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RECENT DECISION

RENO V. ACLU: THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT HITS A RED LIGHT ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

John M. Beahn

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."1 The simplistic brevity of the First Amendment inherently remains misleading. Although the language of the First Amendment appears absolute, the Supreme Court never has held the First Amendment to confer an absolute right to free speech.2 Rather, the Court has excluded certain categories of speech from any constitutional protection based solely on their content.3 These types of speech, such as violence-advocating or obscene speech, remain unprotected because they have no redeeming value and lack any beneficial content.4

The Court also has approved restrictions on certain types of speech not based on their content, but rather on their method of delivery.5 Such situations arise when the courts permit restrictions on certain speech, such as indecent speech, based solely on the medium through which that speech is communicated.6 From the printed media, to the telephonic

1. U.S. CONST. amend I.
2. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (discussing the various types of unprotected speech); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-19 (1919) (denying protection to pamphlets opposing intervention in Russia); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.").
3. See e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (excluding from constitutional protection speech that incited or produced imminent lawless action); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (noting the various forms of unprotected speech); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (noting that some speech does not receive constitutional protection).
4. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. The Court stated that "[t]here are certain . . . classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." Id.
6. See Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 876 (9th Cir. 1991). The court wrote that "in any first amendment
media, to the broadcast media, the Supreme Court has struggled to distinguish permissible from impermissible speech since "each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems." 7 A comprehensive analysis of today's First Amendment problems, therefore, includes both a content-based analysis and a medium-specific analysis. 8

The current wave of technological advancement in communications presents the same First Amendment problems that the legislatures and courts have wrestled with for many years. 9 This exploding area of communications once again has forced the legislatures and courts to revisit "the intractable obscenity problem." 10

The most recent Congressional attempt to control the availability of certain types of speech in a communications medium was the adoption of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 11 a part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 12 The incredible explosion in the popularity of the Internet, 13 the so-called "Information Superhighway," 14 and the

speech case, [we must] evaluate both the content of words and the context in which they are delivered." Id. 7
8. See G. Sidney Buchanan, Toward A Unified Theory Of Governmental Power To Regulate Protected Speech, 18 CONN. L. REV. 531, 535 (1986). Buchanan asserts that the Supreme Court looks to two dominant variables in its analysis of First Amendment issues: "the content variable, . . . and the forum [mode] variable." Id.
9. Cf. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 n.4, 2336-39 (1997) (discussing the availability of sexually explicit material on the Internet and the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)). The historic inter-relationships that have existed between pornography, counterculturalism, and new communications media should be noted. See DANIEL BURSTEIN & DAVID KLINE, ROAD WARRIORS: DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES ALONG THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY 106-07 (1995). Pornographic pictures prompted the development of photography and film development in the late nineteenth century. See id. at 107. X-rated movies drove the development and wide-spread usage of VCRs in the home. See id. Today's new technology apparently has followed in the footsteps of its media forefathers because, as of June 1995, three of the top 20 Internet sites were dedicated to sex. See id.
13. The term "Internet" resulted from a combination of the words "interconnection" and "network," and refers to "the network formed by the cooperative interconnection of computing networks." GLEE HARRAH CADY & PAT MCCREGOR, MASTERING THE INTERNET 5 (2d ed. 1996).
14. This term was popularized by then-Senator Al Gore, Jr., who for years campaigned for the construction of a National Research and Education Network. See BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD 5 (1995). This origin seemed appropriate because Al Gore, Sr., another long time Tennessee Senator, had been responsible for the legislation that led to the development of a national highway system in the 1960s. See id. Another term
resultant increase in pornography available on the Internet, prompted the inclusion of the CDA in the Telecommunications Bill. The CDA outlawed a variety of indecent and obscene communications previously available on the Internet, and criminalized the transmission of obscene or indecent communications to any person under the age of eighteen by means of a telecommunications device.

The adoption of the CDA greatly incensed Internet users, who staged a world wide blackout of the Internet during which thousands of Internet web sites shut down in protest. Immediately following President Clinton's signature of the CDA, two lawsuits were filed challenging the Act's constitutionality. The first suit, filed in the Eastern District of

used to describe the Internet, "cyberspace," was initially coined by William Gibson in his science-fiction novel NEUROMANCER. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 5 (1993). Gibson wrote that cyberspace involved "[a] consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts . . . A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system." GIBSON, supra note 1, at 51. The term "cyber" is derived from the term "cybernetics," initially used to describe the science of computers. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at 835.


The plaintiffs also challenged 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), which provided:

(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly—
Pennsylvania by a coalition of plaintiffs led by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), argued that the CDA unconstitutionally infringed on First Amendment free speech rights. The second lawsuit filed by the publisher of an on-line newspaper challenged the CDA on substantially similar grounds.

Both cases were brought under a provision of the CDA allowing for an expedited constitutional challenge to the statute before a district court three-judge panel. Both panels overturned the CDA as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech and focused their opinions on the plaintiffs' two main arguments: statutory vagueness and overbreadth. While the panels disagreed on whether the CDA was unconstitutionally vague, both found that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because it would result in an impermissible chill on the free speech rights of some Internet users.

Although both sets of plaintiffs had similar interests in wanting to dismantle the CDA, dissimilar motives drove their involvement. Dedicated Internet users, obsessed with governmental intrusion into their lives, view the Internet as the final frontier in which government regulation and intrusion is not only unwelcome, but also repulsive to the very principles that make the Internet so appealing: its decentralized structure, its self-regulated autonomy, and its liberating anonymity.

(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;

shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

\( \text{id.} \) § 223(a)(1)(B).

19. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827. This suit was filed the same day that the CDA was signed into law. See id.

20. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 923-24. This suit was filed the same day the CDA went into effect. See id.


24. Compare Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 936 (finding the definition of indecency not unconstitutionally vague), with ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858 (finding the definitions of "indecent" and "patently offensive" to be unconstitutionally vague).


26. Cf. Rheingold, supra note 15, at 253-57 (discussing the sharp reaction by early Internet users to Operation Sun Devil, the FBI's crackdown on computer "hackers").

