Catholic University Law Review


Recent amendments to Chinese Intelligence Laws codify affirmative obligations upon domestic companies and citizens alike, namely, that they must assist and support the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its intelligence gathering efforts. Coupling these laws with the international prevalence of Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company comprising two-thirds of 5G equipment outside China, CCP compromised 5G equipment is an unassailable reality. This article explores five intelligence allied nations and how each has respectively addressed the risk posed by Huawei. It argues each nation’s policies are deducible to three primary approaches, categorically including: (1) promulgation of law explicitly excluding Huawei 5G equipment; (2) promulgation of law generically improving supply chain risks without any explicit exclusion of Huawei 5G equipment; and (3) no promulgation nor undertaken efforts to address 5G supply chain risks. Various external and domestic factors, including political climates, economic dependencies, and intragovernmental agreement, heavily influence a nation’s supply chain risk mitigation efforts. Irrespective of a nation’s approach to supply chain risk mitigation, this paper deduces that government action, in and of itself, is insufficient to effectively combat Huawei; it is either incapable of regulating private industries’ purchases or, if it is capable, regulatory measures are bogged down by arduous and lengthy procedures such that swift reaction to pervasive security threats is an impracticable option. Thus, the private industry must play a role.