Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2024
Abstract
Administrative law has developed to incorporate insights from two philosophical perspectives: deontology and consequentialism. This Article elucidates administrative law’s reliance on those two perspectives and proposes that administrative law further develop to incorporate insights from a third perspective—virtue ethics—which the legal community has, in large part, ignored.
Unlike deontology (which focuses on actions) and consequentialism (which focuses on actions’ consequences), virtue ethics focuses on actors. Thus, to begin incorporating virtue ethics’ insights into administrative law—a task that a wide range of scholars and jurists can embrace—this Article explores how a virtuous agency official might act in accordance with the virtues of prudence, temperance, justice, and courage. A focus on those virtues (known collectively as the “cardinal virtues”) counsels in favor of making important changes to administrative law—including by increasing the opportunities for judicial review of agency action. A focus on the cardinal virtues also offers additional support for existing administrative law doctrine—including the judicial deference courts give to an agency official’s decision to use one regulatory approach rather than another. In short, virtue ethics offers valuable insights that scholars have yet to consider, but which both transform and reinforce our understanding of administrative law in important ways.
Recommended Citation
Chad Squitieri, Administrative Virtues, 76 Admin. L. Rev. 599 (2024).
