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ANTITRUST TODAY*

by

HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.**

Four years ago some observers predicted that a four year moratorium on antitrust enforcement would shortly begin. Now that those four years have passed and another four are beginning it is perhaps an appropriate time to take stock of the course antitrust has run and some of the problems it faces.

The pervasiveness of antitrust in American industrial and commercial life may be illustrated by nine examples of the types of business conduct that do, or may, transgress the antitrust laws. Agreements

(1) to fix prices
(2) to boycott, or
(3) to divide territories

are traditional per se violations of Sherman Act Section 1. Section 1, however, as the Court announced in the 1911 Standard Oil decision is "an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of transaction or combination by which undue restraint" is achieved may stand. As a result,

(4) permanent combination by merger or vertical integration may raise problems under Section 1. However, as a practical matter such issues arise largely under Clayton Act Section 7. Similarly, though

(5) a "tying" arrangement conditioning the sale or lease of one product on use of another, or

(6) an exclusive dealing plan may run afoul of Section 1, their legality is more generally tested under the more rigorous standard of Clayton Act Section 3.

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** Attorney General of the United States.

1 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 59 (1911).
The same specific acts controlling price and restricting competitive opportunities prohibited by Section 1 may constitute essential ingredients of large offenses proscribed by Section 2. Apart from the elements which Section 2 has in common with Section 1, it establishes three separate offenses:

(7) to monopolize,
(8) to attempt to monopolize, and
(9) to combine and conspire with others to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations.

In the past four years, cases brought have been aimed not at proving doctrinaire economic or social theories, but at making real and prompt and practical strides toward either cracking restraint on entry by new persons into an industry, or control over price. Thus, the Justice Department’s goal has been a vigorous cracking-down on hard core antitrust violations. Second, because businessmen know this difference in policy will spell greater court success, pre-trial settlements have jumped sharply. More results per each enforcement dollar have resulted. Also this policy helped relieve congestion of Federal Court calendars. Finally, to clarify those foggy unsettled regions of law and policy, we organized a study group representing a fair cross section of all antitrust views, and now for the first time since the Sherman Act’s passage we have a survey of the major decisions under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.  

During 1954, the first full year this Administration ran the Antitrust Division, 35 cases were brought; and during calendar years 1955 and 1956, 54 and 46 new cases, respectively, were filed. This record represents a considerable increase in the number of cases filed over the average of preceding years.

Not only are more cases filed, but we are striving to keep our calendar up to date. During 1954, 1955, and 1956, some 162 cases were closed. This represents about a 25 percent increase over the average of preceding years in cleaning up pending cases.

Once decrees are entered, moreover, we see to it that the parties live up to them. Thus, in the 66 years since the Sherman Act’s passage, 24 contempt proceedings were brought for violation of outstanding decrees. Of this 24, one third, or eight, were brought in the past four years.

It should be noted that in our enforcement we endeavor to treat equally all groups covered by the antitrust laws. Congress has exempted some activities, such as certain activities of organized labor, from antitrust. Nonetheless, this Administration has moved vigorously to strike down those union restraints on commercial competition which Congress has not shielded. Since January, 1953, we have brought 11 cases in which

a labor union was among the defendants and one case in which a union was a co-conspirator.

Statistics alone tell only a small part of the story, for cases are filed with an eye to practical enforcement results. In the *Panagra* suit,\(^4\) for instance, the Government seeks to spur a competing transport route to crucial South American markets. Similarly, in the recent *RCA* proceeding,\(^4\) the Government seeks to encourage research in that area of electronic endeavor so vital to our national welfare and defense. A recent complaint against *RCA* and *NBC* seeks to prevent alleged misuse of the power of radio networks to grant and withhold network affiliation.\(^5\) This firm interest in practical enforcement results, inspired a turn-down of the proposed Youngstown-Bethlehem merger. When Bethlehem and Youngstown recently announced their agreement to complete their merger, the Department promptly filed proceedings to enjoin the acquisition.\(^6\)

In another recent suit, it is charged that *General Motors* acquired monopoly control of the manufacture and sale of transit and intercity buses by proscribed means, and the Government seeks to pry this field open for a revival of active competition.\(^7\)

In another action, now before the Supreme Court,\(^8\) the Department is asking that duPont's stock control in *General Motors* be divested.