27. See Burstein & Kline, supra note 10, at 107 (noting the lack of a controlling hierarchy on the Internet as its principal appeal); cf. Gates, supra note 15, at 92 (noting
The coalition led by the ACLU, more concerned with the constitutional ramifications of the CDA, viewed the statute as a veiled attempt by Congress to blur the judicially created distinctions between protected and unprotected speech.\textsuperscript{28} The ACLU’s arguments focused primarily on the disparate constitutional protection afforded to information on the Internet under the CDA as opposed to other media of expression.\textsuperscript{29} They viewed this disparity as a dangerous first step toward ever-increasing infringement on the constitutional right to free speech.\textsuperscript{30}

On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court updated the First Amendment for the twenty-first century. The Court accomplished this in \textit{Reno v. ACLU},\textsuperscript{31} which struck down the Communications Decency Act (CDA).\textsuperscript{32} The Court found the CDA overbroad in comparison to previous Court-approved laws that prohibited indecent communication.\textsuperscript{33} In its opinion, the Court dismissed the government’s reliance on previous Court-approved speech restrictions as misplaced, and found the statute insufficiently tailored to effectuate the government’s interest in preventing minors’ exposure to indecent material.\textsuperscript{34} The concurrence found the CDA to be a mere attempt to create unconstitutional “adult zones” on the Internet.\textsuperscript{35} The concurrence conceded that such “adult zones” could be constitutional, but found that the CDA failed to adhere to proper drafting procedures in creating these zones.\textsuperscript{36}

This Recent Decision first describes the technological structure and inherent strengths of the Internet. It then provides an in-depth analysis of the development of First Amendment theory, focusing first on content-based restrictions and then on medium-based restrictions. This Re-

\textsuperscript{28} Cf. Barry Steinhardt, \textit{Circulating Draft of Revisions to the Exon Amendment} (visited Oct. 29, 1996) <gopher://gopher.panix.com:70/0/vtw/exon/analyses/aclu3> (noting that the CDA attempted to impose restrictions permissible in some media on the Internet without appropriate justification).

\textsuperscript{29} See \textit{Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) About the 1995 Communications Decency Act} (last modified June 27, 1995) <http://www.panix.com/vtw/exon/index.html> (presenting alleged myths related to the CDA, and distinguishing the Internet from other FCC regulatable media).

\textsuperscript{30} See \textit{id.} (presenting a web page section entitled “Brief Analysis” of CDA).

\textsuperscript{31} 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).

\textsuperscript{32} See \textit{id.} at 2334 (holding that the CDA’s statutory language abridges the First Amendment’s free speech protections).

\textsuperscript{33} See \textit{id.} at 2351.

\textsuperscript{34} See \textit{id.}

\textsuperscript{35} See \textit{id.} (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

\textsuperscript{36} See \textit{id.} (asserting that the proper drafting procedures for such “zoning” can be found in the Court’s “prior cases”).
Recent Decision critically analyzes the two district court challenges to the CDA and provides an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in *Reno v. ACLU*. This Recent Decision contends that the Supreme Court greatly narrowed the constitutional chances of any future attempts at restricting indecent speech and concludes that any attempt to regulate the Internet, though legally permissible, remains technically unfeasible.

I. THE INTERNET—INHERENT STRENGTHS LEAD TO ENFORCEMENT WEAKNESSES

The Department of Defense initially developed the Internet to act as a reliable, high-speed method of communication that would allow governmental agencies to access supercomputers and to communicate with one another in the event of a nuclear disaster.\(^{37}\) The rapid increase in demand for Internet access, coupled with the development of faster, more powerful computer networks, caused the Internet to become more decentralized and less dependent on a small number of government-run supercomputers, and more reliant on individual local networks.\(^{38}\) These local networks underscore the current decentralized nature of the Internet.

Because the Internet relies on numerous local computer networks for its operation, no one organization governs or manages it.\(^{39}\) Instead, the Internet remains a vast, loosely organized alliance of individual, cooperating computer networks that are self-operated and self-financed.\(^{40}\) Thus, the Internet utilizes a series of decreasingly smaller networks, layered on

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37. See *Paul Gilster, The Internet Navigator* 16 (2d ed. 1994). In the late 1960s, the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense (ARPA) designed and developed ARPANET, the forerunner of the modern day Internet. See *id.* The primary missions of this new computer network were to aid researchers with the exchange of information and to study how communications between government bodies could be maintained in the event of a nuclear attack. See *id.*

38. See *Rheingold, supra* note 15, at 79-83 (describing the privatization and rate of growth of Internet use).

39. See *Burstein & Kline, supra* note 10, at 107. Several organizations, however, guide and assist in the growth of the Internet. See *Cady & McGregor, supra* note 14, at 27-28, 819, 821. These organizations, such as the Internet Society and the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), handle much of the architectural work of the Internet. See *id.* at 819, 821. Another group responsible for "governing" the Internet is the Network Information Center (NIC), sponsored by the National Science Foundation. See *id.* at 11. The NIC registers the names and addresses of new computers being added to the Internet. See *id.* Despite the involvement of these groups in the management of the Internet, some commentators have maintained that the structure of the Internet renders it "ungovernable." See *Burstein & Kline, supra* note 10, at 113.

40. See *Cady & McGregor, supra* note 14, at 7-11 (depicting the Internet as a "network of networks," that remains void of ownership).
top of one another, that communicate over high speed data circuits. 41

When a user sends a message across the Internet, the message does not remain a single continuous unit. Rather, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) breaks up the message into small "packets" of information. 42 The Internet Protocol (IP) prepares these packets for mailing, ensuring that the packets will reach the proper destination by enclosing each packet into a separate "envelope" containing the proper address. 43 These packets are sent independently over various Internet routes to their proper destination. 44 Upon arrival at the final destination, TCP reassembles the packets into their original form. 45

The technological structure and inherent strengths of the Internet enable users to access information easily, including pornography. 46 This same structure and strength also creates tremendous enforcement problems associated with any attempt to limit the information available on the Internet. Presently, no governing body manages the Internet 47 and, because there is no central bottleneck that information must pass through, it would be difficult for any governing body to restrict the availability of certain information. 48 Other factors that create enforcement problems include inexpensive entry to the Internet 49 and anonymous ex-

