Giles letter, the author expresses shame at having sent Giles the “little book”\textsuperscript{109} and expresses doubts as to publishing the piece at all.\textsuperscript{110} In the Giles/Busleyden letter, the author expands upon the quasi-oratorical nature of the account. Giles’ catalog of praises for Morus’ telling is in fact a catalog of steps in rhetor-
ical composition: "I am at a loss for what I should praise first or most: the faithfulness of a most happy memory which could repeat almost word for word... the sagacity with which he has noted the sources of evils... and blessings; the force and fluency of his discourse by which in pure Latin style and forceful expression he has united numerous topics." Morus is a faithful rhetorician: the man who goes to reason and order rather than ornamentation and bombast. In Book One, Morus’ ethos as an objective storyteller is eclipsed by Raphael’s. In fact, Morus’ gradual evanescence as a character works to More’s advantage as an author. Rather than assume a major role, Morus provides an objective, discerning imagination upon which Raphael’s tale may be registered. The effect, says Surtz, keeps the fantastic tale within the realm of an “ostensibly human world” and provides an immediacy and realism born of “the contact of one man’s experience on another man’s consciousness.”

Some of Morus’ assertions also resonate with Cicero’s political and social thought. With regard to personal talents, Cicero recognizes that each man has a private persona that should be used for the benefit of self and state. This position is at the foundation of his belief in civic duty, the persona in service to the civitas, and also underlies Morus’ theory of counsel. Similarly, the Utopians require all people, including leaders, to work at their crafts for an allotted time each day. However, unequal gifts signal one thing to Cicero, while they signal another to the Utopians. For the Roman, the man with greater gifts is deserving of greater societal benefits. The superior in spirit should rule the weaker in spirit, and the weak should obey the strong. Anything less would be both unjust and contrary to nature, which has allotted the gifts. This natural difference in men affects the protocol of duties owed to a particular individual; the greater the man, the greater the duty owed him.

It is in this area of equality, as in that of private property, where Utopia diverges from Cicero in philosophy. Although the Utopians elect their leaders and honor their moral heroes, positions and honors are open to everyone’s achievement. Holiness is revered and knowledge aspired to, but both are within the realm of each person’s sphere of attainment. The Utopians have their hierarchies in government and value them as beneficial to their society. But their hierarchies are ones of election, not inheritance, a position that Cicero would not support.

According to Wegemer, when answering Raphael’s objections to counsel of any stripe, Morus adopts a tone in his argument that “reflects the ethos of his character: polite—civilis—conversation. . . . Morus uses plain sentence
structure and diction, and significantly, he mitigates the possibility of the personal offense often engendered by such strong disagreement through the use of the parable, antanagoge, understatement, and litotes. And by choosing these rhetorical means, the different approaches to counsel are more clearly delineated. Raphael's plainspokenness, his "anti-rhetoric," insists less on counseling his audience with the facts than on confronting his audience about them. Morus, on the other hand, even in the way he deals with opposing Raphael, clothes his reasons with the figures of accommodation. That More is aware of the meta-rhetorical side of his work is evident in Morus' assertion:

[The statesman's proper philosophy] knows its stage, adapts itself of the play in hand, and performs its role neatly and appropriately. Otherwise we have the situation in which a comedy of Plautus being performed and the household slaves are making trivial jokes at one another and then you come on the stage in a philosopher's attire and recite the passage from the Octavia where Seneca is disputing Nero. Would I not have been preferable to take a part without words than by reciting something inappropriate to make a hodgepodge of comedy and tragedy? You would have spoiled and upset the actual play by bringing in irrelevant matter—even if your contribution would have been superior in itself. Whatever play is being performed, perform it as best you can, and do not upset it all simply because you think of another which has more interest.

So it is in the commonwealth. So it is in the deliberations of monarchs. It is better, More says, to take part in the play that is being acted, even a comedy, rather than introduce comedy into a tragedy. Again, notably, Morus refers to a Senecan tragedy; the parallels between Senecan style and Raphael's own have been mentioned, and here Morus says it would be indecorous to introduce Seneca. In this passage, More plays upon the many dimensions through which readers pass in the dialogue—observing the characters' argument as readers, and yet understanding on some level that they are part of the play, or dialogue, itself.