The purpose and extent of economic analysis differs from case to case. As the *Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws* put it:\(^9\)

> In antitrust cases, courts may be called upon to measure the actual or probable effect of business conduct upon competition. Where agreements to control market prices or output are charged, the only issue is whether the alleged practice did in fact occur, since the effect on competition is known to be so adverse that the practice is unreasonable *per se*. Practices which are not unreasonable *per se* are those from which a fixed set of effects do not necessarily follow. They are subject to more extensive market inquiry under the standards of the antitrust laws. This means that their actual or probable market consequences must be determined as part of the test of their legality. Such determination, in turn, involves resort to economic analysis.

The Supreme Court's recent 4-3 decision in the *duPont Cellophane* case highlights the sort of economic data that may be relevant to proof of monopolization under Section 2. The Supreme Court there upheld the district court's findings that "the 'great sensitivity of customers in the flexible packaging markets to price or quality changes' prevented duPont from possessing monopoly control over price."\(^10\) Accordingly, the Court

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\(^3\) United States v. Radio Corporation of America, E.D. Pa., Civ. No. 21743.


\(^7\) Supra note 2, at 315.

concluded "that cellophane's interchangeability with other materials suf-
fices to make it a part of this flexible packaging material market."\textsuperscript{11}

The majority's beginning point was: "Illegal power must be app-
raised in terms of the competitive market for the product."\textsuperscript{12} The Gov-
ernment's "charge," in the language of the Court, was "monopolization of

cellophane. The defense that cellophane was merely a part of the rele-
vant market for flexible packaging materials." Deciding "what is the
relevant market for determining the control of price and competition,"
the Court reasoned, "no more definite rule can be declared than that com-
modities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes
make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of which
may be illegal."\textsuperscript{13} Applying that test to the facts at bar, the Court deemed
most relevant "the use or uses to which the commodity is put."\textsuperscript{14} Though
the Court conceded that cellophane "differs from other flexible packaging
materials,"\textsuperscript{15} it noted that "it has to meet competition from other materi-
als in every one of its uses."\textsuperscript{16} "Moreover," the Court emphasized, "a very
considerable degree of functional interchangeability exists between these
products."\textsuperscript{17} Accordingly, ruling against the Government, the Court held
that, for Section 2 purposes, the relevant:

\begin{itemize}
  \item market is composed of products that have reasonable interchange-
    ability for the purposes for which they are produced—price, use and qualities
    considered. While the application of the tests remains uncertain, it seems to us
    that du Pont should not be found to monopolize cellophane when that product
    has the competition and interchangeability with other wrappings that this
    record shows.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{itemize}

With that conclusion, the dissent disagreed. As Chief Justice Warren
put it: "We cannot agree that cellophane * * * is 'the selfsame product'
as glassine, grease proof and vegetable parchment papers, waxed papers
* * * and other films."\textsuperscript{19} If "the conduct of buyers indicated * * * [these
other wrappings] were actually the 'selfsame products' as cellophane,"
the Chief Justice reasoned "the qualitative differences * * * would not be
conclusive. But the record provides convincing proof that businessmen
did not so regard the products"; we "cannot believe," the dissent went on,
"that buyers, practical businessmen, would have bought cellophane in
increasing amounts * * * if close substitutes were available at from one-
seventh to one-half cellophane's price."\textsuperscript{20} Accordingly, the dissent con-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[12] Id. at 393.
\item[13] Id. at 395.
\item[14] Id. at 396.
\item[15] Id. at 397.
\item[16] Id. at 399.
\item[17] Id. at 399.
\item[18] Id. at 404.
\item[19] Id. at 414-415 (dissent).
\item[20] Id. at 416-417.
\end{footnotes}
cluded:

* * * the record shows conclusively that cellophane is the relevant market. Since du Pont has the lion's share of that market, it must have monopoly power. * * * This being so, we think it clear that in the circumstances of this case du Pont is guilty of monopolization.21