41. See GILSTER, supra note 38, at 16-17.
42. See CADY & MCGREGOR, supra note 14, at 13 ("Packets are one of the basic units of measurement on the Internet.")
43. See id.
44. See id. at 13-14. As the packets travel through the Internet, "routers" examine the addresses of each IP envelope and determine the most efficient path of transport. See id. A router is a special computer that forwards and directs traffic between different networks. See id. at 837. Routers determine the best path for the packet to take to its final destination based on its IP address. See id. at 13-14.
45. See id. at 14. The entire process of packet transfer remains possible because the Internet is a packet-switched network. See GILSTER, supra note 38, at 18. In a packet-switched network, information packets from the same message travel across a variety of data circuits to reach the same final destination. See id. A natural advantage of a packet-switched network is that it allows the routers to determine alternate routes for transmissions if a particular link fails or remains unavailable. See id. It should be noted that the development of packet-switched networks resulted from a desire to eliminate any central link for the exchange of information between military centers because such a link would constitute an easy target during a nuclear attack. Cf. id.
46. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334-36 (1997) (discussing the capabilities of the Internet and the availability of pornography on-line); see also BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 106-07 (noting the wide variety of information people access on the Internet).
47. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 106-07.
48. Cf. id. (describing the Internet as "an off-road environment" without "stoplights or traffic dividers").
49. See id. at 116; GATES, supra note 15, at 97.
istence on the Internet for users as well as operators of Internet sites, which can frustrate attempts to regulate unwanted activity. Thus, any attempt to enforce statutory restrictions on the Internet, such as the CDA, would encounter numerous technical roadblocks.

II. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT, INCESSANT LEGAL CATCH-UP

A. The Exclusion of Obscenity from Constitutional Protection

It is a long-established judicial fact that obscene speech can be prohibited by the government. Although federal courts addressed limited obscenity issues in the late nineteenth century, and the Supreme Court explicitly had approved the government's ability to restrict certain types of speech, the Court did not address squarely the issue of governmental restriction of obscene speech until the mid-twentieth century.

The Supreme Court first considered the question of the level of constitutional protection afforded obscene speech in Roth v. United States. In Roth, the Court upheld the convictions of several defendants who had published and sold sexually explicit materials in violation of federal and state obscenity statutes. After a review of its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court concluded that obscenity always had been outside the bounds of constitutional protection. Although, historically, obscenity had not been excluded specifically from constitutional protection, the Court reasoned that "implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as [being] utterly without redeeming social im-

50. See Burstein & Kline, supra note 10, at 107; Gates, supra note 15, at 162.
52. See United States v. Thomas, 27 F. 682, 682-83 (S.D. Miss. 1886) (noting the ability of Congress to prevent the sending of obscenity through the mails); United States v. Foote, 25 F. Cas. 1140, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1876) (No. 15,128) (same); United States v. Britton, 17 F. 731, 732 (S.D. Ohio 1883) (same); United States v. Hanover, 17 F. 444, 444 (S.D. Ohio 1883) (same).
55. See id. at 494. The federal statute at issue in Roth provided that "[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character ... is declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier." Id. at 479 n.1.
56. See id. at 484-85.
Therefore, the Court concluded that obscene speech should not be granted First Amendment protection. The Court defined obscenity as that which "to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to [the] prurient interest."

1. Possession vs. Distribution of Obscenity

The Court sharply departed from Roth in Stanley v. Georgia, reversing the conviction of a defendant for possession of obscene movies in violation of a Georgia obscenity statute. Though apparently similar to Roth, the Court distinguished Stanley because the defendant in Stanley had been convicted of illegal possession of obscene materials within his home, and not the sale or publication of such materials. The Court declined to extend the Roth holding to include the prohibition of private possession of obscene materials because such a decision would constitute governmental control of individual private thoughts and would greatly invade their privacy rights.

Although Stanley seemed to partially overrule the Roth Court's exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection, the Court restricted the breadth of that decision in United States v. Reidel. In Reidel, the defendant was indicted for mailing obscene material to willing and consenting adults. The district court dismissed the indictment, reasoning that the Court's ruling in Stanley had rendered the federal obscenity statute unconstitutional.

In reversing the district court, the Reidel Court clarified and distinguished Stanley, and upheld the constitutionality of the obscenity stat-

57. Id. at 484. As evidence, the Court noted that there was a plethora of international, federal, and state laws regulating the distribution of obscene materials. See id. at 485.
58. See id. at 485.
59. Id. at 489.
61. See id. at 568.
62. See id. at 560-61. The Court noted that all of its previous opinions involved the distribution, selling, or mailing of obscene material. See id.
63. See id. at 559.
64. See id. at 565. The Court noted that "[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." Id.
66. Cf. id. at 353.
67. See id. at 353, 355 (discussing the trial court's reliance on the constitutional protections in Stanley).
The Court distinguished Stanley on the grounds that the decision had focused solely on the issue of private possession of obscene materials. Because the defendant in Reidel had not possessed the material merely for private use, but had sought to distribute it using the mails, the Court concluded that the defendant had been indicted properly for criminal activity, not for the exercise of a protected free speech right.

2. Obscenity Defined

After Reidel, the Court faced a tumultuous period in its First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence. During this period, the Supreme Court issued no majority opinions regarding the proper obscenity standard to apply. At the same time, the Court reversed a multitude of obscenity cases. Recognizing that its vaguely defined obscenity standard had become unworkable, the Court reexamined its analysis of obscene speech in Miller v. California.

The Miller Court propounded a three-prong test for determining whether a work was obscene. The first prong of the Miller test adopted the Roth test and inquired "whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest." The Miller Court outlined the parameters of this hypothetical community standard by overtly approving of the state community standards that the jury had used in its deliberations. The Court concluded that use of local standards adequately would forewarn sellers and distributors of obscene materials of the standards by which their material would be judged and the activities for

68. See id. at 354-57 (refusing to read Stanley as overruling Roth, thereby validating the obscenity statute at issue).

69. See id. The Court noted that the Stanley decision "neither overruled nor disturbed the holding in Roth." Id. at 354. Further, the Court stated that "[n]either the holding in Stanley questioned the validity of Roth insofar as the distribution of obscene material was concerned." Id.

70. See id. at 356 (declining to overrule the Roth principle rejecting First Amendment protections for obscenity).

71. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 & n.3 (1973).

72. See id. (criticizing "censorship" practice of the Court due to the lack of a comprehensive obscenity law majority view).