Basically, Morus calls for decorum, a hallmark in Cicero's own philosophy. But for Raphael, Morus' decorum amounts to dissemblance at worst, ineffectiveness at best: "If I would stick to the truth, I must needs speak in the manner I have described." In the end, the two characters have two different approaches to rhetoric and truth, two theories of what counsel can accomplish and the means by which it can be accomplished. At first, it seems Raphael says that the truth should be revealed, and its inherent power accepted by the
If they refuse, he will shake the dust from his feet. But Morus' is the civic humanist's approach. To the unconverted, you cannot play strange songs or tell strange tales. You must adapt your counsel to the audience. His "play" metaphor suggests as much. The rhetor/counselor enters the play that is on stage, takes his role, and converts from within.

Raphael then reveals his true opinion of counsel:

Moreover, there is no chance for you to do any good because you are brought among colleagues who would easily corrupt even the best of men before being reformed themselves. By their evil companionship, either you will be seduced yourself or, keeping your own integrity and innocence, you will be made a screen for the wickedness and folly of others. Thus you are far from being able to make anything better by that indirect approach of yours.

The "indirect approach" of Morus' counsel is not realistic or practical, according to Raphael; it is pure folly. Morus deludes himself by indulging in a counsel that will either cause the sacrifice of his integrity or its misuse as a front for chicanery. Raphael shows he has no confidence in governmental counsel under any form, not even his own unadulterated version.

Rhetorical Classification

As a rhetorical work, *Utopia* has been classified as a *declamatio*, as a scholastic meditation, and as a *suasoria*. It could just as easily be seen as an *epideictic* piece, praising one society, the Utopian world, while blaming another, the English. Following the full story of Utopia, Raphael roundly attacks the modern world's extravagances and selfishness in a peroration. But although he may have the most—and last—words, a final verdict on the Utopian society is never rendered. "I cannot agree with all that he [Raphael] said," states More, but he goes on to admit that many Utopian features should be emulated by the Europeans. With the conflict unresolved, the many levels of dialogue that have taken place—between present and past, Europeans and Utopians, scholars and statesmen, humanists and traditionalists—remain in tension. In this, More patterns his work on the Ciceronian dialogue—presenting all views without providing for their absolute disposition—rather than on the Socratic one. Thus, *Utopia* is not so much a dialogue of counsel for the ruler, as is often suggested, as a dialogue of counsel for the counselor himself.

In one sense, judging by the influence it has on Morus and on generations
of readers, Raphael’s example is successful as an empirical demonstration. Then again, viewed meta-rhetorically, this example is penned by More himself, the humanist, who offers the example in the form of the Ciceronian dialogue, with a slyness that has belied concrete determination of its meaning for centuries. As Hexter says, the inquiry of whether to act as counselor is not a clearly stated problem with a syllogistically-derived solution, but presents the horns of a dilemma: serve corruptly and advance yourself, or serve earnestly and endanger yourself. To a postmodern age attracted to many-horned dilemmas, More’s rhetorical choice of the Ciceronian dialogue is most appealing. However, as a pragmatic man, More had to make his choice; ultimately, the answer turned on the question of civic duty, and the counselor’s role therein.

**CIVIC DUTY**

In *De Officiis*, Cicero says: “There is one class of men that is rarely met with: it is composed of those . . . who have time to consider carefully what career in life they prefer to follow.” Doubtless, Cicero counted himself among those men.

Though he loved philosophy from an early age, he chose a life of public service. There is a parallel with More’s life here, for at the time he was writing *Utopia*, More had just been offered the position of counselor to Henry VIII. Hexter concludes that when More returned to England from The Netherlands in 1515, prior to writing the Book One dialogue, the die had not yet been cast. He was still weighing the life of humanist scholar against the duties of a royal counselor. And Stephen Greenblatt suggests More’s struggle was actually life-long, a tug-of-war between the cloistered and the intellectual life. This required a compromise position, resolved ultimately on the scaffold. If this reasoning is indulged, then by choosing the dialogue to conduct the debate, More selected both a Ciceronian literary mode and a Ciceronian theme to assess his dilemma.