Against this background of enforcement experience thus far, what recommendations for improvements in the effectiveness of the antitrust laws has the present Administration offered? One measure increased ten-fold the maximum fine for violation of the antitrust laws.22 The first sentences under this higher penalty were made February 25, 1957, upon pleas of nolo contendere to charges of price fixing.23

The Economic Report of the President, sent to the Congress a year ago,24 set forth a number of other recommendations, of which three major ones were:

* * * First, all firms of significant size that are engaged in interstate commerce and plan to merge should be required to give advance notice of the proposed merger to the antitrust agencies and to supply the information needed to assess its probable impact on competition. Second, Federal regulation should be extended to all mergers of banking institutions. Combined with the requirement for advance notice, this extension of the law would give the Government an opportunity to prevent mergers that are likely to result in undue restraint on banking competition. * * * When civil rather than criminal proceedings are contemplated, the Attorney General should be empowered to issue a civil investigative demand, compelling the production of documents before the filing of a complaint, and without having to invoke grand jury proceedings.

Legislation to carry out each of these three proposals was introduced in the 84th Congress. Amendments providing for pre-merger notification and bringing bank asset acquisitions within Section 7 of the Clayton Act were passed by the House and reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee but not passed upon by the Senate. Bills empowering use of a civil investigative demand got no further than the Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate.

In his latest Economic Report, the President again urged the need for these three amendments.25 Bills on pre-merger notification and bank asset acquisitions have already been introduced in the 85th Congress and are under study by the House Judiciary Committee.26

There are a number of considerations behind the need for pre-merger notification. At the present time some 19 lawyers are assigned to the section of the Antitrust Division with primary responsibility for antitrust merger activity. Beyond these 19 lawyers, one more lawyer and some five economists devote part of their time to merger work. Before mergers

21 Id. at 425.
23 In United States v. Blaw-knox, et al., W.D. N.C., Cr. No. 893, one defendant was fined $12,500, and another $6,500.
can be appraised with an eye to clearance or suit, they must, of course, be discovered. Our experience has been that a good part of the time and effort of this staff is occupied with discovering mergers before they occur.

Pre-merger notification would substantially ease this investigative burden. No longer would enforcement staffs be required to scan the variety of financial periodicals they now do. More important, many mergers not presently publicized in advance of consummation would be brought to our attention. Since 1953, the Department has preliminarily examined over 2,000 mergers, and set up special merger files in 160 instances which merited detailed inquiry. In 11 suit was filed, but, in some 25 cases, some phase of the acquisition was consummated before it came to the attention of the Justice Department. In another 25, the fact of merger was not known to the Department sufficiently in advance to enable intelligent decision as to whether to sue before the merger was consummated.

In approximately one-third of our detailed examinations, then, pre-merger notification would have afforded a chance to take action before assets of merging companies had been commingled. We wish to avoid problems stemming from the quite understandable judicial reluctance to attempt the task of separating companies that already have been joined.

Not only will the enforcement burden be eased, but pre-merger notification may well benefit the business community. Lawyers representing merging companies have at times stated that disruption of business plans is lessened by Department action before merger consummation. Pre-merger notification, it seems clear, should systematize the process by which mergers are sifted and thus enable more prompt action if it is merited.

Further, evenhanded enforcement requires notification. With that requirement, no longer would the company that tries to obey the law and seeks advance approval watch its close-mouthed rival consummate a merger, and thereafter rely on the natural indisposition of an enforcement agency or a court to attempt to unscramble the omelet. Thus minimized is the element of chance discovery in any decision to sue.