73. See id. at 22-23. The defendant was convicted of sending unsolicited sexually explicit material through the United States mail. See id. at 16.

74. See id. at 24 (specifying basic guidelines a trier of fact must follow).

75. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).

76. See id. at 31. The jury applied the community standards of California, the state in which it was sitting. See id. The Supreme Court found that the First Amendment did not require the formulation of a national standard to determine whether materials were obscene. See id. at 31-32.
which they could be prosecuted.\textsuperscript{77}

The second prong of the \textit{Miller} test asked whether the work depicted "in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."\textsuperscript{78} The final prong inquired "whether the work, taken as a whole, lack[ed] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."\textsuperscript{79} Thus, if the work satisfied all three of these criteria, it would be judged as obscene and given no constitutional protection. The \textit{Miller} Court maintained that this three-pronged analysis would aid the courts in determining whether a work was obscene and would isolate "hard core" pornographic materials from constitutional protection.\textsuperscript{80}

\textbf{B. Treatments of Advancing Technologies by the Supreme Court Force the Legal Creation of "Indecent" Speech}

Although the \textit{Miller} Court believed that it had resolved the "intractable obscenity issue,"\textsuperscript{81} developments in communications media once again outpaced the developments in constitutional theory, presenting the Court with a variety of cases involving unique First Amendment issues.

\textit{1. Broadcast Communications}

In a landmark case involving broadcast radio, \textit{FCC v. Pacifica Foundation},\textsuperscript{82} the Supreme Court approved a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ban on a radio broadcast that contained a variety of lewd and suggestive words.\textsuperscript{83} In approving the ban, the Court partially extended the \textit{Miller} Court's ban on obscenity to encompass "indecent" speech by differentiating, for the first time, between "obscene" and "indecent" speech.\textsuperscript{84} The Court separately interpreted the two federal obscenity statutes at issue, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461 and 1464.\textsuperscript{85} The Court concluded that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{77} See id. at 27.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Id. at 24.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} See id. at 27. Such "hard core" materials, the Court noted would be "specifically defined by the regulating state law." \textit{Id}.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text (discussing the three-part test set forth in \textit{Miller}).
  \item \textsuperscript{82} 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
  \item \textsuperscript{83} See \textit{id.} at 750-51. The broadcast was satirist George Carlin's famous "Filthy Words" monologue, in which Carlin referred to several words that could not be publicly said on the airwaves without violating FCC policy. See \textit{id.} at 729.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} See \textit{id.} at 739-41.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} See \textit{id.} at 739-40. The Court cited the disjunctive use of the words "obscene" and "indecent" in the governing federal obscenity statute and inferred congressional intent to treat the two words differently. See \textit{id}. The broadcasting statute had provided that "\{w\}hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio commu-
§ 1461 was concerned only with obscenity, whereas § 1464 was intended to encompass more than just obscene speech when applied to the public broadcast medium.\(^8^6\) The Court found no congressional intent to limit the scope of § 1464 to cover only obscene material, and thus extended § 1464 to cover indecent material.\(^8^7\) The Court then vaguely defined indecent speech as speech that was contrary to "accepted standards of morality."\(^8^8\)

Restricting the ban on indecent speech to broadcast communications, the court made the ban dependent upon certain nuisance variables, such as the time, place, and manner of its transmission.\(^8^9\) The Court reasoned that the ease of accessibility by minors and the unique pervasiveness of broadcast communications justified these restrictions.\(^9^0\) The Pacifica decision signaled a new direction in how the Court would conduct its constitutional inquiry—by evaluating not only the content of the speech, but also the means through which it was communicated.\(^9^1\)

Two recent cases dealing with indecent broadcasts illuminate the federal courts consistent application of the Pacifica Court's ruling in the context of broadcast communications. In Action for Children's Television v. FCC\(^9^2\) (ACT II), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted its previous adoption of the Pacifica Court's definition of indecency and overturned an FCC order that instituted a blanket restriction on the broadcasting of indecent programming.\(^9^3\) The

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\(^8^6\) See id. at 740-41.

\(^8^7\) See id. at 741. The court recognized that "the First Amendment has a special meaning in the broadcasting context." Id. at 742 n.17.

\(^8^8\) Id. at 740.

\(^8^9\) See id. at 750 (noting that the ban "rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important").

\(^9^0\) See id. at 748-50. The Court listed several reasons why broadcast communication deserves special First Amendment considerations, including the ease of access that children have to radios and the fact that radio receivers are usually in the home, a place where an individual's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference. See id.

\(^9^1\) See id. at 750. The Court noted that constitutional restriction of any speech, especially indecency, remains "largely a function of context." Id. at 742; see also Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ACT III) (holding that the context of the broadcast medium must be taken into account in a First Amendment analysis).


\(^9^3\) See id. at 1508. The FCC order struck down in ACT II was a result of a congressional mandate to ban indecent television programming on a 24-hour basis. See Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988). The FCC had issued a comprehensive report finding that a 24-hour ban on indecent broadcasts comport with the Constitution. See
court found, consistent with the *Pacifica* Court's holding permitting only limited time restrictions, that a twenty-four hour restriction on the broadcast of indecent programming was not narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in preventing the exposure of minors to such material.\(^{94}\)

Correspondingly, the D.C. Circuit approved of an FCC regulation that banned the broadcast of indecent programming only between the hours of 6:00 A.M. to midnight in *Action for Children's Television v. FCC*\(^{95}\) (*ACT III*). The court found that the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest\(^{96}\) in restricting the access of minors to indecent programming.\(^{97}\) Therefore, although the *ACT III* court recognized that indecent speech retained constitutional protection, it also noted that certain broadcast speech remained subject to restrictions based upon the time and method of communication.\(^{98}\)

Thus, the federal courts have been consistent in their application of *Pacifica* that indecent broadcasts may be restricted dependent on certain transmission variables such as time and place.

2. Regulation of Indecency in Telephonic Communications

Although the Supreme Court partially had protected indecent speech in *Pacifica*, it did approve of time, place, and manner restrictions on the broadcast of indecent speech because of the increased potential for exposure of indecent material to minors.\(^{99}\) As technology progressed, the Supreme Court and the lower courts were forced to address problems, raised by the telephonic exposure of minors to indecency, similar to those created by broadcast communications.\(^{100}\)

In *Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC*,\(^{101}\) a federal circuit court of ap-

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\(^{94}\) See *ACT II*, 932 F.2d at 1509. The application of this test results from the Supreme Court's ruling in *Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC*, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text discussing the *Sable* decision.