The debate is presaged in the Giles/Busleyden letter, when Giles writes to the court of Charles V, addressing Busleyden as one who “assists with good counsels the government of the commonwealth in which you have labored for many years, winning the highest praise for wisdom and integrity.” Morus’ attempts to persuade Raphael appeal to the idea that his talents and industry
would be invaluable to a king, because “from the monarch flows a stream of all that is good or evil over the whole nation.” Raphael states that he abhors the idea. Kings love only war. They do not surround themselves with people who disagree or suggest anything that they do not already intend to do. “[A]mong royal councilors everyone is actually so wise as to have no need of profiting by another’s counsel, or everyone seems so wise in his own eyes as not to condescend to profit by it, save that they agree with the most absurd saying of, and play the parasite to, the chief royal favorites whose friendliness they strive to win by flattery.” Counsel amounts to either flattery of others or of the self, neither an attractive alternative.

Morus next appeals to Raphael’s sense of civic responsibility. It is the duty of every good man to serve the commonweal, a refrain often heard in Cicero. Quoting Plato, Cicero says: “We are not born for ourselves alone; but our country claims a share of our being.” To cast away natural talents that could foster a healthy state is immoral.

Morus, too, uses Plato in his argument. He remarks that Raphael’s favorite philosopher considered a happy commonwealth to depend on philosophers becoming kings. “What a distant prospect of happiness there will be if philosophers will not condescend even to impart their counsel to kings,” says Morus. Raphael remains unpersuaded, oddly ignoring that all Utopian life is some kind of service to the state.

Raphael’s position is owing to his belief that a philosopher must remove himself from public involvement. It is the view of a radical humanist, but one that More did not dismiss entirely. His friend Erasmus warned John Colet: “Draw away from worldly affairs, but if you must not, withdraw into spirituality once the affairs of the world threaten peace of mind.” With a note of sadness, Erasmus also wrote to More himself, once the latter had made his decision: “You will be taking service under an excellent prince, but there is no doubt that you will be carried away from us and from learning.” Behind this sentiment is a conviction that the educator/philosopher humanist was to serve the world by educating it, not by serving within its already corrupt institutions. From Raphael’s perspective, their position is outside, not inside, the regime.

Again, Cicero’s position is quite clear. As much as he admires scholarly pursuits, enthusiasm for private study cannot draw one away from public affairs. Only the weak or unhealthy should choose philosophy over public service. He also criticizes those who loathe the commands and offices; it is all right to
consider fame meaningless, but not as a front for those too fearful of the hard
work, criticism, and defeats that public life brings. In a passage that could
have had great significance to More in making his decision, Cicero says that a
statesman requires more greatness of spirit and freedom from annoyances
than a philosopher, who risks nothing: "A man in state must consider not only
the moral correctness of an action, but whether he has the ability to carry it
through—at the same time he should not despair uselessly through cowardice
and not be excessively confident through eagerness. Forethought is essential." For Cicero, public service is more courageous because it is more demanding.
Scholarship, in fact, is best used to assist the common life: "The study and
knowledge of the universe would somehow be lame and defective, were no
practical results to follow." He adds: "And if we consider how many praise-
worthy commonwealths exist now and have existed in the past, and remember
that the establishment of a State which is stab enough to endure for ages
requires by far the highest intellectual powers that nature can produce, what a
multitude of great geniuses there must have been." Statecraft combines phi-
losophy and service. The two are not exclusive; in fact, they are integrated.

In Utopia, there is no notable distinction between the philosopher and the
statesman. Perhaps More illustrates the integration that Cicero supports. But
More's entrance into Henry VIII's court did not simply turn upon convincing
himself that he could indeed have influence, or that scholarship and public ser-
vice were not mutually exclusive. As a Christian humanist, he also had to con-
vince himself that his faith could benefit from his entrance into public life.
Hexter lists two defining characteristics of the Christian Humanist: devotion
to works of both Christian and pagan antiquity, and a belief that those litera-
tures contained something that could better men and resurrect society. When
convinced of this belief, says Hexter, these humanists set themselves off on a
mission of universal salvation. Perhaps More's decision rested on a belief
that whatever virtue he possessed should not be cloistered in Utopian fashion.