The proposal to amend Clayton Act Section 7 to cover bank asset as well as stock acquisitions seeks to plug that loophole left by present Section 7's failure to cover asset acquisition by banks. On the one hand, that provision's stock acquisition bar applies to all corporations "engaged in commerce." Section 7's asset acquisition portion covers only corporations "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission." Section 11 of the Clayton Act exempts banks from Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction by specifying that "authority to enforce compliance" with Section 7 "is hereby vested * * * in the Federal Reserve Board where applicable to banks, banking associations, and trust companies." On the
basis of these provisions, this Department concluded that asset acquisition by banks is not covered by Section 7 as amended in 1950.27

As a result, Section 7 is for practical purposes useless to cope with what the Comptroller of the Currency has described as "this recent trend of [bank] mergers, consolidations, and sales."28 Corroborating the rise in bank mergers, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board concluded that bank mergers "have gone up steadily."29 In 1952, his testimony reveals, there were 100 bank mergers. This number jumped to 116 in 1953 and more than doubled to 207 in 1954.30 Most important, the Federal Reserve Board Chairman concluded, this number is "still rising."31

Mergers may meet Sherman Act standards, yet fall before the Clayton Act's more stringent bans. Congress's clear object by its 1950 amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act was to strike some mergers beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. Thus the Senate report explains that the bill is not intended to revert to the Sherman Act test. The intent here * * * is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.32

The report further states that the Act's intent is to have broad application to acquisitions that are economically significant * * * [The] various additions and deletions, some strengthening and others weakening the bill, are not conflicting in purpose or effect. They are merely different steps toward the same objective, namely, that of framing a bill which although dropping portions of the so-called Clayton Act test that have no economic significance, reaches far beyond the Sherman Act.33

To apply this Clayton Act standard to bank asset acquisitions is the aim of the new proposal, which is endorsed by the President of the United States, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission.

The third of these legislative proposals would enable the Department of Justice to compel production of documents by corporations, partnerships, and associations—but not individuals—during the investigative or pre-complaint stage of civil proceedings.

27 Reaching the same conclusion, a House Judiciary subcommittee staff report explained that, because of revisions in amendments to Section 7, ... "it became impracticable to include within the scope of the act, corporations other than those subject to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission. Banks, which are placed squarely within the authority of the Federal Reserve Board by Sec. 11 of the Clayton Act, are therefore circumscribed insofar as mergers are concerned only by the old provisions of Sec. 7 ..." STAFF REPORT TO SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 5 OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, House of Rep., 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
30 Hearings, supra note 28, at 2159.
31 Hearings, supra note 29, at 680.
32 SEN. REP. NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-5 (1950).
33 Ibid.

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Under present law, the Department has no such power. Where criminal proceedings are contemplated, of course, grand jury process adequately enables production of both documentary and oral evidence. Where the Department proceeds with an eye to civil proceedings, however, experience shows that the Antitrust Division is severely handicapped. Some potential defendants may voluntarily grant access to their records. In other instances, however, a grand jury investigation must be initiated, and the court's power of subpoena used in order to obtain documents. One result of resort to grand jury action is extensive delay and expense. Finally, the Government may resort to filing a complaint and then make use of discovery processes of the Federal Rules to gather evidence. Effective enforcement, however, requires comprehensive civil investigation before—rather than after—formal proceedings have been filed.

In sum, then, two of our three main proposals, pre-merger notification and civil investigative demand, aim to secure, more rapidly, accurate and complete market data. Only thus can intelligent decisions be made in individual cases. Underscoring the importance of these new means for securing market evidence is that, as the Federal Trade Commission Merger Report explained, "Examination of the antitrust cases in which market share information has played a conspicuous role will show that such cases have been brought in fields where the pertinent industries or markets were under regulation and tax or license data permitted full coverage of the market," for example, American Tobacco, Yellow Cab, and Standard Stations, or "where standard published statistics and definitive lists of companies have been available," for example, Appalachian Coals, Alcoa, and Paramount. The proposed legislation may well remedy this defect.

There also has been a development beyond the pending legislation. It came when the President signed S 3879, enabling franchised automobile dealers to sue in federal court for damages stemming from automobile manufacturers' "coercion, intimidation, or threats" in performing, cancelling, or not renewing dealer franchise contracts. In a statement at that time, the President directed that the Department of Justice review conditions in the automobile industry which brought about the demand for the legislation to determine whether they continue to exist, to study alternative or different solutions to the problem, and to make recommendations for appropriate action by the 85th Congress. The Department undertook, as a part of its program to carry out this directive, a full field investigation of the organization and administration of General Motors' dealer

84 FTC REP. ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 179-180 (1955).
87 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
88 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 357 (1933).
89 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, et al., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
advertising fund. During the pendency of this investigation, General Motors announced that it was discontinuing the dealer advertising fund, that henceforth dealers' contributions to the General Motors fund would be eliminated and that it would refund to each dealer the unspent portion of his contributions to the fund.