\(^{96}\) See *id.* at 663, 667. The court found the age floor to be consistent with other federal and state statutes that separated those under 17 years of age for special protection. See *id.* at 664.

\(^{97}\) See *id.* at 663.

\(^{98}\) See *id.* at 660.


\(^{101}\) 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988).
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peals approved FCC regulations that established various defenses against prosecution to operators of obscene or indecent telephone dial-a-porn services. The court noted that the defenses would restrain a minor's ability to access dial-a-porn services, while not unduly burdening a consenting adult's constitutional right of access. The three-tiered approach promulgated by the FCC and approved by the court required payment by credit card, the employment of access codes by the operators, and the use of a scrambling system by the caller.

Following Carlin, Congress once again tried to prevent children from gaining access to dial-a-porn services by completely banning both obscene and indecent telephone messages. Following these congressional amendments to the 1934 Communications Act, the Supreme Court in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, invalidated portions of § 223(b) of the Act, which completely banned indecent telephone message services. The Court reaffirmed the principle that sexually explicit messages which are indecent, but not obscene, require First Amendment protection. The Court, however, found that a complete ban of indecent telephone messages was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest in protecting minors from pornographic telephone services. The Court distinguished Pacifica, which upheld a complete ban on the broadcasting of indecent speech during certain hours of the day, based on the medium used, explaining that minors have much easier access to radio broadcasts as compared to telephone services.

102. See id. at 555.
103. See id. at 557.
104. See id. at 555.
106. 492 U.S. 115 (1989). The case arose when Sable Communications, a provider of sexually explicit prerecorded telephone messages, sued to enjoin the enforcement of amended § 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. See id. at 117-18.
107. See id. at 131.
108. See id. at 126.
109. See id. at 131. The Court concluded that the statute as written would discourage adults from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. See id.
110. See id. at 127-28. The Court noted the affirmative steps a listener must take in order to gain access to telephone services as further reason to treat such services differently from broadcast communication. See id. The Court remained consistent with its obscenity decisions by approving the statute's total ban on obscene messages. See id. at 124. The Court also reaffirmed that the Miller Court's "community standard" rationale still prevailed and that no national obscenity standard had been created by § 223(b) for obscenity. See id. at 125. The Court ruled that the mere fact that the message services op-
Since the Sable Court rejected an outright ban on indecent messages, Congress responded with legislation that did not constitute an outright ban on indecent messages, but only criminalized the transmission of indecent telephone messages to anyone under eighteen years of age. The Ninth Circuit reviewed this legislation in Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of the First Amendment v. FCC and approved the criminalization of the transmission of indecent messages to anyone younger than eighteen years of age. In approving the FCC's regulations on dial-a-porn services, the Ninth Circuit adhered to Supreme Court precedent noting that indecent speech, although protected by the First Amendment, could be restricted if the regulations were narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.

C. Application of Federal Obscenity Standards to Computers and the Internet

Federal courts increasingly have addressed First Amendment obscenity and indecency jurisprudence involving computers and the Internet. Application of previous Court rationales to the Internet has been troublesome because the Internet remains unique from other communications medium. The Sixth Circuit addressed this new and evolving medium in United States v. Thomas. Robert and Carleen Thomas were indicted and charged with violating federal obscenity statutes for operating a sexually explicit and obscene computer bulletin board. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions under federal obscenity laws.

112. 928 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1991).
113. See id. at 879.
114. See id. at 874-76.
117. See id. at 705-06. The Thomases operated a computer bulletin board which allowed members to download and print various pornographic images. See id. at 705. They were charged with, among other counts, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1465. See id. at 706. Section 1465 prohibits the transportation in interstate commerce of "any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent or immoral character." 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
118. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 716.
The Thomases first contended that the unique nature of computer-generated images justified their exclusion from federal obscenity statutes. They also argued that even if the statutes governed, the standards for judging information on such a novel medium must be updated, asserting that the national character of the Internet should force the courts to abandon the *Miller* local "community standards" analysis previously employed to evaluate obscenity.

The court rejected these arguments and affirmed the Thomases' convictions by first determining that the federal obscenity statutes governed information on the Internet despite the Internet's distinct technical features. The court then solidified its previous rationale for determining whether information was obscene in nature and reasoned that the *Miller* "community standard" test was properly applied to the Internet. The court concluded that the Internet material was obscene, and that the *Miller* test did not unconstitutionally chill free speech. The court found that providers of computer-generated obscenity could tailor their material to the collective standards of the communities they serve.

In response to the invention of new communications media, the Supreme Court and federal courts have, in the past thirty years, created and applied obscenity standards to broadcast, telephonic, and Internet media. The courts also have responded by creating and applying indecency stan-
Communications Decency Act

Thus, it was reasonable for Congress in the recent CDA to apply the judicially created indecency standards to the newest form of electronic communication: the Internet.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRICT COURT OPINIONS REVERSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 was enacted to restrict children’s access to pornography on the Internet.\(^\text{124}\) As written, the CDA attempted to regulate both obscene and indecent speech.\(^\text{125}\) The plaintiffs in ACLU v. Reno, however, challenged only the indecency provisions of the CDA, as they conceded that the government could impose a complete ban on obscene materials.\(^\text{127}\) In challenging the indecency provisions, both plaintiffs in Shea ex rel. American Reporter v. Reno and ACLU v. Reno attacked the vagueness of the statutory terms “indecent” and “patently offensive,” as well as the overbreadth of the statute.\(^\text{128}\)

Both plaintiffs argued that the statutory definitions of “indecent” and “patently offensive” left providers and recipients of Internet material unaware of the actual parameters of “indecent” and “patently offensive” speech.\(^\text{129}\) The plaintiffs also argued that such vague terms could lead to arbitrary enforcement of the criminal provisions of the CDA.\(^\text{130}\) They further contended that the indecency provisions of the CDA were overbroad and extended beyond the reach of previous statutes by criminalizing constitutionally protected speech among adults.\(^\text{131}\) Finally, the plaintiffs maintained that the indecency provisions of the law restricted material that on its face was not indecent, but rather possessed significant literary and artistic value.\(^\text{132}\)

In overturning the indecency provisions of the CDA, the Shea and ACLU courts focused on the overbreadth and vagueness of the statute,


\(^{125}\) See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d) (West Supp. 1997) (criminalizing the display of “patently offensive” sexually explicit material to persons under eighteen).