Morus' final use of Ciceronian civic humanism in Utopia comes in his
dvice to Raphael on the statesman's philosophy. Returning to decorum, he
likens the philosopher to a player who must perform as best he can within the
play that is being performed, and not upset everything simply because another
play is of more interest to him. Like the player, the counselor must not desert
the commonwealth because he cannot "pluck up wrong-headed opinions by
the root" or cure long-standing vices to his heart's desire. As strange ideas
cannot be forced all at once, the "indirect" approach might be more useful.
Finally, suggests Morus, “What you cannot turn to good you must at least make as little bad as you can. For it is impossible that all should be well unless all men were good.”¹⁴⁹ To this suggestion Raphael gives the reply of the radical humanist.¹⁵⁰ No compromise is possible in matters of truth, implies Raphael. Indeed, the adaption to circumstances that Morus suggests is the very thing Erasmus considered to be the root of courtly vice.¹⁵¹ In light of this, Raphael’s next words ring a particularly ominous note, especially considering that the man who writes them will mount the scaffold in twenty years’ time, for refusing to do precisely what is described: “At court there is no room for dissembling, nor may one shut one’s eyes to things. One must openly approve the worst counsels and subscribe to the most ruinous decrees. He would be counted a spy and almost a traitor, who gives only faint praise to evil counsels.”¹⁵² By not accepting Henry’s Act of Supremacy, More was counted just that. In one of history’s coincidences, or more likely, patterns, Cicero had met with a similar end some fifteen centuries before. Betrayed by the young Octavius, his hopes for a Roman republic dashed, the orator was hunted down on his flight from the city. Decapitated, his head and hands were displayed in the public forum.

In the Giles/Busleyden letter, Giles states that Raphael’s whereabouts have been variously reported. Some say that he has died; some, that he has returned to his homeland. Others say that he has gone back to Utopia.¹⁵³ If the last is true, it would seem that Raphael chose the philosopher’s retreat that he so greatly advocated. And in the crowning similarity with Cicero’s life, by choosing the public sphere, More ultimately found himself taking a position against his ruler; a position decorous in terms of a different, and in his estimation, more permanent society than the one in which he served.

CONCLUSION

To return to Ricouer’s ideas on utopia—a place beyond any known territory—he says it has the power to bring new perspectives on the territory we do know and live in every day: “What must be emphasized is the benefit of this special extraterritoriality. From this “no place” an exterior glance is cast on our reality, which suddenly looks strange, nothing more being taken for granted. The field of the possible is now open beyond that of the actual; it is a field, therefore, for alternative ways of living.”¹⁵⁴
The same can be said for the counselor, who—his earnestness taken for granted—must encounter alternative ways of approaching what is often a losing proposition. Each approach has its own stock of virtues. Raphael’s theory of counsel, its anti-rhetorical stance, its plainspokenness, is unyielding in its quest for virtue and unqualified clarity. In modern criticism, its critics might call it the discourse of demonization, one that allows its opponent no room for dialogue and affords him no means of access. But Raphael and his soldiers are on the side of those that say a grim business demands a frank argument. History shows what happens when you do not—for good reasons or bad—declare yourself. And in granting Raphael the lion’s share of the dialogue, with his demonstration at center stage, More exhibits at least tacit admiration. He himself could be demanding, and no one doubted where he stood in matters of faith; William Tyndale, More’s Protestant foe and polemical opponent, kept up a heated debate with More over the Church. Tyndale ultimately lost his own battle at the stake.

But More was also of the opinion that, although you should only go so far, you should go at least that far. The commonwealth was worth the gamble. Critics would call this the discourse of acquiescence or complicity. But for its rhetors, it is the only means to do any good in the world. The only way to gain an audience is through the play, the poem, the speech—the proper naming of things. In postmodern times, when meaning has been deconstructed and “naming” itself has received a bad name, both Morus’ and Raphael’s views of counsel are more problematic, theoretically speaking. But from a practical standpoint, Morus’ position calls for civic engagement. In the end, a remove from society will not do. No one can answer questions alone. Questions cannot even be asked alone, at least not so as to benefit any but the questioner. Raphael, one may argue, would have found such a sacrifice predictable and ultimately unnecessary. More found such a sacrifice predictable and ultimately acceptable.