Congress has, in the past few years, imposed on the Justice Department new obligations to make broad economic surveys. The 1955 amendments to the Defense Production Act, for example, require the Attorney General to undertake surveys and report to the President and Congress, every three months "for the purpose of determining any factors which may tend to eliminate competition, create or strengthen monopolies, injure small business, or otherwise permit undue concentration of economic power in the course of the administration of this Act." In like fashion, the Small Business Act now requires the Attorney General to make similar surveys and reports, relative to small business administration, "at such times * * * as he deems desirable." And one Senate Report in the 84th Congress requests the Department of Justice to report to Congress each year for the first ten years following the sale of Government-owned rubber producing facilities. Finally, Congress, granting consent to the extension of an interstate compact to conserve oil and gas, provided that the Attorney General shall make an annual report to Congress "for the duration of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, as to whether or not the activities of the States under the provisions of such compact have been consistent," generally speaking, with the established antitrust principles.

The role antitrust plays in preserving national prosperity is important to all of us. In 1776, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, comparing Britain and the United States, noted:

But though North America is not yet so rich as England, it is much more thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquisition of riches.

Since that day hardly a year has passed without some like exclamation of wonder from students of economics. For example, in 1939, Michael Chevalier, in his Society, Manners and Politics in the United States, remarked on the difference between his own France and what he sees here:

An American's business is always to be on edge lest his neighbor get there before him . . . Industry has become a veritable battlefield . . . Unlimited competition [has] become the sole law of labor, everyone being his own master.

These observations are firmly rooted in the realities of our national income statistics. National income of necessity rests upon national production, our productivity.

America produces one-third of the total goods in the world and one-half the manufactured goods with one-fifteenth of the land area of the world, one-fifteenth of the people of the world, and one-fifteenth of the natural resources of the world.

Perhaps influenced by this striking comparison, a noted Swiss political economist, William E. Rappard, concluded in his study, *The Secret of American Prosperity* published as recently as May of 1955, "that the United States today enjoys a much greater average income than any other nation. The material standard of living is, therefore, by far the highest in the world." Seeking the reason for this, Mr. Rappard wrote Mr. John S. Crout, Director of the renowned Battelle Institute. Explaining American growth, Mr. Crout reasoned: Antitrust has compelled corporate managements to reconsider their position. They realized that they were required to compete, but had no hope of ever establishing a monopoly.

Under these circumstances, they accepted the concept of true competition and directed their energies and efforts to ways and means of increasing their profits by expansion of their volume of business.

In essence, this meant that each management set out to do a better job of producing, selling and distributing its products than its competitors.48

A like conclusion was reached by a British study team that recently visited this country. As a result of the Marshall Plan, international study centers were organized to study the reasons for the superior productivity of American industry. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity was set up. It was responsible for organizing British teams of managers, technicians and trade unionists, who came to the United States to see what methods used here could be adapted to the needs of Great Britain. Sixty-six teams had made the trip by late 1952. They presented reports which were practically unanimous.

An American newspaper reported under a London dateline in late 1954 the return of one of the latest teams. The New York *Times* headline read:

Productivity Team Lays U. S. Output Supremacy Largely to Sherman, Clayton Acts
Hits Own Country's Law
Parliament Urged to Act on Manufacturer Pacts That End Competition

That newspaper's account went on:

The praise for the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts was included in the industrial engineer's report because, according to members of the group, "it was the answer we kept getting when we asked Americans what was the source of the competitiveness in their economy." The group's secretary . . . remarked that "... the monopolies issue has become a part of the public morality of the United States; it is enforced by public opinion."

And so we see the importance that antitrust enforcement assumes, in the eyes of others. It has withstood the crucible not only of time, but of study. Today it stands as one of the prime supports for our prosperous and free competitive economy. In its preservation all Americans have a vital stake.

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