Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2025
Abstract
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, which overturned the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of federal statutes, will impact future regulatory policy. The shape of that impact is less certain. Using bank regulation as a vantage point, this Article explores how the end of Chevron may influence legislative and regulatory outcomes. Through case studies, the Article contextualizes the impact of Chevron within the bank regulatory regime’s complex ecosystem of technical expertise, political influence, and industry capture. The dismantling of New Deal restrictions on banks’ activities illustrates how Chevron may have enabled deference to regulators captured by industry interests rather than motivated by the public interest. This history provides some reason to celebrate, rather than dread, the end of Chevron. Moreover, federalism interests and explicit statutory delegations of discretion have historically muted the impact of Chevron. For these reasons, the policy impact of Loper Bright will likely be mixed and not necessarily profound.
Recommended Citation
Schooner, Heidi Mandanis, Deference and Discretion in Bank Regulation, 55 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1669 (2025).