6. Although More's may be the most readable "utopia," it was hardly the first. The Greeks were there long before him with Plato's Republic, as were the Sumerians with the Epic of Gilgamesh. "Utopian" works roughly contemporaneous with More's include Francis Bacon's New Atlantis and Tomaso Campanella's City of the Sun. A darker variation on this theme, and one more to the taste of modern audiences, is portrayed in "dystopian" literature, such as Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and George Orwell's 1984. For an overview of the genre, see Paul Turner's introduction to his edition, Thomas More, "Utopia" (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 16–21.

7. For clarity's sake, and because I believe there is a distinction between More the author and Morus the character in Utopia, I will use "More" when referring to the author, and "Morus" when referring to the character.


15. More, supra note 4 at 45.

16. Scott, supra note 13 at 309.

17. In contrast to the "Asiatic" style of Cicero, known for its ornamentation, was the "Senecan" or "Attic" style, known for its brevity and simplicity.


21. Marius, supra note 19 at 381.

22. Although these letters are commonly considered useless additions or appendages, the two fictive letters, as well as the other letters of humanists published with the piece, are an important part of More's establishing credibility for his work.

23. In addition to the Morus/Giles letter and the Giles/Busleyden letter, accompanying letters which helped More draw the comical flavor of the piece included a letter from William Bude to Thomas Lupset, a letter from Erasmus to John Froben, and a letter from Joannes Paludanus to Giles. More's letter to Giles in the 1517–18 edition added verses by Gerardus Naviosmagus and Cornelius

24. While he chooses the dialogue form for the account, More varies the format in several ways. He pref- 
ares Book One with a narrative, recounting the context—an ambassadorial trip to Antwerp—for his 
encounter with Raphael. And when the dialogue proper begins, More inserts a dialogue-within-a-
dialogue, having Raphael relate a conversation that once took place when he was a dinner guest of the 
English Cardinal Morton. This provides yet another civic arena within which Raphael's criticisms can 
register. More's use of digressions, interruptions, and transitions in his dialogues can be seen again in 
his Dialogues of Comfort. See Sister Anne O'Donnell, "Cicero, Gregory the Great, and Thomas More: 
Three Dialogues of Comfort," in Miscellanea Moreana: Essays for Germain Marc'hadour, Clare M. 

25. Hexter, supra note 20 at 123.
26. A classic work on the Renaissance humanist tradition is that of Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance 
27. Gerard Wegemer, Thomas More on Statesmanship (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America 
28. A third possibility lurks in the shadows of Utopian discourse: the liar/opportunist who cares neither 
for truth nor for any rhetoric that would make it palatable. The achievement of the world is his only 
concern. See supra note 8.
29. In rhetorical parlance, ethos is the power of the speaker, established through various means; pathos is 
the emotional effect on the listener; logos is the substance of what is spoken.
30. Schoeck, supra note 10 at 40.
More, supra note 5, 462-69 at 464.
32. More, supra note 4 at 51.
33. Id., at 21.
34. Id., at 39. Giles can be seen as an extension of Morus. That it takes the two men together make up the 
alternative to Raphael speaks to the power of the latter's ethos.
35. The degree of spleen in Raphael's oration causes scholars to have different views on his character. In 
Wegemer's opinion, Raphael's commentary crosses the line of decorum, ultimately disqualifying him 
as a Ciceroian orator. Wegemer, supra note 12 at 12. On the other hand, as vituperation is known as the 
other face of praise, perhaps from a rhetorical standpoint Raphael's zeal is consistent with the classical 
orator's mantle. Cicero's Philippics give name to a kind of withering, yet rational, invective.
36. More, supra note 4 at 77.
37. Id., at 87.
38. Cicero, De re publica, Clinton Walker Keyes, ed., Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 
1970), 1.58.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id., at 81.
43. Cicero, De Officis, Walter Miller, ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1968), 1.25.
44. Arthur Kinney calls Book II a demonstrative oration "in full dress," which transforms the orator into 
a sage. Arthur Kinney, Rhetoric and Poetic in Thomas More's "Utopia" (Malibu, CA: Undena Publica-
tions, 1979), 8.
46. Id., at cxxxix.
47. Surtz cites Tomaso Campanella's *City of the Sun* as a catechetical work. *Id.*, at cxxxix.

48. Book Two was composed while on an ambassadorial trip to Holland in 1515; Book One, when More was back in England in 1516.