\(^{127}\) See id. at 829; cf. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 922 (challenging only the provision of the CDA that prohibited the display of “patently offensive” material).


its technically infeasible and economically prohibitive safe harbor provisions, and the government’s reliance on *FCC v. Pacifica.*

A. Vagueness

The two district courts differed in resolving the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenges to the statutory terms “indecent” and “patently offensive.” The *ACLU* court, troubled that the statute did not define the term “indecent,” found the language unconstitutionally vague. The government’s argument that the legislative history of the CDA contained the appropriate definition of “indecent” failed to sway the court because the court believed that the term should have been defined with specific reference to the Internet. The court found the interchangeability of the statutory words “indecent” and “patently offensive” inherently suspect because operators of Internet sites would be unaware of the exact parameters of “indecent” and “patently offensive” speech. The *ACLU* court also based its vagueness ruling on the government’s inability to define the relevant community standards in the CDA by which the material was to be judged under the *Miller* test.

The *Shea* court, however, did not find the statute unconstitutionally vague, holding that the term “indecent,” as used in the statute, merely codified its use as represented in *Pacifica.* The court reasoned that the *Pacifica* Court’s extensive use of the FCC’s definition of “indecent” in its opinion indicated that the Supreme Court would approve of the CDA’s codification of this same definition. The *Shea* court similarly disposed of the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge to the “patently offensive” language included in the CDA.

B. Overbreadth

Despite their disparate rulings on the vagueness claims, both sustained the plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenges. Each district court first de-

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133. See supra notes 83-92 for an analysis of the *Pacifica* holding.
134. See *ACLU,* 929 F. Supp. at 856; *id.* at 858.
135. See *id.* at 862-63.
136. See *id.* at 861. The *ACLU* court concluded that a statute that criminalizes conduct clearly should define the outlawed conduct. See *id.* at 865.
137. See *id.* at 863-64. The *ACLU* court reasoned that the very nature of cyberspace prevented any consistent application of the *Miller* rationale. See *id.*
138. See *Shea,* 930 F. Supp. at 936.
139. See *id.* at 935. The *Shea* court concluded that this approval had “foreclose[d] a vagueness challenge to the FCC’s definition for indecency in the broadcast medium.” *Id.*
140. See *id.* at 936.
141. See *id.* at 950; *ACLU,* 929 F. Supp. at 855-57.
scribed the statute as a content-based restriction on certain speech. Therefore, in evaluating whether the statute was a constitutional restriction on speech, the courts inquired, pursuant to the Sable Court's holding, whether the CDA served a compelling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest.

1. Compelling Governmental Interest

The government argued, in each case, that shielding minors from access to pornographic images on the Internet was a compelling governmental interest. The ACLU court, however, discovered numerous examples of lawful and beneficial cultural and educational materials on the Internet that would be subject to the CDA's criminal provisions. Both panels questioned whether the government could have a compelling interest in restricting a minor's access to such benign material. The two district courts, however, did not base their opinions on the government's failure to exhibit a compelling interest, because each panel assumed a compelling governmental interest for purposes of their opinions.


The two district courts next determined whether the means by which the government sought to accomplish its compelling interest were narrowly tailored. The government maintained that the CDA did not prohibit adults from engaging in their constitutionally protected rights, because the safe harbor provisions of the CDA sufficiently narrowed the statute's reach within constitutional limits. The government argued

143. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851. Both district courts recognized that the level of judicial scrutiny applied depended primarily on the pervasive nature of the specific communications medium at issue. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 872-74. The strict scrutiny standard appears to be applied to broadcast, telephone, and Internet use. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940 (explaining that there was little difference in the standard applied to broadcast from that of strict scrutiny and that strict scrutiny would be used in the context of indecent Internet transmissions); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 851-52, 872-74.

144. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853. The ACLU court cited photographs from National Geographic travel magazines, literary descriptions, paintings, and recent news stories concerning the official practice of female genital mutilation as examples of permissible information that would be banned under the CDA. See id. The Shea court declined to reach this issue, focusing instead on the failure of the government to constitutionally narrow the statute. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 940.

147. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 942; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855-57. Section 223(e)(5)(A) of the CDA provided a defense to prosecution if a person "has[d] taken, in
that it could impose limitations on indecent speech; for as long as Internet providers abided by the safe harbor provisions, they could engage in indecent speech without the threat of prosecution. The plaintiffs countered that the CDA prevented adults from engaging in constitutionally protected indecent speech, and that the statutory “safe harbor” provisions would not protect Internet providers from prosecution.

Both district court panels concluded that the CDA was not narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest, because the law would impermissibly chill First Amendment rights by causing some providers to refrain from engaging in protected speech out of fear of prosecution under the CDA. The two courts determined the safe harbor provisions were technically infeasible, and that the costs of their implementation would be economically prohibitive for most operators.

The panels found that for content providers, such as newsgroups and “chat rooms,” there remained no technology available that would allow operators of these services to screen effectively for the ages of their recipients. For content providers on the World Wide Web, however, both panels noted that although it was technologically feasible for those operators to discover the age of those accessing their information, such measures would be prohibitively expensive and without guarantee that they could screen out minors. Therefore, both types of content providers would be forced to reduce or eliminate their operations, resulting in an impermissible “chill” on their First Amendment rights.

The government also attempted to narrow the scope of the CDA by good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication ... which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology.” 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1997). Further, § 223(e)(5)(B) provides a defense to prosecution if a person “has restricted access to such communication[s] by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number.” Id. § 223(e)(5)(B).

151. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 943; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854. The ACLU court noted that “[w]ith the possible exception of an e-mail to a known recipient, most content providers cannot determine the identity and age of every user accessing their material.” Id.
152. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 945; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 854. Discussing the intractability of this problem, the ACLU court noted that content providers are often unaware of the identity of their recipients, much less of their names. See id.
arguing that the CDA’s intent was to ban only commercial purveyors of pornography. Both panels, however, found no reference to commercial pornography within the statute. In fact, the courts noted that Congress did not have to pass a law prohibiting obscenity on the Internet, because pornography was already subject to prohibition under the federal obscenity statutes. The panels further found that the statute was not narrowly tailored because small operators of Internet sites would either have to pay for expensive, age-screening programs or cease their Internet operations for fear of criminal prosecution. Thus, the safe harbor provisions did not remedy the CDA’s unconstitutional overbreadth.

C. Misplaced Reliance on the Supreme Court’s Holding in *FCC v. Pacifica*

The ACLU court extended its ruling further than the Shea court by analyzing the government’s misplaced reliance on the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Pacifica.* The government argued in ACLU that the *Pacifica* ruling granted the government broad authority to restrict indecent speech in any medium. The ACLU court, however, cited several recent cases that limited the scope of the *Pacifica* decision. The court reasoned that *Pacifica*’s ban on indecent communications applied only to the broadcast medium. Because the Internet more closely resembled telephonic communications than broadcast communications, the ACLU court concluded that a complete ban on indecent communications would represent an unconstitutional infringement on free speech.

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156. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at 949; ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855. The ACLU court concluded that “[i]t is clear from the face of the CDA and from its legislative history that Congress did not intend to limit its application to commercial purveyors of pornography.” Id.
158. See id. at 854-55.
159. See id. at 854-55.
160. See id. at 874-77.
161. See id. at 874.
162. See id. at 875-76. The court cited recent cases in which a complete ban on indecent communications applied only to the broadcasting medium because of broadcast’s unique pervasiveness. See id. (citing Turner Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994); Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)).
163. See id. at 876-77.
164. See id. at 851-52.
IV. CONGRESS GETS PULLED OVER FOR RUNNING A RED LIGHT ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY: RENO V. ACLU

In affirming the district court’s ruling in ACLU, overturning the CDA as an unconstitutional infringement on free speech, the Supreme Court focused its opinion on the statutory overbreadth and vagueness of the CDA. The Court characterized the government’s reliance on prior First Amendment precedent as misplaced, criticized the inherent vagueness of the CDA’s statutory language, and considered the unique nature and history of the Internet in crafting its decision.

In its overbreadth analysis, the Court initially focused on the government’s mischaracterization of prior Court precedent, finding in each instance that the CDA was far broader than any of the constitutional statutes to which the government had analogized the CDA. The government first relied on the Court’s ruling in Ginsberg v. New York, where the Court upheld a New York statute that prohibited the selling of obscene material to minors, even though the material was not considered obscene to adults. The Court determined that the CDA was broader than the statute in Ginsberg in three primary respects. First, the Court determined that the statute in Ginsberg did not bar parents from purchasing obscene material for their children, whereas the CDA’s prohibitions would have applied despite parental consent to the activity. Second, the Ginsberg statute applied only to commercial exchanges; the CDA contained no such limitation. Third, the Ginsberg statute limited the definition of materials harmful to minors to materials that were “utterly without redeeming social importance for minors.” The CDA did not define the term “indecent.”

The government also contended that the Court’s ruling in FCC v.

166. See id.
167. See id. at 2341-44.
169. See id. at 631-33.
170. See ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968)).
174. See id. The Court noted that the CDA not only lacked a definition of the term indecent, but more importantly, failed to include any requirement that the “patently offensive material . . . lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Id. The Court reasoned that some material could fall under “patently offensive” while retaining some legitimate value, making the CDA’s broad prohibition on speech containing this undefined term an integral part of the CDA’s constitutional overbreadth. See id. at 2344.
Pacifica saved the constitutionality of the CDA. The Court disposed of this argument by finding several differences between the CDA and the Court-approved FCC order at issue in Pacifica. First, the FCC order focused on a specific afternoon broadcast that represented a dramatic departure from the traditional types of content normally broadcast on that specific medium, and the order was issued by an agency charged with regulating that particular medium. In contrast, the CDA constituted a broad prohibition, irrespective of time, and was promulgated by Congress, who was unfamiliar with the unique qualities of the Internet. Second, the FCC order was not punitive in nature, whereas the CDA contained extensive criminal sanctions. Finally, the FCC order targeted a medium that had a history of extensive government regulation. The Court distinguished the Internet as a medium with no such history of government regulation.

Finally the government analogized the CDA to the ordinance upheld in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. That ordinance, which banned adult movie theatres from residential neighborhoods, was not directed at the content of the movies, but instead at the secondary effects the theatres would have on the surrounding area. The government argued that the CDA constituted a similar type of “cyberzoning” of the Internet. The Court dismissed this argument, however, stating that the CDA applied only to the content of Internet speech, and not to the time, place, and manner of its transmission.

The Court next focused on the statutory vagueness of the CDA. The

175. 438 U.S. 726 (1978); see also supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Pacifica decision).
177. See id. at 2342.
178. See id. (noting the FCC's long-standing authority to regulate radio broadcasts).
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. The Court noted that radio broadcast received the most limited First Amendment protection because of its invasive nature, and the fact that warnings failed to adequately protect the listener from random contact with the prohibited speech. See id. The Court noted that the district court found the Internet lacking the same ubiquitous nature, as users must take several affirmative acts in order to access obscene or indecent material. See id.
184. See ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2342 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986)).
185. See id.
186. See id.
The Court initially addressed the inconsistent language in the "indecent" and "patently offensive" provisions of the statute noting that each of these two parts of the CDA used a "different linguistic form" in defining the outlawed conduct and remained undefined in the CDA. The Court concluded that these statutory flaws would result in an unconstitutional chill on protected speech, since speakers would refrain from engaging in any communication that arguably would be unlawful under the CDA.

The Court then addressed the government's assertion that since the CDA contained the patently offensive standard approved by the Court in Miller, it could not be held unconstitutionally vague. The Court reasoned that the inclusion of the patently offensive standard, by itself, did not cure the unconstitutional vagueness of the CDA. Due to the CDA's ill-defined nature regarding key statutory language and the absence of the remaining prongs of the Miller test, the Court concluded that "the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech." Consequently, the Court found that the CDA posed a great threat to otherwise protected speech.