49. See Hexter, *supra* note 20 at 42.

50. Sylvester, *supra* note 31 at 52.


54. That the work is Ciceronian in structure but features a character who adopts a Senecan style to articulate a philosophy in part anti-rhetorical is yet another example of Lucian's influence—by way of satirical undercutting.

55. Cicero, *De Officiis*, *supra* note 42 at 130.


57. The Utopians consider education to be the chief end of society, a good in itself: "As far as the public needs permit, as much time as possible should be withdrawn from the service of the body and devoted to the freedom and culture of the mind." More, *supra* note 4 at 135. Of the many hours available to citizens for pleasure, most are spent in intellectual pursuits. *Id.*, at 129. Men and women are master students of the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, dialectic, and music), all taught in their own tongue (reminiscent of Cicero's championing of Latin), but are not as skilled as the Europeans in the "small logics," Peter of Spain's textbooks on logic in the late Middle Ages. More uses the name ironically; he writes in his *Letter to Dorp* of the "little logic" in the works. *Id.*, at 437n25. An excellent evaluation appears in Fr. Walter Ong's *Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).

58. Cicero, *De Inventione*, H.M. Hubbell, ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 2.156. Religion for the Utopians is a preservative good, leading the faithful to the good in itself, God. More, *supra* note 4 at 217. The Utopian's priests are as pious as they (a taunt at English clerics) with conservative ceremonies and moderate fasting. Christianity is nascent in Utopia but accepted with zeal. Willing, even expectant of revelation, their founder, Utopus, required tolerance of all beliefs. Only atheism is forbidden, as it sinks below the dignity of humankind; atheists cannot be trusted to follow the law. *Id.*, at 221. Religion is also preservative of the well-ordered society, echoing Cicero's belief that the downfall of piety signaled the end of Roman order. *Id.*, at 526; Cicero, *De Officiis*, *supra* note 42 at 2.7-8. Despite his skepticism, H.A.K. Hunt says that Cicero accepted a general scheme of nature and ideal morality. H.A.K. Hunt, *The Humanism of Cicero* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1914), 204. Cicero was also tolerant of diverse philosophies and considered philosophical sniping beneath the dignity of the science. Cicero, *De Finibus*, H. Rackham, ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 1:27.

59. Cicero, *De Officiis*, *supra* note 42 at 1.93. "Well-temperedness" as a matter of schooling is suggested in *De laudibus legum anglie* ("On the Glories of the English Law") (1470), by Sir John Fortescue. Fortescue remarks on the education of young lawyers, one More may have read before attending first New Inn, then Lincoln's Inn. Academies were associated with each inn and boys learned "to sing, to play harmonies, and to dance, and the learned noble manners—probably meaning the elaborate drills of courtesy that delighted the upper classes of the time." Education there was on the whole gentle and communal, unlike the harshness reported of the typical grammar school. Marius, *supra* note 19 at 29-31.

60. Hexter, *supra* note 20 at 60. Helmut Herbruggen disagrees: "[I]t is not their thriving institutions that are the cause of their good qualities; rather their behavior founded on their moral integrity forms basis of their sound social, political, and economical order." Hubertus Schütze Herbruggen, "More's *Utopia"
as a Paradigm," in Essential Articles for the Study of Thomas More, supra note 5, 251–62 at 256. Utopian rationality is a necessary precursor to their institutions.

61. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.93.
63. More, supra note 4 at 163.
64. Id., at 161.
65. Id.
66. Cicero, De Finibus, supra note 57 at 1.33.
67. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 3.18.
68. More, supra note 4 at 163.
69. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 3.69.
70. Id., at 1.39.
71. Id., at 3.111.
72. More, supra note 4 at 215.
73. Id., at 197. Ironies that heighten the gently comic nature of the piece are easily interrupted with English in mind. The Utopian’s enthusiasm for agriculture, learning, and worship contrast with their true-life opposites. Even the extremes of Utopian life—moving from house to house every four years, raising chickens like children, and stripping naked before potential marriage partners—only fold the most serious moments back on themselves, so that the “reasonable” society becomes a reductio ad absurdum. In this way, More keeps tension between the comical and the instructive; his piece takes its effect without the reader feeling it at every moment.
74. Id., at 147.
75. Id., at 191.
76. Id., at 219.
77. Id., at 229.
78. Id., at 125.
79. Id., at 191.
80. Id., at 215. This reluctance to inflict capital punishment is in pointed contrast to England’s treatment of thieves, thoroughly discussed in Book One (73–77). Raphael’s heated speech includes an indictment of the system that makes theft necessary. Monopolies on land and wealth give the poor no alternative. By denying not only preservative goods, such as food and shelter, but also the productive goods that would allow the poor to fend for themselves, England proves itself manifestly unjust. Raphael explains, in a fortiori fashion, that the system encourages violence, as it recognizes no distinction between a simple robbery and a robbery that accompanies murder (75). It is this injustice that inspires Raphael’s discourse on communal property.
81. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.23.
82. Id., at 1.41.
83. Id., at 1.20. This distinction regarding property foreshadows the major disagreement between Utopian and Ciceronian political thought. More may have had both Cicero’s and Plato’s Republic in mind when he penned his work.
84. Id., at 1.89.
85. The productive, or expedient, goods are also treated with the concept of decorum in mind. In contrast to societies that see it as an intrinsic good, the Utopians use gold only for children’s toys, slave chains, and chamber pots. Of more value is iron, since it is useful and productive. More, supra note 4 at 153. They also use treasure for bribing their enemies to breed sedition (149) or to pay mercenaries to fight their wars. Their mercenaries are men who “forgetting both kinship and friendship” slaughter those with whom they fought alongside only the day before (207). These men have run afool of Cicero’s cardinal rule, that honestum is never sacrificed to utile. Their kind of avarice—to Cicero, the most offensive of vices—is deadly to the state. It is an intemperance especially grievous in leaders, who
exploit the common resources for their own profit. "It is not only immoral, it is criminal, infamous," says Cicero. *De Officiis,* supra note 42 at 2.77.

86. Cicero, *De Officiis,* supra note 42 at 1.50.

87. Id., at 1.27.

88. Neal Wood, *Cicero’s Social and Political Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 128. Wood points out that Cicero is among the first to distinguish "society" from the "state." The first is equivalent to the people; the last is more akin to a political subdivision. *Id.,* at 126.

89. Cicero, *De re publica,* supra note 38 at 1.43. Marius notes that More and Erasmus, like most men of their day, feared the masses: "Both of them believed that the virtuous should rule and that the virtuous were few, but to both even a bad prince was better than anarchy." *Marius,* supra note 19 at 235.

90. Cicero, *De Officiis,* supra note 42 at 2.41.

91. Surtz, *supra note 44 at cxxi.*


93. More, *supra note 4 at 67.* In *Utopia,* land waste and defense of self and neighbors, are the only just-war causes. *Id.,* at 201. Marius notes that More’s embassy on which he began writing *Utopia* was intended to increase the wool trade, and therefore the wealth of those Raphael castigates. The author observes that the world More built in his writing did not always correspond to the world in which he worked. *Marius,* supra note 19 at 156.

94. Cicero, *De Officiis,* supra note 42 at 1.20.

95. Id., at 1.21.

96. Id., at 2.73.

97. Id., at 2.81.

98. Id., at 2.84.


100. Hexter, *supra note 30 at 38.*

101. Cicero, *De re publica,* supra note 38 at 1.2.43.

102. Utopian society, by contrast, is peopled with educated and virtuous men, trained by excellent institutions. The circularity of the Utopian causes of virtue—that is, virtuous people forming virtuous institutions, virtuous institutions leading to a virtuous state, and the virtuous state enabling virtuous people—answers Cicero’s objections. Each group of thirty households can elect their “syphogrants” (representatives), the syphogrants can elect the “tranibors” (akin to senators) and the governor; the whole society runs smoothly on a system infused with virtue.

103. Cicero, *De re publica,* supra note 38 at 1.44.

104. Id., at 2.69.

105. That *Utopia* is very similar can be attributed to what Albert Duhamel describes as More’s “attempt to define the kind of society which reason alone, but properly directed, might achieve, and how closely this purely rational society might approximate the ideal of the Christian state in theory, and even surpass contemporary Christian Europe in practice.” Albert P. Duhamel, "Medievalism of More’s *Utopia,*" in *Essential Articles for the Study of Thomas More,* supra note 5, 234–50 at 237. He points out that More never defines the perfect state of reason with revelation (i.e., a Christianized Utopia), and to that
attributes the Utopian's allowing divorce, slavery, euthanasia, and bribery. Some conclusions are reasonable when reason alone is the guide. Id., at 240.

106. More, supra note 4 at 41.

107. More missed noting Utopia's exact location, due to a colleague's badly-timed cough. Id., at 23.

108. Id., at 39.

109. Id.


111. More, supra note 4 at 23.

112. Surtz, supra note 44 at cxxiv.

113. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.110.

114. Cicero, De re publica, supra note 38 at 1.34.

115. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.50.

116. The Utopians do not have revelation, but do have collective reason. It is their willingness to "adopt anything that is better arranged" which accounts for their greatness. More, supra note 4 at 109. In contrast, the calcified narrowness of Europe had hindered its prosperity. Surtz, supra note 44 at cxxxii.

117. Wegemer, supra note 27 at 93.

118. More, supra note 4 at 99.

119. A "confusion of genres" was one of Peter Ramus's objections. Ramus, a later reformer of rhetoric and logic, sought to separate the two. Rhetoric became merely style. An anti-Ciceronian in rhetoric, Ramus ironically offered Cicero as the model/authority for his brand of logic. What he would not have imitated in rhetoric he sought to have imitated in logic. An interesting analysis of Ramus's work is Norman E. Nelson's Peter Ramus and the Confusion of Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetry, vol. 2 in Contributions in Modern Philology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1947).

120. Elizabeth McCutcheon has pointed to the work's liberal use of litotes, or affirming something by stating the negative of its opposite: Sailors are not unskilled in sea and weather; Plato without doubt well foresaw the behavior of kings; the Utopian's licorice supply is not at all meager, clothes are not unbecoming; their language is not lacking words, not without charm to the ear, etc. Elizabeth McCutcheon, "Denying the Contrary: More's Use of Litotes in The Utopia," in Essential Articles for the Study of Thomas More, supra note 5, 263-74 at 266. The theme of restraint is also carried over into the plot; Utopian children learn by negative example. Given gold as a toy in infancy, they lay it aside when they grow older. More, supra note 4 at 153.

121. More, supra note 4 at 101.


123. Id., at 103. Surtz has called passages of the piece a masterpiece of indirection. In reference to the Utopian religious devotion, he remarks at the lack of loud attack, bitter satire, and ironic comments on religious abuses in Europe. The pagans quietly show Christians where they must reform in their piety, simplicity, and humility. Surtz, supra note 44 at cxxii. Surtz is referring to the overall decorum of the piece, the Ciceronian hallmark of "aptness" that can be seen as the work's regnant concept.

124. In one of his ironies, More gives his voyager the name "Raphael," the archangel from the Old Testament book of Tobit and the patron saint of guides. Is this a jab at the Platonic ideal, of a republic that is so ethereal that its spokesman is otherworldly? Or is its spokesman truly a guide to a heavenly kingdom? More does not say. It must have also been a delightful coincidence that the latinization of More's name—"Morus"—means "fool."

125. Schoeck, supra note 91 at 284. A declamatio was a school exercise on a hypothetical case. The rhetor was to take a position on a stated issue of deliberative nature.
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126. Duhamel, supra note 104 at 234.
127. Kinney, supra note 43 at 15. A suasion is a type of declamation, centered on a political issue.
128. More, supra note 4 at 245. Arthur Kinney (supra note 43 at 10) notes that the dark aspects of Utopia give it an ironically dystopian feel at times.
130. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.119.
131. Hexter, supra note 129 at 56–57.
132. More, supra note 4 at 104.
134. See Wegemer, supra note 12 at 6.
135. More, supra note 4 at 25.
136. Id., at 57.
137. Id., at 87.
138. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.7.22.
139. Id., at 1.72.
140. More, supra note 4 at 87.
142. Hexter, supra note 20 at 122.
143. Cicero, De Officiis, supra note 42 at 1.71.
144. Id., at 1.72.
145. Id., at 1.53.
146. Cicero, De re publica, supra note 38 at 3.7.
147. Hexter, supra note 20 at 53.
149. Id., at 101.
150. Id.
151. Fox, supra note 140 at 150.
152. More, supra note 4 at 103.
153. Id., at 25.
154. Ricoeur, supra note 1 at 16.