Finally, the Court addressed the unique nature and history of the Internet. First, the Court observed that the Internet had not been subject to the same extensive government regulation that had been imposed on the broadcast industry and thus, the same extensive regulation of the Internet could not be justified. Additionally, the Court noted that the Internet is not as invasive as radio broadcast communication because an Internet user must take several affirmative steps in order to access the

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187. See id. at 2344. Specifically, the Court found that 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) outlawed "indecent" communication, while § 223(d) prohibited material that was "patently offensive." See id.

188. See id. at 2346. The Court opined that the imprecise drafting of the statute "undermine[d] the likelihood that the CDA ha[d] been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials." Id. at 2344.

189. See id. at 2345.

190. See id. The Court distinguished the CDA’s "patently offensive" language from the Miller test's second prong, noting the absence of the critical requirement that impermissible "material be 'specifically defined by the applicable state law.'" Id. (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). The Court found that this requirement reduced the vagueness of the statutory language, by restricting the application of such an open-ended term as "patently offensive." See id. The Court also noted that the Miller definition is limited to "sexual conduct," whereas the CDA definition included both "excretory activities" and "organs" of a sexual nature. See id.

191. Id. at 2346.

192. See id.

193. See id. at 2343.
Internet. Therefore, the same level of regulation imposed on the Internet could not be justified. The Court also noted the district court's finding that most sexually explicit messages that travel across the Internet are preceded by a warning, further differentiating the Internet from the broadcast and telephonic media, where such warnings remain typically ineffective. Finally, the Court determined that the Internet cannot be viewed as a scarce commodity; unlike the commercial airwaves which have a finite number of frequencies, the Internet has infinite capacity to move and store information.

The concurring opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, focused on the CDA's attempt to create "adult zones" on the Internet. The concurring Justices all agreed that such zones remain a constitutional mode of restricting speech, however, they found the CDA's methods problematic. The concurrence concluded that these "adult zones" were historically constitutional only if they did not unduly restrict an adult's access to the material and minors had no First Amendment right to the material. The concurrence stated that the CDA greatly restricted the adult right to receive information, and deemed the CDA's attempt at "cyberzoning" unconstitutional.

V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF RENO V. ACLU

The Supreme Court's opinion in ACLU will be remembered not only for its immediate effect of overturning the CDA, but also for its long-term effect on statutes that attempt to regulate indecent communications. The ACLU Court clearly attempted to narrow Court precedent which had approved of restrictions on indecent communications. Perhaps the greatest ramification of the Court's decision rests with its impact on Pacifica. The Court went to great lengths to limit the Pacifica Court's precedent-setting approval of a restriction on indecent communication. The ACLU Court emphasized that the Pacifica Court's approval of the restriction was only a plurality decision, and then described the plurality

194. See id.
196. See id. at 2344.
197. See id. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
198. See id. at 2351.
199. See id. at 2352-53.
200. See id. at 2357.
201. See id. at 2341-43.
202. See id.
approval as an "emphatically narrow holding." The ACLU Court also clarified that the Court-approved restrictions in Pacifica remained constitutional primarily due to their medium-specific application. Thus, any future attempts to regulate indecent speech premised upon the Pacifica holding will encounter a stricter constitutional analysis based upon the Supreme Court's emphatic restriction of the holding in Pacifica.

While the majority opinion in ACLU strongly rejected the government's attempt at "cyberzoning," the concurrence suggested that, though the CDA's attempt was unconstitutional, future attempts at "cyberzoning" would be deemed constitutional if these attempts adhered to prior Court precedent. This view remains untenable. The concurrence's inscription that the Internet could be regulated through such "cyberzoning" indicates the concurrence's lack of understanding and appreciation of the Internet's structure and culture. Though such "cyberzoning" would be legally feasible, technically it remains impossible.

Any such attempt to "cyberzone" the Internet would require several components, none of which apply to the Internet: a governing authority, a central technical bottleneck, and a corporate culture that lends itself to regulation. A governing body could draft and impose regulations on the Internet. However, no such body presently exists. The Supreme Court in ACLU recognized that neither Congress nor the FCC has had the historical relationship with the Internet to justify such a role. Further, the imposition of such an authority should be questioned. The Internet's tremendous growth and success stemmed largely from its freedom from government regulation and interference. The prescription of such an authority today would serve only to retard the growth of the Internet and stunt its further development.

A central bottleneck would be the obvious place to enforce such "cyberzones." This bottleneck could restrict users from access to certain in-

203. See id. at 2343.
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 2352-53.
207. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 113.
208. See id. at 107.
210. See id. at 7-8.
211. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 107.
212. In fact the Internet's military background, which shrouded the development of the Internet in secrecy, can be blamed for such a lack of governmental regulatory history. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 15, at 67.
213. See id. at 84-85.
formation and “zone” certain information to restricted areas of the Internet. Again, no such bottleneck presently exists on the Internet.214 The decentralized structure of the Internet prohibits such a bottleneck from arising, and inhibits the enforcement of any “cyberzoning.”215 Similarly, the creation of such a technical bottleneck should be questioned. Such a bottleneck would slow the dissemination of information on the Internet and make it more prone to attack from both technical and non-technical influences.

Finally, a corporate culture that understands the need and justification for regulation would greatly enable the creation and enforcement of “cyberzones.” However, no such culture exists, and there appears to be no movement toward such a culture.216 The Internet’s growth resulted from a disdain of such a culture.217 Those disenfranchised with government regulation of other communications media flocked to the Internet for its comforting independence from governmental intrusion.218 The teaching of such a culture likewise should be examined. The creation of a culture accepting regulation would stifle the creative genius that initially developed the Internet and drove its expansion.219

VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has repeatedly fashioned its First Amendment freedom of speech jurisprudence to accommodate the unique nature of different communications media. However, the Court also has established a series of rational and protective judicial tests for examining statutory language attempting to restrict “indecent” and “obscene” speech. In its Reno v. ACLU opinion the Court refused to extend this prior treatment of pre-existing communications media to the rapidly developing world of the Internet. The Court found the CDA to be statutorily overbroad due to its inherent vagueness and its inability to govern efficiently a medium that, historically and presently, remains free from governmental regulation.

215. See id.
216. See BURSTEIN & KLINE, supra note 10, at 113.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 107.
219. Cf. id. at 113.